The League of the Aitolians

by

John D. Grainger



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THE LEAGUE OF THE AITOLIANS

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JOHN D. GRAINGER

THE LEAGUE OF THE AITOLIANS

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BY

JOHN D. GRAINGER

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AGRAIOI
AINIS
Lamia
Echinos
MALIS
Spercheios
Hypata
Herakleia
Skarpheia
AKARNANIA
EURYTANES
Nikaia
Thronion
DORIS
LOKRIS
Opous
Phoitiai
Stratos
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Oiantheia
Chalkis
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BOIOTIA
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
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6
DORIS
DELPHI
2
PHOKIS
WEST LOKRIS
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
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Kaphyai
Orchomenos
Aigina
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Mantinea
Argos
Heraia
ARKADIA
TRIPHYLIA
Tegea
Hermione
Phigaleia
Megalopolis
MESSENIA
Messene
Sparta
Pylos
LAKONIA
Korone
Gytheion
C. Tainaron
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1. INTRODUCTION

The Aitolians were one of those peoples in the ancient world who are everlastingly marginal. When Greece was dominated by city-states, they were weak and divided and, as a group of tribes living in a mountain area, of little account: their emergence as a united people coincided with the establishment of the great Hellenistic kingdoms, Macedon, the Ptolemies, the Seleukids, which limited their scope for action: their disappearance was accomplished fairly early by the ruthlessness of the Roman military power, but only with some difficulty, be it said. This was in the course of the huge military confrontations between the great powers who divided the world from the Atlantic to India, particularly that between Rome and Macedon, in which clash the Aitolians were one of the main victims.

Add to this marginality and victimhood the reputation which they had for treachery and piracy, for banditry and unruliness, and compare that with the opposite reputation of their contemporaries, the Achaians, the 'last of the Greeks', the supposed last defenders of Greek freedom, and it is no surprise that the Aitolians have sunk to the bottom of the historical swamp. Neither reputation is deserved, but the absence of a native Aitolian historian, or even of an account of any particular individual Aitolian from the ancient world, makes it seem as though everybody's ignorance is fully justified. After all, had they been important, someone would have written about them, seems to be the general assumption.

I exaggerate, of course, but only to make the point. Aitolia was a second-rank power for well over a century, less important than Macedon or the other great powers, but of more account than almost any other state, and it went down fighting, in what in any other people would be described as a gallant fashion. They are thus worth studying in themselves, just as other second-rank powers – Sicily, Achaia, the Attalids, the Maccabean state – are worth studying.

There are, in fact, no recent accounts of Aitolian history; those studies which purport to deal with them actually approach from sideways, so to say: Flacelière by way of their control of Delphi, Benecke by way of their supposed naval policy, Freeman and Larsen and Dubois by way of their supposed federal system of government. Only one of these, Larsen's, was produced after 1945, and none of them

take the Aitolians themselves and their history as the primary subject for study. This I hope to do.

The basic problem, as with all under-studied areas of the ancient world, and this is the main explanation for their neglect, is that they have left no explicit written testimony of their own as a basis for historians to work from. Their contemporaries, the Achaians, had the luck to produce a notable historian, Polybios, and two of their leaders were the subjects of biographies by Plutarch. The Maccabees were heir to a long tradition of Jewish historical writing, a tradition maintained by the very political and inaccurate books detailing their exploits. The Macedonians – always an erratic state, and never a convincing great power of the likes of Carthage, or the Seleukids – produced Alexander, though they could never claim another dazzling star like him, or an intellectual tradition to memorialise them. Nevetheless Alexander's very existence has impelled much study of his kingdom, to the extent of several books in the last generation. And so on.

But we should never judge the importance of a person or of a state by the quality of the sources available for its study. That is too accidental a matter. Consider the Roman emperors. Are those of the first century AD more 'important' than those of the second, just because we have Tacitus and Suetonius as sources for their lives? What of the relative importance of Diocletian and Constantine? Why are there more modern biographies of the buffoon Nero than of the inventive and statesmanlike Diocletian? Is Caligula, a failure if ever there was one, a more important historical figure than Septimius Severus? Yet the existence of easily studied sources dictate that Caligula or Nero are more written about and commented on than Diocletian or Septimius. This is a way of proceeding which can only be considered ahistorical. Importance must be judged by deeds and events and consequences, not by the quality or quantity of source material available.

By those criteria I propose that Aitolia is a very much more important political entity than Achaia. Its policies and fate were crucial in the crisis of Greek affairs in the 190s; its political structure was a highly original creation which ensured internal stability in a large part of Greece for well over a century; its relationship to Macedon was the pole about which Greek international relations revolved for a century and a half, whether that relationship was one of hostility or otherwise; as such this was a more important matter than Ptolemaic policies in the Aegean; and it was a situation which was on the same

level of permanence and centrality in international affairs as the Seleuko-Ptolemaic dispute epitomised as the 'Syrian Wars'

And, of course, upon investigation, sources for Aitolian history do exist. They are fragmentary, difficult, episodic, hostile, and refractory, but they are there, and there in sufficient quantity and detail to permit a history of the Aitolian League to be reconstituted. It is, despite my comments above, a history which is better documented, and hence can be made fuller, where the better sources exist. So the account of the later periods, those of Philip V and the Roman war, will inevitably be longer than the earlier, simply because of the availability of the histories of Polybios and Livy. These two periods will therefore form Parts IV and V, covering the period from 238 to 167, with the end of the league in the last chapter as a diminuendo after the excitements of the rest. Part I studies the first generation of the league from its stuttering beginning to its definitive survival after the Macedonian storms set off by Philip II. Part II looks at the growth and early policy of the league, between c.300 and c.240. But before all else, the decks have to be cleared by an examination of the Aitolians' ancient reputation, and that will be the Prologue. It is only by removing the mental blocks imposed by that reputation that a proper all-round view of the league's history is possible. So this study falls into two halves, in effect, breaking at c.238; at this point I have inserted Part III, which consists of some studies which look at other aspects, again background information for the whole book. (Other studies will be published separately, in a volume called *Aitolian Prosopographical Studies*, which will contain a full list of all Aitolians known to have existed.)

The difficulties of the sources is, in fact, the normal condition of source material for almost all the ancient world. It is unusual for a state or a topic to be well-supplied; it is usual for sources to be poor and awkward. As such the Aitolian League may be considered to be typical of the problems of discovering the history of an ancient subject. It is a state which, for purposes of balance, if for nothing else, needs to be known. All its neighbours and contemporaries – Athens, Sparta, Macedon, even Messenia and Epeiros – have been studied; I hope this account will help fill the blank which is Aitolian history.

PROLOGUE

2. A PIRATE STATE?

It is a commonplace of Hellenistic historiography that the Aitolians were pirates by sea and brigands by land, and that their conduct of warfare included a predilection for temple-sacking. It is a further commonplace that this is due to the pro-Achaian and anti-Aitolian bias of the historian Polybios, but that, despite this qualification, such a bias did have a basis in fact. And it is normal for those who recognise this bias to deprecate it, but not to go the further step and investigate the basis on which it rests by considering what the piracy and brigandage and temple-sacking by the Aitolians consisted of.

This is clearly an unsatisfactory situation if one is aiming at discovering the truth, though for the study of ancient historical writing it is clearly intriguing. The lack of concern for the accuracy of received opinion is suggested by a rapid survey of the references to piracy in the latest edition of the relevant volume of the *Cambridge Ancient History*, where F. W. Walbank repeatedly remarks on this assumed aspect of Aitolian behaviour.

His explanation is that the Aitolians 'supplemented a scanty living derived from agriculture with piracy, brigandage and mercenary service', and he refers to 'their regular addiction to privateering'. He further implies a quite remarkable collective cynicism in commenting on the looting of the Argive Heraion by the Aitolian Pharykos: 'Argos [was] a Macedonian client, but this need not have weighed greatly with an Aitolian raiding party against the attractions of easy plunder'[1].

Walbank is particularly blunt in his comments, but Will in the same volume can refer casually to 'Aitolian piracy' as a given[2]. Yet there is also another aspect: in his study of Mediterranean piracy, Ormerod had very little to say on the subject of the Aitolians' involvement, which is rather odd if they were such notorious practitioners[3], and Benecke a little later made use of one part of the evidence, on Aitolian *asylia* agreements, to point up Aitolian diplomacy

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[1] *CAH* (2) VII, 1, 232 and 255; also 235 and 286.

[2] Ibid, 107.

[3] H. A. Ormerod, *Piracy in the Ancient World*, Liverpool 1924, 139-142, with occasional isolated comments.

rather than their piracy[4]. So, on the one hand, there are general comments on Aitolian piracy as an accepted part of the Hellenistic background but without much detail, yet when studies approach much closer to the issue, that piracy fades away and becomes diplomacy.

First, it is necessary to define the terms. Three are used, almost interchangeably. 'Piracy' is to be defined as robbery at sea. It is a private act, by bands of individuals who act outside the law. It was a practice well known to the Greeks, but one which was not possible to a state, since state-organised piracy is a contradiction in terms, and must be classified as warfare. 'Privateering', on the other hand, may well have been a state activity in Greece. Here the state is necessarily involved, by sponsoring the hostile activity of a ship's crew on the seas, and by providing that crew with a safe haven and a market for the disposal of their looted goods and captives. The victims might well argue that the *effects* of piracy and privateering were the same; legally and historically, however, they are distinct.

It is clearly privateering which Polybios and his modern successors have in mind when they refer to 'Aitolian piracy', for the implication of the term is that the state was involved, though private piratical enterprise is obviously not ruled out. All this despite the fact that the Greeks had no special word for privateering. The actual practices of the states show that the distinctions between the two did exist. The reputed law of Solon in which a band of men setting out for a pirate cruise is to be regarded as a lawful company recognises the difference implicitly[5].

'Brigandage', on the other hand, is a land activity. It is also one, like piracy, which is necessarily an activity of private individuals, since if it is state-organised, it becomes a public activity, an act of the state, a fact of diplomacy and warfare. This is not to say that there were no Aitolian brigands, of course, but if there were they were single brigands, or small bands of brigands, who happened to be Aitolians, not Aitolians employed to indulge in brigandage. At the same time, certain aspects of warfare may well remind the victims of brigandage. It was the normal practice in Greek warfare to lay waste an opponent's lands, in which case anything of value would be looted. Once again, the effects for the victim would be

[4] Benecke.
[5] Gaius, *Digest*, XLVII.22.4.

exactly the same whether it was casual theft or state-sponsored devastation.

These distinctions are important, for it is clearly in the propagandistic interests of the victim to describe their sufferings in a way which will harm the 'image' of the attacker and rouse sympathy in their audience. Thus it would be normal for victims to speak of 'piracy' and 'brigands' when discussing their sufferings. So it is even more important now to see through the veil of this propaganda and to delineate clearly what actually took place. It can serve no useful purpose now to persist in ancient insults.

It is easiest to deal with the charge of 'brigandage'. This refers above all to the Aitolians' methods of warfare which in turn reflects the pastoral nature of Aitolian society in the fifth century. In the Athenian invasion of 426, Demosthenes was worsted by the ill-equipped Aitolians, who tackled their hoplite enemies by intelligently harassing them until they withdrew[6]. Not to be outdone, in 280 a Spartan army managed to be repulsed in the same way, when devastating the plain of Kirrha: in this case the victory was won by a supposedly small band of men referred to as 'shepherds' who caught the Spartans while scattered and defeated them[7].

These incidents set the tone for the general assumption of Aitolian primitiveness and backwardness which became an historiographical cliché. But the repulsion of Demosthenes took place before the formation of the Aitolian League and its expansion south to the coast of the Corinthian Gulf, and the defeat of the Spartans was as much due to the disenchantment among the Spartans' allies as it had to do with Aitolian martial prowess[8]. The cliché of the 'light-armed Aitolians' was ironically in part perpetuated by themselves, by their constant harping on their success in defeating the Galatian invaders in 279-278 by harassing tactics[9].

The general background is geographical. The homeland of the original Aitolian tribes was hilly, even mountainous. The Aitolians who lived there, like the modern inhabitants, were pastoralists, shepherds

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[6] Thuc. 3.94-102.

[7] Justin 24.1.3-6.

[8] Ibid, 7; and as pointed out by Ormerod (note 3), 140.

[9] The invasion is discussed, *in extenso*, by Nachtergael, *Galates*, 126-174; for a complaint about the Aitolians' constant reference to their achievement, cf. Pol 9.35.1-4 (Lykiskos at Sparta) and C. Champion, 'Polybios, Aetolia and the Gallic Attack on Delphi (279 B.C.)', *Historia*, 45, 1996, 315-328.

and goatherds. The possibilities of arable farming are confined to the narrow valleys, and there is little enough even there. The society was thus organised in small villages, with much movement of populations, particularly in annual transhumant migrations between low- and highland, searching for pasture. In Greek history, or prehistory, these hillmen had been the enemies of the lowland arable farmers, defeated in the end by hoplite tactics and weapons, and driven back into their hills. But the ancient enmity was not forgotten, and hillmen were always brigands thereafter. The Aitolian reputation was thus fixed even before their league was organised.

The two victories of 280 and 279-278 were atypical. By 280 Aitolia had become as much an urban society as it was rural. The league in that year included such notable cities as Herakleia Trachinia and Naupaktos, and a whole string of other *poleis* along the north coast of the Corinthian Gulf, in the Acheloos valley and around the lake named for one of them, Trichonos. These places did not produce light-armed troops but, like every other Greek city, hoplites, and it was as hoplites that they served and fought. Yet the stereotype of a primitive, backward Aitolia was by then fixed, and was automatically applied to two particular situations in the third century which seemed to confirm it.

The first of these occurred even before the two victories over the Spartans and the Galatians in 280-278, and was made by the Athenian poet who wrote the words of the ithyphallic hymn which was sung to welcome Demetrios Poliorketes back to Athens in 291[10]. Demetrios had been prevented from invading Aitolia by an Aitolian force which had occupied the routes leading out of Boiotia towards Delphi. The poet described the situation as 'the Aitolian sphinx sitting on a rock like the ancient one, who seizes and carries away all our people'. This was then glossed in parentheses: 'for it is the Aitolian habit to seize the property of neighbours and now even what is far afield'. We do not need to accept the Athenian (or Demetrian) point of view to appreciate Demetrios' annoyance at his defeat, and thus the automatic denigration of his victorious opponent: sour grapes is not a tasty fruit. Nor is it necessarily a specifically Aitolian habit to appropriate others' property: the Athenians were scarcely guiltless in that, and Demetrios' wild career of conquests, successful

[10] Athenaios, 4.253 b-f.

or otherwise, was different from the qualities the poet attributed to the Aitolians only in degree. And a poet is not on oath to speak the literal truth in a panegyric; in fact, writing for one such as Demetrios, it might be positively dangerous to be too frank and honest. Far safer to repeat the old estimate of Aitolian methods which had beaten the Athenians themselves in Demosthenes' time. This is not to say that Aitolian methods in 291 were the same.

It is a useful corrective to appreciate the appropriateness of the Aitolians' tactics: faced by an invasion commanded by one of the world's foremost generals, which they could not hope to defeat in open warfare, they blocked his advance and faced him out, defeating his intentions without a fight, and thus saving their own territory from a very nasty ravage, if not something worse. There is nothing primitive or brigand-like here, but an intelligent appreciation of methods and capabilities, and of the enemy's vulnerable points.

The other example concerns Aitolian policy in the Peloponnese in 221-220. The situation was one of preparation for war, in which the Achaian and Aitolian Leagues were confronting each other while busily intriguing for allies, yet without declaring war[11]. Aratos of Sikyon, the *strategos* of the Achaian League, summarised the actions of the Aitolians at the conference at Corinth in 220 at which the alliance was made which gave the war its name as the 'Social' war. He was following a series of accusers who listed other deeds of the Aitolians which were disliked by the speakers[12]. But this source is of the same historical quality as the Athenian poet, and none of the accusations are necessarily either accurate or true, though all of them are certainly biased and tendentious. Aratos' accusations, for example, were a good twenty years old and were extremely selective. Further, the report of the meeting is by Polybios, in whom the bias would be by no means corrected.

It is distinctly odd, for example, that the one Aitolian deed which might actually bear the description of brigandage is omitted from Aratos' list. This was the activity of the Aitolian commander Dorimachos in the previous year, 221. From a base at Phigaleia, he had recruited 'brigands', as Polybios terms them, to mount raids into Messenian territory[13]. The situation thus created had developed in

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[11] See Chapter 13.
[12] Pol. 4.25.1-4.
[13] Pol. 4.3.8.

such a way that a direct collision between the two leagues resulted, in which Dorimachos defeated the official Achaian army under Aratos' command[14]. Either there were surprisingly large numbers of brigands in that small corner of the Peloponnese, who had military training and considerable military talent, or 'brigands' is a tendentious description. Aratos was never a successful commander, but it must be assumed here that the the description of his opponents is probably based on Achaian propaganda originating with Aratos himself.

In fact, the whole sequence of these events is centred on the form of government of Messene, and the 'brigands' recruited by Dorimachos were no doubt really Messenian exiles and their sympathisers. As an example of *Aitolian* brigandage, the record of the episode is irrelevant. The brigands were not Aitolian; the campaign was a regular military one. The account is clearly tainted by Polybios' use of Achaian records as his source. It is as unconvincing as a typical example as is that referred to in Demetrios' earlier propaganda and the Athenian poem. Aratos' failure to mention it in his diatribe is thus in part to be explained by the fact of his military defeat; no doubt also, all too many people knew the facts accurately. It was better for his case that the episodes he talked about should be a long time in the past, and largely forgotten.

But there is a further dimension involved. Dorimachos was in fact adopting a method of warfare which Aratos himself had used for many years in the 240s and 230s in his vain attempts to 'persuade' Athens to join the Achaian League, and his successful attempts to bring in Argos[15]. His repeated raids into Attika had been universally unsuccessful (except in gathering booty), but in a meeting at Corinth (which he had captured by a *coup de main* in peace time) to complain of such tactics would be to risk his whole policy collapsing in derision. Yet the account of the meeting in Polybios, written perhaps fifty years later, makes great play with the charge of Aitolian brigandage. But then, of course, it was in Polybios' interest to portray the Aitolians in a bad light, and his own people, of the Achaian League, as victims. This would go well with the Romans, Polybios' immediate audience, and the other Greeks, for whom, he claimed, only Achaia could hold out any hope of independence by that time.

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[14] Pol. 4.11.1-12.13.

[15] Cf. Walbank, *Aratos*, 53-63, for Aratos' tactics.

At the Corinth assembly, Aratos made a rather more specific charge in his catalogue of Aitolian crimes[16] by accusing them of plundering the temple of Artemis at Lousoi in Arkadia. In the earlier complaints by others Polybios had also included one by the Boiotians, that the Aitolians had plundered the sanctuary of Athene Itonia in peace time[17]. Elsewhere Polybios records a speech by Lykiskos, an Akarnanian, to a meeting at Sparta, in which he referred to Aitolians having plundered the temples of Poseidon at Tainaros and Mantinea and the Heraion at Argos, and to have violated of the sacred truce of the Pamboiotian festival, as well as the exploit at Lousoi[18]. This is clearly a more serious catalogue than the unconvincing accusations of brigandage. Yet they are all accusations by enemies, and must be treated with scepticism, initially at least.

The first thing to bear in mind with regard to Lykiskos' catalogue is that he was an Akarnanian, and an enemy of the Aitolian League, which had been moderately successful in persuading Akarnanian cities to join the league[19]. He was speaking to the Assembly at Sparta, in reply to a speech by the Aitolian Chlaineias in a rhetorical contest aimed at persuading Sparta to join one or other alliance. In such a situation no politician was expected to be balanced, nor necessarily truthful. The second point is that the speeches were Polybios' own composition, and thus are not to be seen as recording the actual words spoken. A certain skepticism as to accuracy, content and truthfulness is required; distortion, exaggeration, possibly even invention, are to be expected.

Nevertheless these are concrete accusations and must be investigated. An examination of the details alleged reveals a variety of elements which somewhat reduce the cumulative impact of Lykiskos' catalogue. The Boiotian accusations of plundering the shrine of Athene Itonia and the violation of the festival of the *Pamboiotia* are surely the same incident, for the *Pamboiotia* took place at the shrine of Athene Itonia, near Koroneia[20]. The violation is said by Lykiskos, in Polybios' words, to have been the work of 'Lattabos and Nikostratos'.

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[16] Pol. 4.25.4.
[17] Pol. 4.25.2.
[18] Pol. 9.34.9-11.
[19] Several Akarnanian cities in the Acheloos valley, including Matropolis, Phoitiai, Oiniadai and Stratos, were Aitolian League members; they were hard hit by Philip V's campaign in 219 (Pol. 4.63.7-65.11).
[20] *RE* XVIII, 3, 288-289, 'Pamboitia'.

Here a further problem develops. Only one Lattabos is known amongst the Aitolians, and then only as the father of a man honoured at Delphi in the 230s[21]. Lattabos therefore lived a generation earlier than that date, and would perhaps have been politically active in the 260s and 250s, and perhaps into the 240s. Similarly Nikostratos is defined by Polybios, in a typical way, as the father of the Dorimachos who had been so active in the Peloponnese in 221[22], thus tarring the father with the same brush he used to besmirch the son. This dating would put Nikostratos' time of political activity back to the 250s and 240s.

It thus the case that neither of the two men who were accused of the sacrilege in Boiotia can be shown to have held any league office, though there are gaps in the records, and it is reasonable to accept that Lattabos and Nikostratos were Aitolian magistrates. The identification of Nikostratos, however, does put the violation of the sanctuary back a generation, to the 240s, which is close enough to the possible dates of Lattabos' political activity. This in turn suggests that it was part of the warfare in Boiotia which involved the Aitolians in about 245. In that event the Aitolians defeated a Boiotian force at Chaeroneia[23], no more that ten kilometres from Koroneia, the scene of the *Pamboiotia*. The Boiotian defeat was followed by an Aitolian-Boiotian alliance which lasted until about 238, when it was broken off by Boiotia at the outbreak of the 'War of Demetrios'[24]. This was thus not a glorious episode of Boiotian history; rather it was one which they would be happy to forget. Retrospectively denouncing the Aitolians as sacrilegious robbers would be a useful sublimation, obscuring the fact of the previous alliance in a meeting devoted to forming another alliance against their erstwhile colleagues. Nevertheless the circumstantial details – names and places – are such that it must be accepted that *something* happened which would give the Boiotians a colourable excuse for their accusations at Corinth twenty years and more later. We have, of course, no real information on what actually happened. There are two sides to every dispute, and it is quite possible that what the Boiotians regarded as sacrilege, the Aitolians did not.

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[21] *FdD*, III, 1, 146; an Aitolian called Lattypos was *hieromnemon* at Delphi before 227/226 (Fl I 34, Lefèvre 68-71; there is a possibility this was the same man, but the dating would still fit, if only just; cf *Prosopography*, 'Lattybos (1)' ansd 'Lattypos'.

[22] Pol. 4.3.5; cf *Prosopography*, 'Nikostratos (4)'.

[23] Pol. 20.4.4-5; Plut. *Aratos* 16.1; discussed by Feyel, *Polybe*, 79-82.

[24] Pol. 20.5.1-3; Feyel, *Polybe*, 83-85; cf. also Roesch, *Études*, 350-354.

As it happens, the one incident which is listed in the speeches of both Lykiskos and Aratos is recounted elsewhere in some detail by Polybios. This took place at the sanctuary of Artemis at Lousoi in northern Arkadia. An Aitolian force marched from Kynaitha towards Kleitor. To prevent the looting of cattle sacred to the goddess, the people of Lousoi offered presents to the Aitolians; these were accepted and the temple's lands left alone. Later the Aitolians were returning, in the reverse direction, defeated, and this time they did take some of the cattle[25].

On the whole this seems a fairly minor matter, consisting of the rustling of some cattle and the blackmailing of some 'gifts'. This was not an unusual occurrence in Greece, one would have thought. Flacelière indeed connects this event with an inscription from Kalydon in which the Aitolian League agreed *asylia* with the Lousiatai[26]. If the connection is accepted, it argues both a guilty conscience in Aitolia and a wish to make amends, neither of which are characteristics of brigands and habitual temple-sackers[27]. In any case 'brigandage' is not the issue, since the cattle were taken by an Aitolian army on campaign: it was thus an official act, by representatives of the Aitolian state, not a piece of private enterprise.

This is the only case of those cited at Corinth and Sparta where such detail survives or can be extracted from the sources. It does suggest a degree of exaggeration on the part of the accusers, as well as a wilful ignoring of both the context and any amends given by the perpetrators. It is, that is, a fairly normal piece of political disputatiousness, not unknown at any and all times.

In the other cases, all in the Peloponnese, it has been usual to date all the events to the Aitolian expedition in 240[28]. Timaios, blamed for plundering Poseidon at Tainaros, was *strategos* of the league in that year and was certainly in the Peloponnese during his year in

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[25] Pol. 4.18.9-12 and 19.4. On the sanctuary see M. Jost, *Sanctuaires et Cultes d'Arcadie*, Paris 1985, 47-51; it is in a '*sauvage*' area, and flourished from the eighth to the third centuries BC, though the buildings were never of the monumental type; that is, it was a small country temple.

[26] *IG* IX.1(2).135; Flacelière, *Aetoliens*, 290, n. 3.

[27] Walbank, *Philip V*, 29, n. 1, implies that the *asylia* treaty existed before the raid of 221, and this explains the 'sparing of the temple': a good example of explaining something which did not happen by a proposed adjustment of the evidence; there is no clear evidence of the date of the treaty.

[28] This is Klaffenbach's dating for Timaios as *strategos* in the list of magistrates in the introduction to *IG* XI, 1, 1, p.L; see Chapter 8.

office[29]. Polykritos, blamed for plundering Poseidon at Mantinea, was a prominent Aitolian statesman for thirty years, being *strategos* of the league at least four times, and perhaps five[30]. Polykritos held no office we can discern during Timaios' strategy, so he was presumably appointed to a subordinate command.

Timaios was the leader of the Peloponnesian expedition in 240 which acquired a series of allies for the league in Triphylia and Arkadia[31], and Polykritos appears to have been involved. It was thus an official expedition. What exactly took place at Mantinea, and whether Polykritos actually did pillage the temple there is not known, and if he did the seriousness of the offence is equally unknown. It is, however, relevant that the alliance of Mantinea and Aitolia was not broken off immediately after the affair, nor is there any evidence of Mantinean complaints (though this is scarcely a good argument). The complaint, it must be noted, was made by an Akarnanian enemy of Aitolia's to a Spartan audience, and Mantinea was an old enemy of Sparta's.

What occurred at Tainaros is even less clear. On the face of it this should have been Lykiskos' trump card. The soiling of a famous Spartan sanctuary by the Aitolians should have left the Aitolians' name stinking in Spartan nostrils for a long time. Yet in Polybios' version of his speech Lykiskos merely mentions the incident. This immediately raises suspicions. Why Timaios went there is unknown, as is his conduct there, but the Spartans clearly ignored the incident (as, it seems, the Mantineans ignored whatever happened there), nor did they later hold it against the Aitolians. One must conclude that whatever happened at both places was of minor importance, and that Lykiskos and/or Polybios exaggerated.

The last of these allegations, in which an Aitolian called Pharykos is said to have pillaged the Argive Heraion, is the most difficult to pin down. No Aitolian called Pharykos is known, other than this man, nor any to whose name his can be emended with any likelihood. Nor can any date for such an attack be convincingly suggested. The other examples cited are all to be dated to the Peloponnesian expedition of Timaios in 240/239, and this also seems the best time to locate the

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[29] *IG* V.2.419.

[30] Klaffenbach, *IG* IX.1, pp. XLIX-L, at 271/270, 263/262, 254/263, and 247/256; there may have been another year in office also.

[31] *IG* V.2.419; cf. Roebuck, *Messenia*, 67-68.

event, for no other example of Aitolian actions in the region of Argos are known. Aitolia had no quarrel with Argos at that or any other time, and no other occasion suggests itself. It was possibly a private raid by an Aitolian – if he was an Aitolian. It is possible that Lykiskos, or Polybios, or popular rumour, was including the event as an extra example and as a means to expanding the area of guilt.

If Pharykos' exploit did take place, and if he really was an Aitolian, and if the event took place during the Aitolians' Peloponnesian expedition, then all the examples which Lykiskos listed took place during one or two campaigning seasons; further, the only likely date for the Aitolian violations of the *Pamboiotia* festival and the sanctuary of Athene Itonia is a little earlier, in 245. It is noticeable that all these events were thus a generation in the past when Lykiskos and the other accusors spoke (in 211 and 220 respectively), which means that memories had faded. It is worth noting, therefore, that Lykiskos was unsuccessful in his attempt to persuade Sparta, who allied with Aitolia after the conference[32]. All the examples which can be securely located in time had taken place in wartime, and so they were part of the state policy of Aitolia. They may have taken place (though the Argive Heraion incident must be doubtful), but certainly not in the extreme terms implied by Aitolian enemies' accounts. All the sanctuaries were in enemy territory in a time of war. To convict the Aitolians of deliberate temple-robbing we need to know much more about the circumstances in each case. In that of Lousoi, for example, the rustling of a few cattle does not seem a particularly heinous offence; it seems likely that the other incidents were on about the same level of seriousness. If that is all that was involved, then the real offence is that of Lykiskos and the other enemies of Aitolia, for wilful destruction of the truth and malicious exaggeration.

There are two better-known examples of apparent temple-sackings by the Aitolians. Again they took place in wartime, but in these cases rather more revealing detail is known. These were the Aitolian attacks on the northern temples at Dion in Macedon and Dodona in Epeiros. There is no problem with these attacks in the matter of date,

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[32] The exact date of Sparta's adhesion is not known, but that is not vital to the argument; though it may not be immaterial to note that the prime mover of the alliance was Rome, and that the Aitolians were thus operating largely as Rome's agents. Hostility to Achaia rather than goodwill to either Rome or Aitolia was the main Spartan interest.

and there is a fair quantity of detail known, yet this did not prevent exaggeration and distortion. The raid on the temple of Zeus at Dion took place in the first campaigning season of the Second Macedonian War, which to the Aitolians was a struggle for survival against attack by most of the surrounding states in alliance. In 219 Philip V marched from Macedon through Epeiros to the siege of Ambrakos[33]; in reply the Aitolian *strategos* Skopas took a raiding party into Thessaly and then past Olympos to Pieria. The usual crop destruction and looting took place and then the city and temple of Dion were taken. Polybios details the damage inflicted: demolition of walls, houses, the gymnasium, the burning of the colonnade around the sanctuary, the overthrow of the royal statues[34].

The purpose of this raid is clear: it was designed to distract Philip from his intended assault on Ambrakos. The first stage was the invasion of Thessaly; when that did not work, Pieria was ravaged and looted; when *that* failed to bring Philip back, Dion, a sanctuary much favoured by Macedonian royalty, was sacked. That also failed, and Skopas then marched his men home. But note what was actually damaged: houses in the city, the city walls, the city's public buildings, the colonnade round the sanctuary, and royal statues, but not even Polybios can find that damage was done to the sanctuary itself. Polybios may well go on about Skopas 'making war on the gods', and it being 'an impious outrage', but Skopas had been very careful to lay hands on property only, not the temple itself. It was a deed no worse than was done to any other town or city which was captured in war. That this town had grown up round a temple, and indeed essentially existed only because of the temple, did not alter the fact that it was the town alone which suffered. The colonnade and the royal statues were no doubt the gifts of Philip and his ancestors: the destruction of these was a personal gesture at the king, surely aimed at distracting him, a refinement on the basic strategy.

Polybios' account of the Aitolian raid on Dodona, which took place in the autumn of 219, after the assumption of office by the next *strategos*, Dorimachos, follows much the same pattern. The Epeirote countryside was ravaged in the usual Greek manner, though Dorimachos is described as being particularly vindictive, whatever that might

[33] Pol. 4.61.4-62.1.
[34] Pol. 4.62.1-2.

mean. Then at Dodona destruction similar to that at Dion was perpetrated: the porticos were burnt, votive offerings were destroyed, and the 'sacred building' demolished[35].

At least that is Polybios' version, though Diodoros is more summary and less precise: 'he plundered the oracle of Dodona, and set fire to the temple, except for the *cella*'[36]. Polybios also takes the opportunity to comment adversely on Aitolian morality: 'they pursue their designs in defiance of the common usages and principles of mankind' – the sort of comment which is clearly the basis for the modern reflections on Aitolian conduct. But we need to distinguish between reportage and comment, and this is clearly a personal remark by the historian. His facts seem clear enough, except that the last part of his report is somewhat ambiguous: the sacred building (*hieron oikian*) is clearly intended to be understood as meaning the temple, the holy place, but it is in that case odd that Polybios does not say so, and Diodoros' point that the *cella* was spared is important. In fact, Polybios' ambiguity is deliberate, for the temple was not damaged, as archaeological investigations have made quite clear. The destruction of the temple of Zeus, the main sanctuary, was impossible without causing damage to the sacred oak-tree, which survived to be cut down by Christians centuries later. Nor is there any damage to the porticos surrounding the tree and the temple, both of which dated from Pyrros' time, over half a century before the Aitolian raid, and were in use for centuries. But nearby there was a substantial theatre, with seating for 18,000 to 20,000 people, and next to it the Prytaneion, which was the meeting place for the delegates of the Epeirote League[37]. This was the political organisation which had replaced the defunct royal dynasty of the Molossi, and it was the league which which had provoked Aitolian anger by claiming to have decided on peace when they had actually done the opposite, and then allowing Philip to march through Epeiros and insisting that he attack Ambrakos[38].

This all seems quite sufficient to dispose of Polybios' ambiguities

[35] Pol. 4.67.1-3.

[36] Diod. 26.7.

[37] S. Dakiris, 'Dodona' in E. Melas (ed.), *Temples and Sanctuaries of Ancient Greece*, trans M. Broughton, London 1973, provides a useful summary of the history of the sanctuary, with clear illustrations.

[38] Pol. 4.30.7; the Epeirotes do not escape Polybios' condemnation for their 'double-faced' conduct.

and to provide a reasonable political context for Dorimachos' expedition. As at Dion, the destruction was confined to the property of the temple, which was, in fact, the communal property of the Epeirote state, just as the damage at Dion was confined to royal and public property.

Once again, therefore, we see a raid conducted with clear and purposeful deliberation. Skopas' raid to Dion was designed to distract Philip – a very young commander in 219 – from his attack on the Aitolian outpost; Dorimachos' raid on Dodona was aimed at discouraging the Epeirotes from participating in the war against them. Neither raid succeeded, and in fact they provoked Philip into a reprisal raid on the Aitolian federal sanctuary at Thermos in 218. Polybios' description shows that exactly the same damage was done to Thermos as had been done to Dion and Dodona; looting, ravaging on the way there and in the town, destruction of votive offerings, burning of buildings. But the temple itself was untouched. To make it quite clear that retaliation was the object of the raid, a punning line of verse was scrawled up on the walls. Polybios then moralises again[39]. But it is clear that the damage to Thermos was precisely calculated to be equivalent to that at Dion, and perhaps that at Dodona.

In all these cases, in the 240s and in 219, those raids on temples which can be examined in some detail were conducted by officials of the league with clear politico-military objects in view. In 240 in the Peloponnese they were apparently successful, for several cities became Aitolian allies as a result of that campaign. In 219 they were largely unsuccessful, though Epeiros took little or no part in the war afterwards, and no doubt Philip will have had to make better provision for defending his kingdom after the raids than he had before. It is noticeable that in the 219 raids – and in Philip's reply at Thermos – looting was confined to the houses of the towns, and the rich votive offerings were deliberately burnt rather than stolen. The accusations of sacrilege were to be reduced to the minimum – not that this prevented such accusations being made, of course.

What has to be explained is why Polybios is so splenetic on the subject (and why modern historians are also, for that matter). After all, occupation of, or burning of, or looting of, sacred places was not all that uncommon in the Greek world. Delphi, Delion, Olympia, the

[39] Pol. 5.9.8-9.7.

Athenian acropolis, the Artemision at Ephesos, Hera Lakinia, the temple of Venus at Eyrx, had all been looted and destroyed, sometimes more than once, and these are only the most obvious examples. Quite possibly the clue is in another aspect of Aitolian behaviour. As Polybios made Lykiskos at Sparta say in his speech to the Aitolians: 'you pride yourselves on having resisted the attack of the barbarians on Delphi, and say the Greeks ought to be grateful to you for this'[40]. This speech took place in 211, nearly seventy years after the defeat of the Kelts at Delphi, and yet the Aitolians are portrayed as still harping on it. Not surprisingly the other Greeks picked out any examples of Aitolian misbehaviour and threw them back in the Aitolians' faces. Their sacrileges were made the more stinging by their control and manipulation of the Delphic sanctuary, a control many Greeks clearly resented. Other Greeks, or Romans, might commit sacrilege, but only the Aitolians puffed themselves up so insistently that other examples were ignored while those of the Aitolians were raked up ever and again. It was not fair, but it *was* politics. It was *not* 'brigandage'.

The charge that the Aitolians practiced piracy on a large scale is based in part on the interpretation of a number of inscriptions supplemented by some known historical incidents. The inscriptions are those in which *asylia* agreements were made between the Aitolians and a number of other cities. These agreements have been supposed to be directly related to the prevalence of Aitolian piracy, and to provide protection against it. Yet these agreements were made between other states and cities, without piracy being imputed to either; in those cases it is assumed that ravaging in wartime was likely to be the problem.

The records of the agreements made by the Aitolians show that some were likely targets, if it was the case that Aitolians practiced piracy: Chios[41], Delos[42], Tenos[43], Keos[44], Mytilene[45], and Teos[46] are all accessible islands or coastal cities, on whom pirates might be expected to descend. One might expect the same of the lands of

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[40] Pol. 9.35.1.
[41] *IG* IX.1.195a; *SEG* II.258 with *SEG* XVII.245.
[42] *IG* IX 1.285 (= XI.4.1050).
[43] *IG* IX.1.191; Rigsby, *Asylia*, 54.
[44] *IG* IX.1.169 (= XII.5.526 = *Syll* (3) 522).
[44] *IG* IX.1.190 (= XII.2.167).
[46] *IG* IX.1.192 (= *Syll* (3) 563); Rigsby, *Asylia*, 132.

Smyrna[47], Athens[48], and Miletos[49], all of whom had reasonably extensive coastlands[50]. But are we seriously to believe that Aitolian pirates threatened the inland territories of Magnesia-on-Maiandros[51], or, worse, the sanctuary of the Nikephorion at Pergamon, with which an *asylia* agreement was reached as late as 182[52]? And yet closer islands – above all, the cities of Euboia – show no such agreements, despite having produced good epigraphic collections, and neither do most of the Asian cities with coastal territories, including the smaller ones who might be thought to be the most vulnerable. Further, the geographic range is very restricted, with no examples on the Ionian Sea shores, despite the prevalence there of a mixture of Aitolian enemies and friends, who might be expected to make such agreements. Such arguments-from-silence, of course, are not wholly convincing, but these gaps in the record cannot be ignored, and the epigraphical research in old Greece has been long, detailed, and extensive, so that it is reasonable to assume that evidence would have surfaced by now if it had existed.

The geography of the Aitolian League makes the distribution of these *asylos* agreements all the more odd. Only in 280 did the league reach the Aegean coast, by the acquisition of Herakleia, and the Aitolian coastline on the east was never more extensive than a relatively short stretch along both shores of the Malian Gulf. To the west, however, Aitolia controlled all the north coast of the Corinthian Gulf, and intermittently had control over parts of the Ambrakian Gulf, and the island of Kephallenia was a member for a time. It seems odd, once again, that protection from piracy was concentrated in the Aegean whereas any Aitolian pirates were more likely to operate out of Ionian Sea ports, if at all.

The importance of the prohibition of supposed piracy may be

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[47] Benecke, 23.

[48] *IG* IX.1.176.

[49] *Milet* I.3.196.

[50] The 'waning of Ptolemaic sea-power' is suggested by Walbank (*CAH* VII.1.(2), 289) as a reason for cities of the Asian coast developing *asylia*-policies, but he has also pointed out that the Rhodians were active in suppressing piracy from c.299 (p.286). This may be an example of having one's cake and eating it, but it also highlights the point that there was a strong and active interest all through the third century in piracy-suppression. It is also noticeable that both of these powers were friendly with the Aitolian League for much of the century.

[51] *IG* IX.1(2).1.4 (= *Syll* (3) 554); Rigsby, *Asylia*, 67.

[52] *IG* IX.1(2).1.179 (= *Syll* (3) 679); Rigsby, *Asylia*, 178.

called into question. On the treaty between Chios and the Aitolian League[53], for instance, the prohibition of plundering the property of Chians occupies less than three lines out of forty-nine, the main business of the decree being measures for *isopoliteia* and the provision of Chian representation on the board of the Amphictionic *hieromnemones*. The decrees embodied in the inscriptions concerning Keos and Aitolia have the same formulaic reference before getting down to the main business, the *isopoliteia*. The treaty beween the league and Miletos is one of mutual-*asylia*; why, therefore, should it be assumed that Aitolians threatened Miletos, and not Milesians Aitolia? That Miletos had made a treaty with Knossos for mutual protection of their enslaved citizens[54] has no relevance to the agreement with Aitolia.

The theory that *asylia* agreements reveal the extent of piracy has a fundamental flaw in it. If such agreements were made in order to protect each of the participants from the consequences of piratical acts by the other, then the more agreements there were the less profitable piracy would become. Therefore if a state, such as Aitolia, concluded large numbers of these agreements, it follows that piracy was being discouraged by that state. In his pages in the *Cambridge Ancient History*, J. K. Davies implies that it was a state-sponsored system of blackmail[55]. Yet the only evidence of this is the existence of *asylia* treaties, whose existence denies the effectiveness of such blackmail.

This is not to claim that pirates who were also Aitolian did not exist. It *is* to deny that there is any clear evidence for an organised system of state-piracy, or even privateering, by the Aitolian League. Ormerod's formulation, like Davies's, is of state-sponsored pirates terrorising foreign communities into joining the league to get some peace[56]. The present day is too familiar with state-sponsored terrorism for that notion to have any credibility. If piracy by Aitolians existed, it was small scale and private, like that conducted by every other ancient (and medieval) Mediterranean people with a coastline.

It is worth pointing out that there did exist a state which attempted to extend its power and influence by the practice of what appears as state-piracy. This was the Illyrian kingdom of Queen Teuta in the 230s and 220s. The reaction of her victims is instructive. Aitolia,

[53] *IG* IX.1(2),1.195a, lines 6-8.
[54] *Milet* I.3.140.
[55] *CAH* VII 1 (2 ed.), 285-290 (a section entitled 'Piracy and its Ramifications').
[56] Ormerod (note 3), 139-142.

Epeiros, Achaia, and Rome all were instantly hostile. Aitolia and Achaia cooperated in fighting the menace. When Rome finally scotched it, embassies were sent to announce the fact to the Greeks, presumably in the knowledge that the Greeks had been active in combatting it as well. Illyrian piracy is generally treated as a barbarian invasion of Greek states, but Rome certainly treated the problem as one to be solved by state action against the sponsoring state[57]. The total lack of such action by any Greek state – or by Rome – against the Aitolian League is, if not conclusive to this argument, certainly supportive of it.

The *asylia* agreements are therefore only what they purport to be, a device for limiting the effects of private piracy by subjects of the two states concluding the agreement. This does not mean that many of those subjects actually committed piratical acts. In each case the *asylia* agreements are no more than formal clauses included within much wider agreements, which deal mainly with other subjects. Each agreement must be taken in its totality, without details being extracted and exaggerated to form the basis of an unlikely theory of state behaviour.

There are, of course, some items of evidence, on inscriptions especially, in which Aitolians are stated to have committed acts which have been interpreted as piratical. Yet these are all composed by the victims. At Naxos about 300 BC Aitolians are said to have carried off 280 inhabitants, whom they then ransomed[58].

This is clear enough, but whether the matter was one of piracy, or part of a wartime campaign is unclear. The date of the inscription is uncertain, but Naxos was a part of the League of the Islanders which was under Antigonid control for much of the reigns of Demetrios I and Antigonos Gonatas[59]; and Aitolia was a frequent enemy of Demetrios'. It is thus quite possible that the raid took place in wartime, as an act of state policy. At Athens an inscription comments that a man called Boukris overran the Attic countryside and carried off captives for sale in Crete[60]. This Boukris may be identified with

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[57] Cf. H. J. Dell, 'The Origin and Nature of Illyrian Piracy', *Historia* 16, 1967, 344-358.

[58] *Syll* (3) 521.

[59] It was under the control of Antigonos I and Demetrios I from c.315 until it was taken over by Ptolemy I between 291 and 287, and then it remained under Ptolemaic control until c.260 at least: R. S. Bagnall, *The Administration of the Ptolemaic Possessions outside Egypt*, Leiden 1976, 136-138.

[60] *IG* II(2) 884 (= *Syll* (3) 535).

Boukris son of Daitas of Naupaktos, who was Delian *proxenos* about 250[61] and *hieromnemon* at Delphi in 260/259[62]. The absence of any other known Boukris makes it very likely that we are dealing with one person: it would be astonishing if the only two men known by that name were contemporaries. But was Boukris' action in Attika a pirate-raid[63]? It seems rather too large in scale for that. The Athenians complained that he 'overran' the countryside, and that he captured 'a large number' of people of both the country and the city. Surprise is indicated, but so is the comparatively large size of the attacking force, and the whole process took some considerable time. Combined with the indications of Boukris' high status in Aitolia, these elements imply that to call the event a mere pirate raid is perhaps understating the matter.

The date of the event is not clear, as all too often. The inscription recording it is dated to 229/228, but the event apparently took place some years earlier, since the man honoured is said to have continued his good work over some time. Boukris was active in Aitolian affairs in the 250s and perhaps before and after. A combination of these two indications suggests the raid was after 250 but before, say, 240.

This dating puts Boukris' raid into the context of the wars of that period: the bid for independence by Alexander son of Krateros, Aratos' seizure of Corinth, the wars he conducted to 'persuade' Athens to join the Achaian League, and the little-known 'war of Demetrios' the Fair[64]. In all honesty it cannot be pinned down more closely than that, but the main point is that there were enough periods in which Aitolians and Athens (which was under Macedonian control at the time) were at war for Boukris' raid to have been an official venture, part of that war. There is thus no reason to assume it to be a 'pirate' raid. The Athenian inscription does not describe it as such, though modern commentators uninhibitedly refer to the

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[61] *Syll* (3) 500.

[62] FI I 17, dated by him to c.262, but Lefèvre 42-43 proposes the date he used, and lists other suggestions.

[63] Walbank, *CAH* VII, 1, 447, is in no doubt: 'an Aitolian piratical raid', he says, without qualification, or context.

[64] These wars remain vague in many respects, but all seem to be more or less contemporary, and cover the period 249 to 237, centring on first Alexander, then Aratos; geographically the main bone of contention was Corinth; the War of Demetrios was in the 230s.

attackers as pirates[65]. Attika was also subjected to raids by Aratos at this time, quite without any official war[66], and he mounted other raids on Corinth and Argos[67], none of which are called brigandage, but which clearly were state-sponsored examples of brigand-like behaviour. In 201 Philip V sent a force to raid in Attika, one of the events which led on to the Second Romano-Macedonian War the next year. This raid did much the same as Boukris' exploit, devastating lands and capturing prisoners, and it then departed, and all this took place in a time of peace between Philip and Athens[68]. It is not called piracy, even though it came by sea, presumably because it is clearly an act of state by Philip. It is only reasonable to accord the Aitolians the same potential for rational planning and the conduct of war against an open enemy as is assumed for Philip and Aratos in peace time. On the whole it seems that Boukris was more likely to be conducting an official campaign in wartime than a mere piracy.

The literary evidence for specific piracies by Aitolians is distressingly sparse. Polyainos mentions 'ten Aitolian pirates' who, under the immediate command of a man called Melatas, went forward with scaling ladders at the capture of Kassandreia by Antigonos Gonatas[69]. Note that the actual capture of the city was undertaken by 2,000 hoplites, and that the Aitolians were being used as the forlorn hope. It is also worth noting that, even if they were referred to by Polyanios as 'pirates', they were, in fact, acting as mercenary soldiers at the time. We have no evidence of their piracies, nor of their subsequent careers. Their commander Melatas may or may not be an Aitolian[70]. That the planner of the assault, Ameinias, is called a pirate is not relevant: he was a Phokian, and, again, at the time he was acting as a soldier[71].

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[65] Walbank (note 63), R. Flacelière, 'Les Rapports d'Athènes et de l'Aetolie au IIIe siècle avant J-C', *HSCR* Supplement I, 1940, 471-481, and Will, *Histoire Politique*, 345-347, are examples; an honourable exception is W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, London 1911, 204.

[66] Walbank, *Aratos*, 53, 58, 61, summarised in his Chronology as 'frequent attacks' from 242 onwards.

[67] The attack on Corinth is regarded as a 'liberation', but it took place, nevertheless, in a time of peace between the Achaian League and Macedon: Pol. 2.43.4; Plut. *Aratus*, 18.2-24.1.

[68] App. *Mac*, 4.1; Pol. 16.27.1; Livy 31.14.10.

[69] Polyainos 4.6.18.

[70] He is said to be their commander, but not their compatriot.

[71] He is referred to as one of Antigonos' commanders by Plut. *Pyrrhus* 29; on this episode see Ormerod (note 3), 123-124.

After that no other literary reference to Aitolian piracy exists until 221, when a royal Macedonian ship, complete with crew, officers, and soldiers, was captured by Aitolians near Kythera. The captives were sold[72]. This, of course, would be normal practice for pirates. But these is something rather odd about Polybios' report of the whole episode. He is quite unspecific about the pirates, though he does imply that it was an official cruise. The ambiguity is presumably deliberate, and is therefore intended to conceal the fact that the Aitolians had some justification for their action. He states that the crew, soldiers and ship were all sold in Aitolia, but that does not prove much: slave markets existed everywhere, though to sell off Macedonian soldiers as slaves does argue a certain *panache.*

It is also worth enquiring what a Macedonian warship full of Macedonian officers and soldiers was doing off the island of Kythera just at that time. This was the year when Dorimachos was conducting raids into Messenia with his 'bandits', and when Aratos of Sikyon's army of Achaians, reinforced by Macedonians under the command of Taurion, Philip V's representative in the Peloponnese, was defeated by Dorimachos and an Aitolian force. The next year, Aratos and Philip joined with other states in attacking Aitolia, an alliance which grew out of the Messenian problem. Macedon had no access to the coast anywhere along the western Greek coast, except by way of the territory of an ally. It seems reasonable to connect the approach of this ship to western waters with the Messenian problem, and thus it was one of the incidents leading to the alliance and the subsequent war. Given the condition of unofficial war in that area at that time, the interception of the Macedonian ship can be regarded as an action by the Aitolian state, on a par with Dorimachos' work in Messenia, and Aratos' interventions – in a time of peace and at the head of the Achaian army – in the same area.

This is the sum total of examples, from epigraphic and literary sources, in which Aitolians are said to have committed 'piracies'. In the case of Boukris' raid into Attika they were in all probability acting as an official Aitolian military force on enemy territory; at Kassandreia they were acting as mercenary soldiers in the service of Antigonos Gonatas. The capture of the Macedonian ship in 221 was probably an act of state in a time of developing tension and unofficial

[72] Pol 4.6.1.

war. Only the raid on Naxos has the hallmarks of a genuine pirate raid, and even that may have taken place in wartime. And this is the product of eight decades. For that period the modern historian of ancient piracy can list raids on Samothrake, on Thera and on Amorgos, and pirate commanders existed at Kythnos and in Crete[73]. None of these were Aitolians. No-one would pretend that these are the sum total of raids and piracies in that area in that century, but the active involvement of Aitolians is not proved, still less is that of the Aitolian state.

A society which existed by piracy requires a considerable marine component. Yet Aitolia is curiously deficient in this area. When Dorimachos and Skopas took an Aitolian force across the Gulf of Corinth in 221, they had to use ferry-boats – presumably those which made a regular run between Rhion and Antirrhion – supplemented by Kephallenian ships[74]. Now Kephallenia was certainly allied to the Aitolian League at the time[75], but it is very strange that no ships were available at Oiniadai or Naupaktos or other Aitolian ports when Aitolia was supposed to be such a hotbed of piracy.

In fact this episode echoes one several years earlier, when Aitolians and Achaians joined in a naval expedition to block Illyrian raids on Kerkyra. Here again these were no Aitolian ships available, only ten Achaian ships, which were jointly manned by Aitolians and Achaians, and were then resoundingly defeated[76]. The enemy was a joint Akarnanian-Illyrian fleet, composed of Akarnanian ships and Illyrian *lemboi* – the latter the typical pirate ship of the time. The joint league fleet will have known they would face such ships, yet they had none of thir own. So where were these Aitolian pirates and their own *lemboi*? One must conclude that they may well not have existed. And later, in 192, when Thoas conducted an operation aimed at capturing Chalkis in Euboia, part of his force was on ships in the Euripos strait; but these were merchant ships[77]. We may conclude that Aitolia did not have any naval vessels.

Ignoring the hearsay denunciations of the Aitolians' enemies, it has to be admitted that the Aitolian piratical achievements are very

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[73] Ormerod (note 3), 124, 131, 139, 116.
[74] Pol 4.6.8.
[75] Klaffenbach, *IG* IX.1. p. XXIII.
[76] Pol 2.9.9-10.6.
[77] Livy 35.37.7.

small, indeed minimal, and its naval power non-existent. The participation of Aitolians in piracy does not mean that Aitolia itself was a pirate state, nor even that large numbers of its people lived by piracy. It simply means that each part of Greece produced some pirates – not a surprising conclusion at any period of Greek history.

It is easy to see where the reputation of the Aitolians came from: they were hillmen, a group whose ancient predilection for raiding was a given fact of early Greek history; their league was powerful, and powerful states provoke jealousy among their contemporaries and insult from their enemies. Their commanders attacked two temple-towns in 219, and so minor incidents involving temples a generation before were resurrected and exaggerated. And some of Aitolians were involved in piracy, so Aitolians were pirates. And Polybius added one more drop of retrospective poison to the concoctions.

Aitolian society developed severe internal conflicts after the defeat of the league in the Roman war of 192-189. Polybios' explanation is that, since it was not longer possible for Aitolians 'to get their living by robbery and similar lawless conduct'; they therefore 'had to turn upon each other'[78]. This, of course, is not proof of their previous habits of 'robbery and similar lawless conduct', but it is proof that Polybios believed that this had been Aitolian behaviour. But what Polybios believed is not necessarily correct, and this single statement is not sufficient to counteract the overwhelming impression marshalled above, that Aitolia was a normal Greek state, capable of normally unscrupulous acts. Polybios, given his initial beliefs and assumptions, does provide an ingenious explanation for the Aitolian *stasis*. It is not, however, good enough.

I hope this helps to clear away the same initial beliefs and assumptions which have prevented a proper study of Aitolia so far. I do, of course, intend to replace that interpretation with a different one, which is that the Aitolian League must be taken as a particular and peculiar representative of the Greek states of the Hellenistic period, different from all the rest, but only in that it was individual, not that it was so different as to be wholly predatory. To understand it and its history, the league must be assumed to be more or less normal: it was not a pirate state.

[78] Pol 30.11.1.

PART ONE

ORIGIN AND SURVIVAL

3. THE BEGINNING OF THE LEAGUE (BEFORE 335)

In the beginning were the tribes, their people scattered thinly over the hills and valleys of inland central Greece, with a common sanctuary at Thermos, and a common name to the outside world, Aitolians, but organised politically in tribal groups. Along the valley of the Daphnos river were the Apodotoi, separated from the sea on the Gulf of Corinth by the small cities which filled the lands between the coast and the range of hills, the modern Trikorpho. North of the Apodotoi, in the upper valley of the Euenos river, was the tribe of the Ophioneis, in land higher and more rugged than that of the Apodotoi. The Eurytanes had an even larger and higher territory, blocked on the east by the Vardousa range and on the north by the spur of the Tymbestos which strikes west above Karpenision. They had the upper valleys of the streams which flow into the Migdoros and Acheloos rivers. The middle Acheloos was the land of the Agraioi, and beyond them the Aperantoi occupied the valleys of the streams flowing from the north, including the middle Inarchos valley[1]. Five tribes, all Aitolians.

These lands were poor in agricultural terms, and Thucydides thought the Eurytanes at least were so primitive as to eat raw meat[2]. This at any rate indicates their pastoral nature, just as clearly as it shows the urban, probably Athenian, bias of Thucydides' source. But the Greeks who lived in cities had an atavistic dislike, even fear, of hillmen, and, above all, it was the Aitolians who still carried on the hillmen way of life, nomadic, pastoral, village-centred, more than any other Greek group in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. Indeed, the Greeks of Athens affected not to be able to understand some Aitolian dialects[3] – but then, the Athenians always were snobs. In fact, the Aitolians spoke the same North-West Greek as the Epeirotes and the

[1] Woodhouse, *Aetolia*, is still the best description; also M. Cary, *The Geographical Background to Greek and Roman History*, Oxford 1949, 58-9 and 60-1, very briefly.

[2] Thuc. 3.94.4.

[3] Ibid; cf. M. Lejeune, 'Note sur l'alphabet étolien archaique', *REA* 47, 1945, 110-115, though this is not very forthcoming on the dialect; L. H. Jeffrey, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece*, 2 ed. by W. Johnson, Oxford 1990, 225-227.

Akarnanians, though no doubt with a rural accent. The same prejudice was voiced by Philip V, when he claimed that the Aitolians were not even Greek[4]. Since his own Macedonians were often accused of the same failing, this was probably a reply to Aitolian insults.

This, however, was not the whole of Aitolia. There was also the lake district, a region lower lying than the tribal hills but still cut off from the sea by a range of hills parallel to the coast, the Arakynthos, or Zygos range. Here, round the twelve-mile-long Lake Trichonos and the five-mile-long Lake Angelokastron, were a string of towns, from Thermos, the sanctuary of Apollo at the east, to Agrinion on the west. North of the lakes were the towns of Phistyon, Boukation, and Thestion, south were Phytaion, Trichonos, Lysimacheia, and Arsinoe – these last two having other names originally[5].

All this large area had only three reasonable outlets to the sea: along the valleys of the Acheloos, the Euenos, and the Daphnos rivers. But these rivers, in breaking through the mountain ranges which separate Aitolia from the Gulf of Corinth and crossing the coastal plains, also provided suitable sites for independent cities. Along the coast there were a string of mainly small and unimportant *poleis*, none of which had originally been Aitolian. From west to east they were Oiniadai, an Akarnanian city, on the marshy bay of that name, just west of the mouth of the Acheloos; Proscheion, at the head of the long, narrow, Gulf of Missolonghi, Pleuron and Kalydon, sheltering from the inland under the slopes of Arakynthos; Chalkis, to the east of the Euenos mouth, sharing that river's plain with Kalydon: Makynia and Molykreion, on either side of the ferry point at the cape of Antirrhion[6]; and Naupaktos, the strongest of all these cities, where the Athenians had planted a colony of exiled Messenians after the great helot revolt of 464, and which controlled the mouth of the Daphnos just east of the city[7]. Eastwards from the Daphnos the coast was Lokrian, but the geography was similar: small plains and small cities, until Kirrha, the port for both Amphissa, the main Lokrian city[8], and for Delphi and its great Apollo temple. All these places were independent cities, at least when they were not under the con-

[4] Livy 32.34.4.

[5] Arsinoe had been Konope, according to Strabo 10.2.22; the old name of Lysimacheia is not preserved.

[6] Strabo 10.2.3-6.

[7] Thuc. 1.103.3.

[8] Lerat, *Locriens*, 15-18 and 174-180.

trol of some coloniser, or some imperial city, and were certainly independent of the inland areas to the north. Athens' sponsorship of Naupaktos gave her that city's alliance until the Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian War at the end of the fifth century, and, with it as a well-fortified base, Athens also acquired naval control of the Gulf. Corinth counted Chalkis and Molykreion (and the unlocatable Sollion) as her colonies[9].

These small towns were fair game for any great power which happened along. Athenian power was succeeded by Spartan, and then the Achaians from the opposite coast held Kalydon between the 380s and the 360s, and Naupaktos until 338. Naupaktos was weakened after 369 when the descendants of the original Messenian exiles were summoned 'home' by Epameinondas' refoundation of the Messenian city-state[10], though most had been expelled thirty years before by the Spartans. The Achaians would seem to have been quickest off the mark to grab control; the Aitolians repeatedly attempted to gain control of that city themselves, and repeatedly failed. A joint Spartan-Aitolian attack on Naupaktos in 426 had failed, though they did capture Molykreion, but whether or not the Aitolians held on to the place afterwards is not known[11]. Proscheion is about the only place which was always reckoned to be Aitolian, though after 367 it seems that Kalydon was reckoned to be Aitolian too[12].

Kalydon was actually taken from the Achaians who were in garrison there by the action of Epameinondas of Thebes, during one of his Peloponnesian campaigns, presumably by threatening the Achaian homeland[13]. It is said to have been claimed from him by the Aitolians on the grounds that it was described as Aitolian in the Homeric 'Catalogue of Ships' in the *Iliad*[14]. That Epameinondas accepted this

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[9] Thuc. 1.108.5 (Chalkis), 3.102.2 (Molykreion). and 3.30.1 (Sollion); cf. A. J. Graham, *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece*, 2nd ed., Chicago 1983, 119. Sollion, from Thucydides' words, must be in Akarnania.

[10] Plut. *Pelopidas*, 25.

[11] Thuc. 3.102.1-2.

[12] Strabo 10.2.3 puts Kalydon in 'Old' Aitolia.

[13] Diod. 15.75; Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.6.1.

[14] Homer, *Iliad* 2.638-644, 10, and Scolion B to Iliad 2.494; the Aitolians are said to come from 'Pleuron and Olenos, Pylene, Chalkis by the sea, and rocky Kalydon', and were led by Thrasbon of Andraimon; Meleagros was the Aitolian king. Since Thoas commanded 'forty black ships' these ancient Aitolians are rather different form those of the fourth and later centuries. Cf. H. Simpson and J. F. Lazenby, *The Catalogue of the Ships in Homer's Iliad*, Oxford 1970, 107-110, for a discussion and location of these places; the authors relate the passage to Strabo's discussion (next note).

argument says more about Kalydon's unimportance than about the strength of the Aitolian claim or the authority of Homer. Naupaktos, a well-fortified and moderately powerful city, significantly did not become Aitolian at that time; it was still garrisoned by the Achaians in 338.

There was another claimant. The Akarnanians, a people living in the triangle of land between the Ionian Sea, the Gulf of Ambrakia and the Acheloos river, and who were thus Aitolia's western neighbours, several times attempted to control the narrow land between the Arakynthos and the sea, the territories of Proscheion, Pleuron, and Kalydon. They rarely succeeded, though Oiniadai was their's, and the Acheloos was reckoned to be an Akarnanian river. But the fact that they could lay a colourable claim to such places as Proscheion and Pleuron, and at times, usually by the aid of an ally, could make determined efforts to seize the land, is very suggestive[15]. For what all this demonstrates is, first, the lack of Aitolian power, right through to the 330s, and second, the general consistency of Aitolian claims and aims. This implies the existence of some sort of authority which could speak and act in the Aitolians' name. It is this which has persuaded some that the origin of the Aitolian League should be located about 370, and associated with the work of Epameinondas.

This is a most difficult and controversial area, for the sources are few, awkward, and ambiguous. This is, of course, quite normal in ancient studies. It is therefore necessary to bear in mind all the time that a consideration of the wider context is requisite for a full understanding of the individual sources. In particular, it is necessary to look at what the Aitolians actually did, and at what they did or did not achieve.

In 426 Demosthenes, the Athenian general, was persuaded by the Messenians of Naupaktos that he could invade, even conquer, Aitolia with impunity[16]. It is from these Naupaktians that we have, by way of Thucydides, those libellous stories about Aitolian primitiveness – raw meat eating, and so on. The Aitolian were a threat to Naupaktos, so

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[15] This coast was divided, according to Strabo, into 'Old' and 'Acquired' Aitolia (102.3); another name for the 'Old' part was 'Aiolis'; this is discussed, with references to the literature and the archaeology, by S. Bommelje, 'Aeolis in Aitolia, Thuc. 3.102.5, and the origins of the Aetolian *ethnos*', *Historia* 37, 1988, 297-316; I am relieved to note that I do not need to pronounce on this.

[16] Thuc. 3.94.4.

it was said, and the Naupaktians explained that they could be conquered piecemeal, tribe by tribe, first the Apodotoi, then the Ophionoi, then the Eurytanes, then the rest. On this basis Demosthenes agreed to undertake the campaign[17].

The Aitolians did not co-operate. The attack on the Apodotoi – which the victims knew about before it began – provoked assistance from other tribes and sub-tribes, the Ophionoi, Bomoi, and Kallioi[18]. It was clear that they felt equally threatened – as they were right to. The more distant tribes, especially the Eurytanes, did not send help, though this may have been due to distance and shortage of time. What this amounts to, of course, is a defensive alliance. There is no indication that there was any organisation of either a temporary or a permanent nature higher than that of the tribes. However, the sequel suggests more than a momentary alliance. Once Demosthenes' invasion force had been defeated and driven out, three Aitolians envoys went to Corinth and Sparta to conclude an alliance. These three came from each of the three main tribes, Apodotoi, Ophionoi, Eurytanes[19]. And later the Spartan commander Eurylochos was joined by 'the Aitolian army' in a brief campaign against Naupaktos[20]. There was thus clearly some central authority in Aitolia, though the careful balance implied by the envoys' tribal origins suggests that it was weak; it is not possible to see it as more than a defensive alliance.

Much the same can be said for each of the odd incidents in which Aitolians figure during the next ninety years. An expedition by a thousand Aitolian soldiers into Elis in 402 or 401[21] does not demonstrate anything about Aitolian government, though they presumably went there as a result of a summons from Elis, who asked for help from an allied force to resist Sparta which was intending to chastise the Eleians[22]. They were perhaps volunteers rather than an officially sponsored force. That some sort of authority existed which was capable of passing on Eleian requirements may be inferred, but no more. The various doings of King Agesilaos of Sparta in and about Aitolia during the Korinthian War (394-388) show that the Aitolians were as

[17] Thuc. 3.94.5-95.1.
[18] Thuc. 3.91-98.
[19] Thuc. 3.100.1.
[20] Thuc 3.101-102.
[21] Diod. 14.17.9.
[22] Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.2.21-31.

unorganised as in Demosthenes' time[23]. In 389 they were still hostile to Naupaktos, which was, even after the expulsion of the Messenians, still independent[24]. The repeated references to the Aitolian wish to control Naupaktos show that the Aitolians did not have the power themselves to gain that control. The army which defeated Demosthenes' force in 426 was entirely formed of light infantry, mainly javelin-men using very fluid tactics, and there is no indication that this situation had changed by 389. The Aitolians' weakness clearly left them open to manipulation. Agesilaos seems to have bought his right to march through Aitolia in 389 with a vague promise to help with Naupaktos, but then simply by-passed the city and crossed over to the Peloponnese[25].

A decree of the Athenian assembly dated to the archonship of Polyzelos (367/366) contains a reference to the *koinon* of the Aitolians[26]. This has been taken to mean that the League of the Aitolians existed at that time, and a theory was developed that it had been constructed by the Theban Epameinondas about 370[27]. In that year, the Aitolians are listed by Diodoros Sikulos as allies of Epameinondas[28], though they do not appear in a more convincingly reliable list of those allies provided by the contemporary chronicler Xenophon[29]. So there is no evidence of any weight for seeing Epameinondas' active

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[23] Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.6.1.

[24] Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 4.6.14; the Messenians had been expelled by the Spartans in 401 (Diod. 14.34.2).

[25] Xenophon, Hellenica 4.6.14. At some point an alliance was made by the Spartans with Aitolians. The date of the treaty is much discussed: published first by W. Peek, 'Ein neuer spartanischer Staatsvertrag', *Abhandlung des Sachsischer Akademie des Wissenschaft Leipzig*, Phil.-hist. Classe 65, 3, 1974, 3-15 (= *SEG* 26, 461), and discussed by P. A. Cartledge, 'A new 5th Century Spartan Treaty', *Liverpool Classical Monthly*, 1, 1976, 81-92, D. H. Kelly, 'The New Spartan Treaty', Ibid 3, 1978, 133-141, by Cartledge again, 'The new 5th Century Spartan Treaty again', Ibid 3, 189, and by V. Cozzoli, 'Sul nuovo documento di Alleanza tra Sparta gli Etoli', *Xenia, Scritti in onore de Piero Treves*, Rome, 1985, 67-76. In all the discussion of dating and Spartan scripts and so on, it is not noticed that, although the Spartans headed the inscription as an 'Aitolian alliance', in fact it was an alliance with the 'Erxadies', of whom nothing further is known; they were thus a very minor Aitolian group, scarcely even a tribe. And, for all the discussion, the date remains unclear: from c.450 to c.388 is the generally accepted range, but precision is not possible.

[26] E. Schweigert, 'Greek Inscriptions', *Hesperia* 8 (1939), 3 (pp. 7-12). This is discussed particularly well by M. Sordi, 'Le Origini del koinon etolico', *Acme* 6, 1953, 415-45, an article which underlies all modern work on the subject.

[27] W. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, vol 2, Oxford 1948, 137.

[28] Diod. 15.57.1.

[29] Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.5.22.

involvement in Aitolian affairs. The fact that he promoted a league in Arkadia is not evidence that he did so elsewhere, for the purpose of the League of the Arkadians was clearly pragmatic, not ideological: it was to act as a counter-balance to Spartan power in the Peloponnese. Nearer home, Epameinondas can have had no wish, presumably, to erect a comparable counter-balance close to his own power base, the Theban-dominated Boiotian League. He did, in fact, along with his political ally Pelopidas, deliberately break up Thessalian power by destroying the league there. It would be much more comfortable to have a weak and unorganised Aitolia as a Boiotian neighbour.

The wider context, therefore, must cast doubt on the interpretation of the Athenian decree which sees it as a sign of the existence of the Aitolian League in and before 367/366. In this case, the purpose of the decree was to authorise a herald to go to Trichonos to obtain the release of a group of other heralds who were being detained there in violation of the sacred truce connected to the Eleusinian Mysteries. The herald was clearly to go to Trichonos to obtain the release of his fellows. And the Trichoneians were equally clearly acting on their own. There is no sign that there was an over-arching league structure which could discipline the culprits. The Athenians dealt directly with the Trichoneians.

It was at this same time that Epameinondas was seeing to the removal of the Achaian garrisons from Naupaktos and Kalydon, and the delivery of the latter to the Aitolians[30]. But exactly to whom Kalydon was delivered is unclear. In formal terms, the removal of a garrison would leave Kalydon a free city; it would then be a Kalydonian decision if it was to become 'Aitolian'. This would seem to imply some sort of organisation to join, but what that was cannot be inferred.

Thus the overall context between 426 and after 367/366 is that the Aitolians as a people were incapable of expansion out of their homeland, even to the shores of the Gulf of Corinth, without outside help. The situation in 338, when they were unable to expel the Achaians from Naupaktos without Macedonian assistance, was exactly the same as it had been in 426, 389 and 370. The conclusion must follow that the Aitolians did not have the strength – for they surely, as Demosthenes discovered to his cost, had the numbers – because their political

[30] Diod. 15.75.2.

organisation was either too weak or even non-existent. For, once their league was established and operating, they did find little difficulty in expanding in all directions by capturing cities, and also in surviving by defending themselves against attack and invasion by the most formidable powers in the Greek lands. The only certain acquisition during the ninety years during which we can dimly see actions in which Aitolians took part, was Kalydon, and that was *given* to them by Epameinondas, or at least he set up the situation in which the Kalydonians could make a choice. This implies that, since Proscheion was also Aitolian, in all probability Pleuron was also Aitolian, being sited between Kalydon and Proscheion[31]. But some harder evidence would be welcome, both as to the date and the circumstances of the acquisition, if it actually had occurred. There is no evidence for any further extension of Aitolian control of the coastline of the Corinthian Gulf before 342-338. Access to the sea, therefore, was limited to the harbours of these small cities, none of which were actually on the coast.

In 338, when Naupaktos finally became Aitolian, the league did not yet exist; by 330 or thereabouts, by contrast, the League did exist, and it took action, by capturing the city of Oiniadai, near the mouth of the Acheloos[32]. It was a place as difficult to capture, perhaps, as Naupaktos, less for its strength than for the difficulty of its situation amid swamps and behind lakes. The fact that the Aitolians took that city, in the full knowledge that they were breaking the general peace imposed on Greece by Philip and Alexander of Macedon, is good evidence for a major change having taken place in Aitolian power and confidence. That change was the foundation of a binding and effective league; this thus took place between 338 and 330.

The fact that outsiders, Naupaktians, Athenians, Eleians, had been able to speak of Aitolians as a distinct group for the previous century – and presumably before that as well – provides a limiting factor on the argument I have put forward so far. The Naupaktians made the point to Demosthenes in 426 that the language of the Eurytanes was almost incomprehensible (to the Naupaktians, that is), but they had not made the same point about the tribes nearer to them. Now this may be because the Messenians of Naupaktos spoke their own Doric dialect of Greek, or because they were speaking to an Athenian, but

[31] This is Strabo's 'Old' Aitolia, of course: 10.2.3-4.
[32] Plut. *Alexander*, 49.

the basic points are surely valid: that there was a considerable variation in dialect both between Aitolians and the other Greeks, and within Aitolia itself. This would thus suggest a certain separation from the rest of Greece, and a certain isolation of the tribes from one another. There was also a difference between the uplander pastoralists and the cultivators of the valleys, and between the people of the unwalled villages of those hills and valleys and the townsmen of the lake area and the coastal section called 'Aiolis' and 'Old' Aitolia. The variety within Aitolia is really most striking[33]. Yet the Trichoneian citizens, and the Eurytanian 'raw-flesh-eaters', and the Ophionian hillmen, were all willing to accept the description of themselves as Aitolian, and, as was shown in 426, they were willing to aid each other in defence.

There must, therefore, have been something which reminded them regularly and pleasurably and forcefully of their common identity. The existence of common enemies is unlikely to be sufficient. The Apodotoi in the south east looked longingly at Naupaktos, but there is no reason why the distant Aperantoi in the north west would be very interested, though the prospect of seizing Amphilochian Argos might stir them; the Aiolian coast and the mouth of the Acheloos would attract the townsmen of the lake district, but there was no obvious reason for either the Aperantoi or the Apodotoi to be particularly concerned there. The basic reason is that the land of the Aitolians was large, at least by Greek standards, being seventy kilometres from Kallion in Apodotia to Agrinion on the Acheloos, and much divided by mountains and steep valleys. This is plenty of distance for different geographical preoccupations to act so as to drive these various communities apart. The geographical difficulties in the Apodotoi meeting the Aperantoi were very much greater that those dividing Athenians from Boiotians, or Boiotians from Phokians. In Greek terms they should scarcely have owned the joint name of Aitolians.

It was, probably, the existence of the common sanctuary at Thermos which was the basic binding force of the various communities of Aitolians. While it was not centrally placed in a strictly geographical sense, being somewhat in the south-west corner of Aitolia, it was situated very centrally in social and economic and political senses. It was

[33] Woodhouse, *Aetolia*, is very good on all this; cf. also L. S. Bommelje and P K. Doorn, *Strouza Region Project*, Utrecht, 1981-1985, and L. S. Bommelje, et al., *Aetolia and the Atolians*, Studia Aetolica 1, Utrecht, 1987.

situated where the two main social zones of Aitolia met. To the west and south of the sanctuary was the lowland, arable, urban zone, around the lakes, and to the east and north was the pastoral, rural zone in which the tribes lived. It was at Thermos that both groups could meet without leaving their own social environments, for Thermos was a sanctuary and nothing else, but also neither a city not a village[34]. That is, it was neither city nor country, but partook of both, with the added ingredient of religion, and thus was the meeting place acceptable to both.

The main god of the sanctuary was Apollo, distinguished as 'Thermios', perhaps from a hot spring nearby. It had been a holy place for centuries, from the late Mycenaean period, and a temple had existed there in one form or another since about 1000 BC. Archaeologists can distinguish at least four phases in the temple, rebuilding upon rebuilding, and it has its place in the history of Greek art, for Corinthian-style painting connected with the Archaic temple of about 630 BC was discovered there, and of architecture and architectural decoration. This longevity and stability fits well with the social situation in Aitolia, which seems also to have been an exceptionally stable society from the Archaic period onwards, or even from the Geometric period. The inevitable accompaniments to the sanctuary were regular festivals and games; a market can be further assumed, all the more so since the position of Thermos at the intersection of the two geographical zones, the agricultural and the pastoral, made it an obvious place to exchange the products of those areas, while the sanctuary provided protection for men and goods[35].

The festival, the games, and the market would all require organisation. A priest of the temple to supervise the festival, a president for the games, a legal system and adjudicators to regulate the market: these can all be assumed, and it is probable that this regular meeting

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[34] It is an oddity that only a very few men among all the Aitolians known by name gave his home city as Thermos: see *Prosopography*, 'Origins'.

[35] K. Rhomaios, 'Ek ton prohistorikou thermou', *Arkhaiologikon Deltaion* 1, 1915, 225-79, is the basic archaeological report on the early excavations; see also the British School's 'Archaeological Reports' for 1897-8, 1912-3, 1919-21, 1924-5, and 1931-3; renewed excavations recently are summarised in these 'Archaeological Reports' for 1984 onwards, and in the 'Chronique de Fouilles' in *BCH*: cf also J. H. Croom, 'Artemis Thermia and Apollo Thermios', *Mnemosyne*, 9, (1956), 193-220. An aerial photograph and plan of the site are in R. V. Schroder, *Ancient Greece from the Air*, London 1974, 311-213. C. Antonetti, *Les Étoliens, Image et Religion*, Paris 1990, discusses the seating at 197-210.

would inevitably become the place at which disputes among the Aitolians were settled, all protected by the holiness of the place, and the sacred truce enforced at such times. Since the meetings were relatively brief, perhaps no more than a week in length each time, these officials will have exercised authority both briefly and temporarily[36]. But some sort of organisation for choosing these men must also have existed. This is, no doubt, what the Athenian decree was referring to in resolving to approach the *koinon* of the Aitolians over the problem of the detention of the heralds by the Trichoneians, all the more suitably since their offence was a religious one. Thus the existence of the *koinon* can be accepted, and not necessarily only from c,370, but since time immemorial (for the Thermos sanctuary was effectively extremely ancient, and so presumably was its role as an Aitolian centre). The existence of the *koinon* does not, however, necessarily imply that it had any wider powers, though, as the Athenian decree indicates, it was the obvious body to approach if there was the need to solve a problem between an outsider such as Athens and a group of Aitolians. It would be this same *koinon* which will have organised the envoys sent to Sparta in 426, and the thousand soldiers sent to Elis in 402. All that non-Aitolians needed to know was that the regular meetings at Thermos were the best time to contact Aitolians; an elaborate government system is not thereby also implied.

The regular meetings at the Thermos sanctuary were clearly the basic element in establishing a common Aitolian identity out of the several tribes. It is here that any common decisions which it was possible to take would be taken, though the evidence for such decisions is non-existent. It is here that the decision must have been taken to form a tighter union, a league with a common government. And to do that there must have been either a perceived threat to all of the Aitolians, or a perceived advantage to be gained, or, of course, both of these together and simultaneously, for they are not necessarily alternatives. It was in the course of the various manoeuvres and campaigns of Philip II of Macedon in the period 342-338, which culminated in the battle of Chaironeia and the setting up of the 'League of Corinth', that both of these perceptions were presented to the Aitolians, and the requisite decisions were made.

[36] There is no evidence at this early period for such officials at Thermos; I conjecture them from analogous temples · Delphi, Olympia, and so on.

Philip steadily approached closer to Aitolia from the mid 350s, when his move into Thessaly during the crisis of the Sacred War resulted in his becoming an Aitolian neighbour. Yet for the next ten years he remained somewhat distant. His control of Thessaly itself remained uncertain and disputed until his radical reoganisation of the government of the area in 344[37]. This in turn meant that the neighbouring peoples, those living in the hills which separated the Thessalian plain from Aitolia, the Dolopes, and the Ainianians of the Spercheios valley, came under much closer supervision from Thessaly than before. By 344, in other words, Philip's writ ran as far as Aitolia's northern and eastern borders.

He was next seen to be approaching closer to Aitolia in the northwest as well. In the autumn of 343 he intervened in Epeiros, where he installed his brother-in-law Alexander as king of the Molossi. It seems that he persuaded the Molossi to accept Alexander by promising to extend their territory to the coast of the Ionian Sea. He carried out this promise by ensuring the incorporation of a group of towns around Kassopeia into the kingdom[38]. It was a masterly display of accomplished diplomacy; Philip established Alexander on the throne, ensured his gratitude, and that of his people, and gave that people the extra power they needed to put them into the supreme position amongst the other Epeirote tribes. Thus he ensured a benevolently neutral neighbour. (When Alexander's sister, Philip's termagant wife Olympias, fled with her son to Epeiros in 337, Alexander received them, but would not act for them, nor support them against Philip.)

For the Aitolians, however, this Molossian *coup* was the replacement of a friend by a potential enemy. The previous Molossian king Arybbas had been friendly enough with the Aitolians to be allowed to send his people for refuge in Aitolia when the lands of the Molossi were invaded by Bardylis of the Illyrians[39]. The Aitolians involved were, presumably, the Amphilochians and the Aperantoi, the Molossians' closest neighbours. The close relations implied make it certain that the overthrow of Arybbas in 343 would be unwelcome news in Aitolia.

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[37] On Thessaly, see H. D. Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century BC*, London 1935, and G. T. Griffith's chapter on 'Thessaly, 344-342' in Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 2.523-44; a briefer account is in J. R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism*, London 1976, 137-43.

[38] Dem. 7.32.

[39] Frontinus, *Strategems*, 2.5.79.

In view of what was to be Aitolia's role in the next century and a half, it is worth emphasising that the Aitolians had been quite remarkably peaceful in the generation before 338. So far as we can see no Aitolians were involved in any of the wars of the Greek cities since the King's Peace of 386. Even before that, their involvement had generally been passive and marginal. Agesilaos had marched through Aitolia peacefully. In fact, the last clear evidence of Aitolian militancy before 338 is the small expedition of a thousand Aitolian soldiers into Elis in 402, which was a result of the Spartan alliance provoked by the gratuitous Athenian invasion of 426. This, given the turbulence of Greek political life in that period, is a remarkable record. This is, of course, not to say that life in Aitolia was necessarily peaceful, but it does show that the Aitolians, as a people, were not at that time an aggressive community. They did, however, have their longings and ambitions, not being wholly immune from the expansionist instincts of Greek polities. But their inability to organise themselves except in defence had been clear.

Philip was able to capture the allegiance of the Aitolians with remarkable ease, simply by promising them Naupaktos, which they could not acquire for themselves – and which there is no indication that they had ever attacked. (The Spartans had, in 426, and had promised to do so in 389, without results in either case.) Until 338, Aitolia was a peaceful place, but the previous years had brought international conflict steadily closer. The occupation of Delphi by the Phokian mercenaries during the Sacred War brought the grand conflict between Macedon and Athens to Aitolia's very doorstep. The resolution of that war had left Delphi free, but the Amphiktyonic Council, which exercised authority over the sanctuary, was now effectively under Philip's control[40]. With his reorganisation of Thessaly, his establishment of Alexander the Molossian as a satellite of Macedon in Epeiros, and his new domination of the Amphiktyony, Aitolia had Macedonian power, in a variety of forms, all round its landward borders, except in the west, across the Acheloos in Akarnania. And in 342, in response to the Macedonian-sponsored move of

[40] This was accomplished by the autumn of 346, at the Thermopylai Amphiktyonic meeting, where the membership was reorganised; Delphi became a voting member, bringing yet another Aitolian neighbour into the organisation: cf. Griffith's section 'The Delphic Amphictyony', in Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 2.450-456 and Ellis (note 37) 120-2 and table 3, p. 131-2.

the Molossians into Kassopeia, the Athenians sent an armed expedition to Akarnania, ostensibly to protect Ambrakia, which seemed to be Philip's next target. Certainly an appeal had gone from Ambrakia to its mother-city of Corinth, and Ambrakia was threatened, and so was Akarnania. In the event, whatever Philip's intentions, the arrival of an Athenian force in the west seemed to save the city. For Aitolia it must have been an uncomfortable feeling to find the two great powers of their world steadily approaching their borders, armed and snarling at each other[41].

The Aitolians now found that they were the only uncommitted people in central Greece in the great crisis. Macedon enclosed the land on the north and east, the allies of Athens on the west, and to the south was Lokris Ozoloi, another of Philip's satellites[42], and Naupaktos, garrisoned by Achaians from the Peloponnese[43]. Philip's offer to capture Naupaktos for the Aitolians brought them to his side at once[44]. It was a decision made as much, perhaps, through fear of Philip's closeness and power as by greed for Naupaktos. There was no initiative from the Aitolians in the matter, and such alliance as they made with Philip does not seem to have entailed obligations on the Aitolians' part. There was, after all, little in the way of a central authority among the Aitolians with which Philip could make an agreement. The threat to Naupaktos, of course, immediately alienated the Achaians, who proved to be sufficiently annoyed to join the Athenian alliance next year[45] – and this may well have been Philip's purpose. But neither the Achaians nor the Aitolians were particularly keen on deeper involvement in the conflict. An Aitolian delegation went to Thebes late in 339 with a group of Philip's satellites to try to dissuade the Boiotians from joining Athens[46], but they sent no troops to assist Philip at Chaironeia next year. The Achaians, however, did send troops to join the allies, and suffered badly in the battle.

Nevertheless Philip carried out his promise, and at some time later

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[41] [Dem.] 48.24-26 (Akarnania) and 9.34 (Ambrakia).

[42] This is evident from their role in the provocation of the Amphissa war in 340-339: Aeschines 2116.

[43] Dem. 91.34.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Achaians fought at Chaironeia in the centre of the Greek line (Paus 7.6.5); it is reasonable to infer that Philip's threat to their hold on Naupaktos was one of the stronger reasons for their joining the alliance; Dem. *On the Crown* 237, names Achaia as an Athenian ally.

[46] Philochoros, *FGH* 328, F 56.

in 338 Naupaktos became Aitolian. The process was apparently peaceful, for the word used by Strabo to describe it is that Philip 'adjudged' the city to Aitolia[47]. This must describe a quasi-legal procedure. Both Aitolians and Achaians had claims to the city, and presumably Philip sat in judgement on those rival claims. But the real judgement had, of course, been the existence of Philip's army at his back, his earlier promise of the city to the Aitolians, and the defeat of the Achaians at Chaironeia. This judgement clearly happened after Chaironeia, that is, after August of 338, but before Philip's campaign into the Peloponnese in the autumn, when it developed that he had changed his mind. It seems, however, that Philip had taken the city before the battle; no doubt the Achaian garrison was withdrawn to form part of the contingent sent to join the allies[48].

The acquisition of Naupaktos – it was rapidly garrisoned by an Aitolian force – also presumably involved the Aitolian acquisition of the small towns lying to the west of the city, between it and Kalydon, which was already Aitolian: Makynia, Molykreion, and Chalkis. This is the area which Strabo designated as Aitolia Epiktetos, 'Acquired' Aitolia[49]. The first of these places was certainly Aitolian by 329/8, when a Delphian decree was passed in honour of an 'Aitolian from Makynia'[50]. This is also, as it happens, one of the key inscriptions concerning the foundation of the full league machinery.

This series of events, crowded into a few years, which culminated in the acquisition of Naupaktos, brought the Aitolians fully into the international arena. They also compelled the Aitolians to develop their league to the point where it could speak for them, as it did at Thebes in 339, where it could speak for the Aitolians as a whole with a foreign power, as with Philip in 338, and where it could take over a city, as it did at Naupaktos in 338, with some hope of maintaining control over it. The existence of a garrison of Aitolians there presupposes an organisation to which the soldiers were responsible, and who could provide them with pay, and which could thus collect taxes. All this presupposes an active and accepted governmental machinery. In other words, it was the pressure of outside events, impingeing steadily closer, combined with the prospect of a gain in wealth and power,

[47] Strabo 9.4.7; also Dem. 9.44; Paus. 7.6.5.
[48] Theopompos, *FGH* 115, F 235.
[49] Strabo 10.2.3.
[50] *IG* XI(2).1.13 line 21.

which forced the growth of an active league. Indeed, it may well be that it was Philip himself who insisted on dealing with a central authority and who thus forced that growth. Yet each of these elements, by itself, would not do the trick. The delegation sent to Thebes in 339, even if its members spoke in the name of the Aitolians, would not necessarily carry much weight, nor is it necessary to assume that it was authorised by a government of any importance – Aitolian alliances had been made before, without the existence of a league being required. The Aitolian absence from the battle line at Chaironeia was probably due more to Philip's determination to win the battle with his own men, and so to be able to go to the peace conference with as little in the way of obligations to any allies as possible; equally, it may have been due to his realistic appreciation of the small value of Aitolian military assistance. But he did hand over Naupaktos, and this, it seems to me, must have been decisive for the formation of the league.

For the acquisition of Naupaktos by the Aitolians necessitated several decisions being made by that people. The city was, by definition, hostile, and its people were likely to remain so for some time. It would, therefore, need to be garrisoned, and that garrison would need to be recruited, commanded, instructed, and paid, all of which could only be done by an established and reasonably stable government. The city would need to have some sort of government imposed on it, or at least recognised by the Aitolians – another job for an Aitolian authority. The Naupaktians would also need to be persuaded that being Aitolian was to their advantage, a task which was not one to be accomplished instantly, and the linking of an important city with fairly primitive tribes, with which communication was difficult, was not the best way to start that process of persuasion. The citizens, those who remained – for no doubt some would prefer to leave – would need to see among the Aitolians a rather more sophisticated governmental system than the annual and brief Thermos festival and games, where disputes could be settled, but which was scarcely a suitable method of continuing administration and diplomacy.

It therefore seems likely that the need to have some authority which could speak for the Aitolians as a whole in the newly dangerous international world after 346, when the great powers came steadily and menacingly closer to Aitolian territory, was the initial impulse which began the process of developing a league government; then the acquisition of Naupaktos and the need to take awkward

decisions and maintain those decisions over time, combined with the continuing international pressures after 338, meant that the infant government system would have to grow into a full-fledged system during the 330s[51].

This new government was not accomplished easily. In fact, it seems that no sooner had the agreement over Naupaktos been completed by its delivery to Aitolia than the Aitolians and Philip became hostile to one another. This would not be surprising; indeed, it may be doubted that their mutual feelings were ever anything but hostile; the alliance had certainly not been particularly warm. Philip's career had made him inevitably suspicious of the development of any political entity of any power on his southern border, and Aitolia's new unity presupposed a similar suspicion towards all its neighbours. The basic political geography had not changed with the battle of Chaironeia and the delivery of Naupaktos; in fact, from Aitolia's point of view, it had got worse. Such counter-balancing pressure as had come from Thebes and Athens had now vanished, or at least was severely reduced. To the west Philip had now managed to get a garrison into Ambrakia, a move which Aitolians could only regard with fear and suspicion. Philip was, it must have seemed, tightening his noose.

This developing hostility was clearly dangerous to Philip in his attempts at imposing a settlement on Greece before he could set off on his projected invasion of the Akhaimenid empire. This settlement took some time to work out. The Chaironeia battle was in August 338, the League of Corinth was formed, and the various arrangements thus accomplished, early in 337, say in March[52]. It will have been during this brief period that a decree giving honours to the Aitolians was passed by the Amphiktyonic League at Delphi[53]. This was an organisation now under effective Macedonian control, and

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[51] It will be evident from this discussion that the precise date of the foundation of the league is not known A variety of dates have therefore been suggested, for which see Sordi 'Origini', 419. The elimination of Schweigert's hypothesis of Epameinondas' foundation, and the recognition that the Athenian decree published by him is not evidence for the full-blown league, means that we are once more pushed back to the period of Philip and Alexander. Larsen *GFS*, 78-80, argues that a central government system existed 'before the King's Peace' of 386, but his discussion, full of uncertainties, in fact only highlights the complete absence of existence for any central authority.

[52] See the Chronological Table in Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 2.726.

[53] J. Bousquet, 'Les Aitoliens à Delphes au IVe siècle', *BCH* 81, 1957, 485-495.

the decree may be taken as a sign of the good relations between the Aitolian League – it was a collective honour – and Philip. It was during that period of six or seven months that the original Aitolo-Macedonian alliance disappeared, and open hostility took its place, with disastrous results for the new Aitolian League.

Perhaps the first signal that all was not well with the friendship came from Akarnania. After Philip had seized Ambrakia, Akarnania was the only land neighbour of Aitolia's not under his control or influence. The pro-Athenian politicians who had been in power in Akarnania since at least the time that Philip's power had encroached on Kassopeia and had threatened Ambrakia, were overthrown after Athens' defeat at Chaironeia. Pro-Macedonian politicians now moved into the positions of power, and their opponents went into exile. Some of the exiles fled to Athens, where they were given official refuge[54]. Others went to Aitolia[55], and the fact that Aitolia welcomed them is a powerful indication of Aitolian unease, for hostility between Aitolia and Akarnania was old and deep-seated. The almost simultaneous installation of a Macedonian garrison in Ambrakia meant that Aitolia was thus now completely encircled by states under Philip's effective control. The fact that the Akarnanian exiles chose to go to Aitolia indicates that they knew that they would gain refuge there, just as those who went to Athens were confident of a welcome there. So Aitolian suspicions of Philip were already known in Akarnania soon after Chaironeia, presumably almost immediately after the transfer of Naupaktos.

Philip spent the autumn of 338, after Chaironeia, in the Peloponnese. Attention was inevitably focussed on Sparta and Arkadia, but Philip was ever concerned to conciliate his defeated enemies, and in the Peloponnese they included the Achaian League, formed of a string of small cities along the northern Peloponnesian coast, who had been deprived of Naupaktos already. It will have been made clear to Philip – he probably saw it instantly without being told, for his mastery of the art of international politics was well-developed – that the way to Achaian hearts was by way of a restoration of Naupaktos. It was perhaps as dear to the Achaians as Amphipolis and Samos were to Athenians, all the more so after it had been lost. By the end of the Peloponnesian

[54] Tod (note 27), 178.

[55] This is a necessary conclusion from the fact that the Aitolians restored the Akarnanians later (Diod. 17.111.3).

campaign, therefore, Philip will have known that he faced a choice once more, either Aitolia or Achaia, and that it was Naupaktos which held the key. Both leagues, at the end of the campaign, were hostile to him. The stronger of the two, and this will have come as a disagreeable surprise, was Aitolia. Its new strength, and its new confidence (as shown by the reception of the Akarnanian refugees) was the result of two things: the formation of their new League, and the possession of Naupaktos. Faced with the choice between them, it will have been Philip's instinct to break the stronger and thus bind the weaker to him.

In 337 Philip and the Achaians together attacked Naupaktos. Its Aitolian garrison resisted, and when the city was taken, the soldiers were put to the sword, including Pausanias, its commander[56]. This garrison can only have been Aitolians, placed in the city, and Pausanias appointed, by the Aitolian League. This will have taken place before the final agreement on the treaty which simultaneously established the Common Peace in Greece and set up the League of Corinth. For this new league included the Aitolians within it, as it did every Greek state except the Spartans, but it seems that it was the individual tribes who were members, not the Aitolian League itself. This is difficult, for the section of the inscription recording the names of the participants in the Corinthian League is heavily damaged. At one point there is a list of tribal names linked together: '[the Oit]aians and the Malians and [.....]raians and the Dolopes: 5', where the number gives the voting strength of this group in the council of the league. The space has been filled by various conjectures, but it is reasonable to conclude that it held two names, the second ending in '..raians'. The general conclusion is that the name is '[Ag]raians', though there is no agreement on the previous name[57]. If '[Ag]raians' is correct, then we have evidence for Philip's further moves after the recovery of Naupaktos for the Achaians, for the Agraians were an Aitolian tribe, and if they were nembers of the Corinthian League as a tribe, then the Aitolian League itself was not a member and had been dissolved[58].

By itself this is not conclusive. The restoration cannot be definitive,

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[56] *Suda* Z 742 (Adler): Zenobios VII 33; Theopompos *FGH* 115 F 235; the discussion by A. B. Bosworth, 'Early Relations between Aetolia and Macedon', *AJAH* 1, 1976, 164-81, is essential and convincing.

[57] Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* III, 403, is the best modern edition; cf. also Tod (note 27) 177, whose restorations are very adventurous.

[58] Tod 177 restores '[Aitolians 5, Akarnani]ans 2', before Ambrakiots, but Schmitt does not, and indeed it is not more than a guess, without any evidential foundation.

though it is difficult to find an alternative. The battered and broken nature of the stone means that the name 'Aitolians' could have been inscribed somewhere else, and the absence of the name in what remains is no indication of their absence from the league – the Athenians are not named in the existing fragments, but we know they were members. Further, the Agraians might not have been members of the Aitolian League. They were usually reckoned to be Aitolians[59], but that does not mean they were necessarily in the league from the start; they are known to have had their own king in the fifth century[60], as did the Epeirote tribes to their north, and the Athamanes. It is possible that they were in the Corinthian League because they were not in the Aitolian League (and that the league was a separate member). The list in which their names may appear is geographically mainly of tribes whose lands were to the east of the Pindos range: Dolopes, Malians, Oitaians; into this group the Agraians fit rather awkwardly, though if they were on their own, this may have seemed simply convenient for the organisers. And if the Aitolian League had been broken up by Philip it may have made sense to put the various Aitolian elements into different groups as a means of further separating them. All of which is to say that there is no certainty here.

To this uncertainty may be added, however, one further indication which helps towards a decision. Greece remained quiet after the murder of Philip, until a rumour spread that his successor Alexander had been killed in a campaign in the north. Thebes rebelled, and was expected to get support from Athens, Sparta, other Peloponnesians, and from the Aitolians, according to Arrian[61]. Alexander's superb march from Illyria along the mountains and through Thessaly in a fortnight effectively prevented anyone from providing real assistance, and Thebes then went down to utter destruction alone. Rapid action was therefore then needed by all those who had so much as hinted at any sort of anti-Macedonian activity to forestall Alexander's further vengeance. The Aitolians, amongst others, at once sent conciliatory embassies to the newly victorious king, and these embassies came from the individual tribes, as Arrian explicitly reports[62]. It is thus reasonable to suppose that at this time no league existed.

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[59] Strabo 10.2.5 and 3.6; *IG* IX(2).I.3 (= Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* III, 480).
[60] Thuc. 3.3.4.
[61] Arrian, *Anabasis* 1.7.4.
[62] Arrian, *Anabasis*, 1.10.2.

The sequence of Aitolian history during these years was thus as follows: a politically effective league was in existence by 338, when Naupaktos was taken over from Philip by the Aitolians, and it was probably organised a year or two before that date. The enhancement of Aitolian power which thereby appeared roused Philip's suspicions, and, in combination with the Achaians, he retook Naupaktos in 337, killed the Aitolian soldiers taken there, and broke up the league. In the membership of the League of Corinth the evidence is ambiguous, but the context implies that any Aitolians who were members were there as tribes not as the league. In 335, when Alexander sacked Thebes, the Aitolians submitted to him by tribes, so the league did not exist at that time. But between 337 and 335 another brief item is known, which suggests that the league had in fact been reconstituted.

The occasion, of course, was Philip's assassination in October 336. On receiving the news the Aitolians 'voted to restore' the Akarnanians who had come to them after Chaironeia[63]. Since this action might, so far as they could know, result in Macedonian hostility, the decision seems likely to have been one taken by the restored League. The conciliatory behaviour of Alexander in his first months as king – he forgave the Ambrakiots for expelling their Macedonian garrison, which had occurred at the same time as the Aitolian vote, by saying he had intended to withdraw it anyway[64] – would thus imply that the restored league had gained his acceptance. But this would last only so long as Alexander permitted it. The news of the destruction of Thebes was sufficient indication to the Aitolians that their league was no longer acceptable. To prevent a Macedonian attack the league would seem to have voluntarily dissolved.

In other words, in 335, after Thebes, the Aitolians were no longer organised as a league, since this was clearly something which the Macedonian rulers could not accept. The tribal embassies seem to have been obsequious enough to avoid further punishment at the time, and the Aitolians, after all, had only *voted* to do something and perhaps had not yet got round to doing it, and had broken up their league. Alexander was also anxious to avoid building too great a sense of resentment, just like his father. One might, however, be machiavellian about this, and go further. It just might be that these

[63] Diod. 17.3.3.
[64] Diod. 17.3.4 and 17.4.3; Aeschines, *In Ctesiphon*, 160-161.

tribal embassies were a blind, by whom Alexander was to be hoodwinked into believing that the league had been dissolved when it was actually continuing. However, this is perhaps an unnecessary conjecture, since the practical effect would have been the same: by pretending that the league did not exist, it did effectively cease to exist. For the only diplomatic relationship which mattered now was that with Alexander, and if he believed that the league had been dissolved, then it had been. The lesson of Thebes was clear, and the various revolutions which followed it – of which Aitolia saw one – ensured that most of the rest of the states of Greece were ruled by pro-Macedonians.

The Aitolian League thus had had an uncertain start. Based upon a longlasting feeling of common identity, which was articulated in the use of the common sanctuary at Thermos, the league came into political existence during the years in which Philip of Macedon established his power in central and southern Greece. The consolidation of power which this new league represented was at first congenial to Philip, who encouraged it by seeing to the acquisition of Naupaktos by the new league. This means that the league had been formed by 338, the date of his promise, but there is no sign of its earlier existence. Naupaktos having been gained, however, the league soon became a menace. Philip's new power, combined with the realpolitik needs of Philip himself, led to a reversal of positions. Philip now allied with the Achaians, and together they recovered Naupaktos from the Aitolians, and Philip insisted on the dissolution of their league. Therefore the league did not exist when the Corinthian Assembly organised the Greek alliance with Macedon. However, the advantages of their own league had become clear to the Aitolians as a whole by now. Their anti-Macedonian sympathies were fixed by their deprivation of Naupaktos in 337, when refugee anti-Macedonian Akarnanians were also given shelter, and again in 335 when Aitolians as a whole were implicated in the general movement against Alexander which came to an abrupt end at Thebes. The end of the Aitolian League had meant that it was the individual tribes who were members of the Greek Assembly, and it was those tribes who sent embassies to beg Alexander'e forgiveness in 335. Thus the league had so far had only a brief existence, between c.339 or 338 and 337, and perhaps in 336-335, and so long as the Macedonian ruler wished it could not be revived.

However, the power of the ruler of Macedon to issue orders to other

states depended on his military strength, and in the next year that was to be significantly reduced. Alexander's Persian expedition progressively reduced the direct military power in his kingdom by demanding repeated drafts of reinforcements[65]. His viceroy Antipatros was left with no more than 13,500 soldiers available by about 332[66]. When Agis III of Sparta began a new war in 331, however, Antipatros was able to use the machinery of the Greek Alliance to drum up reinforcements from the Greek cities, who had no wish to support a Spartan, even against a Macedonian[67], and in the decisive battle Antipatros commanded 40,000 men against Agis' force of only half that.

This war was fought in 331. Aitolia did not take part on either side. Given the hostility of the Aitolians towards Macedon it is perhaps not surprising that they should not provide troops for Antipatros, but one might expect them to take advantage of Antipatros' preoccupation or even to join in Agis' insurrection. In fact, it is likely that they did use this crisis, but with a determined regard for their own interests and advantages which, it will be seen, was to be characteristically Aitolian. By the next year, 330, the Aitolian League was in existence once more, for it can only have been a league action which led to their capture of Oiniadai which took place in that year. Between 335, when the league did not exist, and 330, when it did, there is really only one occasion when Antipatros and Macedon were in a position to be forced to concede permission for the league to be revived – for it must have taken place with Antipatros' acquiescence. In this connection, there is a comment in Plutarch's life of Alexander that Antipatros made a secret agreement with the Aitolians[68]. It is dated by Plutarch after the 'conspiracy' of Philotas (in 331) and after the capture of Oiniadai (perhaps in 330)[69], and is described as, first

[65] A. B. Bosworth, 'Alexander the Great and the Decline of Macedon', *JHS* 106 (1986), 1-12; for details of the manpower withdrawn from Macedon see D. W. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, Berkeley, Calif., 1978, tables 4-6, pp. 146-52.

[66] Diod. 17.17.5.

[67] Diod. 17.62.6-63.3.

[68] Plut. *Alexander*, 49; this secret alliance has been widely doubted, but Plutarch is quite specific about it. The real problem is in explaining it.

[69] Ibid, includes the fact in a collection of bits and pieces in connection with the killings of Philotas and Parmenio; the Oiniadai capture is thus technically undated, but it could scarcely be earlier than 331, and the disturbances connected with Agis' war are the most likely period for it.

secret negotiations, and then an alliance between the two. If this sequence is correct, then the Aitolian League had first been reactivated, then had captured and destroyed Oiniadai, then Antipatros had negotiated and made an alliance with the league. One would suppose that Antipatros' actions were a result of the re-emergence of the league – though Plutarch actually connects the negotiations with the Philotas affair.

The insurrection of Agis will certainly have provided the Aitolians with the opportunity to reconstitute their league, but the fact that they then went on to capture – and destroy – the Akarnanian Oiniadai without any hostile reaction from Antipatros rather implies that Antipatros had approved the Aitolians' actions. Akarnania had been anti-Macedonian from the 340s, and a movement in favour of Agis there is perhaps likely enough – both the Arkadians and the Eleians joined him, and Elis is only across the Gulf of Corinth from Akarnania. Perhaps the exiles voted to be restored by Aitolia in 335 had actually gone home and seized power. I would therefore postulate an agreement between Antipatros and Aitolia to deal with Akarnania while he attended to Agis, and that Aitolia's price was the revival of their league, and the possession of Oiniadai. This would also be a sensible basis for the later alliance of the league and the regent, attested by Plutarch.

It is no argument against this interpretation that Alexander made a vow to restore the Oiniadans, and that he would punish the Aitolians[70]. Indeed it is perhaps an argument in its favour, for by this time Alexander and Antipatros were deeply suspicious of one another, in part because of the Philotas affair, which had led to the murder of Antipatros' old colleague Parmenio, but also because Alexander was unable to bear the thought of a victorious rival, and Antipatros' victory over Sparta counted for more in Greek eyes than any number of victories over Asian barbarians. If Antipatros permitted the Aitolian League to revive, it would be all the more in Alexander's interest to destroy it, both as a threat to Macedon, and as a way of undermining Antipatros.

There must be some surprise, though, that it was Oiniadai which was the Aitolian target. Naupaktos was surely much more tempting. And most of the Achaian League joined Agis in his war[71] so Aitolia

[70] Ibid.

[71] Curtius Rufus, *History of Alexander* 6.1.

and Antipatros would be able to agree instantly that Aitolia should attack Achaian Naupaktos if the suggestion was made. Revenge for the loss of that city, and for the killing of the Aitolian garrison, was surely one of the strongest emotions behind the wish to reconstitute the league. At some point in the next fifty years Naupaktos did become Aitolian once more, but exactly when is unknown. All that is known is that an inscription at Kassandreia of about 280 mentions a man from 'Aitolia from Naupaktos'[72]. The city could have joined the Aitolians at any time before then back to 330 or so, but the odds must be on an early recapture. It was clearly high on the Aitolian agenda after recent events, and the Agian war was the first, and the best, opportunity the league had for retaking the city. I suggest, therefore, that Naupaktos became Aitolian again in 331 or 330, at the same time as Oiniadai was captured, and both did so by agreement with Antipatros and that the league was revived at that time as well, with retrospective acceptance by Antipatros.

This second reconstitution of the Aitolian League (or the third, if it had revived briefly in 336-335), which thus took place in 331 or 330, proved to be definitive. Not until the final depopulation of Aitolia by Rome in the first century BC was the league to cease to exist. In the process of coming into existence, however, the Aitolians had made enemies of three neighbours: the Macedonian kingdom, the Achaian League, and the Akarnanians. Just as the origin of the league can be seen in the threat to Aitolia which was posed to it by the great powers of the 340s, and the encirclement by Philip which resulted, so the existence of the league was seen by those neighbours to constitute a threat to them. The pattern of the history of the Aitolian League was set in the very circumstances of its birth.

[72] *Syll* (3) 380.

4. SURVIVAL (330-300)

The Aitolian League's continued existence after its seizure of Oiniadai was precarious. It depended on the forbearance of Antipatros. His king, Alexander, is recorded as having promised to restore the Oiniadan fugitives to their city, and, in addition, to punish Aitolia, supposedly making the threat as early as he heard of the conquest, though it may actually have been made later[1]. That threat could only mean that Alexander intended another deconstruction of the league. If he wished to be legalistic, Alexander could point to the clause in the treaty which had set up the Greek alliance at Corinth, by which it was forbidden to alter the political complexion of a member state[2] and as *hegemon* Alexander was responsible for putting right any such change. So Aitolia had two counts against it: political change, and aggression. This would surely be enough for the Macedonians to remove the league from the scene.

Antipatros may have failed to prevent these developments for a whole variety of reasons. The one favoured by conspiracy theorists is that he and Alexander were developing rival sets of Greek allies, with a view to an internal Macedonian contest in the future[3]. It seems an unlikely idea in itself, and there is little or no evidence for it. Antipatros always acted as a Macedonian patriot, and it is usually best to take his actions as extensions of his inner beliefs. His failure to oppose Aitolia can be explained by other theories, above all by his shortage of manpower. He had been able to muster a Greek coalition against Sparta, an old enemy to many, but to do so against Aitolia would be more difficult. At the same time his alliance with the league was also a way of exercising control over it. But there is no doubt that the Aitolians had cause to fear Alexander, if and when he should return to Europe.

In this, of course, the Aitolians were by no means alone. Indeed

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[1] Plut. *Alexander* 49.

[2] Schmitt, *Staatsverträge*, III, 405, lines 12-14.

[3] Mendels, 'Aetolia', 129-80, adopts this as an explanation for the events in his first period (331-320); it goes back essentially to Curtius Rufus, who was using the politics of the time of the Emperor Tiberius to explain internal events in Alexander's empire.

Antipatros may have had good reasons to fear Alexander's return himself, if only because his military ability, his prestige and his victories might detract from Alexander's own glory. Yet this is far from a reasonable basis for imagining that Antipatros planned a rebellion. For the Aitolians, the longer Alexander's return was delayed, the firmer would be the Aitolian League, and the more likely it would be that other Greek states would become impatient of Macedonian domination. The other Greek state threatened by Alexander's return was Athens, and it may have been, in fact, that the restiveness of some of the Athenian politicians drew the attention of the Aitolians, though it is more likely that it was the Athenians who initiated contact by searching for possible allies. Contact between the two, on the initiative of Athens, began, so it seems, in the first half of 324, when Alexander had returned from India, had made his headquarters at Babylon, and was clearly intending to return to Macedon in the near future. The visits of the mercenary leader Leosthenes to both Athens and Aitolia seem to have taken place before the Olympic games of that year[4], and it was his diplomacy which brought the two states closer. But it was the publication, at those games, of Alexander's 'decree' ordering that Greek political exiles be allowed to return to their cities[5], which threw Aitolians and Athenians together politically and chrystallised these approaches into an alliance.

Alexander picked out these two states for particular attention: Athens must restore the Samian exiles, Aitolia the Oiniadans[6]. This was clearly deliberate, for several reasons. Both were whole city-populations in exile, not just relatively small political groups who could be fairly easily integrated, and so they would be especially difficult cases. But, above all, the two culprits were the two most powerful states in Greece, outside Macedon. Agis' war had destroyed Spartan power, at least for the present. Of the other states with real power, Athens had a navy capable (as the next year would show) of challenging Alexander's own fleet, and both Athens and Aitolia could put formidable numbers

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[4] Diod. 17.111.3; this has been connected with a fragmentary inscription, *IG* II(2) 370, which certainly records an alliance of Athens and Aitolia, but nothing else; cf F. W. Mitchell, 'A Note on *IG* II(2) 370', *Phoenix* 10, 1964, 13-17, and I. Worthington, *IG* II(2) 370 and the Date of the Athenian alliance with Aitolia', *ZPE* 57, 1984, 139-44; in fact, the inscription is quite undatable.

[5] Diod. 17.109.1 and 18.8.3-5: Curtius Rufus, *History of Alexander*, 10.2.4; Justin 13.5.2-4.

[6] Diod. 18.8.6-7.

of soldiers into action. The next two states with real power were Achaia and Arkadia, and both were the recipients of a particular message from Alexander, which may well have been a preliminary to their dissolution – both, like Aitolia, being leagues[7]. That is to say, the basic intention behind Alexander's various measures of 324 was to destroy the most powerful remaining political entities in Greece. For a Macedonian king this was an intelligent policy, but one which only he, in person, and commanding the full power of the Macedonian state, could hope to accomplish. In fact, it begins to seem as though the 'exiles decree' was a deliberate attempt to provoke Athens and Aitolia to hostility, so that they could be defeated in isolation. Perhaps also Alexander hoped that Antipatros would have to bear the brunt of the early fighting. Alexander could then ride in to finish the job, Antipatros' reputation having been destroyed.

The relative power-balance was obvious to contemporaries. Rather than leap to arms they resorted to secret contacts with each other, and to sending pre-emptive envoys to Alexander. Some sent congratulations, and the Eleians, Delphi, Epidauros, and Corinthians are in this group; others sent envoys expressly concerning the operation of the exiles' decree[8]; it seems clear that two of those must have been the states most severely affected, Athens and Aitolia. At the very least, they could avoid doing anything to implement the decree while their envoys travelled to Babylon and back and negotiated there. Similarly, Antipatros was neutralised by the news that his replacement, Krateros, was on his way. Meanwhile he could do nothing to enforce the exiles' decree, while it was the subject of diplomacy and negotiation at Babylon, even if he had wished to.

Aitolia's policy was, no doubt, aimed first of all at self-preservation in a world which had grown suddenly very much more dangerous. The death of Alexander in mid-323 did not alter the danger to the league, nor even the direction from which it came, but it did enlarge the possibilities for action. The absence of Alexander's military genius, combined with the absence of the great bulk of the Macedonian forces in Babylonia, and the difficulties attendant on the confused and disputed succession meant that another opportunity existed to expel Macedonian power from Greece. Given that opportunity, the

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[7] Hypereides, *Demosthenes*, col 18; cf. A. B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, Cambridge, 1988, 221-222,

[8] Diod. 17.113.3; Arrian, *Anabasis* 7.19.1-2 and 23.2.

Aitolians exhibited another of their enduring characteristics: the ability to break off from an alliance at a moment's notice if it suited the league's interests. The friendship with Antipatros ended the moment the news of Alexander's death arrived, for Antipatros now represented the real power of the Macedonian state, and no advantage could be gained from his friendship. Instead a formal alliance was now struck with Athens, where the anti-Macedonian politicians seized the moment to persuade the Assembly to declare war[9].

It seems clear that it was only the prospect of a firm alliance with a powerful state like Athens which persuaded the Aitolians to go to war. Leosthenes is said to have gone to Aitolia and persuaded them, presumably carrying news and encouragement from Athens. He then led the Aitolian forces, 7,000 men, to occupy Thermopylai[10], so blocking the main route south, and so also sheltering Athens. But there must have been other diplomatic moves before this. To get to the pass from Aitolia it was necessary for their troops to cross the territory of the Malians, the Dorians, or the Oitaians, depending on the route chosen, and then to occupy part of the land of the Opuntian Lokrians. In fact it seems most likely that the Aitolian army would cross between Mounts Oita and Korax, into the Dryas valley, this being the shortest route. But they could not use any of these routes without the prior agreement of the inhabitants, nor would the league be happy at the thought of, say, Phokis, being hostile while the Aitolian army was far from home, and so cutting communications, perhaps threatening to invade, and being diplomatically active in hostility. No Aitolian army had ever moved outside the league boundaries before – except to conquer Oiniadai. It would be reasonable to assume caution on the part of the league, and that some preliminary diplomacy had taken place with Aitolia's eastern neighbours, aimed, at the least, at ascertaining attitudes[11].

It seems clear also that no Aitolian soldier set out from home until the Athenians had made a definite move, and so committed

[9] For the causes of the war, cf. W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens* 11-28, E. Lepore, 'Leostene e la origini della guerra lamaica', *La Parola del Passato* 10, 1955, 161-185; Will, *Histoire Politique*, 1.29-30; the Athenian origin of the ancient material has meant that Athens has been seen as the source of the war; Aitolian participation is downplayed.

[10] Diod. 18.9.5 and 11.5.

[11] Diod. 18.9.5: the diplomacy is attributed to Leosthenes by Diodoros, but this does not alter the argument.

themselves. The Athenian force had a greater distance to travel, through Boiotia, which was hostile to Athens, being under the control of the pro-Macedonian party, and they were held up near Plataia by a Boiotian force[12], which clearly had had warning of the Athenian intentions; the Boiotians had to mobilise and march to their southern borders to block the Athenian move. But that Boiotian force was ranged against the Athenians to the south, not against the Aitolians to their west and north. It is thus clear that the Athenians had moved first, though they had obviously received assurances from Aitolia before moving. But the Aitolians waited until Athens was publicly committed before Leosthenes could lead them to Thermopylai – after presumably negotiating with Phokis and Lokris and others. The Athenians contributed 5,000 hoplites, 500 Athenian cavalry, and 2,000 mercenaries[13]. This clearly explains the Aitolian strength of 7,000 infantry: each state contributed half the strength of the army, with Athens adding its cavalry, which the Aitolians probably did not have. It seems unnecessary to look further to discover reasons for the Aitolian numbers. There is no suggestion that this was their full muster[14].

Once these two powerful states were committed, the list of allies grew. There are in fact two lists in the sources. One, preserved in Pausanias, is clearly Athenian in origin, and lists cities in the Peloponnese, and the Lokrians, Phokians, and Thessalians in central Greece, with 'the Akarnanians of the Aitolian League'[15]. The other list is in Diodoros and includes only some of the Peloponnesians, but a much longer list of peoples of northern and central Greece: the Oitaians, Phthiotic Achaians, Akarnanians of Alyzoi, Dolopes, Athamanes, Molossi, some Illyrians and some Thracians, the island of Leukas, as well as the Lokrians, Thessalians, and Phokians who are in Pausanias' list[16]. It seems likely that these two lists reflect the separate diplomatic endeavours of the two allies. The Aitolians could make a good appeal to the northern tribes, largely because of their similar proximity to Macedon, and perhaps their similar lifestyle; Athens had longstanding ties with cities such as Argos and Troizen and Messene in the Peloponnese.

[12] Diod. 18.11.3-5.

[13] Diod. 18.11.3; cf. Mendels, 'Aetolia', 151.

[14] Justin 13.5.8 claims that Athens contributed 30,000 men and 200 ships to the common army; this may well be the full total of the allied armed forces, or it may be Athens' contribution of military and naval personnel.

[15] Paus. 1.25.3-5 (partially repeated in Justin 13.5.1).

[16] Diod. 18.10.5-11.2.

The omissions from this list are equally instructive. Many of these peoples were divided: for example, the Pelinnaians among the Thessalians and the Lamians among the Malians did not support the allies; the Herakleians and Lamians were, no doubt, under Macedonian occupation. But certain states are also missing, the Achaians of the Peloponnese, for example, whose hostility to Aitolia may be used as an explanation. The occurrence of Akarnanians in both lists is also curious. The Athenian list has 'the Akarnanians of the Aitolian League', who may be Akarnanian exiles who had taken refuge in Aitolia, or perhaps Akarnanian communities who were enrolled in the league. In the Aitolian list in Diodoros, Akarnanians appear as 'Alyzoi', people of a city on the Ionian Sea coast almost opposite Leukas, which itself was also an ally. It would appear that the Akarnanians were deeply divided, to say the least, between those who looked to Macedon for help in recovering Oiniadai, and those who looked more to Aitolian friendship, and perhaps a third group who opted for neutrality. It is a division which will be important later in Akarnanian history.

The occupation of Thermopylai, together with the hostility of much of central Greece, except defeated Boiotia, sufficed to block Antipatros' instinctive first move southwards. The defection of his Thessalian troops was enough to allow the allies to shut the Macedonian forces into Lamia – which had been pro-Macedonian – and subject them and the Lamians to a siege, which turned into a slow blockade. Leosthenes organised the building of a wall of circumvallation and the digging of a moat. Before it was completed he gave permission for the Aitolians to go home[17]. Other contingents left as well[18]. Despite this, the remaining Greek troops maintained the blockade throughout the winter of 323/322. Even after the winter the Greek army had 22,000 hoplites and 3,500 cavalry, and this army sufficed to drive Antipatros out of Thessaly, after the Lamian siege was lifted.

It is evident, therefore, that Aitolian forces were not required for at least a year after the establishment of the siege. Nevertheless, since they were in at the start of the war it is surprising that they were pulled out so quickly. The reason given by Diodoros, for asking to

[17] Diod. 18.13.4.
[18] Diod. 18.15.1.

leave the siege was some 'national business'[19]. This is very vague, provoking all sorts of conjectures. Without evidence, conjectures they must remain[20]. Some of them can be ruled out: since it was late in the year, the demands of agriculture seem unlikely; there is no evidence that the Akarnanians had invaded Aitolia, nor did they later, but it is a fact that hostility existed between Akarnanians and Aitolians, and some of the Molossians left the allied side during the war and joined the Macedonians[21]; the lateness of the year (which is only vaguely indicated) might or might not mean that the annual Assembly of the league was due, when elections for officers of the league took place at Thermos. This happened at the autumn equinox. The death of Alexander was known in Athens by September, and so an Aitolian election was certainly due to take place in the midst of all this activity. The clue may lie in the very uniqueness of the reason – 'some national business' – perhaps this was exactly the way the Aitolians put it, and Leosthenes agreed to their departure rather than have them simply march out. He would thus have a certain hold over them, and might be able to call them back later; if they left without his agreement, they might never return. In fact, with Leosthenes' death during the siege, any promises made to him will have died also.

It is evident that no particular or specific 'national business' can be sensibly adduced other than the possible election. The withdrawal of the Aitolian forces must therefore be a political decision concerned with the alliance against Macedon and the progress of the war. My own conjecture is that the Aitolian commanders, seeing the size of the army which had gathered at Lamia, came to the cold-blooded conclusion that there were quite enough Greeks to do any necessary fighting, and that their men were superfluous. Leosthenes, faced with the need to keep an army of over 30,000 men fed during the winter, may have acquiesced because it would mean that he had 7,000 fewer mouths to feed. He may have been all the more willing to agree to their leaving if the majority of those soldiers were light-armed troops rather than hoplites. This appears to have been the Aitolian fighting style at this time, and they were probably of less value in a siege than

[19] Diod. 18.13.4.

[20] Mendels, 'Aetolia', 151-3; one of Mendels' suggestions is that the Aitolians were taking time out of the war to re-establish their league.

[21] Diod. 18.11.1-the Molossians who were subject to Aryptaios (i.e., Arybbas): Hammond, *Epirus*, 561.

heavy infantrymen. It is certain that the formalities were observed, and that the Aitolians formally requested permission to leave, and Leosthenes formally granted their request. They did not desert.

In the end, the defeat of the Greek army at Krannon in September 322 took place so swiftly, and was so decisive, that the Aitolians, if they had to march from Aitolia, could not have reached the field of battle in time to affect the outcome. It may be that Aitolians were among the troops said to be on the way to join the Greek army, but none are actually specified[22]. It is certain tht Aitolia remained at war with Macedon, as did Athens, even after Antipatros was able to dismantle part of the Greek alliance by offering terms to the cities individually[23]. It is also clear that the Macedonians, led by Antipatros, continued to regard Aitolia as an enemy. Having defeated the Greek army and divided the Greek allies, they picked them off one by one, and finally occupied Athens and imposed an oligarchic regime on the city of democracy. No doubt Antipatros aimed first at eliminating the main enemy in the field. Aitolia could be dealt with later.

The reorganisation of Athens was followed by similar exercises in other cities. While each one would not necessarily take long to accomplish, it was apparently necessary that Antipatros supervise the process, perhaps from Athens, and so he had to stay in Greece for long enough to ensure that the new regimes were firmly in place and settled. He then went back to Macedon, where his daughter Phila was married to his colleague and rival Krateros, a marriage which was important politically in that it sealed the alliance of these two Macedonian chieftains. All this presumably took up the winter of 322/1[24]. By the spring of 321 only the Aitolians were left unsubdued.

More time will have been taken up with negotiations. There are no hints of these in the sources, but they must have taken place. After Krannon the Macedonians had not needed to do any more fighting. All their enemies, except Aitolia, had keeled over at the news of the defeat of the Greek army at Krannon, and Antipatros had then simply marched through to Athens and imposed terms on those who gave in, no doubt after a certain amount of discussion in each case. The Aitolians also must have been invited to give in as well. It would

[22] Diod. 18.17.6.
[23] Diod. 18.17.8.
[24] Diod. 18.18.1-7; R. M. Errington, 'From Babylon to Triparadisos, 323-320 BC', *JHS*, 90, 1970. 49-77.

have seemed reasonable that they should do so. They had taken little part in the actual fighting, after all. The problem would be in the terms Antipatros was imposing. In Athens and other cities he insisted on a new, oligarchic regime to replace the defeated democracy. When the peace was made the Athenians succeeded in having the matter of the restoration of the Samian exiles put off, though the regent Perdikkas, to whom it was referred, eventually insisted on their return. This was the original cause of the war, and Athens, under whatever regime, could not seriously have expected any other outcome.

In reference to Aitolia, therefore, the issues were: first, the restoration of Oiniadai, second, a change of regime. The equivalent change in Aitolia to the imposition of the oligarchy on Athens was a dissolution of their league. These two items were surely the issues still being discussed between Antipatros and the Aitolians. And, whereas Athens had been defeated both by land and by sea, Aitolia had not. In the fighting which followed, the anger of the Macedonians, and the determination of the Aitolians, both imply that something very great was at stake, and that must be more than just the restoration of Oiniadai. For the Aitolians it can only have been the very existence of their league. The Aitolians were also inevitably affected by the opinions of the refugees who were escaping from the terror imposed on the cities where Antipatros' new oligarchies and who were taking refuge in Aitolia[25].

Whatever terms were discussed, the talking ended sometime in 321, and Antipatros sent his army to invade Aitolia. It would seem that the actual fighting began after the harvest was in, and so in June or later, for it was only hardship and not actual starvation, which was the Aitolians' lot[26]. There had also been quite enough time for both sides to have thought out their strategies with some care. Antipatros, with Krateros in joint command, clearly knew that they were up against a very difficult enemy, and brought up an army of 30,000 infantry and 2,500 horse to occupy Aitolia. The Aitolians, quite unable to combat such a force in the field, resorted to a defensive strategy. The non-combatants were removed to the hill-forts in the mountains, taking with them all the available supplies. All the

[25] Pol. 9.29.1-6 and 30.3.

[26] Errington (note 24), 76, dates the opening of the war to summer; Mendels, 'Aetolia', 154, prefers autumn.

strongest and defensible places, hilltops or fortified towns or forts, were occupied and defended. Their military manpower is said to have been 10,000 men[27].

Antipatros had shown, at Lamia, that a garrison behind strong walls could defy a much larger army, and that if it held out long enough the political circumstances in such a volatile situation would change and the besiegers would then have to withdraw. The Aitolians now demonstrated the correctness of that lesson over again. Their 10,000 men were quite enough, when distributed behind strong walls, to preoccupy 30,000 Macedonians. The campaign bogged down into a winter stand-off. The Macedonians had lost men in the fighting, and others had to be used as builders of shelters against the cold Greek mountain winter. And no doubt others had to be used to bring up supplies from outside Aitolia, in convoys which were liable to ambush by the light armed Aitolians who were familiar with the country. It may well have come as a relief when Antigonos arrived from Asia with the news of Perdikkas' ambitions and actions[28]. The prospect of the continuation of such a difficult and murderous campaign cannot have pleased either the Macedonian commanders or their men. A council of Macedonian commanders determined to transfer the fighting to Asia, and an agreement was made with the Aitolians to allow the Macedonian army to withdraw[29].

This, of course, was a serious mistake by the Macedonians. By leaving Aitolia and its league intact – and it was the Macedonians who were asking for terms – the invaders were effectively strengthening the league they had aimed to destroy. The Aitolians had survived, where every other Greek state, including both Sparta and Athens, had succumbed. What is more it seems that some at least of the Macedonian commanders knew that the Aitolians would have to be crushed if Macedon was to remain dominant in Greece. These men secured an agreement among their fellow commanders that, once Perdikkas had been dealt with, they would come back to eliminate Aitolia. They even wrote into the agreement the terms they would impose: complete evacuation of Aitolia, and the whole population to be transferred to an Asian desert[30]. It was both an ironic compliment

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[27] Diod. 18.24.1-25.2.
[28] Diod. 18.25.3.
[29] Diod. 18.25.4.
[30] Diod. 18.25.5; this treaty is omitted by Schmitt, *Staatsverträge*, III.

to Aitolian strategy and an index of the hatred built up by the winter's fighting.

The Aitolians and their league had survived, but it was a most uncomfortable process of survival. Destruction was, no doubt, extensive. And the threat made by the Macedonian officers that they would return to the attack later had to be taken seriously. For the present the Macedonians were busy fighting each other, but once their mutual quarrels were sorted out, they could be expected to attack again. It was therefore clear to the Aitolians that they would be unlikely to be able to withstand the next invasion. It followed that the Aitolian forces would need to be strengthened, and that they also needed allies.

The manpower the league had so far deployed was scarcely in the great power class: 7,000 men at Thermopylai, and later withdrawn from the siege of Lamia, 10,000 used to defend themselves against the Macedonian attack. Even this number – suspiciously round as it is – may not be the total of trained manpower available to the league, for they are specified as being 'of the age of service', which suggests a that there was also a reserve of older men and ephebes. In the next campaign the Aitolians deployed 12,000 infantry and 400 cavalry[31]. This is the first mention of cavalry, and the size of the infantry army is the biggest yet attested. It has been supposed that the extra 2,000 foot and 400 horse were mercenaries[32], and this may be so, though there is no evidence for this, and the earlier figures are not obviously total manpower figures. These extra men may in fact be from the refugees who had been arriving since Antipatros began adjusting Greek constitutions. A little later in the campaign, after being reinforced by a Thessalian army, the 'citizen soldiers' had to march rapidly away, leaving the 'others' behind in Thessaly[33]. It is not clear therefore if these 'others' are just the Thessalians or the Thessalians and the (hypothetical) mercenaries or the (hypothetical) refugees. One would expect that the defence force against invasion would be

[31] Diod. 18.38.1.

[32] Mendels, 'Aetolia', 152, suggests that the larger army was the result of the reorganisation consequent on the revival of the league; but there is no evidence of this, and the revival of the league surely dates from before the capture of Oiniadai. The suggestion that the extra men were mercenaries is by H. D. Westlake, 'The Aftermath of the Lamian War', *Classical Review*, 63, 1949, 87-90: again there is no actual evidence.

[33] Diod. 18.38.5.

larger than the army sent on campaign abroad, and so we have to account for the 'extra' 2,200 troops acquired between 321's campaign and the spring of 320.

The problem in fact cannot be separated from that of the ally the Aitolians acquired. Once Antigonos had brought the news of Perdikkas' activities to Antipatros and Krateros, and the three men had become allies against the regent it was obvious that the Aitolians should make contact with Perdikkas. In fact, the contact may already have been made, at least indirectly. During the Lamian war the Athenian politician Demades had written to Perdikkas[34], and he may have therefore linked the regent with others of Antipatros' Greek enemies. At the very least, these contacts would predispose Perdikkas towards an alliance with any available Greek powers[35].

The alliance which was made was based less on similar interests than on mutual enmity towards Antipatros and his party. Perdikkas required allies to distract his enemies and divide them, Aitolia wanted him to preoccupy them and delay the threatened invasion, at least, if not prevent it. The Aitolians above all, needed more troops, but Perdikkas had so many wars on his hands that he could spare none. He did have cash, however, and it may be that he was able to subsidise the Aitolians so that they could hire their own mercenaries. If the extra troops were refugees, money would still be needed for their sustenance. Alternatively, he may have been able to release any Aitolian mercenaries who were in his employ, though we know of only two individual Aitolians employed by any commander in Alexander's wars[36].

So the reaction of the Aitolians to the threats of their recent Macedonian enemies was to increase their forces by a quarter, and to form

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[34] Arrian, *Successors of Alexander* 14; Diod. 18.48.

[35] The date of the Perdikkan-Aitolian contact is not known; Mendels, 'Aetolia', 153, suggests that negotiations might have begun 'as early as spring 322', and makes this one of the reasons for Antigonos' attack in autumn 321. This seems a very long process, rather contradicted by the apparent suddenness and surprise implied by Antigonos' message in the winter. It is better to see the contact initiated only when it became clear to both Perdikkas and the Aitolians that they were facing the same enemy, that is, in autumn 321.

[36] Perdikkas is Westlake's suggestion (note 32); Aitolian mercenaries in Alexander's wars: Lykidas appointed to command the mercenaries in Egypt and Glaukos commanding Darius' surviving mercenaries after Gaugamela (Arrian, *Anabasis* 35.3 and 3.16.2). Since both of these men are in high positions, it seems reasonable to assume there would be other Aitolians in more lowly posts.

an alliance with their enemy's enemy. Perfectly sensible diplomacy. That this was going to involve breaking the treaty just concluded with Antipatros probably caused the Aitolians no concern at all – after all, it was Antipatros' men who had publicly threatened to depopulate Aitolia when they returned. Why should Aitolia wait to be attacked again by such men? As soon as Antipatros' army was shipped to Asia, the Aitolians broke the treaty and attacked Macedon by invading Thessaly[37].

Once more, however, as in the Lamian war, the Aitolians pursued their own policy without permitting themselves to be subordinated to that of their ally. The evidence this time is much clearer than that for the Lamian war. The Aitolian attack in the spring of 320 was directed partly at Antipatrian forces, but partly also at others, non-Macedonians, who they saw as a threat to Aitolia. The first move was directed at Amphissa, the Lokrian city next to the lands of the Apodotoi, which was a good base for an attack on Aitolia by way of the Daphnos valley[38]. A Macedonian force under one of Antipatros' commanders, Polykles, came up, was encountered, and was destroyed. Polykles died, and the prisoners were either sold or ransomed[39]. The net result of this campaign was a ravaging of Amphissan Lokris and the capture of some Lokrian towns, though the siege of Amphissa does not seem to have resulted in the city's capture. But the city alone was not a problem, only the city plus the Macedonians. The threat to Aitolia posed by Polykles' force being thus removed, it was then possible for a more distant campaign to be mounted. Although they succeeded in capturing a number of smaller settlements, the failure to take Amphissa meant that the area as a whole remained independent – though the Aitolians had made a substantial political point[40].

The main attack, any opposition from Lokris having been thus neutralised, was now directed into Thessaly. How the Aitolians got there is not clear, though it is worth considering. Diodoros implies that the army went first into Amphissan Lokris and then to Thessaly.

[37] Diod. 18.38.1.

[38] The importance of Amphissa's position was demonstrated again in 191 when M'. Acilius Glabrio laid siege to it as a preliminary to a new invasion.

[39] Diod. 18.38.2.

[40] This is not a definitive conquest, and Amphissa was not taken. It has been supposed that this part of Lokris was henceforth part of the league, but Lerat, *Locriens*, 2.63-64, demolished the argument.

There are two possible routes. If, as Diodoros' words imply, the army went directly to Thessaly from Phokis, it would have marched north from Amphissa along the road between Mounts Korax and Parnassos, through Doris and down into Oitia, north past Herakleia Trachinia, through Malis, and into Thessaly by way of Achaia Phthiotis. Such a route would also mean previous diplomatic negotiations with all these peoples – Dorians, Oitians, Malians – in order to ensure a trouble-free passage. That the passage was made without opposition is certain, for Diodoros would have mentioned it otherwise. Yet it seems doubtful that it could have been accomplished. Both Herakleia Trachinia and Lamia had taken Antipatros' side in the Lamian war, as had Phthiotic Thebes and Pelinna in Thessaly, all of which were in or near this route[41]. It also seems unlikely that the Macedonians had failed to put garrisons along the road at some places – Herakleia and Lamia, for instance – all the more so if they had had a force in or near Amphissa (that under Polykles, which was defeated). Other forces, especially garrisons, staged back along the route to Macedon are thus militarily more than likely[42].

The alternative route would take the Aitolian army back into Aitolia from Amphissa, then north west over Mount Oita into Ainis, from where Thessaly could be reached through eastern Dolopia or western Achaia Phthiotis, perhaps by the route over Mount Othrys past Thaumakoi. Both the Ainianians and the Dolopes had been allies of Aitolia in the Lamian war, and both had a certain antipathy towards Macedon as a threat to their independence. This route is certainly more arduous, in a physical sense, than the Isthmus Route through Doris, but it seems the easier option politically, and would clearly involve less in the way of preliminary diplomacy.

Once in Thessaly, the Aitolians persuaded some at least of the Thessalians to join them. The joint force reached 25,000 foot and 1,500 horse, which meant that slightly more than half of the army was Thessalian, though if the Ainis-Dolopian route had been chosen, no doubt these communities will have contributed some soldiers. There seems to have been a joint command, the Aitolians under their *strategos* Alexander, the Thessalians commanded by Menon of Pharsalos, who

[41] Diod. 18.11.1.

[42] This is the 'Great Isthmus Route' which has been explored by E. Kase, *et al.*, *The Great Isthmus Corridor Route, Explorations of the Phokis-Doris Expedition*, 1, Dubuque, Iowa, 1991.

had been one of Leosthenes' successors as commander in the Lamian war[43]. This would surely have been a large enough force to hold Thessaly against anything the Macedonian commander Polyperchon could bring south, weakened as he was by the removal of much of the Macedonian army to fight in Asia. But Polyperchon was a sensible diplomat – or at least one may assume that he was responsible for what followed. The Aitolians were recalled home by the news that their land had been invaded from the west by the Akarnanians. They returned swiftly, presumably by way of the Spercheios valley and then along the Acheloos. Apparently without a fight, the invaders withdrew[44]. A fight had not been necessary.

This was the first example, or at least the first of which we have evidence, of an attack by the Akarnanians on the Aitolia of the league. There had been Akarnanian attempts to acquire part or all of the Aitolian coastlands in the past, though not for many decades; even when the two were aligned on opposing sides in the war of Philip and Athens, there is no record of hostilities between them, and during Alexander's reign Aitolia had given refuge to Akarnanian exiles. Yet there was an old tradition of hostility between the two. The legend was that Old Aitolia – along the coast west of Naupaktos – had been inhabited by the Kouretes when the eponymous Aitolos arrived from Elis. Defeated, the Kouretes removed themselves to Akarnania; ten generations later, Aitolians colonised Elis[45]. This myth explained the hostility of Aitolians and Akarnanians, and the equally old friendship of Aitolians and Eleians, and to some degree legitimised them both.

The re-emergence of active enmity between the Aitolians and the Akarnanians no doubt dates from the Aitolian seizure of the Akarnanian city of Oiniadai in 330. This city was distinctly isolated from the rest of Akarnania, and Thucydides remarked that it was surrounded by swamplands impassable in the winter[46], but it was definitely on the Akarnanian side of the Acheloos estuary. Its isolation

[43] Diod. 18.38.3; Mendels, 'Aetolia', 156, has the wrong figures for the Thessalian forces; their maximum numbers were 13,000 foot and 1,170 horse.

[44] Diod. 18.38.4-5; there is no evidence that Polyperchon was behind the Akarnanian invasion, but his immediate invasion of Thessaly on the Aitolians' departure suggests that, at the least, he knew what was going on.

[45] Strabo 10.3.1-8, a criticism of Ephoros' lost account, with psychological guesswork thrown in.

[46] Thuc. 2.102.

had led in the great Peloponnesian War to its use by the Peloponnesians as a naval base[47], and the city had in the past held itself aloof from the Akarnanian League[48]. It is perhaps this semi-detached aspect, and its potential as a military base, which helped to prompt the Aitolian move. Oiniadai was, for Aitolia, the equivalent on the west of Naupaktos on the east: both were well-fortified cities with harbours which functioned as anchors for maintaining Aitolian control of the western half of the north coast of the Corinthian Gulf; both were useful bases for trade, and Oiniadai commanded the entrance to the route north along the Acheloos, which, according to Strabo, was navigable as far as Stratos[49]. But if Oiniadai remained in Aitolian hands Akarnanian enmity could easily be roused. There is no direct evidence of the involvement of Polyperchon in instigating the Akarnanians' invasion, but no-one else benefited from it. As soon as the Aitolians had marched away from Thessaly, he was able to march south into Thessaly and crush the Thessalian troops still in the field under Menon of Pharsalos[50].

The victories gained by both principal antagonists – the Aitolians and Polyperchon – seem to have satisfied them. The Aitolians could not contemplate a direct collision with Polyperchon's victorious Macedonian army without the help of allies, and Polyperchon would be fully aware that, if Antipatros' and Krateros' army of well over 30,000 troops could not conquer Aitolia, then he, with half that number or less, could not hope to do so either. Meanwhile the Aitolians had gained some security, in the sense that the campaign vitories in Lokris and against the Akarnanians had removed the threats from both directions for the moment. And meanwhile the really major contest was being conducted in Asia. The death of Perdikkas during his attack on Ptolemy in Egypt took place in the summer of 320. The removal of their ally will have further persuaded the Aitolians to lay low. The threat of a renewed attack by the victorious Antipatros loomed steadily closer during that year.

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[47] D. Kagan, *The Archidamian War*, London 1974, 201.

[48] Larsen, *GFS*, 91; during the Peloponnesian war it had been attacked more than once by the Athenians, without producing a reaction from the rest of the Akarnanians; eventually the others compelled it to join the Athenian side (Thuc. 4.77). Thucydides calls it 'the only place in Akarnania which had always been anti-Athenian' (2.102).

[49] Strabo 10.1.2.

[50] Diod. 18.38.5.

Yet when he returned to Macedon, after settling the affairs of the empire at the conference at Triparadeisos, Antipatros did nothing about the Aitolians. It may be that he was simply too old to bother – he died the next year, well over eighty years of age. It may be that he did not have the troops, or that his soldiers had had enough of difficult campaigns: the memory of the winter campaign in the Aitolian mountains cannot have been alluring. These are all possibilities. But there are others, perhaps rather more persuasive. Antipatros had never been a vehement anti-Aitolian. He had made an agreement, perhaps even an alliance, with them back in 331/330, against Alexander's policy. He had ignored them after the Lamian war for a year, perhaps hoping for acceptable terms to emerge, and he may well have harboured generous feelings towards a state which had withdrawn its soldiers from the siege of Lamia, and had then taken no further part in the war. The winter campaign into Aitolia may well have been Krateros' work, but it was not something Antipatros would wish to repeat. It certainly only took place after Krateros had arrived in Macedon, and it is perhaps significant that the threat of deportation issued by the withdrawing Macedonians was to put them in the farthest desert of Asia. This was not a destination which would occur to Antipatros, who until then had never left Macedon, except to fight in Greece. But it would occur to Krateros and his men, who were veterans of the difficult and sanguinary campaigns in Media and Baktria, and along the Indus. Krateros, however, had been killed early in the Asian fighting, and his place at Antipatros' side was then taken by Polyperchon, who had been as reluctant to attack the Aitolians in 320 as Antipatros had been in 330 and 321. Further, to the Macedonians the Aitolians cannot have seemed to be very dangerous. They had pulled out of the Lamian war as soon as the going got tough, and they had stimulated a Thessalian rising in 320 only to desert their new allies almost at once, as soon as a threat developed from Akarnania. They fought in defence of their land, but not aggressively. Their army, at 10,000 or 12,000 men, was not large enough to pose a serious threat to Macedon. Only with reinforcements were they a problem, and with their record of apparent desertion, the Aitolians were going to find it difficult to gain reliable allies again. And then, Polyperchon had shown how to control them – call up a neighbour. Akarnania or Lokris, or even Achaia, all had grievances which a little judicious lubrication by gold could inflame into action. No, Aitolia in 320 could not be perceived as a serious danger to Macedon.

There does not seem to be any need to postulate a close relationship between the Aitolian League and Polyperchon after Antipatros' death[51]. They were certainly allied later, but that was when Polyperchon needed any ally he could find, which was not the case in 320. However, he was the heir to Antipatros' power and to his policy, and this will have predisposed the two parties towards each other. Polyperchon's early moves after Antipatros' death were designed to repair the rifts in Macedonian politics which still remained after the attempted general settlement of Macedonian affairs which had been achieved at Triparadeisos. He recalled Olympias and the kings, for instance. But Antipatros' son, Kassandros, disappointed in his expectation of inheriting his father's position, contrived to wreck the scheme. Polyperchon acted to block Kassandros, whose early strength lay in the loyalty of his father's garrisons in several Greek cities, by stimulating democratic revolutions in several of Antipatros' oligarchies. This was a policy very reminiscent of the rousing of the Akarnanians against the Aitolians. It only delayed matters, however, and by the late spring or early summer of 316 Kassandros was strong enough to begin a march north towards Macedon.

In all this quarrelling and intriguing the Aitolians stayed resolutely neutral. The war passed them by, fairly closely at times, as when Polyperchon camped in Phokis with his army[52], but they nevertheless kept clear. The fact that Polyperchon was now sponsoring democratic governments will have impressed them as little as Antipatros' oligarchies had repelled them. It was such a cynical manoeuvre that a reversal of the policy was likely at any time; no-one surely believed that Polyperchon himself was a democrat. So there can have been no ideological element in the relationship with Polyperchon, and in fact they had not given him any assistance in his dispute with Kassandros. Nevertheless when Kassandros marched north he found that the Aitolians had mobilised their army and moved out to block Thermopylai against him. Diodoros explains this as the Aitolians' desire to please Olympias and Polyperchon[53], but such an explanation is naive

[51] Mendels, 'Aetolia', 157, suggests that 'friendly relations with Polyperchon' affected Aitolia's foreign relations for the next eleven years' after 320; this seems to me to postulate a sentiment of loyalty wholly absent from Aitolian policy.

[52] Diod. 18.68.2.

[53] Diod. 19.35.2: for the chronology of events in Greece through to 311, cf. R. M. Errington, 'Diodoros Siculus and the Chronology of the early Diadochoi, 320-311 BC', *Hermes* 105, 1977, 478-504.

and unbelievable. The Aitolians, as ever, were acting wholly in their own interests. The behaviour of Olympias on her return to Macedon had been so revengefully murderous as to alienate many of the Macedonians, and that sensibly reduced the support for Polyperchon, since he was her ally. So Kassandros' cause was prospering – it was, of course, exactly this calculation of support which persuaded him to move north in the first place. So the Aitolians were occupying Thermopylai in an attempt to prevent Kassandros winning control of Macedon as well as the Greek bases he had held all along.

The Aitolians were, of course, basically uninterested in who ruled in Macedon, only in weakening whoever did. If the ruler was peaceable, as were both Antipatros and Polyperchon at bottom, this was acceptable; but a vigorous, expansionist ruler, such as Philip or Alexander or Kassandros, was a danger. And a Macedon under Olympias was no danger to its neighbours, only to Macedonians. Yet the Aitolians had no real wish to fight any Macedonians, and Kassandros for his part had no intention of adding to his enemies. His eyes were fixed firmly on the chance to rule in Macedon, to such a degree that he had left his allies in complete confusion in the Peloponnese, when he dropped everything in the middle of a siege on realising that the chance had come to win control of the kingdom. So, faced by this potential new enemy at Thermopylai he deliberately evaded the pass, going by sea by way of Euboia, and on into Thessaly[54]. Not only that, but the Aitolians simply sat tight and let him do this, making no attempt to interfere. They could have done something, such as attacking his rearguard or pursuing him into Thessaly, but they did nothing. Once more, it is clear that the Aitolians did the very minimum for their temporary ally (Polyperchon), concentrated on not making a serious enemy of Kassandros, and looked to their own interests first and last.

This was intelligent politics on their part, for Kassandros won the war for Macedon, though it took him a full year to eliminate Olympias, after which her adherents and Polyperchon still remained at large to be dealt with. Polyperchon's cause faded until he had to escape from a desultory siege in Thessaly without much in the way of support. The only places to which he could go for refuge were his son

[54] Diod. 19.35.2; Mendels, 'Aetolia', 162-163, sees the situation in Epeiros involved in this as well, but this does not seem necessary; the Aitolians were concerned with power above all in Macedon.

Alexander in the Peloponnese, or Aitolia. He chose Aitolia, no doubt with the intention of persuading the league to take action to support his cause. He was welcomed and given refuge[55]. He had lost Macedon and most of his own following amongst the Macedonians, but he still had forces in Greece, including the army led by his son Alexander which blocked the Isthmus by controlling Corinth, and Polyperchon had taken over a force led by the Epeirote Aiakides. He was not wholly without resources, however. The Aitolians still (or again) blocked Thermopylai, perhaps to support Polyperchon, more likely for reasons of their own.

This all meant that Kassandros faced a strongly hostile Greece, even if he retained footholds here and there. The situation was thus reversed, with Kassandros replacing Polyperchon in the north, and Alexander replacing Kassandros in the south. This would be quite satisfactory to the Aitolians, whose policy was aimed at keeping the two areas hostile. But Kassandros, no more than Polyperchon, could not accept it. So Kassandros' next move was obviously to try to neutralise the power of his enemies in Greece. After all, he himself had now shown that a campaign based in Greece could be mounted to win Macedon, if its government was unpopular enough. He was himself not the most likeable of men, and his control of Macedon cannot have been very firm as yet. Further, the news from the east was filtering through; the defeat and death of Eumenes by Antigonos in the battle in Media was initially welcomed by Kassandros, because Eumenes was an ally of Polyperchon; but the new power and wealth of Antigonos was gradually revealed, and was extremely dangerous. Kassandros needed to clear up the position in Greece quickly in order to prepare for whatever might result from Antigonos' return to the west[56]. So in the autumn of 315 he came south.

The flight of Polyperchon into Aitolia had apparently left Thessaly peaceful and submissive towards Kassandros, so the first problem he faced was the Aitolian force blocking Thermopylai. This time Kassandros could afford to fight, and he pushed his army through,

[55] Diod. 19.52.6.

[56] It was the flight of Seleukos to Ptolemy, his news of Antigonos' wealth and forces, which Ptolemy quickly passed on to Kassandros and Lysimachos, which brought about a coalition of these four against Antigonos by late 315 (Diod. 17.56.1-3); but Kassandros knew of all this a good deal earlier in the year and could calculate on time for a campaign in Greece before Antigonos arrived.

despite the Aitolians[57]. The strength of the position is such that this implies that the Aitolians were not present in any great strength. Kassandros is expressly said to have pushed the Aitolians aside, that is, he had beaten them in a straight fight in the pass, not by means of a Persian- or Roman-style outflanking move. Had the full Aitolian army been present Kassandros could scarcely have succeeded so relatively easily. And perhaps the Aitolians did not resist too strongly; they had no wish to antagonise Kassandros to such an extent that he became irreconcilable. Kassandros went on to the Isthmus and there the more determined defiance of Alexander son of Polyperchon forced him to take to his boats again, to get past, as before at Thermopylai.

Kassandros' campaign was no more than a moderate success. Although he did not remove Alexander from his base at the Isthmus, he was able to recover control of Argos, most of Messenia, and some other cities, and he left a garrison to block part of the Isthmus in rivalry with Alexander at Corinth. In addition, on his way south, he had re-established the city of Thebes, and so provided himself with an ally in Boiotia. This was clearly of some concern to Aitolia. Kassandros now controlled Macedon, Thessaly, Thermopylai, Boiotia, and substantial sections of the Peloponnese, altogether a menacing position from Aitolia's point of view, and all too reminiscent of the power of Philip II after Chaironeia, or of Antipatros after Krannon.

What Kassandros' immediate intentions were is not known, for it was in the next winter, of 315/314, that the full extent of Antigonos' power, wealth, and ambition became clear to all his fellows, when in November of 315 envoys of Kassandros and Lysimachos from Greece and Thrace joined with envoys from Ptolemy met Antigonos in Kilikia to demand that he surrender some of his gains, a meeting which resulted in war[58]. Antigonos himself turned on Ptolemy first, but he also and simultaneously sent various generals and envoys out to stir up trouble for the others. Aristodemos of Miletos went to the Peloponnese, with a thousand talents to spend. Like a sensible man he used some of the money to recruit an army from the mercenaries camped at Cape Tainaron. With both power and wealth, he could then deal with those forlorn Macedonians, Polyperchon and his son Alexander.

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[57] Diod. 19.53.1.
[58] Diod. 19.57.1-2.

Polyperchon had spent a year in Aitolia, and in that time the only thing they had done for him was to give him refuge. The power he had brought with him had not been sufficient to reinforce the Aitolians to any great degree. They had thus allowed their forces to be pushed out of Thermopylai by Kassandros, and had provided no resistance to Alexander in the Peloponnese. But now a true enemy of Kassandros, one with both money and men, had arrived. Polyperchon allowed himself to be appointed as Antigonos' general in the Peloponnese, and his son Alexander went off to formalise the arrangement directly with Antigonos, who was busy in Phoenicia. One of the terms agreed between them was the promotion of the idea of the freedom of the Greek cities. This was Antigonos taking up Polyperchon's old policy of promoting democracy in the cities where Kassandros' oligarchies held sway, but it was pursued with as little real sincerity as ever, though with a good deal more power behind it. But as a policy it was devalued still further when Ptolemy began to make the same offer.

Since the Aitolians were already free and autonomous, this competition for Greek favour can have made little appeal to them. Their friendship with Polyperchon presumably now also aligned them with Antigonos, and Aristodemos came to address their Assembly. He made a successful attempt to bring them to join Antigonos' side, though it may be that he did not persuade them to a full alliance[59]. Certainly when he returned to the Peloponnese he took with him only his own mercenaries, not any of the Aitolian troops. He operated in Elis and Achaia, and progressively cleared much of the southern coast of the Corinthian Gulf of Kassandros' garrisons and satellites. This removed one of Aitolia's concerns. But Polyperchon's son Alexander suddenly changed sides, so that Corinth and Sikyon now became hostile, and they remained that way even after Alexander's assassination. Yet Aitolia was obviously unwilling to commit itself decisively to any of the contenders, but it may also be that the Aitolians were already at war with the Akarnanians. We only know this from an oblique reference, and the cause of the war and when it started are both unknown. Diodoros describes it as a border war[60], and implies that it broke out independently of events elsewhere, and

[59] Diod. 19.66.2; Mendels, 'Aetolia', 107-108.
[60] Diod. 19.67.3.

that no great events were involved. This is possible, of course, but one must express doubts. At the very least, Kassandros was quick to exploit the situation, and the suspicion has to be voiced that he was copying Polyperchon in 320 by instigating the fighting in order to neutralise the Aitolians[61].

'Border war' implies little more than skirmishing and raiding. The Aitolians, with Kassandros looming in the north and east and Polyperchon and Alexander present but inactive in the south, would not wish to become deeply involved in war in the west. Yet it was this war which brought the Aitolians, who had been clearly very reluctant to become more than marginally involved, firmly into the fray.

Kassandros came to Akarnania, after September, for it was subsequent to the Assembly addressed by Aristodemos, and camped with his army in the valley of the Kampylos river, a minor tributary of the Acheloos. He was thus on the Aitolian side of the Acheloos, and he appears also to have secured control of the Aitolian city of Agrinion. The political allegiance of Agrinion is generally assumed to be towards Akarnania, but geographically it was well to the east of the Acheloos river. The Acheloos was considered an Akarnanian river, and so Stratos was certainly Akarnanian at this time. But Agrinion was well away from the river. It was closer to several Aitolian cities – Arsinoe, for instance – than to Stratos. I prefer, therefore, to see it as an Aitolian city, which Kassandros captured, and presented to the Akarnanians. This in turn explains the unusual savagery of the Aitolian action in massacring the Akarnanian settlers when they retook the city – and perhaps the ease with which they captured it.

Kassandros attended a meeting of the Akarnanian league and persuaded them that the best course to follow to deter Aitolian power was to concentrate their population into cities. This was applied, particularly to the lands which were especially vulnerable to Aitolian attack along the Acheloos. The existing cities of Stratos and Agrinion received their local rural populations inside the walls and were thus reinforced; a place called Sauria was the new home, for 'the Oiniadai' and others. Presumably these Oiniadai were the exiles from that city who had taken refuge in Akarnania from the Aitolians. Sauria is

[61] Aristodemos' address to the Aitolian Assembly is generally assumed to be at the regular meeting at Thermos in September 313 (cf Errington, 'Diodorus Siculus', 497-8); so Kassandros crossed from the Peloponnese after that, and it would seem that the war might even have broken out after Aristodemos' visit.

unlocated, and probably never amounted to much[62], but its foundation was a clear anti-Aitolian move. Aitolians had long experience of a settlement of displaced citizens in their doorstep, for Naupaktos had been the home of the evicted Messenians for eighty years. The Saurians could be expected to cause constant trouble. Kassandros' and the Akarnanians' move was therefore one which struck very accurately at Aitolian nerves and sensitivities. The move was also a clear escalation of the 'border war' which had attracted Kassandros to the area in the first place, not only by the reinforcement of Stratos and Sauria, but above all by the seizure of Agrinion and the installation of Akarnanians in the city, presumably either to swamp or replace the native Aitolians.

Kassandros' gain from this would be an alliance with the newly strengthened Akarnanian League, and thus a greater power to threaten and so checkmate the already hostile Aitolians. He moved against the city of Leukas, also closely associated always with Akarnania, and gained its alliance is well, though how sincere this would be was unclear. Before leaving to extend his power along the Adriatic coast to the north, Kassandros left a detachment of his forces under a general called Lykiskos as reinforcements, and no doubt ae superviser, for the Akarnanians. In all probability Lykiskos was an Akarnanian, for this was a well-known Akarnanian name. This appointment was, in fact, ineffective, for as soon as Kassandros and his main force had left, the Aitolians laid siege to Agrinion, the city they had lost. Lykiskos failed to intervene, presumably because the Aitolians were in such strength that he was properly deterred. The city was taken, and the inhabitants massacred as they left, supposedly treacherously[63]. At once, the worth of Kassandros' friendship was devalued for the Akarnanians. The Aitolians were using a relatively small force, 3,000 men, which could not be construed as a threat to Akarnania itself, but which was clearly big enough to deal with Agrinion, and presumably, to present Lykiskos with a deterrent sufficiently strong to prevent his interference.

This episode is a problem. There had been no hint earlier that

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[62] Diod. 19.67.3-4; the political allegiance of Agrinion before this episode is unknown, but its geographical position puts it clearly in Aitolia; I therefore assume it was Aitolian until Kassandros arrived: his camp on the Kampylos would be no more than 10 km from the city.

[63] Diod. 19.68.1.

Agrinion was Akarnanian, and its geographical position puts it firmly in Aitolian territory. When Kassandros camped by the Kampylos river he was close to the city, and it must have been his influence which transformed the city. The movement of Akarnanians – described as 'the Derieis and the rest', the Derieis presumably being a tribal designation – into Agrinion was therefore designed to overpower the native Agrinians, who considered themselves Aitolian, and thus to transfer the city permanently out of Aitolia into Akarnania. The rapid Aitolian reaction, the swift capture of the city, and the failure of Lykiskos to intevene are thus all explicable: the Aitolians were recovering their own, and the original inhabitants helped to eject the newcomers. Lykiskos would not move without Akarnanian participation, and the Akarnanians had no wish to embark on a long term serious war against Aitolia, such as would be required to hold Agrinion. Kassandros had perhaps even given his general contingency orders on the matter. The whole episode only took place because Kassandros had his army with him. He constrained the alliance of the Akarnanians, just as he did that of Leukas, and tried to make them his accomplices by his synoecism of Agrinion. Akarnania was temporarily compelled to obey, but as soon as he left it would seem that they withdrew their participation. The whole episode is a move in the war between Kassandros and Aitolia, and not really one in the 'border war' between Aitolia and Akarnania. It is significant that Sauria, the Oiniadan exiles' new city, is not heard of again: Stratos did become a locally important city, but it was probably that already. So Kassandros' work at Agrinion was the real point of the episode, and its underlying purpose was to embroil Aitolia and Akarnania. If the Akarnanians had been tempted, the destruction of their colonists at Agrinion clearly convinced them otherwise. Repeatedly they had involved themselves in war with Aitolia at the behest of Macedonian rulers. It had gained them nothing; no doubt they were becoming weary of the process and wary of Macedonians bearing gifts[64].

Winter intervened before anything more could be done, but in the spring of 312 Kassandros sent his brother Philip to revive the war in the west, with the intention of invading Aitolia[65]. The Aitolians had clearly seen this threat approaching during the winter, and had made

[64] For a different interpretation of the episode, cf. Mendels, 'Aetolia', 167-170.
[65] Diod. 19.74.3.

their own preparations. One move was to send envoys to Antigonos, who was now in Karia. They were accompanied by other envoys, from Boiotia, and the two sets of ambassadors made an alliance with Antigonos[66]. This was a more binding commitment than the Aitolians had made to anyone since their alliance with Athens in 324/323. Neither Polyperchon nor Aristodemos had extracted such an agreement from the league. But it still did not ensure that the Aitolians would actually turn out to fight for Antigonos. The participation of the Boiotians, however, suggests that Kassandros had lost his right of passage though that land.

These alliances gave Antigonos the chance to intervene decisively in Greece. He sent a fleet under Telesphoros to continue the campaign against Polyperchon and Alexander's widow Kratesipolis, who were soon reduced to Corinth and Sikyon, but before committing himself any more deeply he met Kassandros at the Hellespont to try to arrange a peace settlement. The attempt failed. Antigonos' new allies were not, it seems, consulted. It is clear that there were plenty of mental reservations on each side in the agreement.

Meanwhile the Aitolians were facing the attack by Philip, brother of Kassandros. He brought men from Macedon to Akarnania, presumably marching through Epeiros, and he will have added Lykiskos' force to his own. His stated intention was to plunder Aitolia, which means that he did not intend to stay long. It was thus another attempt by Kassandros to ignite the war in the west at the expense of the Akarnanians. Whether he was able to use the Akarnanians seems unlikely, and it is certain that none of them are mentioned in the subsequent events, though that is not conclusive[67]. Philip apparently began to mount his attack on Aitolia, but then broke off to deal with a problem in Epeiros. There the former King Aiakides of the Molossi had returned and had been accepted as king once more. He had probably been a refugee in Aitolia since his original expulsion. His

[66] Diod. 19.75.6; Mendels, 'Aetolia', 173-4, suggests that Aitolians and Boiotians were allied to each other as well as to Antigonos, and points to a treaty of alliance recorded on *IG* II(2) 1, 170 as the likely record. This is certainly an Aitolo-Boiotian alliance, but most other attempts at dating it put the treaty twenty years later, though some would also put it in 301 (cf. Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* III, 463 for a list, to which add Roesch, *Études*, 157-9 in favour of 301). It certainly seems reasonable to assume an agreement of some sort between, the two at this point, but whether the inscription is a record of this agreement seems much more doubtful.

[67] This may be taken as some confirmation that Akarnanian participation in the Agrinion episode was unwilling.

return to the Molossi is then to be seen as an Aitolian ploy to sever Philip's communications with Kassandros. Philip reacted instantly, breaking off his attack in Aitolia to deal with Aiakides, whose army he met and defeated before it could be joined by that of the Aitolians – if that was the Aitolian intention[68]. The Molossian survivors did in fact join with the Aitolians, whereupon Philip attacked again, and again won the victory. This battle took place at Oiniadai[69], and so some time will have elapsed since the first victory, certainly more than the 'few days' of Diodoros[70]. Aiakides died in the battle, as did many of the soldiers. The Aitolians, on receiving the news, which opened the way for Philip's invasion, reacted as they had when attacked by Antipatros and Krateros, by moving their population into their mountain refuges[71].

Meanwhile Kassandros had discovered that the failure to make peace with Antigonos had exposed him to a major attack. Antigonos' nephew Ptolemaios campaigned effectively in central Greece, conquered Euboia and Boiotia, removed Kassandros' garrisons from Phokis, and finally set siege to (probably) Opous in Opountian Lokris. Early on, Kassandros called in his detachments, and this seems to have included Philip's army, which did not perhaps do as much damage to Aitolia as had been intended. The Aitolians were thus saved, once again, because a more potent power distracted their enemy at the moment of attack. However, Kassandros – or Philip – left Lykiskos in Akarnania once more, presumably with some soldiers[72]. This was a sensible use of the detachment, for Lykiskos' pressure from that direction would effectively prevent the Aitolians from intervening in the war in the east. If Lykiskos was an Akarnanian, it may be that his force was composed of locals, which would explain his continued presence.

However, it would seem that the Aitolians had no intention of involving themselves in any fighting in they could avoid it. Lykiskos, like Philip, was distracted into a campaign into Epeiros by the appointment of a new king there, Alketas, an elder brother of Aiakides. Then, after Lykiskos' initial defeat, Kassandros also moved

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[68] Diod. 19.74.3.
[69] Paus. 1.11.4.
[70] Diod. 19.74.5.
[71] Diod. 19.74.6; Diodoros assumed that this was a panic reaction to the invasion.
[72] Lykiskos is there later (Diod. 19.88.2) and so probably all through.

into Epeiros. The Aitolians made no move, not into Akarnania, where Lykiskos' absence might have interested them, nor to assist Ptolemaios in Lokris, nor to oppose Kassandros or Lykiskos in Epeiros. This was all quite sensible. Kassandros had only a small army with him, so he was not a serious danger to Aitolia. In Lykiskos' absence, and while its Kassandrian governor was killed in Epeiros, Leukas broke its alliance with Kassandros – so if Lykiskos returned, that would have to be his first order of business. And Telesphoros, Antigonos' commander in the Peloponnese, piqued at the congratulations being lavished on Ptolemaios for his successes in Boiotia and Euboia, rebelled, seized control of Elis and Olympia, hired mercenaries, and set himself up as an independent warlord. All this meant that none of the powers surrounding Aitolia was going to be fully occupied, and none of them would be interested in attacking that difficult and prickly land for some time.

The next year the various Macedonian lords made peace, of a sort, though the Greeks can be forgiven if they scarcely noticed much change. Ptolemaios defected from Antigonos soon after, and then Polyperchon promoted a new pretender to the Macedonian throne. He persuaded the Aitolians to ally with him and to permit his forces to pass through Aitolia. He gathered an army of over 20,000, some of whom were Aitolians officially detailed to join him[73]. He reached Epeiros, but there he spinelessly allowed himself to be bought off by Kassandros[74]. For the Aitolians, of course, the result, by which Polyperchon murdered his own candidate, was irrelevant, but the fact the contest ended in negotiation was surely a relief, and their contingent of soldiers with Polyperchon could return home undiminished.

When Polyperchon came back towards the Peloponnese, now a subordinate of Kassandros; he was opposed, with some success, by 'Boiotians and Peloponnesians', and had to winter in Lokris[75]. If it had ever existed, the Aitolo-Boiotian alliance was now clearly ended, for they were on opposite sides with regard to Polyperchon in this case. And it would be interesting to know just in which part of Lokris Polyperchon stayed. There is a good deal of doubt about the precise

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[73] Diod. 20.23.1-4; the proportion of Polyperchon's force which was Aitolian is not known; it was probably not very high.

[74] Diod. 20.26.1-3.

[75] Diod. 20.28.4.

political situation in western Lokris. It has been claimed to be part of the Aitolian League as early as 321, but the evidence is very poor, even non-existent[76]. Naupaktos is not certainly known to have become Aitolian until c.280, but was probably acquired before them; Amphissa and its area were only ravaged in 321 by the Aitolians, not conquered. In all probability, since he was moving from Thessaly towards the Peloponnese, Polyperchon wintered in eastern Lokris, which in fact puts him in control of Thermopylai.

The alliance of Kassandros and Polyperchon meant that Polyperchon became Kassandros' general in the Peloponnese. One result was the intrusion there of the forces of Ptolemy of Egypt, which took Corinth, Sikyon, and Megara in 308, but could not then persuade any other of the Peloponnesians to come out to support him with anything other than words. In such a situation, Aitolia would be most likely to do the same as those Peloponnesians: give fair words to Ptolemy, encourage him against Kassandros and Polyperchon, but provide no material assistance. In the divisions between the Macedonian warlords was Aitolia's safety. So in 307, when Demetrios son of Antigonos spectacularly seized the Peiraios and expanded his authority into Boiotia and the north-east Peloponnese, Aitolia sat pat once more, for this was clearly the safest condition to adopt. Seriously joining one side or the other only exposed one to an early attack by a rival.

When Demetrios sailed off to Cyprus, on his way to his great naval victory at Salamis in 306, Kassandros came south in strength to attack Athens, and this stimulated the Aitolians to diplomatic action once more. The Athenian politician and general Olympiodoros sailed from threatened Athens and persuaded the Aitolians to help[77]. What the Aitolians actually did was probably no more than a diplomatic intervention, for the very threat of their intervention in Kassandros' rear – combined with Athens' newly formidable fortifications to his front – put Kassandros into a very precarious situation. He withdrew northwards again, the more determinedly no doubt, when news came of Demetrios' naval victory at Cyprian Salamis. Athens then combined with Boiotia to push Kassandros' forces away from Elateia and

[76] Mendels, 'Aetolia', 156, note 157, where doubts are expressed, and 173, where 'West Lokris must already have been Aitolian since 321'. Lerat, *Locriens*, 2.63-63, argues for a date considerably later.

[77] Paus. 1.26.3; W. H. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, London, 1911, 114.

back to Thermopylai[78]. It was almost like the old days. But there is no indication that any Aitolians took an active part in any of this, despite the agreement with Olympiodoros. A cool view of events could not sustain the notion of Athens being victorious for very long; Kassandros was still there, and his control of Macedon was unshaken, and Demetrios could easily return. No commitment of an irreversible nature could be made to Athens in such circumstances.

This ensured that, when Demetrios became entangled in the siege of Rhodes in the next year, Kassandros and Polyperchon were too fully occupied in trying to recover their position in Greece to bother with the Aitolians. But Aitolia did require the power of Demetrios to be in Greece in order to balance that of Kassandros, and a well-timed diplomatic intervention at Rhodes[79] finally got Demetrios off the hook so that he could return. He landed in Boiotia and recovered control of central Greece once more with little difficulty, which placed him neatly between Kassandros in Macedon and Thessaly, and Polyperchon in the Peloponnese. The Aitolians now made an alliance with Demetrios[80], though, needless to say, there is no sign that they contributed anything actively to Demetrios' military strength. The Aitolian purpose was to avoid distracting Demetrios from his enmity towards Kassandros. Given this alliance, it is a reasonable assumption that the Aitolians became founder members of Demetrios' Hellenic League in 302; since it faded away once he was beaten at Ipsos, it scarcely matters[81].

For thirty years the Aitolian League had trodden very delicately in the minefield of the politics of the Macedonian imperial break-up. Very largely assisted by its remote geographical position, its general poverty, and its difficult terrain, the league had managed both to survive and to avoid too much involvement in international affairs. It had not wholly escaped, but two invasions in thirty years, only one of which was a serious attempt at conquest, compares favourably with the battering taken by other, more famous Greek states – Corinth, Athens, or Thebes, for instance. The few ventures which the league had made outside its boundaries had been brief and only to a short distance, once into Lokris, twice to Thessaly, twice to Thermopylai,

[78] Paus 10.18.7 and 34.3; Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, 116, note 1.
[79] Diod. 20.99.3.
[80] Diod. 20.100.6.
[81] Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* III, 446; the names of the members do not survive.

twice into Epeiros. The lesson administered by Polyperchon and the Akarnanians in 320 had been well learned. For all that thirty years, the Aitolians had remained steadfastly on the defensive, and had made no attempt to expand their territory (assuming that Agrinion was Aitolian originally)[82]. This is in contrast to the initial attempt at expansion, at Oiniadai and Naupaktos in the 330s. The league was clearly during all that time under a very cautious leadership, an attitude to which there is no sign of dissent (though Aristodemos' persuasiveness at the Assembly in 313 was accepted only by a majority; a minority therefore disagreed). Yet all this does not mean that the will to expansion had faded.

By 300 BC, therefore, the Aitolian League was an accepted, if idiosyncratic, part of the Greek political landscape. It had by then been in existence for a full generation, and had survived more than one serious attack by the strongest powers of the time and place. Furthermore, that survival had been achieved less by physical strength – its army was never larger than 12,000 men – than by determined obduracy and skilful diplomacy, and above all by a well-organised system of defence, which, once put into action successfully had been a powerful deterrent to later attacks. With, therefore, a well-defended home-base, the league had become a major power in Greece.

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[82] For a brief discussion of all this, see R. H. Simpson, 'Aetolian Policy in the late Fourth Century BC', *Antiquité Classique* 27, 1958, 357-362; though I do not agree with many of the individual points he makes, his conclusion is the same as mine.

PART TWO

GROWTH AND POWER

5. EXPANSION: THE FIRST PHASE (300-278)

In the first generation of continuous existence, from c.330 to c.300, the Aitolian League had failed to expand, except for the acquisition of Oiniadai. This had been accomplished in the old Greek way: the city had been conquered, and those Oiniadans who could not accept the new political situation either died in the fighting or went into exile afterwards. There were exiles complaining to Alexander at Babylon in 324[1], and others (or perhaps the same people) formed the new city organised by Kassandros at Sauria in 313[2]. This process meant continued vigilance on the part of the conqueror, for the exiles were always on the lookout for an opportunity to return. The Aitolians had only to look at their neighbour Naupaktos for an example: the Messenians settled there by the Athenians were as eager to 'return' after two generations as the original exiles.

The other method of control was to install colonists into the conquered city. This is often assumed to have been done at Oiniadai, but there is, in fact, no direct evidence for it. Plutarch describes the city as 'destroyed' by the Aitolians[3], which may mean no more than the subjugation of an independent city; driving out irreconcilables would produce the exiles without necessarily requiring their replacement by more than a garrison, such as the Aitolians had placed in Naupaktos in the brief period (337-336) when they had controlled that city[4].

Thus it is not wholly surprising to discover that Oiniadai ceased to be Aitolian at some point after its conquest. It had been seized in 330, and by the time of the treaty of peace and friendship with Akarnania, which was agreed, probably, in 271/270[5], Oiniadai was listed as one of the member cities of the Akarnanian League. It had thus ceased to be Aitolian at some point between 323 and 271/270. An inscription found at Nemea listing the places visited by the priests of Nemean Zeus at some time between 330 and 311 lists Oiniadai as one of their

[1] Plut. *Alexander*, 49.15.
[2] Diod. 19.67.3-4.
[3] Plut. *Alexander*, 49.15.
[4] Hammond, *Hist. Mac* 3.81 and Flacelière, *Aitoliens* 42, both presume colonisation.
[5] *IG* IX.1.3A; the date of this inscription will be discussed later: I anticipate the result of that discussion here.

Akarnanian destinations[6]. So the limits within which Oiniadai returned to Akarnania are reduced to 323-311. In that period the Akarnanian invasion of 321, when the decision of Alexander was fresh in men's minds, is one possible occasion for the transfer; another is the visit of Kassandros in 314, when he synoecised several states for the Akarnanians; the capture of Oiniadai would be a sensible move by him, providing him with full control of the Acheloos valley, but had he controlled the city it would not have been necessary to settle Oiniadans at Sauria. We may conclude that he did not take the city at that time. Shortly after, however, Kassandros' brother Philip fought a battle at Oiniadai against the Epeirote-Aitolian army[7]. Since Philip won, it may well be that he also took the city. There is no other occasion before 311 when this could have taken place.

Earlier, in 321, the Aitolian forces had marched towards Thessaly by way of Amphissa, whose territory they had ravaged[8]. This is another episode fully in the tradition of expansionary Greek states and, with the Oiniadan capture, it showed that Aitolia was operating in that mode, using those methods: the seizure of the place, the expulsion of irreconcilables, who then became exiles roaming about in search of sympathy and allies, the ravaging of enemy territory, sieges and conquests. It was just as unsuccessful a process for the Aitolians as it had been for everyone else; the conquests were soon lost, the ravaged enemies were only confirmed in their enmity, the exiles thirsted for revenge. However, during the next generation a clear change came over Aitolian policy, one which resulted in a successful, peaceful expansion of the league, and which produced a powerful loyalty among the newly absorbed states, some of whom had earlier been enemies and victims.

It is worth recalling that the generation which had followed the capture of Oiniadai by the Aitolians was one of constant tension and frequent wars, a time when great armies trampled back and forth across Greece. Aitolia came out of all this intact and relatively unscathed – at least by comparison with many other places. The Aitolians had learnt to be exceedingly nimble in a diplomatic sense,

[6] Referred to by P. Cabanes, 'Le pouvoir local au sein des états fédéraux: Épire, Acarnanie, Étolie', *La Béotie Antique*, Paris 1985, 345-346, basing himself on a photograph in S. G. Miller, 'Excavations at Nemea 1978', *Hesperia* 49, 1979, plate 2 and pages 78-80.

[7] Paus. 1.11.4.

[8] Diod. 18.38.2.

but had always placed their own interests before any other obligations. And in that period the league had made no geographical gains, had, in fact, lost control of Oiniadai. Further, there is no evidence that the league had made any attempt to expand: survival had been the sole object. It was a policy of vigilance, soft speaking, and care. This was the policy which remained the Aitolians' preferred method after survival was assured. This does not mean that Aitolian expansionary ambitions were over; indeed in the next generation after c.300 this seems to have been the league's main purpose. But the two aspects – survival and expansion – are not contradictory. It is the events of the career of Demetrios Poliorketes which show this clearly for the first time.

Demetrios' father's death in battle at Ipsos in 301 led to the collapse of Demetrios' own authority in Greece. Demetrios' new Hellenic alliance, of which the Aitolians were probably members, also vanished. He was quickly reduced to control of his fleet and a couple of Peloponnesian cities; even Athens got rid of him, for a time. This vacuum should have left Greece open to penetration once more by Kassandros from Macedon, but it seems that he was already lethargic from the effects of the disease which killed him in 297, and he remained content with Macedon – or perhaps it was Macedon's weariness with war which deterred him. It was Kassandros' death which brought Demetrios back to Greece to fish in the re-troubled waters[9].

In the meantime Aitolia had remained quiet. An alliance with Boiotia has been dated to 301[10], and may be seen as a pact of mutual defence concluded at the time Demetrios' Hellenic alliance was falling apart. The Phokians were a part of the alliance as well, which looks like an attempt to replace Demetrios' scheme with a home-grown version. It was, as always with the Aitolians, essentially a defensive move. The return of Demetrios to Greece in 296 made it all the more necessary.

The old friendship of the Aitolians with Demetrios was defunct. Aitolia's policy had to be defensive, as before, and the threats came

[9] Cf. Hammond, *Hist. Mac* 3.199-210.

[10] Schmitt, *Staatsverträge*, III, 463. The date is not agreed: Schmitt suggests 292, others various dates between 301 and 281/280 (cf Schmitt, p. 99). R. Flacelière, 'Les Rapports de l'Aitolie et de la Béotie de 302 à 228 av J.-C.', *BCH* 54, 1930, 75-94, favours 301, as does Roesch, *Études*, 357-359; this is the most popular date, but the vote is still a minority one.

from all directions. There had been a threat from the north and east in 297, when Kassandros's son Philip was at Elateia in Phokis when he died of disease[11]. This brief foray scarcely tested the alliance. Demetrios campaigned in the Peloponnese in 295 and then fastened his teeth into a siege of Athens in 294. To the north fighting broke out also in 294, between Kassandros' second son Antipatros, who had been king in Macedon since Philip died, and the new king of Epeiros, the turbulent Pyrros[12]. Pyrros also expanded southwards and took the city of Ambrakia, which he developed into his capital[13], and made an alliance with the Akarnanian League, certainly in 283, though the agreement may date from ten years earlier[14], and this now made him Aitolia's neighbour all along its western boundary from Oiniadai to the Pindos mountains, a new and unreliable neighbour, clearly a threat.

Demetrios returned to Greece, therefore, operating in Attika and the Peloponnese until he conquered Athens in 294; then he seized the opportunity presented by the weakness of Kassandros' heirs to make himself king in Macedon. Thus suddenly could matters change; in that same year Pyrros' power reached to Oiniadai, and Demetrios reached from Athens to Macedon. Demetrios' power now threatened everyone else in Greece, and after he put down one rising in Boiotia in 293, he controlled all Aitolia's eastern neighbours from Thessaly to Attika.

The league gave no support to the Boiotians, theoretically their allies, who were put down again by Demetrios after a two-month siege of Thebes[15], after which he remained in control of Boiotia and Phokis. The one distraction he had suffered had been an invasion of Thessaly by Pyrros, but Demetrios saw this off easily. The Aitolians

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[11] Porphyrios, *FGH* 260 F3.

[12] Plut. *Demetrios* 6.4.

[13] Strabo 7.7.6; Hammond, *Epirus*, 568-569.

[14] Schmitt, *Staatsverträge*, III, 459; the date is, of course, disputed; Schmitt suggests 294. Plut. *Pyrros* 6, states that Akarnania was given to Pyrros by Alexandros son of Kassandros, joint king in Macedon with his brother Antipatros; this is obviously a tendentious way of expessing the transaction. Since Akarnania formed a league at this period, and Pyrros controlled it, the simplest explanation of the relationship is that Pyrros was *hegemon* of the league; it was eventually formalised as an alliance, recorded on an inscription from Aktion (now missing: *IG* IX.1.207); cf. Larsen *GFS* 266, Hammond, *Epirus* 568-569. The form of the relationship is less important than the fact, which is that Pyrros was in control of Akarnanian foreign relations until his death.

[15] Plut. *Demetrios* 40.

may not have seriously attempted to interfere with events in Boiotia, but they had been members of the alliance; as a precaution they did mount a guard on the roads leading out of Boiotia towards their lands. This put them well into Phokis, for Plutarch describes them as blocking the passes which led to Delphi, that is, on either end of Parnassos, that to the west leading out of Doris towards Amphissa, and that to the east leading through Daulis. Demetrios attempted to penetrate this defence but could not, any more than the Aitolians had been able to disrupt the siege of Thebes. Insults aimed at the Aitolians were included in the Athenians' celebrations in 290 in words which suggest that Aitolian actions were confined to raids on Demetrios' supply lines, which he – and his Athenian sycophants – could describe as 'brigandage'. Defiantly Demetrios, unable to send participants to the Delphian *Pythia*, held a rival celebration at Athens in that year[16].

Geographically this suggests that the Aitolians were in control not just of the approaches to Delphi, but of Delphi itself and this is the conclusion usually drawn[17]. We cannot point to a source which says this in so many words, and if geography is to be taken as the determining factor, then we must also conclude that Amphissa was Aitolian by this time, but we know from other sources that it was not[18]. It does not follow from the events of 290, therefore, that Delphi had yet fallen under Aitolian control. The passes were an advanced defence for Aitolia even more than for Delphi, which was not threatened by Demetrios, and they were occupied for that reason, not so as to control Delphi, which is a separate issue. Demetrios' *Pythia* in Athens does not mean Aitolia controlled Delphi, only that they controlled the routes to Delphi, which is not quite the same thing.

Aitolia was, by Demetrios' attack, thrown into alliance with Pyrros. This was not necessarily the choice of either, and may well not have amounted to a formal alliance. It was simply a matter of facing the same enemy. Pyrros alone could well be seen as a threat to Aitolia, particularly as he was the *hegemon* of the Akarnanian League. This relationship, in the absence of Demetrios, could be construed as aggressive, though from the Akarnanian viewpoint, it was probably

[16] Athenaios 6.253d-f (Duris, *FGH* 76 F13); Plut. *Demetrios* 40.7-8; see also chapter 2.

[17] Flacelière, *Aitoliens*, 68-80.

[18] See next chapter.

defensive. For Pyrros similarly, it may have been seen as removing a political problem, and as providing a bulwark protecting his acquisition of Ambrakia, which city he was developing as a royal centre.

Aitolia's war with Demetrios continued until 289. In that year he invaded Aitolia[19], apparently from the direction of Macedon, that is, by way of Thessaly. This implies that the Parnassos passes and Delphi were still denied to him – though he could certainly use Thermopylai and the route over Oitia into Phokis. The Spercheios valley has been suggested as the route he took[20]. He would be able to march through Malis and Ainis, effectively defenceless lands which he surely controlled, before reaching Aitolian land, but only the northern mountain cantons of Aitolia were then available to him for ravaging, not a particularly inviting prospect. But Demetrios' main target in this campaign was not in fact the Aitolians, but Pyrros, though the two kings missed each other in their opposing marches. Pyrros did, however, locate and defeat part of the Macedonian army which Demetrios had left in Aitolia as an occupation force[21]. We have no indication where this took place, still less that it occurred in Akarnania, as some claim[22]. It does seem, though, that peace between the kings was made soon after, if the sources are juggled about somewhat[23]. No doubt the Aitolians were involved in the fighting against Demetrios' forces, and no doubt they were included in the peace which followed, but the dominant impression we gain is that the Aitolians did as little fighting as possible, and that mainly defensive.

Aitolia's policy remained the same when Demetrios fell from power in 287. They did not stir, so far as can be seen. The early division of Macedon between Pyrros and Lysimachos which followed suited Aitolia well enough, since this made for trouble between the kings. Even the reunification of the kingdom by Lysimachos was only a distant problem, for Lysimachos was by then based mainly in Asia Minor, and from there was no threat to Aitolia. Pyrros meanwhile, having been alternately victorious and defeated in Macedon, began to look westward for new adventures.

[19] Plut. *Demetrios* 41.2, *Pyrros* 7.4.
[20] P. Levêcque, *Pyrros*, Paris 1957, 144-145.
[21] Plut. *Demetrios* 41.3, *Pyrros* 7.6-10.
[22] E.g., Hammond, *Hist. Mac* 3.224-225.
[23] Plut. *Demetrios* 43.1-2; *Pyrros* 10.2-5.

In fact the relationship between Lysimachos and Aitolia seems to have been much more friendly than with any other king. This is suggested by the fact that two Aitolian towns were named after the king and his queen, Lysimacheia and Arsinoe. The second of these was certainly an old settlement, originally called Konope, according to Strabo[24]. It is probable that Lysimacheia was also an older settlement renamed. This is a gesture which was never repeated by the Aitolians (except for a minor settlement which received the name Attaleia decades later[25]). They did not name a place after Pyrros, for example, a longstanding ally, though he was honoured with a statue at Kallipolis[26], nor any of the Ptolemies, allies for some time. Nor, later, was Antiochos the Great so honoured. There was scarcely time to do so, so short was their alliance – though the Boiotians, even briefer allies, managed to put up a statue to him at their federal sanctuary at Koroneia[27]. These two renamings, therefore, do suggest a considerable, and unusual, sincerity in the alliance with Lysimachos on Aitolia's part, and a certain longevity of friendship for that sentiment to develop and the renaming to take place. It is possible that the attachment dates back to the 320s, when Lysimachos was satrap in Thrace, though this is on the face of it unlikely, and here is no evidence for it. However, Lysimachos' acquisition of part of Macedon in 287 would still give six years before his death at Korupedion, time enough for the friendship to grow.

One reason for this close friendship in the 280s was their mutual antipathy towards Demetrios' son Antigonos Gonatas. Antigonos had inherited his father's fleet, his Greek interests, and his garrisons in Argos, Corinth, Megara, Athens, Boiotia, and Elateia, and his father's city of Demetrias in Achaia Phthiotis. These were spread all along Aitolia's eastern borders. These holdings were slowly whittled away over the years following Demetrios' fall. Probably Athens was lost, at least for a time, in a rebellion; Elateia may have risen in rebellion; Boiotia was ever ready to rise against any king, and its treatment by Demetrios guaranteed that it would go as soon as a chance arose for a successful rebellion[28]. Aitolia was thus surrounded by kings:

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[24] Strabo 10.2.22.
[25] Pol. 4.65.6.
[26] *IG* IX.1.154.
[27] Livy 36.20.3.
[28] Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas* 114.

Pyrros to the west, Lysimachos to the north, Antigonos to the east, a thoroughly uncomfortable situation, all the more so in that these men were liable to spring at each other with little or no warning. At the same time, the threats they posed were sensibly less than at any time in the past generation. Lysimachos was friendly, old, preoccupied for years with internal family problems, and based well away from Aitolia in Asia. Pyrros from 282 had his eyes fixed on Italy, and sent troops there in 281. Antigonos was the least powerful of the three, and no real threat to Aitolia without assistance, which he would not get from the other two.

In all this Aitolia's normal policy of caution continued: neutrality if possible; alliance where necessary, but with as few strings as possible, and for as brief a time as possible, and entered into with the object of deterring attack or preventing it; fierce resistance when attacked. Yet this policy of caution and defensiveness did not preclude a policy of equally cautious expansion – after all, expansion can be a form of defence. And this period was the first for decades when a cautious expansion could take place. It is thus during this period, between 290 and 280, that the western part of Lokris, along the coast of the Gulf of Corinth, was largely incorporated into the league, and the even more significant acquisition of Herakleia Trachinia was made.

Parts of Ozolian Lokris, on the Corinthian Gulf, had already been absorbed. Naupaktos was Aitolian by 280, which means it was taken at the latest during the decade before that. Naupaktos' importance, in a geographical sense, lay in its position at the narrows of the Gulf of Corinth. In a larger sense, its importance was in the fact that it was a famous and independent city. It had been acquired in reasonably unpleasant circumstances in 338, and lost in 336, in each case by the agency of Philip II of Macedon. This time, however, there is no suggestion of violence, no trace of exiles. Thus it is evident that Naupaktos joined the league voluntarily. The date, however, is quite uncertain. The city does not appear in any capacity in any of the sources between Aitolia's loss and 280, nor are there any inscriptions which might provide a clue[29].

The small town of Makynia, west of Naupaktos, between it and

[29] Lerat, *Locriens*, 54-55, suggests that the acquisition in 338 was permanent, but C. R. Bosworth, 'Early Relations between Aetolia and Macedon', *AJAH* 1, 1977, 164-181, has shown that the city was lost again.

Kalydon, is described as Aitolian in an inscription of 329/328[30]. It and its eastern neighbour Molykreion had become Aitolian in 338 along with Naupaktos; it seems that Aitolia kept at least one of them when Philip took Naupaktos back. This is thus the pattern of events in West Lokris, a slow acquisition of individual settlements, very few of which can be dated. This western end of Lokris was the area which, even in Strabo's time, was referred to as Aitolia Epiktetos, 'Acquired' Aitolia[31], which implies that it was 'acquired' before the rest of Lokris, of which the area might be originally a part. At the other end of Lokris, Amphissa was still outside Aitolia in the late 270s, when a family of men from the city were appointed *proxenoi* of the league[32]. Between these two areas was a string of small towns and cities – Erythrai, Eupalion, Oineon, Antikyra, Tolphon, Phaistinos, Oiantheia, Physkeis, Chaleion, and others whose position is not known – all of which became members of the Aitolian league. One of these, Chaleion on the gulf of Krissa at the eastern end of Lokris, was not a member during the first strategy of Charixenos I, which dates to about 288/287, for one of its citizens was granted the privilege of citizenship in the league, which could only be given to foreigners[33]. Another, Myania, sent a 'Lokrian' to be *hieromnenon* at Delphi in 269/268[34], and so that town was probably still outside the league at that time. It seems very probable that it became a member within the next year or two.

The other towns and cities of Lokris, Erythrai, Eupalion, and Oineon in the west, Oiantheia, Phaistinos and Tolphon by the Krissan Gulf, Tritia and Physkeis inland, were certainly members of the league by the time Amphissa and Chaleion joined, and so by about 270. Since the Lokrians were not listed separately in the names of the contingents to fight the Kelts in 279, but the Amphissans are[35], it would seem that their absorption into the league took place before that attack. The silence of the sources is, in this period, not very surprising, given their fragmentary nature, but a hint may well have been preserved if the process had been violent. There were plenty of enemies of Aitolia at the time and later who would be pleased to

[30] E. Bourguet, 'Inscriptions de Delphes', *BCH* 1899, p. 356.
[31] Strabo 10.2.3.
[32] *IG* IX.1.12a.
[33] *IG* IX.1.5.
[34] Fl I 11; Lefèvre 29; there was a Lokrian in the list for the next year, but the name and home city are not legible (Fl I 12; Lefèvre 29).
[35] Paus. 10.23.1.

exploit any Aitolian difficulties in the area, and plenty later who would use such a process, if it was violent, as a stick to beat the league. But the most telling item is Amphissa. In 321 the Aitolians ravaged Amphissa's lands on their way to Thessaly, which surely indicates a definite interest on Aitolia's part in expanding in that direction, and also indicates Amphissa's determined unwillingness to comply. The problems with Oiniadai at the same time are another sign that Aitolia's neighbours were unwilling to submit, and that Aitolian methods at the time were violent in the usual Greek way. Yet these small Lokrian cities apparently did submit, though Amphissa did not – and it was not forced. Amphissa was a vital node in communications for Aitolia, controlling as it did the route to Delphi, and therefore also the route from Boiotia into eastern Aitolia, overlooking the important land route connecting the Gulfs of Corinth and Malis. And yet, the city remained independent until well after Aitolia was in control of Delphi, which lay beyond Amphissa from Aitolia's viewpoint. If ever there was a city ripe for conquest by Aitolia, it was Amphissa, which event could have been justified by a whole series of acceptable reasons. Yet when it joined the league, it did so voluntarily.

Although Amphissa was still outside ths league in the 270s, it was surrounded by Aitolian-controlled territory by 280, and perhaps ten years before. Delphi was certainly under some form of Aitolian protection from the time of Demetrios' frustration in 291-290, and in 280 King Areus of Sparta made an expedition to expel the Aitolians from the Kirrhan plain. This was supposedly sacred land lying between Delphi and the sea at the Krissan Gulf. Areus claimed he was rescuing the land from Aitolian exploitation, a claim which would have had more validity if he had not turned his army loose to plunder the disputed land. This allowed the Aitolians to catch his army scattered, and to expel him and it[36]. But his accusation, and the Aitolian defence, show that the plain really was under Aitolian control at the time and it also implies that Chaleion (also Itea, the port for voyagers heading for Delphi), on the west coast of the Krissan Gulf, was also Aitolian by then. Amphissa was thus both surrounded and isolated – except for tiny Myania. If Aitolia was still pursuing a policy of aggressive expansion, Amphissa was particularly ripe for the plucking by then.

[36] Justin 24.1.

So we may assume that the accession of the more westerly Lokrian cities and towns to the league was voluntary, just as Amphissa's was in the end. These small settlements gained the protection of their larger neighbour, and Aitolia gained control over its maritime approaches. But protection was no compensation for loss of independence, if exploitation accompanied it. That is, obligations had to be balanced by advantages, and the way to ensure this was by equitable participation. These small places were assured of full participation on equal terms in the processes and decisions of the league. The proof of their participation is clear in the lists of men holding league offices. All through the third century from the 270s, when records become reasonably numerous, men from these small Lokrian cities appear holding league offices: not many of them, to be sure, but then these were small places, and there were many members; but there are enough of them to show that they were not being excluded[37]. But the real lesson came from Herakleia Trachinia, in Oitia.

This was as notable a city as Naupaktos, and with a curiously parallel history. It was a Spartan foundation, where Naupaktos had been a refuge for Messenian exiles, and both had emancipated themselves from these burdens, while both were also situated at important communications nodes. Herakleia was in fact founded soon after Demosthenes' invasion of Aitolia, and in part as a result of the Spartan expedition to the area which resulted from the Aitolian alliance which followed his defeat. The city lay just north of Thermopylai, and was well fortified. It was the main city of the Oitaians, the land below Mount Oita, commanding the entrance to Thermopylai from the north, and controlling the northern end of the Isthmus route to the Gulf of Krissa, one of the routes into Aitolia, and its acquisition gave the Aitolians much better defences in that area, and access to the Aegean Sea, as well, now, as control over every north-south route in Greece. The league now stretched right across the Greek peninsula, from the Ionian Sea to the Aegean.

The one source which notes the city's accession to the league is Pausanias, who says the city was forced to join[38]. The context in which he made the comment was the invasion of Macedon by the Kelts, and the collapse of that kingdom, which allowed them to

[37] *Prosopography*, 'Origins'; for an extended discussion of the absorption of Ozolian Lokris into the league see Lerat, *Lokriens*, 61-66.

[38] Paus. 10.21.1.

invade Greece as well. Pausanias also made the point that the Aitolians defended the city next year as one of their own. This may well thus be the purpose of the 'force' used by the Aitolians, to get the city into the league so as to provide a proper advanced defence against the anticipated Keltic attack. Within less than ten years an Herakleian was elected as *grammateus* of the league, and in less than twenty a man of the city was *strategos*. Herakleians sponsored *proxenoi* for the league almost as soon as records appear, and they appear also as Aitolian *hieromnemones* at Delphi in 272/271[39]. That is, the city was participating fully in the league in all its official aspects from the very start of its inclusion.

This immediate participation is in direct contrast with the statement that the Aitolians had to use force to bring the city in. The degree of 'force' which the league had had to exert must therefore be small, since it clearly left no resentment behind. No doubt one party in the city wanted to continue in independence, an assumption which is surely safe enough to be made of any Greek city at any time. It must be assumed that there had been a Macedonian garrison in the city until recently, given its important strategic situation, but the collapse of the kingdom during 280, which followed on the collapse of Antigonos Gonatas' power in central Greece after his naval defeat in that year, probably left the city defenceless[40].

The international situation was thus one of the main factors in the establishment of conditions conducive to Aitolian expansion. At the very time that Herakleia was being taken over, all the surrounding kings and kingdoms had been eclipsed for one reason or another. Macedon had become the prey of a succession of kings with the death of Lysimachos and his conqueror Seleukos in 281, and this weakness brought in the Kelts; Antigonos Gonatas, whose power had been declining, was reduced to a few cities and a few ships by the same time; Pyrros went to Italy in 280 and stayed there, and in Sicily, for five years. All this left the Greek states suddenly free, but the surrounding climate was still dangerous, all the more so with the invasion of the Kelts. Herakleia, formerly protected, was now bereft. The Aitolians were the nearest power. The diehards had to be compelled;

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[39] *Grammateus* (Polycharmos): *IG* IX.1.l0 and 11; *strategos* (Trichas): *IG* IX.1.2; *engyon*: *IG* IX.1.17 of 271/270 (four men): *hieromnemones*: Fl I 7; Lefèvre 23-24 (273/272) and Fl I 8; Lefèvre 25-26 (272/271) – choosing only the earliest examples.

[40] Antigonos' defeat: Memnon 13; Justin 24.1.8: Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas* 131-133.

no doubt the majority of Herakleians were happy with the Aitolian takeover. There is no hint of resentment, or of an Herakleian independence movement, at any time in the next century and more.

This distinction between persuasion and forcible conquest is vital to an appreciation of the whole history of the league. It is the contention of this study that Aitolia was basically a peaceful and peaceable political entity, capable of defending itself, but unwilling to attack. Its enemies feared such an alien entity, and calumniated it, accusations which have been discussed. This new policy of peaceful expansion was adopted after the failures of the attempts to conquer Naupaktos, Oiniadai, and Amphissa which had been made by the league in the 320s. The successful Aitolian defence since then persuaded its neighbours, mainly small and weak, and therefore vulnerable, cities, that the league was worth joining. This sentiment had to overcome old prejudices, such as that voiced by the Messenians of Naupaktos to Demosthenes in 426. That it was successful is evident.

One aspect of this policy was a successful defence. The last invasion of Aitolia which had made any real impact had been that conducted by Antipatros and Krateros in 320. Since then there had been threats – by Kassandros, by his brother Philip, by Demetrios in 291 and 290 – but only the second attack by Demetrios had really penetrated into any part of Aitolia. This for its time is a remarkable record, and it must be the basis for the prosperity which is evident in the area in the next century. It was accomplished in part by the defeat of the Macedonian attack in 320, which was so successful as to deter others, and in part by the successful, if unscrupulous, Aitolian diplomacy. In summary, Aitolia's policy was always to put Aitolia's interest first; if that involved breaking alliances, then the alliance would be broken. It was not a policy which made for popularity, but that was not the purpose of the policy. In this diplomacy, success's reward was peace.

The Aitolian League's expansion to include Herakleia Trachinia in 280 was in part due, it may be assumed, to the invasion of Macedon by the Kelts in that year, for the invasion provided a clear, if in fact distant, threat to the Greek states as well. These same Kelts were able to penetrate as far as Delphi in the next year, and the Aitolians were to bear the brunt of the attack, and to bore the rest of Greece for decades with boasts of their prowess in defending the temple. More practically, that prowess included defending the city of Herakleia successfully, and so the Aitolians laid even better foundations for the fur-

ther expansion of the league in the decade and more which followed. But the emphasis on the Keltic war should not distract us from the fact that the real foundations of that expansion – and indeed the process itself – had already been well laid in the preceding period. After the Kelts had withdrawn, and after Macedon had been re-established, there was perhaps less need for Aitolia's neighbours to join the league, yet they did so, one at a time, peacefully and voluntarily, and this attests to the league's power of attraction, even when no common threat existed.

The Kelts had ravaged Macedon in 280 and into 279, and they invaded the kingdom again in the late summer of 279, having regrouped beyond its northern boundaries. The Macedonians who lsurvived took refuge in their fortified cities, and the Kelts, commanded by Brennos, then moved on southwards out of Macedon and into Thessaly. There can have been little enough left to loot in Macedon by that time anyway, outside the cities, which the invaders could not take, and there can have been little or no food available for them in the rural areas. Hence the move south to more porductive areas.

The news of the renewed invasion had galvanised the Greeks into unaccustomed co-operation[41]. All the peoples from Malis to the Isthmus sent contingents to block the pass at Thermopylai, and, since Brennos and his people took their time about looting Thessaly, the Greek forces managed to reach the pass first. The Boiotians and the Aitolians were the most numerous, for they, with the Phokians, would be the most immediately threatened once the invaders came farther south. The Aitolian contingent is said to have been the largest, but the numbers we are given are only 7,000 hoplites, 790 light armed-infantry, and an unknown number of cavalry[42], which is in fact a smaller contingent than that of the Boiotians. There were also other Aitolian troops who remained at home[43], and a detachment which was posted to Phokis[44], both of which were eventually involved in the crisis. There may also have been others. When these are added to the Thermopylai contingent the Aitolian forces probably did produce a

[41] Sources for these events: Paus. 10.19.5-23.9; Justin 24.6-8; Diod. 22.9; of modern accounts, Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas* 148-157; Nachtergael, *Galates* 140-164; Flacelière, *Aitoliens* 93-104.

[42] Paus. 10.20.3; Nachtergael, *Galates*, 142-143; Will, *Histoire Politique*, 1.105-107; *CAH* (2) VII 101-106; Cary, *Greek World*, 58-62.

[43] Paus. 10.22.3.

[44] Paus. 10.23.2.

greater total than that for the Boiotians, whose contingent, at 10,000 hoplites and 500 cavalry, is the largest number actually stated among the Thermopylai forces. The confusion over numbers is no doubt a product of later squabbles over who won the victory. The Aitolians may be said to have produced the largest number of troops, but, unless all the Aitolians who were actually involved are to be added in, the statement must be the result of Aitolian postwar boasting. It is, for instance, difficult to believe that the Aitolian cavalry was numerous enough to bring the total of Aitolians at Thermopylai to over 10,500; this would require a cavalry force of about 3,000, which is too great a number for the Aitolian mountain lands to have produced. Never did the Aitolians produce a larger cavalry force than 500 men at any time in their history.

The Kelts crossed the Spercheios River – which had been Aitolia's northern border since the incorporation of Oitia along with Herakleia – despite an attempt to break the bridges and guard the ford. They crashed into the Greek army at Thermopylai, without success[45]. Brennos tried to divide his enemies. A detachment of the Keltic army was sent over Mount Oita and into the upper valley of the Daphnos. They behaved with revolting cruelty, or so the Greeks remembered, and even succeeded in capturing and burning the Aitolian city of Kallion. This was all Aitolian territory, the land of the Apodotoi, though the people are referred to as Kallians, a sign perhaps of the recent urbanisation of the area. They resisted, of course, and as word spread of the Kelts' atrocities, the whole Aitolian population, old and young, men and women, set out to punish the invaders, a quite remarkable display. The Kelts turned to retreat by the way they had come and met and defeated a detachment of Achaian hoplites from Patrai, who were apparently detached from the main force, perhaps still on their way to Thermopylai. This fight, however, delayed them – which supports the view that this Keltic detachment was not very large[46] – so that the Aitolians were able to catch up with them and harass them ferociously on the retreat; the invaders lost, so it is said, half their number[47].

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[45] Paus. 10.20.4-21.2; Justin omits the Thermopylai fight; Nachtergael, *Galates*, 140-150.

[46] Paus. 10.22.4 puts their number at 40,000, which is not believable; still less is Justin's figure of 65,000 (24.7.9).

[47] Paus. 10.22.1-4.

Still blocked at Thermopylai, Brennos evaded the Greek army by taking a second detachment off to raid Delphi. This detachment first threatened to surround the Greeks in the pass, and this sufficed to break up the allied army, and the various contingents left for their homelands. The main Keltic force under Akichorios then lumbered after Brennos, but was harassed by the main Aitolian force which had been stationed at the pass and had marched off earlier. Brennos' detachment was met at Delphi by the levy of Phokis, presumably including the Delphians, reinforced by 400 Amphissans and by the nearest Aitolians. This army first stopped the Kelts, then, after a troubled night of snow and falling rocks, and having been reinforced by 1,200 more Aitolians, drove them back, partly by a frontal assault by the hoplite phalanx, and partly by flanking fire from the hills on either side. The next night – their troops having been fighting or under fire for two days and a night – the Kelts panicked at the slightest sound, no doubt assisted by more Greek harassment, and by their own superstitious fears of attacking a noted sanctuary. Brennos was mortally wounded also, which cannot have helped[48].

The Aitolians harried the retreat as far as the Spercheios valley, and other contingents – Athenians, Boiotians[49] – joined in to cut down the fugitives as they passed through Thermopylai. Then the longsuffering Malians and Thessalians joined in as well[50]. It was said, by the Greeks, that none of the Kelts escaped[51], though this is most unlikely. The Thessalians are more likely to have harassed them out of Thessaly rather than to have forced them to stand and endure a do-or-die fight. They were plainly leaving, and to hinder them was not sensible. One source, indeed, connects this band with the later Keltic kingdom of the Scordisci, on the Danube[52].

The Aitolians came out of the whole affair as the heroes, not least

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[48] Paus 1.4.4 and 10.23.1-6; Pausanias claims 16,000 killed in this fight – again not a believable figure; Justin 24.7.1-15 gives all the credit to the Delphians, and does not once mention the Aitolians.

[49] Paus 10.23.11. Their availability suggests that these contingents had not retreated very far from Thermopylai after the joint army broke up.

[50] Paus. 10.23.7-8.

[51] Paus. 10.23.8.

[52] The Keltic force was annihilitated three times: at the Spercheios according to Pausanias (10.23.8); in Thessaly according to Justin (24.8.16); and by the Dardanians, in Diodoros' account (22.9.3); all this is not necessarily contradictory since there were several bands, and to split up for greater speed would make a certain sense; Scordisci: Justin 32.3.6-8; Nachtergael, *Galates*, 164-172.

in their own eyes. In the future they would exploit the reputation this gave them to the full, still claiming credit nearly seventy years later[53]. When the record is closely examined, however, it is clear that the Aitolians acted wholly in their own interests, as they always had, and as did every other Greek state. (Justin reports that Thessalians and Ainianians joined with the Kelts in their plundering raids[54]). That is to say, the Aitolians' policy with regard to the Kelts was exactly the same as the policy they adopted towards Demetrios or towards Antipatros and Krateros, or even towards the Athenian Demosthenes, a century and a half earlier: they defended their own territory, but scarcely stepped outside it on any pretext. So when the Keltic detachment ravaged the valley of the Daphnos, the Aitolians at Thermopylai reacted in exactly the same way as those in Thessaly in 320 when they heard of the invasion of the Akarnanians: they headed for home at once. When Brennos and Akichorios headed for Delphi the Aitolians certainly opposed them. Yet it may be that they did so not primarily because of the holiness of the sanctuary but more because by threatening Delphi they also threatened nearby Aitolian lands. Delphi itself was under Aitolian protection, but it was also close to Aitolian territory, and its capture would give the Kelts a base from which to invade Aitolia proper. Pausanias makes the point that the Aitolians had held Herakleia Trachinia for only a year, but that they defended it against the Kelts as though it had always been their's[55]. When the Kelts retreated, the Aitolians pursued and harassed them as far as the Spercheios River, their northern boundary[56], but then they stopped, just as they had only begun to fight the Kelts once they had crossed the Spercheios on the way south. In this, of course, they were acting in the same way that all Greek states did; the concept of the joint defence of Greece was alien to all the states; it is a mistake to imagine a belief in Greek nationality at this time.

The Aitolians capitalised on their success, claiming to be the saviours of Greece, for which they certainly had an aguable case, though

[53] Complaint of Lykiskos the Akarnanian: Pol 9.35.1; the absence of any mention of the Aitolians in Justin's account is perhaps a sign of the antagonism they had provoked by their harping on the matter; cf. C. Champion, 'Polybius, Aetolia, and the Gallic attack on Delphi (279 BC)', *Historia* 45, 1996, 315-328 for a study of the 'legend' of the Aitolian defence which developed afterwards.

[54] Justin 24.7.1.

[55] Paus. 10.21.1.

[56] Paus. 10.23.8.

not an indisputable one, and of Delphi, about which there could be no argument at all. The temple was adorned with Aitolian trophies of the war: statues of gods, statues of Aitolian commanders, a statue of the personification of Aitolia as a woman, armed, and seated on a heap of Keltic shields, actual captured Keltic shields, displayed in a conscious imitation of the Persian shields which the Athenians had taken at Marathon[57]. Deliberate reminiscences were made of the last time the god and his temple were saved from barbarian capture, in Xerxes' invasion, and this is reflected in the ordering of events in Pausanias' account. The message was: the Aitolians are the new Athenians, the new saviours of Greece. Aitolian coins vigorously publicised these deeds for the next century and a half[58]. At least one other community, Thespiai of Boiotia, was grateful enough to the Aitolians to dedicate a statue at Olympia, probably of the Aitolian commander Plaistainos son of Eurydamos, where he stood amongst kings[59]. Others, not directly involved, came to check on what had happened, and to hear the elaborating stories, and to sacrifice and give thanks for the shrine's preservation, as did envoys from Kos[60]. In the process the work of the Boiotians, the Phokians, the unfortunate Achaian detachment, the Athenians, and others, was sidelined.

The Delphians established a festival, the *Soteria*, with the usual games, to celebrate their deliverance. This, of course, also celebrated the Aitolian victory. The festival was an annual one at first, which meant that every four years it clashed with the main games of Delphi, the *Pythia*. This eventually caused the Aitolians to interfere, but no doubt the original idea was fully acceptable at first[61].

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[57] Paus. 10.15.2 and 18.7.

[58] A. J. Reinach, 'Un Monument Delphien: l'Étolie sur les Trophées Gaulois de Kallion', *Journal International d'Archéologie Numismatique*, 1911, 177-240, lists these coins on 187-203.

[59] Paus. 10.16.2.

[60] *Syll* (3) 398.

[61] Nachtergael, *Galates*, 295-382.

6. EXPANSION: THE SECOND PHASE (278-260)

The events of 280-278 showed the importance of Delphi and its surroundings for Aitolian security. With the sanctuary and the city in hostile hands the Aitolian position in Lokris and Phokis was precarious, and it would leave eastern Aitolia also open to attack – the smoking ruins and murdered people of Kallion were a powerful warning. Almost ignored in the excitement of the Keltic attack is the earlier attack by Areus of Sparta, whose excuse had been the old one, used often enough in the past to justify an attack in the area, that the Aitolians had profaned the sacred lands of the Kirrhan Plain[1]. So Delphi was important to Aitolia in a variety of ways, above all strategic, and it had to be controlled. This could have been done by military means, by installing a permanent Aitolian garrison, as had been done in the first Aitolian attempt to hold Naupaktos fifty years before, but this was a course which would inevitably prove to be unpopular, and smacked rather too much of the methods of the Phokians in the Sacred War of the 350s; and everyone had been reminded of that episode by the cancellation of the remnants of the fine imposed on the Phokians then as a result of their participation in the defence of the sanctuary against the Kelts[2].

It was necessary, therefore, that the Aitolians should be present in Delphi by invitation, or at least that their supervision should be acceptable to the Delphians. This required that both the Delphian *polis* and the Delphic sanctuary be involved. The city itself was not a problem, since it depended for its very existence on the sanctuary, which, in turn, was effectively governed by the Amphiktyonic Council, a body of delegates from various surrounding communities. So the Aitolians needed to have members on the Amphiktyonic Council, whose membership had so far carefully excluded them, despite their geographical proximity. By 278, however, they had two members on the Council[3],

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[1] Justin 24.1.2-7.

[2] This is generally assumed from the fact that the Phokians' votes in the Amphiktyony were restored to them: two Phokians appear in the brief list of the archonship of Hieron, in 278 (FI I 1).

[3] FI I 1; Lefèvre 12, who dates it to 279/278 or 278/277.

presumably by virtue of the lands they had control of, who had previously sent delegates, of which eastern Lokris is the obvious one – but it is also possible that gratitude for deliverance from the Kelts was another main motive, and that the Aitolians were able to send delegates in their own right as a result of their victories. This was certainly the motive for accepting Phokian delegates once more after their long exclusion because of the Sacred War.

The gradual expansion of the Aitolian membership of the Amphiktyony over the next half century has been one of the clues to the growth of the Aitolian league, but rather too much attention has been given to it[4]. There are other sources for this expansion, though none so apparently systematic, and these need to be given due weight. For instance, it is not altogether certain that the Aitolians were quite so consistent in replacing absorbed members by those described as 'Aitolians', nor that non-Aitolians were quite so consistent in their attendances. This means that their absences cannot necessarily be correlated with increases in the number of the Aitolian delegates. Above all, the rationale of using the Amphiktyonic lists presupposes that it was an overtly political organisation. The Council could certainly be used at times for political purposes, as Philip II had, as the Thebans had, and as the Thessalians (and even the Phokians) had in the past, but this is not to say that every power necessarily did so, and there is no indication other than the changes in membership that the Aitolians were politically motivated in gaining control. Aitolia's Amphiktyonic membership is just one of the clues which must be used in determining the course of Aitolia's history. This record is, after all, not of direct reference to Aitolia itself. Other sources clearly require to be used, and to be used as correctives to the Amphiktyonic inscriptions, if necessary.

Adjusting and shuffling the votes of the Council was not a new practice, and there does not seem to have been a predetermined number of members. For example, Philip II of Macedon had been granted two votes as a personal possession[5] but these had probably

[4] It is also being used in reverse, as by Lefèvre, as a means of determining the chronological order of the inscriptions which record the Amphiktyonic decisions, and which show the names and origins of the delegates. And so the numbers of Aitolians is being used to date the stones, and the stones are being used to date the Aitolian expansion – a very dangerous hypothetical structure.

[5] Paus. 10.3.2; the Phokian votes were transferred to the Macedonians in gratitude for liberating the sanctuary from Phokian oppression; the Aitolians' new votes would,

lapsed at some point[6]; several of the Thessalian peoples – Magnetes, Perrhaibians – appear to have lost their votes, without them being transferred to any other state[7]. Total membership might range up to 24, but from 277 onwards the maximum number of members recorded is only 16, and this may well have been the size of the normal council from then on, though attendance was erratic, and to some extent determined by political considerations or where warfare might interrupt journeys. The records of membership are mainly inscribed lists of the attenders at the twice-annual meetings included on records of honours given by the Amphiktyony mainly to non-Delphians. These records are intermittent; they are fairly full for the 270s and 260s, and more or less regular from then until the mid-230s, but there are enough gaps in the sequence to lend uncertainty, not to mention the difficulty of dating the stones and thus sorting out the sequence itself in the first place. Dating the inscriptions depends on determining the sequence of the *archons* of Delphi, but *their* dates are not known for certain. However, the early examples are fairly well agreed between the four main authorities, down to 266/265, and this is the crucial period for the Aitolian expansion[8].

Yet it will not do to rely too much on this evidence. It is largely inferential in nature, so far as Aitolian history is concerned, and its importance is largely due to the shortage of other evidence. It is by no means certain that contemporaries saw the issue of Amphiktyonic membership as vital to Aitolian interests, nor that they considered that the Aitolians' conduct in entering the council, or dominating both it and Delphi, was an exercise in power. While the Amphiktyonic lists are a useful indicator, they are not sufficient by themselves to dictate our view of Aitolian history; common sense and geography are useful correctives to such a view; precise evidence of any other sort is quite capable of overruling interpretations based on those lists. And we must always remember that the lists are a stage removed from Aitolia, and are indirect evidence at best.

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therefore, be given them for the same reason. Pausanias points out (10.3.3) that part of the Phokian motivation for fighting the Kelts was to 'justify themselves' to the god over their past misbehaviour.

[6] Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas* 212-213, for a conjectural reconstruction of the process.

[7] Two Thessalians – not otherwise specified – attended in Hieron's archonship, 278, but no others thereafter until the Magnetes in 204.

[8] Flacelière, *Aitoliens*, app. I, modified by Daux, *Delphes*, further modified by Nachtergael, *Galates*, and most recently, by Lefèvre; many others have also contributed.

The first list of the Amphityonic members after the Keltic repulse is that of the spring session in the archonship of Hieron. However, it is not clear whether this is in the year 278 or 277, and so either immediately after the defeat of the Kelts, or a year later. It is an unusual list in that it is the first one to contain Aitolians, and the last to have Thessalians in it. There are only eight members attending, the others being two each from Boiotia and from the Phokians. This small number does suggest an unsettled time, and so a time close to the Keltic troubles when travel was difficult, or men were otherwise occupied; the spring of 278 is therefore to be favoured[9]. The next list, of the *archon* Aristagoras I, also of the spring, is either the year following Hieron or a year later, if the poorly attested Delphian *archon* Erasippos is to be placed between the two. In all likelihood this list is thus to be dated to spring 276[10]. On it, there were now three Aitolian *hieromnemones*, along with two each from Boiotia, Phokis, Delphi, and the Ainianes, and the remaining five were two Ionians, two Dorians, and a Lokrian – a total of 16. The Ionian membership was usually divided between an Athenian and an Euboian, and the Dorian between a man from 'metropolitan' Doris, in central Greece, and one of the Dorian Peloponnesian cities. This is what happened in the archonship of Charixenos I (276/275)[11]. Then the Argives had the other Dorian vote, and the Eretrians had that of the second Ionian. In future lists the Peloponnesians vote moved to Troizen, to Sikyon, to Epidauros, and the Eretrian vote to 'Euboia'[12].

During this period the Aitolian vote increased again. Their membership stayed at three until the first list of the *archon* Archiades, in autumn 273, but rose to five in his second list, in spring 272[13]. It rose to six in the spring list of the archonship of Straton II dated to either 270 or 269[14], and it remained at that level until after the archonship of Pleiston who is attested in lists for both spring 262 and spring 261, with six Aitolians[15]. The next more or less datable list is of the archon-

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[9] Fl I 1; Lefèvre 12; Lefèvre rejects the idea that the inscription, or its transcription, is incomplete.

[10] Fl I 2; Lefèvre 14.

[11] Fl I 3 and 4; Lefèvre 15 and 16/17.

[12] Fl I 6-9; Lefèvre 22-27.

[13] Fl I 6, 7; Lefèvre 22 and 23-24.

[14] J. Bousquet, 'Nouvelles Inscriptions de Delphes', *BCH* 62, 1936, 352-369; Lefèvre 28.

[15] Fl I 15 and 16; Lefèvre 38-39 and 40.

ship of Peithagoras, dated to autumn 260, with seven Aitolians as *hieromnemones*[16]. But there is another list, also with seven Aitolians, of which the *archon* is not known, and which may come between Pleiston and Peithagoras, in 261/260. So in that archonship the Aitolian number rose by one after the spring of 261, and before the autumn of 260[17]. It is these numerical changes which have suggested a chronology for the Aitolian expansion, for, not only do the Aitolian numbers grow, but the attendance by delegates from other states ceases, apparently as a consequence, and the presumption is that these changes indicate that the states involved were annexed to the Aitolian League.

The problem then is to recognise which votes were being annexed to those of the Aitolians. There was one added in 278-276, two in 273/272, and one more in 271/270 or 270/269. In the second case the change seems clear enough for at the same time that the Aitolian number rose by two, the two *hieromnemones* from the Ainianes cease to attend[18]; but in 278-276, when the Aitolians gained one vote, between the archonships of Hieron and Aristagoras, the only change to be seen in the inscriptions is the alteration in Ionian and Dorian memberships between Euboian and Peloponnesian cities. Amphiktyonic evidence cannot therefore be used alone. It is thus necessary to look for other evidence.

Geographically the possibilities of Aitolian annexations are limited, consisting of the small cantons of peoples located north and north-east of Aitolia, that is, the Dolopes to the north, the Ainianes of the Spercheios valley, and the Metropolitan Dorians on the eastern side of Mount Korax. If Ainis became Aitolian in 273/272 – two Ainianes were *hieromnemones* from the archonships of Aristagoras to the first of Archiades (277/276-273/272)[19], but none thereafter – then the other two peoples should have become members in the other years. The Metropolitan Dorians sent members in that same period, so they should have joined in 271/270 (or 270/269), the archonship of Straton, though they were also absent the year before[20]. But another piece of evidence can be used here. An inscription recording a treaty

[16] Fl I 17; Lefèvre 42-43.
[17] *FdD* 3.3.190; Lefèvre 41.
[18] Fl I 6 and 7, the archonship of Archiades; Lefèvre 22 and 23-24.
[19] Fl I 2-6; Lefèvre 14-22.
[20] Fl I 11 (attributed to *archon* Athambos); Lefèvre 28; under Archiades (Fl I 7; Lefèvre 22) and Eudokos (Fl I 8; Lefèvre 25-26); no Dorians attend (except those from the Peloponnese), but the Aitolian numbers did not increase.

between Aitolia and Akarnania (which is best dated to 271/270)[21] includes as one of the witnesses in the Aitolian list Timandros 'Erinaios', that is, of the Dorian city of Erinna[22]. By process of elimination, therefore, this suggests that the change of Aitolian numbers in 278 – 276 was the result of the Dolopes joining the league. The Dolopes had been members of the Amphiktyony in the past, and during the time of Philip II and Alexander they had shared a double vote with the Perrhaibians[23]. So the assumption is that Aitolia took over the Dolopian vote and that this occurred because the Dolopes joined the league.

Recent history, of course, did suggest that Aitolia ought to pay close attention to these northern and north-eastern lands. The Aitolians had successfully blocked Demetrios' threat from Boiotia by occupying some Phokian territory, but Demetrios had then succeeded in his invasion of 289 by way of the Spercheios valley – or so it has been suggested[24]. Similarly, the attempted Keltic invasion of Phokis had been blocked at Delphi, before it reached Aitolian territory, but the other invasion by the Kelts had reached Kallion by way of the Spercheios valley, Demetrios' route, the lands of the Oitians (already Aitolian) and Ainis. The success of these invasions obviously required some action by the Aitolians.

The presumed order in which the three peoples joined the league is therefore all the more interesting. For the Aitolians the priority was obviously Ainis, the land of the Spercheios valley, the route of the two successful invaders in the past ten years, the land of a people who had joined in with the Kelts in their invasion. But it was the Dolopes, north of the Spercheios, who joined first, then the Ainianes, between Aitolia and the Dolopes, after several years, and then the Dorians. The Dolopes were a tribe as remote as any in the Greek lands. They lived in the upper valleys of the Pindos where the streams drained west to the Acheloos, or east towards the rivers of Thessaly. They had been dominated mainly from Thessaly in the past, and so by Macedon when the Macedonian kings ruled in Thessaly[25]. But now Macedon was in chaos, under partial Keltic occupation and without a

[21] To be argued later in this chapter.

[22] Bousquet (note 14); *IG* IX.1.3A.

[23] See the summary chart of membership, 343-326 in J. R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism*, London 1976, 132-135.

[24] P. Levêcque, *Pyrros*, Paris 1957, 144-145.

[25] Diod. 16.69.8; H. D. Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century*, London, 1935, 192.

recognised government. Thessaly may or may not have been independent, but it was certainly not peaceful and organised, nor capable of providing protection to a remote people, and at least one source claims that Thessalian generals had helped the Kelts to invade Aitolia[26]. To the Dolopes the prospect of a raid by Kelts out of the north or the east was a real and continuing danger. They were a people of few numbers, in a land which even in the twentieth century AD is just about the most remote and the least densely populated in Greece[27].

There is a further element which needed to be discussed. Assuming that the accession of the Dolopes to the league did take place in 278-276, and that it was voluntary on both sides, it is worth considering which of the two took the initiative. For it was a step which could well have been very dangerous for both. The Dolopes had been, until the death of Lysimachos in 282, most definitely in the Macedonian orbit, as one of the peoples surrounding Thessaly, the Thessalian *perioikoi*. For them to join the Aitolian League was therefore a major move fraught with implications for the geopolitical future of all northern Greece. That it took place at a time when Macedon was prostrate and powerless did not mean that a future Macedonian king would necessarily accept the new situation. Control of Thessaly was, given the general hostility of the Greek states, a priority for any Macedonian ruler. Therefore Dolopia had to be be considered still as a secondary object for Macedonian control. Under the domination of a major unfriendly power, Dolopia could be considered a danger to Thessaly, though not directly a threat to Macedon, but once Macedon controlled Thessaly again, the need to control Dolopia would return. Yet, when Macedon recovered under Antigonos Gonatas later in the 270s, the issue of Dolopia as a part of the Aitolian League did not arise. It therefore follows that the Aitolians had most likely discussed the matter in advance with the Macedonian king, for by 277-276 it was a fair assumption that Antigonos Gonatas would become the next Macedonian ruler – he destroyed a Keltic army in 277, and moved to Macedon later in that year[28].

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[26] Justin 24.7.2.

[27] Population distribution: D. S. Walker, *The Mediterranean Lands*, London 1960, fig. 42, as an example.

[28] Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas*, ch. 7; Tarn remarks that Antigonos 'permitted' Aitolia 'a free hand' in expanding (346), but it is not clear that he could have done anything to stop it.

In these circumstances it is not possible to decide who took the initiative in the union: the advantages to each people, Aitolians and Dolopes, were clear, as were the dangers, though the precarious situation of the Dolopes would suggest that they should scuttle for shelter under the wing of the victorious Aitolians as soon as possible. The situation was, however, perhaps not unconnected with the assistance provided by a group of Aitolian 'pirates' to Antigonos Gonatas in 276. Under the command of Ameinias of Phokis, a group of ten Aitolians headed the force which stormed Kassandreia for Antigonos[29]. Ameinias is found a few years later operating as a general of Antigonos' in the Peloponnese[30]; his 'piracy' may well mean no more than that he had become temporarily detached from Antigonos during the latter's desperate times in the early 270s, and that Polyainos' source was, for some reason, hostile to Aitolia. This item cannot be taken as evidence that Aitolians practiced systematic piracy; it is more likely that the terms 'Aitolians' and 'piracy' habited together in Polyainos' mind. However, the presence of Aitolians in Antigonos' forces at that time is definitely suggestive, particularly in view of the Aitolian expansion into former Macedonian spheres.

It was, in fact, clearly in the Aitolian interest to have a settled and peaceful Macedon. The Keltic invasion had been a highly unpleasant experience and was very close to an even greater disaster than just the burning of Kallion and the ravaging of north-east Aitolia. It was not beyond the wit of Aitolians to provide assistance to Antigonos in return for a promise from him to refrain from interference in Aitolia's neighbourhood. This would in turn make sense to Antigonos, whose kingdom in Macedon was scarcely in a condition after the Keltic ravaging, which came on top of the exhausting warfare of the past sixty years, to allow him to mount any foreign expeditions. His father, after all, had been overthrown as Macedonian king precisely because he was about to do just that. Antigonos could thus control Macedon and Thessaly, including his father's new city of Demetrias, while the Aitolians dominated his southern borders. For this Dolopia was a small price to pay, if the result was an assured peace in that area. And the Aitolians also moved to secure Dolopia while Antigonos was in no position to dispute their move, and while Aitolian troops were fighting for him.

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[29] Polyainos 4.6.18.

[30] Plut. *Pyrros*, 29; Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas* 271-272.

Antigonos also in theory controlled several votes in the Amphiktyony: two Thessalian members (which were still being exercised in Hieron's archonship in 278), one from the Perrhaibians, another Thessalian people, and two which had been given to Philip II personally, and which Antigonos could have claimed to be heir to. These five votes were not exercised at all during his kingship. It has been suggested that Antigonos refrained because he did not wish to set himself alongside such minor groups as the Ainianes and the Malians on terms of equality[31]. This may possibly be an element, though it seems unlikely, but his absence does fit in very well with the situation in northern Greece after 277. By exercising these votes Antigonos could be seen to be challenging Aitolia; his abstention from the Amphiktyony, and the absence of all those associated with him such as the Thessalian peoples, can be best seen as evidence of the tacit division of northern Greece between Macedon and Aitolia. It also permitted Antigonos to detach himself from any problems in the area which could well absorb too much Macedonian strength – as it did when he returned to the area ten years later. The accession of the Dolopes to the Aitolian League might then be part of such a bargain. There is no concrete evidence for such a bargain, only the absence of any hostility between Aitolia and Antigonos, so its existence cannot be proved.

The league, with the addition of the Dolopes, was now somewhat awkwardly spread. The acquisition of Dolopia meant that Ainis was surrounded by the league on three sides, and to the south the small land of Doris was even more enclosed. Doris' normal opening to the rest of the world lay along the valley of the Kephisos, through Phokis, or north into Oitia or even over Kallidromos into Epiknemidean Lokris, but the league now surrounded it on three sides, in Oitia to the north, its own land to the west, and part of Phokis to the south. The inclusion of both of these two lands was thus an obvious aim for the Aitolians, and both were thoroughly isolated and were weak enough to be taken with very little effort. And, of course, they did eventually become league members. Yet there is no urgency, no force was involved, and both communities were incorporated peacefully, the Ainianes over four years after the inclusion of the Dolopes, and

[31] Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas*, 213-215; it seems to me that Tarn over-estimated the political significance of the Amphiktyony here.

the Dorians seven years after. Further, both the Dorians and the Ainianes had men participating in Aitolian official life almost at once. Timandros of Erinna in Doris, as already noted, was joined as a witness to the treaty with Akarnania in 271/270 by Agrios of Sosthenes, a city of Ainis[32].

The need for vigilance and preparation on the northern frontier was demonstrated at the same time as these lands joined the league because the whole north collapsed once more into chaos and warfare. King Pyrros of Epeiros attacked Antigonos Gonatas in 273, beat the Macedonian army, but was then as baffled as ever by his enemy's failure to give in[33]. This can only have confirmed the vulnerable Ainianes in their decision to join Aitolia in that year (and the Dolopes, even more so). Pyrros' conquest was unstable from the start and collapsed soon enough, but his power had reached right across Thessaly as far as the sanctuary of Athene Itonia in Achaia Phthiotis[34]. In the midst of all this, Aitolia's internal peace was notable.

The conflict of Pyrros and Antigonos did not directly affect Aitolia. Friendly with both kings, so far as can be seen, the league took no part in their contest. They transferred the fighting to the Peloponnese in 272, but again Aitolia was not involved, although it has been assumed that Aitolia gave Pyrros free passage through Aitolian territory on his way south out of Epeiros[35]. This is mistaken, and there is no evidence for it. Leaving his son Ptolemaios in charge of his Macedonian conquest, Pyrros returned to Epeiros, where he recruited his army up to 25,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry and 24 elephants[36]. Meanwhile Antigonos and Ptolemaios continued fighting in Macedonia. Pyrros had been enticed into his invasion of the Peloponnese in order to place the Spartan pretender Kleonymos on the Spartan throne. He moved south from Epeiros, aiming to reach the western Peloponnese by crossing the western end of the Gulf of Corinth. For this, the obvious mustering place for his forces was Ambrakia, his royal capital.

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[32] *IG* IX.1.3A (= Schmitt, *Staatsverträge*, III, 480).

[33] Plut. *Pyrros* 26; Tarn *Antigonos Gonatas* 264-266; Hammond, *Hist. Mac* 3.260-263.

[34] Paus. 1.13.2.

[35] Tarn *Antigonos Gonatas*, 266; Will, *Histoire Politique* 1.214 and 216; Flacelière, *Aitoliens*, 189; Levèque, *Pyrros* 584. Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 264 even locates Pyrros' embarkation point as Pleuron. The whole idea is based on a suggested interpolation by Beloch (4.1.575 note) into a sentence by Justin 25.4.4, which is unnecessary.

[36] Plut. *Pyrros* 26.19-20.

Assuming Pyrros was intent on as short a sea-crossing as was practicable – only an assumption, not a fact – he would need to march his army south from Ambrakia. His obvious route was from Ambrakia along the eastern shore of the Ambrakian Gulf as far as Limnaia, from where the routes led south. Two lay along either side of Lakes Ambrakia (or Limnaia) and Ganitza (or Ozeros) and a third was through Medeon. From all of these the way led on to the Akarnanian ports of Astakos and Oiniadai. The Akarnanian League was Pyrros' subordinate ally, and had been since 283, and so through it and his Epeirote kingdom he controlled all the ports along the Epeirote and Akarnanian coasts from Kerkyra to Oiniadai. Further, he also possessed the shipping required for the voyage, for not only had be brought his army across from Italy in 275, but his son was able to evacuate the Epeirote garrison from Taras in 272. There was therefore no need for him to pass through any Aitolian territory, which at that time reached no further west than the line of the Acheloos river; Amphilochia does not seem to have been Aitolian at this time. In the absence of a specific statement on the subject in any of the sources, we have no warrant for stating that the Aitolians permitted Pyrros to march his army through their territory, since it was possible for him to make his march through territory he already controlled. It follows that there was no need for the Aitolian League to take a position on Pyrros' expedition, other than to keep a wary eye on events.

It seems reasonable to conclude – though again there is no evidence for this – that Pyrros landed in the Peloponnese at one or more of the ports in Elis, its north-west corner. He moved on at once towards Megalopolis in Arkadia, where he was met by several envoys[37], with the eventual intention of attacking Sparta. As he moved out of Elis he lost control of that land to a tyrant, Aristotimos, who either gained the support of Antigonos after his *coup*, or had been instigated to seize power by the Macedonian king[38]. In the account Plutarch gives of the tyranny[39], the wording suggests the former sequence, and indeed the rapidity of events also implies that Antigonos only gave support to Aristotimos once the latter was already in post. Antigonos' policy by this time was to ally with anyone who was opposed to Pyrros[40], and a

[37] Ibid; Justin 25.4.4.
[38] Paus. 5.5.1.
[39] Plut. 'Bravery of Women', *Moralia* 250F and 253B.
[40] Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas*, 272.

hostile tyrant astride the Epeirote king's line of communication back to his homeland would seem to be a useful tool.

Here, however, the two kings both crossed Aitolia's path. The Eleians had long had friendly relations with Aitolia. The legends of the migration period claimed that Elis was populated from Aitolia, and the second king of Elis was Aitolos, who led a reverse migration to Aitolia[41]. The newly refounded Achaian League, the former possessor of Naupaktos and Kalydon, and Elis' eastern neighbour, was also a matter of mutual concern. So when Aristotimos' tyranny became unusually vicious, it was natural for the Eleian refugees to flee across the Corinthian Gulf to Aitolia, and equally natural for the Aitolians both to receive them and later to assist them to return[42].

The chronology of these events in Elis is difficult to fit in with wider events. Aristotimos is said to have ruled for five months, and he was killed some time after Pyrros, who died in the autumn of 272. Aristotimos seized power, therefore, no earlier than the late spring of 272, when Pyrros was in the southern Peloponnese – and so he was probably part of a move against the Epeirote king. By the time Aristotimos came under serious threat from his opponents, Pyrros was dead, and Antigonos had left the Peloponnese. It was Antigonos' brother Krateros, whom he had left in charge at Corinth, who vainly marched to the tyrant's assistance[43]. Aristotimos thus died late in 272. Some time for preparation by his Eleian enemies has to be allowed: they had to flee from Elis, recover in Aitolia, gather support there and at home, return to seize the stronghold of Anomyne, which was their first base, and then form the conspiracy by which the tyrant was eventually killed. So the involvement of the Aitolians in the tyrant's death was not necessarily directed against either Pyrros or Antigonos. The timing, in so far as it is known, is such that Aitolians were probably operating with the conspirators during the chaotic time between Pyrros' attack on Sparta and the re-establishment of Antigonid influence after the death of Pyrros, which was surely a period of two or three months, say between the autumn and the end of the year. That some Aitolians were involved is certain – the refugees fled there, were succoured there, and were allowed to return to Elis as an organised, armed band from there, and the actual assassin, Kylon, was hon-

[41] Paus. 5.1.3, 5.3.6-7, 5.18.6.
[42] Plut. 'Bravery of Women', *Moralia* 250F.
[43] Ibid.

oured by the Aitolians at Olympia afterwards[44] – though all this does not necessarily imply that anything more than passive encouragement was needed. It was not followed by anything more than friendship between the league and the new regime. It was a very similar policy to that which appears to have been pursued with regard to Antigonos: opposition was shown to any obvious declared enemy such as Demetrios or the Kelts or Aristotimos, but when an acceptable regime is in place, friendship, even indifference, was the policy.

Pyrros was succeeded in Epeiros by his son, Alexander, who was instantly challenged by the Illyrian king Mitylos from the north[45], while in the south the Akarnarnians detached themselves from the Epeirote connection while the Illyrian war went on. Pyrros' death automatically dissolved the personal unity between him and the Akarnanians. Alexander succeeded his father as Epeirote king, but not as *hegemon* of the Akarnanian League – if that had been Pyrros' position[46]. Further, Alexander was busy, not only facing the Illyrian invasion, but coping with the arrival of his brother Helenos, who was generously released by Antigonos after Argos in order, surely to create trouble in Epeiros[47]. Alexander also had to establish himself in his several Epeirote offices. Epeiros and Akarnania, therefore, separated. It is into the subsequent political and chronological space that it is best to insert the first known treaty between the Akarnanian and Aitolian Leagues.

The treaty is recorded in an inscription from Olympia[48]. It states the terms to which the two leagues agree as alliance, isopolity, and intermarriage; the boundary between them is described as the River Acheloos, except that two areas, called Pras and Demphis, are Aitolian, and for Pras arrangements are made for its boundary to be defined[49]; the mutual obligations of the leagues in alliance are detailed. Arrangements are made for publicising the treaty, and long lists of witnesses from both sides are named.

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[44] Paus. 6.14.11.

[45] Plut. 'Bravery of Women', *Moralia* 251B.

[46] The stone recording the treaty between Pyrros and the Akarnanians is now lost; it will have expired on Pyrros' death, as did other such treaties of alliance; cf. Schmitt, *Staatsverträge*, III 459, where it is dated '294(?)'; its exact date of origin cannot now be ascertained, but it will have remained in force until dissolved by Pyrros' death.

[47] Justin 25.5.2; Helenos certainly vanishes.

[48] *IG* IX.1.3A (= Schmitt, *Staatsverträge*, III 480).

[49] Pras is not securely located: Pritchett, 'Sites in Northeastern Akarnania', *Studies in Greek Topography*, 8, 79-114, accepts the usual suggestion which identifies it with the modern Pelegrinitza, near Stratos.

The importance of this treaty is enormous for an understanding of Aitolian history. If the Aitolians are seen as brigands, pirates, and insatiable aggressors, the treaty is an abberration, to be explained as a machiavellian tactic designed to lull Akarnania into a sense of false security in advance of an attack. On the other hand, it is difficult to read the terms in that way, for, taken at their face value, they actually describe an agreement which was reached between independent polities, in which the terms were suitably reciprocal, and in which provision was made for the one unresolved dispute – the boundaries of Pras – to be decided by a commission which would be composed of both parties. To see this treaty as enforcing Aitolian domination[50] is to make an assumption about Aitolian policy which is not justified by the Aitolian relations with other peoples and states.

Hostility between Aitolia and Akarnania is largely absent in the generation before the treaty, perhaps because both sides realised that they had been pawns of the Macedonian *diadochoi*, or maybe because Akarnania had been under Pyrros' control, and he had been on friendly terms with Aitolia. The erratic behaviour of Pyrros in the last twenty years, and the disastrous history of Macedon in the previous ten years, were more immediate memories at the time, and could be contrasted with the stability and peaceful expansion of Aitolia. Akarnania clearly seems to have felt the need for a solid agreement with at least one of its more powerful neighbours; so when Epeiros collapsed in 272, Aitolia at once became the better candidate.

The date of the treaty is an important element in understanding its terms and its context, and it has attracted supporters for dates from the mid 270s to the 240s[51]. The one internal dating statement in the inscription which can be used is that it was concluded in the second strategy of Polykritos of Kallion, but no independent evidence of the date of this strategy exists, though some outer limits can be set. Polykritos was *strategos* of the league at least four times, but none of the suggested dates for these terms of office is secure[52]. Apart from the Akarnanian treaty he is recorded in inscriptions recording decrees of *proxenos* appointments, none of which are dated except by his term

[50] As does Oost, *Roman Policy*, 4; to be fair, most authorities see the alliance as simply that, an alliance.

[51] A very difficult and contentious issue; for a summary of suggestions see Schmitt *Staatsverträge* III, 480; Hammond, *Hist. Mac* 3.286, note 1, accepts Will's date of 263/262 (*Histoire Politique* 1, 227-228).

[52] See Klaffenbach's list, in the introduction to *IG* IX.1.

of office[53], and no inscription records his third office as *strategos*. So the dates suggested for his terms of office – 271/270, 263/262, 254/253, and 247/246 – are only approximately correct, and there are plenty of gaps in the current period, and before and after. The Akarnanian treaty is dated by his second term, but there are so many gaps in the list of holders of that office between 280 and 260[54] that his first strategy can be argued to be before 271/270, and in fact I propose that this be so. The dating of Polykritos' strategy is thus so insecure that the date of the treaty itself can only be determined by a careful consideration of the international context, and this consideration must be allowed to override any dating by the hypothetical sequence of Polykritos' terms of office.

First, the list of witnesses includes Timandros of Erinna in Doris, whose presence dates the treaty to after the incorporation of his country into the Aitolian League, that is, after the autumn 271 meeting of the Amphiktyony, when the Dorians became members; the earliest date could actually be as late as spring 269 because of the gaps in the Amphiktyony records. So 271 is the earliest possible date for the treaty. (Note also that Agrios of Sosthenes in Ainis is another witness, also from a very recent accession to the Aitolian League.) The second dating point is 263/262, when Alexander II launched a sudden invasion of Macedon, was defeated, and was then compelled to take refuge in Akarnania[55]. From there, with the aid of 'his allies' in Akarnania, he returned to Epeiros and recovered his kingship. From this episode it is too often assumed that 'his allies' are the Akarnanians as a whole, and that the Aitolian-Akarnanian alliance is thus assumed to be a brief and untypical episode which only temporarily interrupted a stable Akarnanian-Epeirote connection dating back to the treaty of c.283 or earlier between Pyrros and the Akarnanian League[56]. But it is not necessary to see the whole league as 'allies' of Alexander, only to assume that he had friends in Akarnania who

[53] *IG* IX.1.13X, 17, 18a, 6, 55.

[54] No names can even be suggested from 280/279, 278/277-274/273, or 260/259, and only one for the period 269/268-265/264.

[55] Justin 26.2.9-3.1; Hammond, *Hist. Mac* 3.285-286; Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas*, 302-304.

[56] E.g., Hammond, *Hist. Mac* 3.286, note 1, and Hammond, *Epirus* 588-589; some elaborations are: Cabanes, *L'Épire*, 91-93, that Alexander needed *Aitolian* help to return to his kingdom, hence the alliance; Walbank, *Commentary*, 1.239-240, has Alexander engineering the alliance. Neither of these is credible, and there is no real need for them if it is only accepted that the alliance dates back to 270 or so.

assisted his return. After the alliance with Pyrros, friends of Epeiros in Akarnania there certainly were; indeed there were, no doubt, both Aitolian and Epeirote partisans in the Akarnanian cities, and these latter can be seen as Alexander's 'allies' in the crisis.

The widely accepted dating of 263/262 for the treaty[57] is thus founded on sand. It was clearly a carefully negotiated measure, which, with its provision for delimiting the boundary of the area called Pras, was expected to be in force for a considerable time. It was not an emergency, short-term measure. It is thus particularly odd to date it with reference to a brief episode in the life of a king who was not mentioned in the text. The treaty has no reference to any outside authority, and, while it clearly has a politico-military dimension, the whole tone is of two friendly states confirming good relations and dealing with a relatively small boundary problem. It was not a quick, nor an emergency, measure.

The period following Pyrros' death in the autumn on 272 is the best context for the treaty, with the year 270 the most likely time for its conclusion. The treaty will have taken some time to negotiate; it was not by any means an Aitolian *diktat*. The mutual obigations had to be agreed, the machinery for consultation and that for delimiting the boundary of Pras had to be set up, and the two leagues had to ratify the whole agreement at their assemblies. In the case of Aitolia this would be most likely at the September 270 meeting at Thermos, though it could also be either of the meetings in 269 – the ratification could take place after Polykritos' term of office, though it was obviously concluded during it. The process of negotiation will have taken some months to bring to a conclusion: a beginning of the process some time in 271, once the problems of the succession in Epeiros developed after Pyrros' death in the autumn of the previous year, can be envisaged.

It has been suggested that the provision for setting up a copy of the treaty at the Epeirote temple at Dodona indicated Epeirote involvement, but the argument is weak[58]. Copies were to be put up at temples at Aktion and Thermos, for the two principals in the treaty, and

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[57] Schmitt, *Staatsverträge*, III 144, shows that the earliest studies all placed the date in the 270s; he dates it 263-262 (?) with Klaffenbach, 'Die Zeit des atolische-akarnanische Bundnisverträge', *Klio* 24, 1931, 222-234, and *Klio* 32, 1939, 198, and 'Die Zeit des ätolische-akarnanische Bundnisverträges', *Historia* 4, 1955, 46-51.

[58] Hammond, *Epirus*, 589.

at Delphi and Olympia, as well as Dodona. These are best seen as being simply the most famous and best-visited of Greek shrines, and so to be the most sensible places at which to publicise the new alliance. If Dodona is to be seen as a politically significant site for the treaty because it was in Epeiros, so must Olympia as well, and who it is who is to be seen as the target at Aitolian-controlled Delphi, when a copy was already on display at Thermos?

The international context for the treaty is thus the death of Pyrros and the consequent break in the Epeirote-Akarnanian alliance, which was followed by his son Alexander's difficulties in securing the inheritance. This made Epeiros a much less worthwhile ally, and Pyrros' recent policies and behaviour may well have disenchanted Akarnanians already. Akarnania's other neighbour was Aitolia, whose condition was much more stable and attractive than that of Epeiros. The internal Aitolian context of this treaty is the peaceful expansion of the league over the previous ten years: Oitia in 280, Dolopia in 277, Ainis in 273, Doris in 271, together with Lokris, gradually absorbed over the past generation, and the establishment of Aitolian control over Delphi. Only in the case of Herakleia Oitia is the suggestion made (by Pausanias) that force had been used in any of these episodes. In all other cases the process had been one of negotiation and agreement. The delay in incorporating Doris is perhaps the most persuasive point, for that land had been virtually surrounded for a decade before it entered the league, and this was something which will have been well known in central Greece, as will the slow absorption of Lokris, again without any hint of violence. A negotiated settlement and an alliance with Akarnania thus fits very well into this Aitolian policy. However, unlike these eastern territories it is noticeable that the Akarnanians did not become members of the Aitolian League, though it may be that their later union was contemplated by the Aitolians – and perhaps it was also by some of the Akarnanians. For the moment, from the Aitolian point of view, this did not matter: what was important was the layer of protection which this alliance provided for both parties against the troubles of Epeiros.

By 270, therefore, as a result of all these measures Aitolia had successfully strengthened all its land and sea boundaries. Friendship with the Akarnanian League and assistance in removing the vicious tyranny in Elis, lands with ports from which raids could be made, provided security on the west and south-west; the incorporation of Dolopia, Ainis, and Doris supplemented the powerful position already gained

by the accession of Herakleia, and provided an extensive *glacis* of protection for the Aitolian heartlands on the north and north-east: control of Delphi carried with it control of the inland roads of Phokis, the main approach to Aitolia by land from the south-east; along the Corinthian Gulf the acquisition of Naupaktos was succeeded by the absorption of central Lokris by 270, and by the accession of Amphissa to the league a little later.

This accession of Amphissa is certain, but the date is a problem. The event is not attested in any source, and the only indirect evidence is difficult to interpret. In 273/272, in the term of office of the Aitolian *strategos* Dorkinas of Naupaktos, the Amphissan Kallias and his three sons were granted the privileges of isopolity and the right to own property in the lands of the league[59]. This shows that the Amphissan citizens were not citizens of the league at the time, for they would already have such rights if they were. At the same time such a grant of privileges to individuals is good evidence for friendship between the league and the Amphissan *polis*. The grant of such a kind may well have been part of a slow Aitolian campaign of persuasion, to link prominent Amphissans more and more closely to the league.

Two years later, in the second strategy of Polykritos, the same year as the treaty with Akarnania, Xenophanes of Amphissa appears as the sponsor of a *proxenos* of Rhodes in a long inscription from Thermos[60]. The date depends on the acceptance of the argument set out above for the date of the treaty, for the link is the *strategos*' second term of office. If this is accepted then the city of Amphissa became a part of the Aitolian league between 273/272 and 271/270 (or 270/269). Geographically this accession made obvious sense, for the city had been more or less surrounded by Aitolian controlled-territory for ten years or more, with the Aitolians in much of the rest of western Lokris and in Delphi, and it had been the Aitolians who drove Areus of Sparta out of the Plain of Kirrha in 280, and that plain was on Amphissa's doorstep. But, once more, as with Doris, this isolation had not been followed by any Aitolian violence. The process of inclusion had been persuasive, and maybe the grant of privileges to Kallias and his sons is evidence of that method, one by which impor-

[59] *IG* IX.1.12a.
[60] *IG* IX.1.17.

tant Amphissans were being persuaded and honoured. The city was small, and persuading a relatively small number of such men may well have been sufficient to sway opinion in the city as a whole. Once again, it is clear that no direct pressure had been imposed; the point about the lack of Aitolian aggessiveness is reinforced.

There remains one other territory which joined the league in this period, but whose date of joining has not been determined. This is the land of the Malians, situated along the north side of the Malian Gulf and the Spercheios River, between Oitia on the south, Ainis on the west, and Achaia Phthiotis on the north. Its main city was Lamia, with a subsidiary centre eastwards on the coast of the Gulf at Echinos. It was separated from Achaia Phthiotis by Mount Othrys, and it commanded the approaches to Herakleia Trachinia and Thermopylai from the north. Strategically it is thus an important area, and after the acquisition of Oitia and Ainis it became an obvious Aitolian target as a forward defence for Thermopylai. The Kelts had camped in Malis and from there they had the choice of advancing either south or west; Demetrios probably mounted his invasion of Aitolia in 289 from there; to Aitolia it was another area to be controlled for defensive purposes, if possible.

The Malians had been members of the Amphiktyony from the start, though in the 340s they shared a double vote with the Oitians, and there is no trace of their presence in the records of attendance for ten years from 278 onwards, but a Malian suddenly appears once again in the Amphiktyony meetings in 270/269 and 269/268, the archonship of Athambos[61], but not again thereafter. The only way to discern Malian accession to the league is therefore to locate Malian participation in league affairs by finding men from Malis who held league offices. Two inscriptions are crucial for the accession of Malis. In the archonship of Athambos (270/269 or 269/268), the Malian representative was Lakrates of Lamia, listed quite separately from the Aitolians. In the archonship of Peithagoras, in 260/259, the *grammateus* was Melanthios of Aitolia[62]. Now this name reappears on an inscription recording honours given to him by the Amphiktyony, dated by the archonship of Pleiston, 262/261, and he is described there as a Lamian[63]. Now, while it is quite possible for a

[61] Fl I 11 and 12; Lefèvre 29.
[62] Fl I 17; Lefèvre 42-43.
[63] Fl I 15a and II 33A; Lefèvre 38-39.

man from an Aitolian city to be identified as from that city without a mention in Aitolia, it is clear that Malis had become an Aitolian area by 260/259, where it had been a separate state ten years before, and it is at least arguable that it had been independent also as late as 262/261. It thus appears that Malis became Aitolian between 269/268 and 260/259, and most probably in the years 262-260.

The southern shore of the Malian Gulf, the land of Epiknemidian Lokris, was also the scene of Aitolian expansion. Thermopylai had been at least partly under Aitolian control from 280, when Herakleia-Oitia was acquired; but it seems that Epiknemidian Lokris, like the western part of Lokris along the Gulf of Corinth, entered the league in sections, no doubt by local decisions, and each of the small cities strung along the land – from east to west, Nikaia, Skarpheia, Thronion, Opous. In Polykritos' second strategy, which I have suggested is dated to 271/270, a man of Opous, at the eastern end of the area, is listed as a *proxenos*-sponsor in an Aitolian inscription. His name is half erased, but his city is clearly Opous[64]. If the redating of Polykritos is accepted, then Opous was a member of the league as early as 271/270; even if the date of Polykritos' second term is retained at 263/262, Opous was in the league then. The *poleis* of Nikaia, Skarpheia, and Thronion lay between Herakleia and Opous, and if the latter was a member, then they probably were also, though, given the methods used by the Aitolians, this is not at all certain. Remembering the delays in bringing Doris and Amphissa in, this argument from geography is not decisive. Yet it is unlikely that Opous, well to the east, and on the border of Boiotia, would be attracted to Aitolian membership unless it abutted directly on the territory of the league; the purpose of membership, after all, was protection for these small cities, and an Aitolian city which was isolated would be too tempting a target for an enemy in wartime. So the indications are good that by 262 at the latest, and probably by 270, all Epiknemideian Lokris had acceded to the league.

These accessions gave Aitolia a solid block of territory of a substantial size, roughly rectangular in shape: over a hundred kilometres from Delphi to the Acheloos, and a hundred from Naupaktos to the northern border of Dolopia. It had clear and defendable boundaries along the Acheloos river and the Corinthian Gulf to west and south;

[64] *IG* IX.1.17 ('...doros Opountios').

to east and north the borders were mountains: Mounts Parnassos, Kallidromos, Othrys, and the southern Pindos. Further, the process of achieving these intelligent frontiers had not been the old Greek process of conquest and domination, but one of persuasion, absorption, and the sharing of power with those incorporated.

The Aitolian League thus takes on a particular and distinctive appearance, yet also, to students of ancient history, a strangely familiar one. Upon the original compact group of members – 'Old' Aitolia about the lakes and the upland-valley tribes – were grafted an outer circle of states whose adherence was individually negotiated, and which may have become either full members of the league, like Herakleia, Dolopia, Doris, or the Ainianes, or friends with full formal independence like the Akarnanians, or a mixture of ally, subject and protectorate, such as Delphi. This pattern of peripheral states linked individually to the central power is one which is familiar from Roman experience. It gave the central power control over the foreign affairs of the alliance and at the same time absolved it from any responsibility for regulating the internal affairs of its members. When compared with the Roman Republic, however, the difference lay in the alliance system; to Rome an alliance with another state gave Rome control over that state, and an attempt to break that alliance was deemed a rebellion; to the Aitolians an alliance was one between equals. So the Akarnanian alliance was not in the event permanent, and its end was a disaster.

The Aitolian achievement had in part been the result of the simultaneous weakness of all the neighbouring and competitive powers: Macedon since Lysimachos' death and even before, Epeiros during Pyrros' absences and in the early years of Alexander's reign, Boiotia always, Athens in the face of Macedonian enmity and amid its internal troubles. In the Peloponnese, only Achaia and Sparta were capable of raiding as far north as Aitolia, and in the 270s neither had the power to do so, and even before that these raids were weak and ephemeral. Aitolia thus took the opportunity to expand into this power-vacuum using the process of intelligent and constructive statesmanship detected in this and the previous chapter.

Yet these acquisitions and treaties did not give the Aitolians a serious position as a great power. The lands they annexed were generally poor and mountainous, thinly populated, and the cities they absorbed were on the whole small; their allies remained independent, formally and actually. But, since the Aitolian policy was one of cautious and

peaceful expansion, and aiming for peace all round, and had been so for decades, the league presented no threat to any of its neighbours; since the Aitolians had the reputation, as all hillmen did, of poverty, they also provided those neighbours with no easy pickings. For a generation after the retrat of the Kelts, they were thus left in peace.

The emergence of Aitolia as an important state in the Greek world – if not yet a great power – is signalled by a group of inscriptions which were set up at the Thermos temple in the strategy of Skopas I of Trichonos, 272/271. These inscriptions recorded the establishment of proxeny-relations with a series of Greek cities each of which is allocated to an Aitolian *engyon*, as a sponsor[65]. These sponsors originated from several of the more important of the Aitolian cities, and often seem to be men who are members of the same families who provided rulers of the league in later years[66]. The cities of Pleuron, Trichonos, Naupaktos, Kallion, and Lysimacheia are all represented, and their citizens sponsored relations with Aigion and Dyme in Achaia, Megalopolis in Arkadia, Athens, Histiaia in Euboia, and Knidos in the eastern Aegean. Three other sponsors are from small places – Tapheios (possibly the island south of Leukas, but this is surely unlikely; it is more probably a small, unknown, inland town) linked with Glaukioi (equally unknown), Makynia linked with Phigaleia in the Peloponnese, Bouttos with Phaloria in Hestiaiotis. In addition Satyrinos of Naupaktos was *engyon* for the Gergitheians, a small inland city in the Troad, as well as for Megalopolis in Arkadia and Knidos in Karia. A separate inscription of the same year shows Stratagos of Pleuron sponsoring a link with Aigion and Bura in the new Achaian League, just across the Corinthian Gulf. (See Map III.)

This process of proxeny-making had begun in the strategies of Dorkinas (273/272)[67] and the first of Polykritos (mid 270s) – at least there are no earlier examples of Aitolian *proxenoi*[68]. The places with which relations were established included Dyme in Achaia and Histiaia (again) in Polykritos' year; under Dorkinas, Corinth, then under the control of Antigonos, and Ambrakia, the capital of Pyrros and, later, of Alexander II of Epeiros, a pairing which might suggest deliberation; also Plataia in Boiotia, 'Phokis', and Amphissa. The sponsors

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[65] *IG* IX.1.12d, e, 13 I-IX, XI, XII.
[66] See chapter 10, and *Prosopography*, 'Aitolian Families'.
[67] *IG* IX.1.10a, b, 11a, d, e, 12a.
[68] *IG* IX.1.13X., 17, 18a, b.

came from Kallion, and Lysimacheia, and from Eupalion in Lokris and 'Dexios' (location unknown), though some other places are obscured by the gaps in the inscription.

In the second strategy of Polykritos, 271/270 or 270/269, the year in which the programme of expansion was forwarded by the accession of Doris and Malis and by the conclusion of the treaty of alliance with Akarnania, the proxeny-relationships were hugely expanded. It would seem that the process of expansion by the league and of contact elsewhere were simultaneous and complementary. (It is another, if minor, reason for dating the treaty to c.270 rather than 263/262, since the proxeny-campaigns of the late 270s and that of Polykritos' strategy fit together so very well.) Relations were now established with a huge number of cities, very largely in Greece and the Aegean, of course, but also in Macedon, in the Propontis, in western Asia Minor, in Crete, and in Sicily and Italy (see map). Particular attention was given to Macedon, where seven separate sponsors established relations with the cities of Pella, Kassandreia, and Amphipolis, or just with 'Macedon'. In Euboia, Eretria, Chalkis, and Karystos were added to Histiaia – relations thus established with every community on the island; in the Peloponnese, Patrai and 'Achaia' joined Dyme and Aigion, and Sikyon, Corinth, and Megara extended relations all along the south coast of the Corinthian Gulf; to Megalopolis and Phigaleia in the southern part of the peninsula were added proxenies at Messene and Lakedaimon. Towards the west relations with Ambrakia were renewed, and one with Epeiros added. Beyond the homeland of Greece, *proxenoi* were accepted at Syracuse and Akragas in Sicily, and at Metaponton and Rome in Italy. This extension of Aitolian relations marks the league's conscious emergence to a new plane of political and economic importance, and it demonstrates the extent of the league's new political and economic interests.

The concentration of all these new relationships into a brief period, and the apparent suddenness of the process argues a deliberate political decision. The purpose was presumably to draw the rest of the world's attention to the new situation in Greece. The whole of the Greek world was thus contacted, as were the important states of Italy and Sicily. Two notable absentees are Egypt and the Seleukid kingdom, though some cities connected with those states – Knidos, Seleukeia – were included. Macedon, however, was heavily represented, with three cities and the kingdom itself, and still more if Thessaly – two cities – and Corinth are included. This is in direct contrast

to later periods. After the death of Antigonos Gonatas no further proxeny-agreements were made with Macedon, and only one with Thessaly. The contrast seems good evidence, if any were needed, that the whole process of establishing *proxenoi* was political.

This the first example of proxeny-relations being organised by the league, so far as we can see (though there is a dearth of inscriptional evidence for the previous half-century). But it is a process which happens in bursts during the league's history, and always at times when a major political change has taken place. The mid-240s, 239, the mid 220s, the 180s are all periods when the league emerged from, or underwent, a major crisis, and all saw sudden extensions, or renewals of the *proxenos* network. It will not do to press this too far, perhaps, for there were occasional examples at other times, but the chronological relationship is too obvious to be ignored. These proxeny-relationships were politically motivated and centrally organised by the league.

The inscriptions of the late 270s also provide a snapshot picture of the extent of the league, for the origins of the sponsors are given, and to some extent this provides an indication of the relative importance of the various communities within the league. Two cities in particular stand out in the list: Naupaktos provided ten sponsors, and Herakleia seven; in fact, if the Oitians are added to Herakleia, that community provided eleven. Kalydon provided six, Trichonos four, and Pleuron and Eupalion three each. The spread of these is indicative: one city, Herakleia, was on the Aegean coast; four of the others were close together on the coast of the Corinthian Gulf (Eupalion, Naupaktos, Kalydon, and Pleuron) and only one city, Trichonos, was in the interior. All this is perhaps not very surprising. However, there were also nineteen other places which provided one sponsor each, and most of the places in the league of any importance or size figure in the list, as well as some which are unlocatable and which were presumably of small importance, and many of these were clearly inland. It is clear that communities throughout the league participated in these matters, just as they did in providing men to serve as officers of the league.

The outbreak of the war known as the Chremonidean in 267 or 266[69] did not affect the Aitolian League directly, though its expansion seems to have halted while the war was on – no new members can be

[69] Will, *Histoire Politique* 1, 219-226 for discussions on the date.

discerned between 267 and 262. And as soon as it was over Malis was added. With that, the league reached the borders of Thessaly, Boiotia, and Akarnania. And there its expansion stopped. Beyond the Acheloos and Mounts Othrys and Parnassos were bigger and already well-organised states, and there was no immediate possibility of more small isolated cities and tribes being persuaded to join in the league. Further, the Chremonidean War involved states on all the borders of Aitolia: Macedon, Epeiros, Akarnania, Boiotia, Euboia, Athens, and Peloponnesians were all involved. It did not, very noticeably, involve Aitolia, which was the only serious political power in Greece to maintain a neutrality all through the war. The league was thus performing its essential and main task, which was to provide protection for the many small communities of which it was made up. And that peace lasted a full generation.

7. A GENERATION OF PEACE (270-245)

The Aitolian League had expanded to a comfortable size during the decade which followed the Keltic repulse, taking in territories on all sides, and growing to become the largest state in Greece in terms of territory, outside the Macedonian and Epeirote kingdoms. The disturbances associated with King Pyrros had been survived, and a wary neutrality achieved with regard to Antigonos Gonatas, who had spent the 270s gaining and struggling to keep the kingship in Macedon. The exuberant recognition of *proxenoi* for dozens of cities from Rome to Syria at the end of the decade was an assertion of Aitolian self-confidence, and a diplomatic recognition by those other states of Aitolia's new strength and importance.

The reverse of this international esteem was fear among its neighbours. Even though the league's expansion had been conducted with circumspection, and by peaceful persuasion, its new size could not but be seen as a threat by its new neighbours. The Akarnanians had more reason than most for apprehension, having been at war with Aitolia within living memory, and perhaps explains to some extent the treaty of 271/270. To the north the Epeirote and Macedonian kingdoms had probably little to fear of themselves, but they were unstable and liable to collapse, and Aitolia could well find an ambition to absorb parts of their territories. To the east were Phokis and Boiotia. The former is a problem. It had formed a league of cities until this was broken up, and the cities reduced to villages, after the Sacred War in 346. But some sort of league revived, as did many of the cities after some years. The Aitolians certainly occupied the western part of the land by 290, when Demetrios Poliorketes was blocked by Aitolian control of the approaches to Delphi. It is sometimes assumed that Aitolia controlled the whole land[1], but when the Amphiktyony records resume after the Keltic invasion the Phokians are regularly shown as sending two representatives to the meetings.

This continued without a break until 264/263[2]. In that year and

[1] Larsen, *GFS* 206.
[2] FI I 13; Lefèvre 33-34.

the next the Phokians sent three *hieromnemones*[3]. It may be that this third man had been a representative from Epiknemidian Lokris, for a man of Skarpheia had attended in 264/263[4]. In 261/260 the Phokians reverted to two, but the Aitolians rose by one. The assumption must be that Skarpheia ceased to be a member of the league in 263, and that its vote, if not the place itself, became Phokian for a year or so, then Aitolian again[5]. This, of course, may be seeing too much in the Amphiktyonic records. But the continued attendance of Phokians from 278 to the 250s is certainly a clear sign that the Phokian League continued in existence and in independence through those years.

It is tempting to associate the changes in the 260s with the Chremonidean War, which lasted until 262 or 261, but no connection can be discerned. Phokis' representation in the Amphiktyony may have reduced to one man in 258/257[6], but the stone is badly damaged. For the next four records no Phokians are listed, and it may be that Phokis became an Aitolian member, except that for much of the time Boiotia failed to send representatives as well. It is thus not safe to equate the absence of Phokians with the expansion of Aitolia to include it. The absence of Phokians may be due to other reasons, of course, and there is no coincidence between the temporary ending of Phokian attendance and the rise in Aitolian *hieromnemones* from seven to nine, which took place between 260 and 258, since one Phokian attended in 258/257[7].

Yet it is the case that in that year only one Phokian attended, and when Phokian attendance resumed, in 251/250, only one man was present. This remained the case until Phokian membership ceased completely in 240/239 or 239/238, though the condition of the stone makes certainty impossible[8], and there are no clear records for the next ten years, until the list of 229/228[9].

The result is that the precise situation of Phokis with respect to

[3] Fl I 14 and 15; Lefèvre 35 and 38-39.

[4] Fl I 13; Lefèvre 33-34.

[5] As suggested by Walbank in *CAH* VII, 1 (2), 241-242, following G. Klaffenbach, 'Zur Geschichte von Ost-Lokris', *Klio* 20, 1926, 68-88.

[6] Fl I 19; Lefèvre 45-46.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Fl I 30; Lefèvre 63; Lefèvre claims a Phokian (and a Malian) on his 64 (Fl I 31) but this seems to be an error.

[9] Fl I 32; Lefèvre 66-67.

Aitolia is not clear. The western part was under Aitolian occupation in 290 at the time when Demetrios Poliorketes' attack had been blocked by an Aitolian army. It was always possible for Aitolians to repeat that feat, no matter what the Phokians said or did. The existence of two Phokian *hieromnemones* until the 250s implies the continued existence of an independent Phokian League, and the single Phokian *hieromnemon* who attended until c.240 implies the same, though presumably a smaller area. It may be presumed, therefore, that Aitolia annexed Phokis in stages – just as happened with western Lokris. The disappearance of the last Phokian *hieromnemon* in the 230s would therefore mean the full annexation of the last part of Phokis. One would assume that the process went from west to east, with the last independent section being Elateia, or perhaps the area of Ambryssos and Stiris in the south, but this is only a guess.

It is worth emphasising that there is no indication that Aitolian relations with Phokis were conducted with any resort to violence. And this despite the existence at this time of the Chremonideian War, which lasted from 267 to 261 and involved fighting all along the eastern part of Greece. Aitolia kept well clear of this war, and it may be that Aitolia's neutrality persuaded parts of Phokis to take shelter under its wing[10].

Peace was also very largely maintained in the west, even though the problems of Akarnania and Epeiros recurred. The alliance between the Akarnanian and Aitolian Leagues which had been concluded in 271/270 was the basis of Aitolian policy in that area, and this solved the old problem of hostility between the two. In Epeiros, however, King Alexander II took some time to establish himself in his inheritance after 272 in the face of disenchantment within and hostility without. By the time he had done so his eastern neighbour, Antigonos Gonatas of Macedon, had become involved in the Chremonideian War, tying up the main Macedonian army in the siege of Athens for several years. Alexander at last seized the opportunity of

[10] There is a record of an alliance between the Aitolian League and Athens (Schmitt, *Staatsverträge*, III 470). It is very poorly preserved and its date is much disputed, though the best argument puts it between 277 and 266/265 (Schmitt's date). Whatever the exact date, the alliance appears to have had no effect on Aitolia's stubborn neutrality; it is best seen as one of those alliances which were purely temporary. Without more data and a better date we can scarcely put it to much use; cf. R. Flacelière, 'Les rapports d'Athènes et de l'Aitolie au IIIe siècle avant J.C.', *HSCP Supp* 1, 1940, 475.

Antigonos' preoccupation with Athens to invade Macedon[11]. This appears to have taken place in 262. Alexander was soon beaten and driven out of Macedon, and then even lost his own kingdom briefly. He took refuge in Akarnania, from where with help from local friends he was soon able to return to Epeiros[12].

The fact the Alexander was able to secure refuge in Akarnania in 262-261 does not mean that there was a strong party in the land which was willing to look to Epeiros for Akarnania's chosen protector rather than to Aitolia. Alexander was restored, we are explicitly told, by the wish of the Epeirotes, presumably after the Macedonian withdrawal. But it does imply that there was a party of sorts which looked to Epeiros rather than to Aitolia as their preferred foreign policy alignment. For Akarnania, the weakest of the three powers, the choice was a defensive one. An alliance with one neighbour necessarily excluded the other. But Alexander's performance was erratic, just as his father's had been. When he arrived in Akarnania he was a defeated exile, and so was scarcely a worthwhile candidate for an alliance. But his weakness was also Epeiros' weakness, and this may have implied that the Aitolian alliance was perhaps not necessary; if Epeirote weakness continued, that alliance, for the Akarnanians, could be allowed to wither. Alternatively, as the stronger partner, Aitolia might take the Akarnanians for granted, and yield to arrogance; the alliance might turn out to be a means of Aitolian control. This, in fact, may well be what happened in Phokis.

There were thus three parties to this local balance-of-power problem: the Aitolians, Alexander II of Epeiros, and the Akarnanians. The two former each wanted the alliance of the last, while the Akarnanians were evidently divided on the issue, though given Epeirote weakness and instability, no doubt the majority opinion tended to favour Aitolia as a partner, and this was evidenced by the alliance of 271/270. Since the Akarnanian League was made up of cities, when the next moment of decision arrived, it is not surprising that it was these individual cities who decided the issue[13]. Those closest to Aitolia

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[11] Justin 26.2.9-11.

[12] Justin 26.3.1.

[13] In the inscription recording the treaty (*IG* IX.1.3A (= Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* III 480)), the Akarnanian witness list suggests that the cities each elected a *strategos*, and the *strategoi* plus an *hipparchos*, a *grammateus*, and a *tamias*, formed the league government. This in turn implies that the cities were much closer to independence than those of Aitolia, and that the Akarnanian League was a much looser organisation; see Larsen, *GFS*, 268-269.

chose to join that league, while those farther off chose the Epeirote option. A third option, independence, theoretically existed, but apparently could not be sustained in practice.

The moment of decision came after the alliance of the two leagues had lasted about two decades, a long time for a passive alliance, for alliances need to be kept active if they are not to fade away or break up. The sources for these events are as difficult as ever, none being close to the time, and none being produced by any of the principals involved. Polybios purports to quote from a speech by an Akarnanian, in which reference is made to the events, but the speech is highly rhetorical, and was made many years later with the express purpose of blackening the name of the Aitolians. For what it is worth, the information is that Alexander and the Aitolians made a treaty to partition Akarnania between them. This is mentioned in the same context as a later agreement between Aitolia and Antigonos to partition Achaia, but that is not good evidence that they were contemporary, or even nearly so. Polybios also mentions that the Akarnanian partition happened before an event which took place in 235[14]. In neither case can the initiatives in the partition be allocated.

The partition of Akarnania, however, was certainly agreed between the Aitolians and Alexander. Therefore it took place during Alexander's lifetime, but clearly after his restoration in 262 or 261. The date of Alexander's death thus becomes relevant. It is usually placed c.240[15], but this involves ignoring the only piece of evidence which gives a clear indication of the date, a passage in Justin which clearly places the king's death before 246[16]. Justin is discussing the problems faced by Olympias, Alexander's widow, who acted as regent for her sons Ptolemaios and Pyrros, successively kings of Epeiros after Alexander, who were under age when Alexander died. She apprehended a threat to Epeiros from the Aitolians, and to counter it began negotiations with Antigonos Gonatas, offering her

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[14] Pol 9.34.7; Polybios also refers to it at 2.45.1 and 9.38.9.

[15] 'Alexander died, it is fairly well agreed, about 240 BC', says Oost, *Roman Policy*, 5, referring to such authorities as Corradi, Niese, Walbank, Tarn, Dow and Edson, and Holleaux. To these may be added Will, *Histoire Politique*, 1.312, who qualifies his agreement to the date by commenting 'sans doute', R. M. Errington, *A History of Macedonia*, Berkeley, California, 1990, 174 (but his genealogical table 3, page 258, gives the king's dates as '270-ca. 255'), and N. G. L. Hammond, *The Macedonian State*, Oxford 1989, 313 accept c.240. Yet this agreement is always qualified by such phrases as that of Will and Oost. Clearly there is, in fact, much uncertainty.

[16] Justin 28.1.1.

daughter Phthia as a bride for Antigonos' son Demetrios, who became sole king in 240/239, after having some authority for some years[17]. The offer was accepted, whereupon the Seleukid princess Stratonike, who had been married to Demetrios for some years, not unnaturally departed to seek refuge with her brother, the Seleukid King Antiochos II. Since Antiochos II died in 246, it follows that all this took place before that year, and thus that Alexander died before 246, perhaps several years before.

We have, therefore, no certain indication as to the date of Alexander's death, but the extreme possibilities are 262, when he was restored to the Epeirote kingship, and 246. Neither of these dates is in fact acceptable, since in 262 he was clearly fully active, and by 246 he was clearly already dead. There is another indication in his successors. His sons Ptolemaios and Pyrros were too young to take up royal responsibilities when he died, according to Justin[18], so the elder was presumably no older than, say, fifteen at the most. Since Alexander had been old enough to be put forward as a putative king in his father Italian's campaign, he had presumably been a young adult then. His elder brother Ptolemaios was 15 in 280[19], so Alexander was born a year or so after 295, and he appears to have married soon after his accession in 272 – Olympias was his half-sister. Ptolemaios, their eldest son, could therefore have been born in 270 or a little after, and, if born within a year of the marriage, would thus be old enough to rule by the late 250s. Since he was not old enough to rule when his father died, Alexander's death came earlier than that, or the boy's birth was later. This is all very woolly and indefinite, but it does tend to push the date of Alexander's death back into the 250s rather than the 240s. The Akarnanian partition thus took place before 246 but after 262, and had probably occurred by the mid 250s – some time before Alexander's death – and that is all that can be said.

The actual process of the partition is almost as difficult to sort

[17] For Phthia, cf. W. W. Tarn, 'Phthia-Chryseis', *HSCP* Supp 1, 1940, 483-502, and S. Dow and C. F. Edson, 'Chryseis', *HSCP* 48, 1937, 127-180, and J. Seibert, *Historische Beiträge zu den dynastichen Verbindungen in hellenistischer Zeit*, *Historia* Einzelschriften 10, Wiesbaden 1967, 38-39. Demetrios has been suggested as joint king with his father from c.257, on the basis of *SEG* XII, 314; R. M. Errington, 'An inscription from Beroea and the alleged co-rule of Demetrios II', *Ancient Macedonia* 2, 1977, 115-122, argues against joint rule but in favour of Demetrios having delegated power.

[18] Justin 28.1.1.

[19] Justin 18.1.3.

out[20]. The initial assumption is that the process was treacherous and violent, particularly on the Aitolian side, and this is the reputation which was given to it later, both by ancient historians and by their modern successors[21]. But that is not evidence of how it *actually* happened, particularly since the sources all date from at least a generation after the event. Similarly, the fact that a treaty was concluded between the Aitolians and Alexander II to partition Akarnania does not mean that this treaty was the starting point of the partition process: it could equally well be the end of that process, the final record of the agreement. And it is as well to remember that there were at least three parties to the partition, and perhaps four. It is necessary to step back and consider the context.

For, on the surface, it is difficult to see what Aitolia could gain from that partition. The treaty of alliance between the two leagues provided fully adequate protection for Aitolia's western border territories by ensuring peace there. Only if a new threat to that border had arisen was it worth Aitolia's while to become involved in the tricky process of partition, and no such threat is visible, or even imaginable. Alexander, of course, may well have aimed to disturb the alliance, for he clearly had interests and adherents in Akarnania, as his brief exile there indicates; towards Akarnania his overall aim will have been, no doubt, to return to the relationship which had existed between the Akarnanian League and his father Pyrros: that is, he would wish to be *hegemon* of the whole league.

From all this, it follows that any disturbance to the Aitolian-Akarnanian alliance must have come from Alexander, or it came from the Akarnanians who were anti-Aitolian. One of Justin's remarks in his story of Olympias' problems is that the partition occurred after Alexander had assisted Aitolia in a war[22]. What lies behind this is unknown, and who the war was with is not clear, but it does suggest

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[20] The sources are: Pol. 2.45.11 and 9.34.2; Justin 28.1.1; cf. Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* III 485.

[21] The tone is set by Polybios, as so often. His anti-Aitolian bias is notorious, but it is worth noting that his comment is in a speech by an Akarnanian, and one who was explicitly anti-Aitolian as well. Oost, for example, states as a fact that Akarnania's 'treaty with Aetolia had been violated with a completely Machiavellian lack of principle' (*Roman Policy*, 4); Walbank in *CAH* VII, 1 (2), 251, has a neutral comment; Cary, *Greek World*, 145-146, remarks they 'appropriated the southern half' of Akarnania at Alexander's suggestion (it was more the eastern third), and adds in a footnote that they 'promptly went back on their word'. And so on.

[22] Justin 28.1.1.

that friendly relations existed between Aitolia and Alexander. This is scarcely good evidence for a their long-term relationship, but it does suggest that Alexander was not actively attempting to disrupt the alliance of the two leagues. Therefore, it would seem that the disturbance which led to the partition emanated from Akarnania itself. This was always likely since neither Alexander nor Aitolia had shown any real interest in conquest in the area in the past: a land of fortified cities such as Akarnania had become was not an inviting prospect for a conqueror.

Akarnania was organised as a league of cities, and the league was headed by an annual *strategos*, with a *hipparchos* and a *grammateus*, and a council of six men, each from a different city[23]. This scheme effectively institutionalised internal disputes, which may well have been exacerbated by the apparent practice of one city providing all three league officials in any one year – presumably so that they could operate from their home, for there is no indication of a league capital[24]. We know nothing of the internal affairs of the league, but internal disputes are all-but inevitable, given Greek political attitudes, and the usual jealousies between neighbouring cities. We have no information about such disputes at this period, though in the Peloponnesian War Oiniadai had been the odd-city-out[25]. It is obvious that one source of disagreement was over foreign policy, in this case over the alignment of Akarnania with Aitolia or with Epeiros – or perhaps it would be more accurate to say *against* Aitolia or *against* Epeiros. Since the result of this particular crisis was the partition of the league this seems to be its likely origin. And the well-estabished foreign policy alignment was indicated by the alliance with Aitolia, an alliance about two decades old by the time of the crisis.

The dispute will therefore have been provoked by a group who wished to break the Aitolian alliance and then either ally with Alexander or adopt an independent stance. This was, of course, resisted by those who wished to maintain the Aitolian alliance. From the result it would seem that the preferences were geographically based, and the internal result was some sort of *stasis*, perhaps descending into formal violence, but ultimately resulting in the

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[23] As shown by the Aitolian-Akarnanian treaty, *IG* IX.1.3A.

[24] In *IG* IX.1.3A all three officials are from Oiniadai, while the six councillors are all from different cities, and none were from Oiniadai.

[25] Thuc. 3.7 and 4.77.

paralysis of the league's governmental machinery, such as it was. The next stage would be that Alexander and Aitolia moved in, in concert with their respective supporters in Akarnania, and in agreement, formal or informal, with each other. The one element which is agreed on all sides is that Alexander and Aitolia operated together.

The Aitolians acquired the territories of the four cities along their western border: Stratos, Phoitiai, Matropolis, and Oiniadai. This amounted to little more than the valley of the Acheloos, with a westward extension to the valley of the lakes at Phoitiai. Alexander, on the other hand, acquired three-quarters of the Akarnanian land, including the cities of Aktion, with its league shrine, Anaktorion, Thyrreion, Medeon, Alyzea, and Astakos. To his share also fell Leukas on its island[26].

It must be assumed that some violence was used in this partition. Yet it was all over quickly, without much in the way of Akarnanian recrimination, and if the two principals operated in conjunction with each other and with their partizans inside Akarnania, the violence will have been kept to a minimum[27].

The institutional arrangements which resulted would appear to be different on the two sides. For the Aitolians the matter was straightforward: the ex-Akarnanian cities became constituent members of the Aitolian League, and the prominent citizens of those cities could take part in league affairs. Philleas of Stratos became league *strategos* in 209/208, which implies perhaps two decades of preceding political activity; and there are several other men from Stratos who were active about the same time, and more later[28]. On Alexander's side, however, it seems probable that his cities were organised into a new version of the old Akarnanian League, with himself as *hegemon* – no other office would provide him with control, and it was an office his

[26] The Aitolian share is determined by the appearance of citizens of the four cities as Aitolian officials, and from an addition to the 271/270 treaty over thirty years later (*IG* IX.1.3B).

[27] Larsen, *GFS*, 267, suggests that the Aitolians attacked Thyrreion and were repulsed, but his reference does not say this.

[28] It must be admitted, however, that only Stratos is at all prominent, and even there not until the last decade of the third century, when four men from there appear in various offices: *strategos*, *hieromnemon*, *engyon*; one earlier Stratian was *engyon* in 223/222. Of the other cities, Phoitiai and Oiniadai produce no men whe held league offices; in mitigation Phoitiai was small, and both were damaged by Philip V in 219. Matropolis, however, as small as Phoitiai, produced an *hieromnemon* in 205/204. One may, however, perhaps detect a lack of enthusiasm here.

father had held[29]. His kingdom was already in effect a royal league, composed of the more-or-less voluntary adherence of peoples and cities in Epeiros to the Molossion monarchy; under his father, the Akarnanian League had been one of these constituent parts. A small league is the easiest assumption.

The partition was thus not the end of the problem, for it revived after Alexander's death, when Olympias complained that the Aitolians wished to take part of Akarnania from her[30]. Whatever the arrangements were that he had made for ruling there, the death of the king cancelled his treaties; so his section of Akarnania was then separate and independent once more. Presumably the Aitolians were suggesting the extension of their league farther into Akarnania. Olympias clearly felt threatened, though not necessarily only by the Aitolians, and no force appears to have been used. The Aitolians were thus using a diplomatic approach. Olympias achieved her Macedonian alliance by providing a new wife for Demetrios, in the person of her daughter Phthia. Olympias may well have retained control over her late husband's share of Akarnania, presumably by installing her son as *hegemon*, despite his minority, and subsequent events show that Aitolia's move did not bear fruit. If my hypothesis of a break-up of the earlier Akarnanian League over the question of 'Aitolia-or-Epeiros' is close to the mark, then it is not surprising that the Aitolians made no progress into the Epeirote section, for this was the grouping who had wished to break the Aitolian alliance in the first place. However, it is noteworthy that the cities of the Aitolians' own section were successfully incorporated into the Aitolian League and became full and participating members, certainly in the cases of Stratos and Matropolis. Indeed, Stratos became one of the most prominent Aitolian cities in the next century.

It is necessary, once again, to emphasise the nature and methods of Aitolian expansion and actions, which were used also in these Akarnanian crises. Between the repulse of the Kelts in 278 and the fighting in Boiotia in 245 (to be discussed later) we have no indication that the Aitolians were involved in any wars. In that time they expanded

[29] Larsen, *GFS*, 267-268, assumed that the partition destroyed the league, but if so it is difficult to see what position Alexander held. Instead of seeing the league as dissolved, it may help to see the Aitolian cities as seceders; but this is not a political attitude likely to be viewed with sympathy by an historian in the United States, such as Larsen.

[30] Justin 28.1.1.

their league eastwards to the Aegean, south and east along the coast of the Corinthian Gulf, and north to the borders of Thessaly, in all cases without any violence. They expanded also into eastern Akarnania, by a partition treaty arranged with Alexander of Epeiros, which, again, appears to have been accomplished peacefully, at least on the Aitolian side. For an expanding Greek state, this is a remarkable and most unusual record, and it argues a powerful persuasiveness amongst its statesmen, and a consistent and generous policy towards its new members. Even in the years before 278, the only wars in which the Aitolians are known to have been involved were defensive – against the Kelts, Areus of Sparta, Demetrios Poliorketes and, earlier, other Macedonians – with the exception of the acquisition in 280 of the city of Herakleia Trachinia, where some fighting evidently took place. There were some Aitolians involved in an attempt to overthrow the tyrant Nikokles of Sikyon in 251, but this is not a war; indeed it may not have been an official Aitolian action at all, but a private anti-tyrant movement[31].

This Aitolian policy is a new form of imperialism in Greece. No doubt the successful defensive wars persuaded many of the new members that membership would benefit them – the defence of the new member Herakleia against the Kelts was a convincing action – and it is obvious that most of these new members were minor states, often rural, even tribal, in which the urban communities were small, perhaps no more than refuges. The only cities which joined which were in any way prominent were Naupaktos and Herakleia, and neither of these could be considered to be cities of the first rank. And for those who joined the league membership did bring a long period of peace. And even when Aitolia became enmeshed in warfare once more, after 245, these latest members did not attempt to leave the league. In fact, at no point in its history did the league lose members by any means other than *force majeure*, applied from outside, until the effective destruction of the league by Rome. No states ever seceded voluntarily.

That long period of peace – 278 to 245, a full generation – may also be identified as the mainspring of the prosperity of Aitolia which becomes obvious later. And, of course, wealth attracts wealth. The

[31] Plut. *Aratos*, 4; the reference in Justin 28.1.1 to Alexander of Epeiros assisting Aitolia in a war is too late and too vague and unspecific to be taken seriously.

ports of the league could provide guaranteed shelter, at a time when the former great cities of commerce, such as Corinth and Athens, were occupied by foreign forces, or were fighting to free themselves of such forces. When the Chremonidean War was active in Attika and in the Aegean, with Macedonian forces campaigning in the Peloponnese, at the Isthmus, at sea, in Attika and Euboia, occupying Corinth and Megara and besieging Athens for several years, the neutrality of Aitolia provided welcome shelter, and a peaceful route across the Greek peninsula ran through Aitolian territory.

In the difficult political world in Greece of the 260s, it is noticeable that the Aitolian campaign of establishing proxeny-relationships which had been prominent in the late 270s, more or less ceased. Of course, sources are exiguous as well, but it is scarcely an accident of inscription-survival which finds records of over fifty *proxenoi* in the late 270s and only five in the 260s. But these are reasonably significant in the context of the times.

Between 269 and 264 (the dating is unclear) proxeny-relations were agreed with Ambrakia and the unlocated city of Bostrycheion[32]. Ambrakia was the city which had been developed by Pyrros as his capital, and was used by Alexander II and his successors also in that role. Earlier relations with that city had been formed in 271 when the sponsors had been two Naupaktians, Dorkinas, who had been *strategos* of the league in 273/272, and Machatas, who was probably the father of Physkos, *strategos* in 257/256[33]. This new *proxenos* agreement – the sponsor's name and city are not known – may well be an affirmation of a previous friendship with Ambrakia, and with Alexander, once the king's regime had settled down.

There were two more proxeny-agreements later in the 260s. In 262/261 Antenor son of Trichas of Herakleia sponsored *proxenoi* with Megara and Kassandreia[34]. Antenor, was, in fact, the son of the league *strategos* for that year, which was also the year in which the Chremonidean War finally came to an end, with the Macedonian capture of Athens after the long siege. It is unlikely that this is a coincidence. Trichas was from the only Aitolian city on the Aegean coast, geographically close to both Demetrias, Antigonos' stronghold, and Euboia, which had been fought over more than once during the war.

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[32] *IG* IX.1.11c (Ambrakia) and 15 (Bostrycheion).
[33] *IG* IX.1.17A.
[34] *IG* IX.1.18c and d.

It was a city which will have been more affected by the war than any other in the league. Its neighbour Skarpheia seems to have been affected in some way, for it sent a separate *hieromnemon* to the Amphiktyony about this time. It is also relevant that it was just at this time that Herakleia's northern neighbour Malis was entering the league. Diplomatic contact with Antigonos can be expected over this, for he was also Malis' neighbour on the north. The places with which proxeny-relations were established were also significant in the context of the end of the war. Megara was a city under Macedonian occupation during and after the war, and Kassandreia was a major Macedonian city. Neither had been the subject of such an agreement with Aitolia before, at least as far as surviving records go. These arrangements may thus be seen as a diplomatic gesture towards the victor.

But Ptolemy II had also been involved in the war, as an active, if not very effective, ally of Athens. It has been pointed out that the Amphiktyonic Council, in that very same year, 262/261, finally accorded recognition to the *Ptolemaia* at Egyptian Alexandria[35]. This was a festival celebrating the divinity of Ptolemy I Soter, and Amphiktyonic recognition thus took twenty years to be awarded. Since the Amphiktyony was under effective Aitolian control by this time (six of the *hieromnemones* were Aitolians, and two were Delphians – effectively subject to Aitolian control – in 262/261[36]), this diplomatic gesture cannot be considered merely accidental in its timing. It has, indeed, been seen as a deliberate favouring of Ptolemy by the Aitolians[37], but this is in apparent ignorance of the simultaneous establishment of proxeny-relations with Megara and Kassandreia, cities both under Macedonian control. Further the Aitolians also contacted both Antigonos and Ptolemy with requests to respect the festival of the *Pythia* at Delphi and that at Thermopylai, requests which treated the two kings as equally likely to interfere with those attempting to attend[38]. Taken together all this looks very much like a careful balancing-act in the difficult diplomacy, both in the time of war and in the post-war period. Rather than showing a partiality towards Ptolemy, the actions of the Aitolians are a clear affirmation of the neutrality which the league had maintained all along.

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[35] *ISE* II.75.
[36] Fl I 15 and 16; Lefèvre 38-39 and 40.
[37] Walbank, *CAH* VII, 1 (2), 241.
[38] *FdD* III.1.479; Walbank, *CAH* VII, 1 (2), 241.

The last proxeny-agreement of this group (there is no other extant for the next decade and a half) was with Messene, in 261/260, the strategy of Alexandros of Trichonos[39]. Again the sponsor was a Naupaktian, Aias, not otherwise known. But Messene was another Greek state which had carefully remained neutral during the war. It had a longstanding attitude of enmity to Sparta, but even Sparta's defeat by Macedon during the war did not induce Messene to join in. And, of course, there was another connection: Naupaktos had been the place of exile of the Messenians driven out of their homeland by the Spartans in the fifth century. For those with a taste for such resonances, here was a connection which rang on several strings, for the Messenian exiles had originally been put into Naupaktos by Athens, and they and Athens had jointly attacked Aitolia in Demosthenes' expedition. All in all one could see here yet another affirmation of Aitolian neutrality. And the leading figures in all this were from the two or three main cities of the league: Naupaktos, Herakleia, and Trichonos, cities which regularly produced high officials of the league.

In fact, the origins of these officials may be a clue to the policy of peace, expansion, and neutrality which was pursued consistently for over thirty years. Between 273/272 and 247/246, a period of 27 years, we know the names of eighteen *strategoi* and seven *hipparchoi* and *grammateis* – one third of the total actually elected. This is a precarious proportion on which to base conclusions, but it is a fact that, of those whose origins we are informed, all but two came from just five places: Naupaktos, Trichonos, Herakleia, Pleuron, and Kalydon. Further, thirteen of these offices were held by just six men, and in the later part of the period, from 264/263 to 247/246, the post of *strategos* was repeatedly held by a small group of men; Alexander of Trichonos, Lykopos of Kalydon, Arkison, and Charixenos of Trichonos all held the post twice, and Polykritos of Pleuron three times. There are several gaps in the list, and only a few of the other officials are known from that period (three each of *hipparchoi* and *grammateis*), but it looks very much as though the oligarchy was becoming very tightly drawn[40]. Several of these men were associated with major

[39] *IG* IX.1.18e.

[40] At the same time, the gaps in the list were presumably filled by men who did not hold office more than once. There is, thus, a gap of five years in the 260s – exactly the period of the Chremonideian War – and other gaps at 260/259, 258/257, and 251/250 to 249/248. Further, several of the occupiers are indefinite in the sense that

policy decisions in this period: Polykritos of Pleuron was *strategos* when the original alliance with Akarnania was made; if I am right in placing the later partition of Akarnania in the late 250s one of these iterating *strategoi* held office then as well.

This is a rather tentative conclusion based on unfortunately lacunose evidence, but the consistent Aitolian state policy of these years does imply that the men in control were all in agreement, and the repetition of the same names and origins of the *strategoi* in office also implies that such a group existed. The expansion of the state in the 270s came to a halt in the 260s, when the Chremonideian War made moves into new territory dangerous, since most of the potential new members were involved in the war; at the same time it may well be the emergency caused by that war which cemented the policy of caution and neutrality which was pursued until the 240s; certainly it is in that period that several of these men who held office during that twenty years first appeared – Arkison in 264/263, Alexandros of Trichonos in 261/260, when Charixenos was his colleague as *hipparchos*. From then on, only one new name appears in the list of office-holders, and that is Physkos of Naupaktos, from the same small group of cities[41].

One aspect of the policy of these years has attracted more attention than the overall statesmanship of the Aitolian ruling group, though it is of minor importance. In 248/247 Charixenos, as *strategos*, contacted a number of foreign states with a proposal to reorganise the festival of the *Soteria* at Delphi[42]. This had been instituted to celebrate the rescue of the city and the temple from the Keltic threat. The original festival had been an annual affair, probably organised by the citizens and the temple, and Charixenos' proposal was to make it a penteteric meeting, like the great festivals at Olympia, Nemea, the Isthmos, the Athenian *Panathenaika*, and the Delphian *Pythia*. It would now alternate with the *Pythia*, providing Delphi with a major festival every two years.

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direct attestation of their occupancy is not known, but is inferred from a record of a later post which states the number of times he held that post. Nevertheless, eighteen of the *strategoi* between 273/272 and 247/246 (27 possibilities) are known by name, a large enough proportion from which to draw some conclusions; on the Aitolian oligarchy, see chapter 9.

[41] Always bearing in mind that there are five year-gaps in our list.

[42] The latest, very comprehensive, discussion of all the evidence, is by Nachtergael, *Galates*, 328-372.

The fact that it was the Aitolian *strategos* who reorganised the Delphic festival is a clear sign of Aitolian control of the city, even if the suggestion might well have come from the Delphians themselves. It was presumably awkward to have the two festivals in the same year, as would happen every fourth year, and the annual repetition of a minor festival may well have staled the appetite, and perhaps even detracted from the main festival, the *Pythia*. The suggestion was accepted and recognition accorded to the new arrangements, by formal decrees from at least seven states, of which six are known by name – Athens, Chios, Tenos, one of the Kyklades islands (perhaps Teos), Smyrna and Abdera[43]. These are, of course, only the cities whose replies have been preserved, and there will have been others whose replies have not survived, and still more who did not bother to reply but whose recognition was tacit. Certainly the games continued their four yearly cycle under Aitolian sponsorship.

It is difficult to see much of political significance in this move[44]. It is best to see it as a necessary development to revive a festival close to Aitolian hearts – they were the sanctuary's rescuers, after all – when the festival was perhaps failing. Of course, the institution of the games reflected glory onto Aitolia, and perhaps reminded both non-Aitolians and Aitolians of their glorious victory over the Kelts, and as such it had a minor political benefit. It is, of course, possible that the recognition of the reorganisation by outside powers also involved a recognition of Aitolian control of Delphi[45], and an Aitolian *agonothetes* presided at the games[46]. But this is to find a problem for which no evidence exists. Since 280 no power had challenged Aitolian control at Delphi, and the *Soteria* had in fact been under indirect Aitolian control all along, as a record of a sequence of boards of administrators, annually elected, shows[47]. And to see the reorganisation as a

[43] Nachtergael, *Galates*, 435-447, reprints all these in his catalogue of 'Actes', at numbers 21 to 27. The name on the seventh inscription has disappeared.

[44] It has been linked in time with new 'vase-festivals' established by Antigonos Gonatas at Delos (Walbank *CAH* VII, 1 (2), 248-249), but it is easier to adduce considerations local to Delphi – particularly since the reorganisation took place well before these new, minor festivals were established.

[45] Walbank *CAH* VII, 1 (2), 248.

[46] The *agonothetai* are only recorded after the reorganisation, and the post may have originated then; the earlier lists of Soteria officials from the 260s do not show any such official; these are headed by the annual *archon* of Delphi, who may well have presided.

[47] *SGDI* 424.

devious method of gaining such recognition would be too convoluted. Any state which still failed to accord such recognition after forty and more years of Aitolian control was hardly going to do so as a result of a reorganised festival, and its recognition would not matter much anyway. This is a non-problem. The greatest benefit of the reorganisation flowed to Delphi, where a second major festival could only help to fill the city's coffers and the purses of the citizens more than before.

For a generation since the Keltic invasion, the Aitolian League had been growing, peacefully and successfully, under the domination of a small group of men who repeatedly occupied the chief offices of the league. In 245 this policy changed, and as far as can be seen the change was abrupt. For the next generation the league faced a steadily lengthening list of enemies, who eventually joined together to attempt to destroy the state.

8. THE CHALLENGE FROM ACHAIA (245-238)

I assume that by now it has been established that the Aitolian League was a basically peaceful polity. It had expanded by using persuasion rather than conquest, and its people were no more addicted to piracy and brigandage than any other in Greece. However, as the period before the enlargement of the league had shown, living in peace is not something which a single state can accomplish without the cooperation of its neighbours. One basic reason for Aitolian peacefulness between 278 and 245 was the rule of Antigonos Gonatas in Macedonia and his exercise of restraint in not opposing Aitolian expansion. He was also largely preoccupied with Macedon itself, and with keeping control of Athens and Corinth and dominating the surrounding lands.

At the same time that control was regularly challenged. The Chremonidean War was a challenge by Athens and Sparta, eventually crushed. At the end of the 250s Antigonos' governor of Corinth, his nephew Alexandros, rebelled. This deranged the balance achieved by Antigonos. Then in 251 Aratos overthrew the tyranny at Sikyon and took that city into the Achaian League. Aratos' political heritage was thus the very reverse of that of the Aitolian leaders: his solution to a political problem tended to violence. This was the surrounding background to the apparently abrupt emergence of Aitolia from its peaceful phase to into one of conflict.

In 245 an Aitolian army met and beat a Boiotian army in battle at Chaironeia. The Boiotian commander Abaiokritos and a thousand of his soldiers were killed[1]. The name of the victorious Aitolian commander is not recorded, nor are his casualties, but the *strategos* of the league was surely in command, so the victorious commander was either Neoptolemos of Naupaktos, *strategos* for 246/245, or Alexandros of Trichonos, *strategos* for 245/244. This is also the episode into which we may insert an otherwise undated event, the violation of the Pamboiotian festival at the temple of Athene Itonia near Koroneia, which Polybios later included in his list of Aitolian crimes against

[1] Plut. *Aratos* 16; Pol. 20.4.

temples. He attributed it to Nikostratos, the father of Dorimachos, and to Lattabos[2], who is otherwise unknown, unless he was the father of Strombichos, who was honoured at Delphi in 237[3]. This issue may be put aside, for it was the battle which is the more important matter. For the fact of the battle, its origins, and its results, plunged Aitolia into the international affairs from which the league had kept profitably aloof for the previous thirty years. It is thus a vital moment, indicating a radical change in Aitolian state policy. An investigation of the surrounding events must also convict Aitolia's enemies of causing the war, which Aitolia entered reluctantly.

The trouble came from the Peloponnese. The League of the Achaians had been hoisted to a certain local power by the adhesion of the city of Sikyon in 251. Sikyon's succession of murderous tyrant rulers was brought to an end in that year by a *coup* carried through by Aratos, the orphaned son of one of the tyrants' victims. He brought the city into the league, thereby attempting to solve the difficult social and economic problems caused by the return of the exiles driven out before 251, and simultaneously making the league, until then no more than a collection of small towns, a rather more important political power[4].

The economic problems which followed their overthrow were intended to be eased by the gift of 25 talents from 'the king', either Antigonos Gonatas of Macedon or Ptolemy II. Aratos promptly showed his political quality by collecting another 40 talents from Ptolemy, who promised more cash on proof of Aratos' usefulness to him. For the next few years Corinth was the centre of attention. Aratos launched a series of raids on the city until Alexandros rebelled, and then he and Achaia became friends. When Alexandros died in 246, his widow Nikaia continued to rule in his place[5]. In the process of these obscure and complex events Ptolemaic naval power in the Aegean was drastically curtailed[6], and Aratos made such a

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[2] Pol. 4.5.3; 9.34.17; neither Nikostratos nor Lattabos was the league *hipparchos*, as might be supposed, since other men are recorded in that position in both possible years.

[3] *FdD* III.1.148; FI II 61.

[4] Plut. *Aratos* 9.4; Walbank, *Aratos*, 32-38.

[5] Plut. *Aratos*, 17.

[6] The date of the battle of Andros, a victory of Macedonian over Ptolemaic ships, is not known, though many favour 246, and it is not relevant to this study. Independently of the battle, it is clear that the naval strength of Ptolemy III (who acceded in 246) in the Aegean declined about this time, perhaps as a result of his concentration on the Syrian War which he initiated in that year.

name for himself that he was elected *strategos* of the Achaian League for 245/244, at the age of 26, taking office in May of 245[7].

All this had occasional and mixed repercussions for the Aitolians. The disturbances caused by the existence and disputes of the former tyrants of Sikyon had provoked some unspecified interference in the city by the Aitolians, apparently against the tyrant Nikokles, the man driven out by Aratos, and so in 252 or 251. The nature of this interference is nowhere stated, and the words Plutarch uses imply that the Aitolians were trying to seize control from Nikokles[8]. There is no doubt that relations did exist between Sikyon and Aitolia. In 272/271 a representative of Sikyon had a place as *hieromnemon* at Delphi, one of a succession of Peloponnesian states who held the second Dorian place in the Council of the Amphiktyony[9]; in the great proxeny-making under Polykritos at the time of the Aitolia-Akarnania treaty in 271/270, not less than four men sponsored Sikyonian *proxenoi* in a list in which only Pella had as many[10]. Two of their *engyonoi* came from Naupaktos[11] and Pleuron[12], at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, places which Sikyonian ships must pass, and perhaps call at, on voyages to and from their home port. Relations with Aitolia were thus of some importance before Sikyon became part of the Achaian League, but relations had also been established with earlier members of that league at the same time – proxeny-relations with Aigion, Bura, and Dyme in 272/271, and with Patrai and a place whose name began with 'L' the next year[13]. This level of contact is reasonably proportional to the relative importance of Sikyon and Achaia before they became united in 251, but there is no real sign, other than Polybios' vague comment, of any other Aitolian 'interference' at Sikyon[14]. If it occurred it did so in the time of the tyrants, whose erratic behaviour may have been the cause.

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[7] Plut, *Aratos*, 16.1.

[8] Plut. *Aratos* 4.1.

[9] Fl I 7 and 8; Lefèvre 23-24 and 25-26; one Dorian place was taken by the 'Metropolitan' Dorians, the other by a Dorian city from the Peloponnese: Argos, Troizen, Epidauros, and Aigina are recorded in the 270s and 260s as well as Sikyon; they seem to have ceased attending when the Metropolis became Aitolian.

[10] *IG* IX.1.17A.

[11] This is Neoptolemos, who may have been the father of the *strategos* of the same name in 246/245; *Prosopography*, 'Neoptolemos (1)' and 'Families' under 'Naupaktos'.

[12] One sponsor's name is not preserved; the fourth is from 'Arakynos', which was probably in the territory of Kalydon, which would reinforce the point made here.

[13] *IG* IX.1.12d (Aigion), 12e (Bura), 13-X (Dyme), 17B (Patrai) and 17A ('L[...]').

[14] Walbank, *CAH* VII, 1 (2) 147-149.

The Aitolians had also maintained good relations with Corinth. Proxeny-relations with the city were established in 271/270, at the same time as those with Sikyon and many other places, sponsored by Trichas of Herakleia, a prominent Aitolian politician[15]. The Aitolians also assisted the passage of Alexandros' bride Nikaia. On her way to Corinth for her marriage, she passed through Naupaktos[16].

Aratos' election as *strategos* of the Achaian League in May 245 was in part a response to Antigonos' recovery of Corinth from Nikaia. The return of Macedonian power onto Achaia's doorstep threatened Achaia (recently in receipt of a Ptolemaic subsidy) and prevented further expansion. It had been only when Alexandros declared his independence that Achaian raids on Corinth stopped. Now that it was Macedonian again, the hostility revived. It would appear that Aratos' plan was to pre-empt Antigonos' move south by establishing Achaian power in central Greece in his place. This involved an alliance with the Boiotian League, and a war with the Aitolian League. Aitolia and Macedon being long-time friends, this would presumably distract Antigonos; Boiotia's alliance would simultaneously threaten Euboia.

The plan, overly elaborate, was dependent too much on the actions of too many other states, and of course, it went wrong. The alliance with Boiotia was successfully made[17], thus forming a solid central Greek territoral grouping of Euboia, Boiotia, Corinth, and Achaia. Both Achaia and Boiotia mobilised their forces. Aratos sent a raiding force across the Corinthian Gulf to conduct a raid in the Aitolian coastlands, defined by Polybios as Lokris and Kalydon[18]. The Achaians had had an interest in these areas in the past, for it had been from Achaian control that Philip II had taken Naupaktos in 337, to give to the Aitolians, and Kalydon had been held by Achaians earlier, but only temporarily. So another element of Aratos' plan would seem to have been to revive Achaian interest and claims along the Lokrian and Aitolian coast. He was presumably in part playing to

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[15] *IG* IX.1.17; *Prosopography*, 'Trichas (1)'; Trichas was a very busy *engyon*.

[16] Livy 35.26.5; after she left Naupaktos her ship was captured by Achaians; she was released but the ship was kept. It is interesting tha this exploit is not described as 'piracy', though it seems to have taken place in peace time. Clearly differing standards are applied to Achaians and to Aitolians.

[17] This alliance is presumed by Plutarch's reference to Aratos going to Boiotian assistance (*Aratos* 16.1).

[18] Plut. *Aratos* 16.1; Paus. 2.8.3, narrows 'Lokris' down to Amphissa.

his own domestic constituency in this raid, in the knowledge that he required home support[19].

The immediate purpose of the raid can only have been to distract the Aitolian forces while the Boiotian army marched into Phokis as a preliminary to an attack on Aitolia – a pincer attack, in short. Control of the routes through Phokis was clearly a vital ingredient in the presumed plan, first as a defence for Boiotia, then as a means of pushing the war farther away from allied territory, and also as a way of blocking any move south by Antigonos. Control of the Kephisos valley would cut the highway which linked the Malian and Corinthian Gulfs, and this would prevent the Macedonian army from coming south. The war could thus be pushed north as far as Thessaly, and perhaps Antigonos could be pushed even further on to the defensive.

The Aitolians failed to react as they had been intended to. They had presumably been expected to attempt to counter the seaborne attacks. Instead, ignoring the Kalydon raid, their army was sent to block the Phokian routes, and then went on into Boiotia, where the Boiotian army was encountered at Chaironeia and defeated. The priority the Aitolians gave to the Boiotian force can be explained in several ways. The Boiotians may have moved first – Aratos is said to have had men marching to their assistance when they were defeated. Their army was encountered almost at their border; no doubt Chaironeia was the mustering point, and there could be only one target for an army collected there. There is some suggestion that the Boiotian League's military system was rusty[20], and a slow muster would have certainly alerted the Aitolians that something was planned. The size of the Achaian raid across the Gulf may have been only small, and perhaps was all-too obviously so. They had only a small naval force, though, of course, private shipping could have been used. But Aratos was in command of the main Achaian army, so the raiding force can only have been a fragment of that. The Aitolian early warning system may have worked well, and invasions of Aitolia had come from the east too often for it not to be a sensitive area. A combination of all these factors is perhaps the best explanation. It is also noticeable that the Aitolian army performed well, even

[19] Walbank, *Aratos*, 42.

[20] The Boiotian League adopted a new law on military training about this time; this has been connected with the defeat: P. Roesch. 'Les Lois federales boiotiennes', *Teiresias*, Supp 1, 66-67.

if it was pitted against a poorly trained enemy, despite not having been involved in any serious warfare for a generation.

The Aitolian invasion of Boiotia which followed the victory at Chaironeia was a brief, short-distance affair. Abaiokritos, the Boiotian commander, had been killed in the battle, along with a thousand of his hoplites, and this helped induce an abrupt change in Boiotian policy. Abaiokritos had dominated Boiotian affairs for a long time, and his death may have allowed new men to gain power. At any rate, the new policy was to make an alliance with Aitolia[21], in place of that with Achaia. What made everything much worse for Aratos was that he had failed to come to the aid of his ally, even though he had led the Achaian full muster ('10,000 soldiers', it was said later) through the Isthmus into Boiotia[22].

The complete failure of Aratos' policy followed. Late in 245 Alexandros of Corinth suddenly died. In the subsequent manoeuvres Antigonos succeeded in regaining control of both Corinth and the Euboian cities. Not only had everything Aratos tried during his term of office failed, but his successor now had to face the active enmity of Macedon, in control once again of Euboia, Attika, and Corinth, and allied with Argos and other Peloponnesian cities, but also Aitolia.

In the event, it was Aitolia which took the initiative. Antigonos was apparently quite satisfied with having recovered his losses. Just as Alexandros had given the Achaians free passage through the Isthmus in 245, so now Antigonos gave the Aitolians free passage in their revenge attack[23]. Aratos mustered his forces at the Isthmus to defend Achaian territory and called up the army of Achaia's ally Agis of Sparta. But pitched battle was not Aratos' way in warfare, nor was close association with the Spartan king, whose revolutionary programme was both reviving Spartan strength and threatening social stability in the region. Yet Aratos was not enamoured of the thought that the glory of any victory would go to the Spartan king. He argued

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[21] Pol. 20.5.2.

[22] Plut. *Aratos*, 16.1.

[23] The date of this raid is not known for certain. It seems probable that it was before 243, for the Aitolians had to pass Corinth, and from then Corinth was controlled by the Achaians, who could block the raid there. It was also during a term of office of Aratos as Achaian *strategos*, which must be between May 245 and May 24, or between May 243 and May 242. A third constraint is that Agis must be king of Sparta. The date of his accession is uncertain, either 244 or 243. It must also be after the harvest, and so after May, perhaps even after June. This all puts the event into the summer of 243.

against bringing on a fight, and then, when the Aitolians did not attack, sent his own forces home, including the Spartans[24]. Thereupon the Aitolians did attack, passing through the Isthmus[25], thereby demonstrating their understanding with Antigonos Gonatas. Aratos now recalled his Achaian forces, waited until the Aitolians were embroiled in the capture and looting of Pellene, and then attacked them and expelled them, reportedly killing 700 men, though this may be an exaggeration. Some certainly got away[26].

The Aitolians had clearly not been present in any large number and were a mere raiding force. They had therefore mounted suitable and measured replies to the two threats they had faced: against the prospect of an invasion by land from Boiotia they had mustered an army which had itself gone on the offensive pre-emptively; in the face of the seaborne raid by relatively small Achaian forces they had replied with their own, relatively small, raiding force. The full-scale invasion which Aratos had apparently originally feared – he had mustered a big army, it seems – did not happen. No doubt the large size of the Achaian force had deterred the Aitolians from attacking, and will have then persuaded Aratos to disband his original army.

To Aratos the problem was the Isthmus. Later in the year he carried out his spectacular capture of Akrokorinth[27], after which Corinth city, and other cities in the northern Argolid, acceded to the Achaian League[28]. Megara followed them[29], and Aratos was then able to lead a raid into Macedonian-controlled Attika and Salamis, meanwhile proclaiming his wish that Athens should also join his league[30]. Aitolia's actions in the face of this are unrecorded, but the presence of Achaian forces on the southern borders of Aitolia's new ally Boiotia, and Aratos' propensity for unexpected attacks during times of peace was clearly alarming. He had carried out such attacks in Sikyon, on Corinth, along the Lokrian coast, and now into Attika. On the other hand, Aratos had not made any other move against Aitolia after the defeat of the raid on Pellene.

It is not perhaps surprising that Antigonos Gonatas failed to make

[24] Plut. *Agis* 13-15, *Aratos* 31.1.
[25] Plut. *Aratos* 31.1.
[26] Plut. *Aratos* 31.2-32.2.
[27] Plut. *Aratos* 18-23; Polyainos 6.5.
[28] Paus. 2.8.5; Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* III 489 for Epidauros' treaty of accession.
[29] Plut. *Aratos* 24.3.
[30] Plut. *Aratos*, 24.2.

any serious effort to retake Corinth. The place was reported impregnable – except to surprise attacks, of course – and the Achaians put a large and alert garrison in Akrokorinth. But Antigonos still controlled Chalkis and Euboia, and the Peiraios, and had a variety of friends among the Peloponnesian cities. Yet his own capture of Akrokorinth was one of his proudest personal exploits and he can be expected to have been very annoyed at its loss. So it is just at this point that most historians place a fragment of information which fits best here because of that[31].

Polybios mentions, twice, a plan to dissolve the Achaian League which was made by Antigonos and the Aitolians. In one case he claims that it originated with the Aitolians[32], but in the other he tends to suggest it was Antigonos' idea[33]. It is not possible to decide, but Antigonos' anger was surely greater than any feelings the Aitolians had. It clearly came to nothing, and was perhaps no more than a momentary notion. Antigonos was now in his mid-seventies, and had only a few years left. The Aitolians on the other hand, may have had their attention newly directed to the situation in the Peloponnese.

If it is a correct interpretation of Aitolian policy between the Keltic invasion and the battle of Chaironeia that it was essentially cautious and defensive, and that this was what attracted the neighbouring communities into joining the league, and if it was the case that this policy was still in observable operation in 245-243 – as evidenced in the carefully measured responses to the two attacks on it – then it is necessary now to explain how and to what extent that policy changed in the later 240s. It is clear enough that the aggression came from Achaia, and from an unwilling Boiotia. The normal Aitolian reaction to attack was a vigorous defensive, and that is what had happened, but with Aratos in power regularly in Achaia, the best defence was to provide distractions in the Achaian area so as to prevent attacks being mounted in the first place.

The agreement to partition Achaia faded as quickly as it was made, and without any impetus from Macedon, nor any continuing hostilities between Achaia and Aitolia, there was no need to continue with the war. It may well, knowing Aratos' methods, never have been

[31] E.g., Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas*, 400, noting that 'it was the negation of his previous policy'; Walbank, *CAH* VII, 1 (2) 251.

[32] Pol. 9.34.7.

[33] Pol. 2.43.10.

declared at all, but there was certainly a formal peace agreement, made between Aratos for the Achaians and Pantaleon of Pleuron for the Aitolians. The peace agreement was accompanied also by an alliance of the two leagues.

This agreement is another awkward chronological problem. It is attested both by Polybios and Plutarch[34], who both link the two men, the peace, and the alliance, and the death of Antigonos which occurred in 239. This last is not acceptable, and so the chronology needs to be investigated. It is best to consider these three elements separately. The real link between the peace and the alliance is the two men involved, Aratos and Pantaleon of Pleuron. If Aratos was negotiating peace he was the league *strategos*, and the same must apply also to Pantaleon. These two men were in fact in office simultaneously on three occasions, of which only the first two are relevant: between May 241, when Aratos took up the office for the third time, and September 241, when Pantaleon ceased to be Aitolian *strategos* for 242/241, and between September 235, when Pantaleon became Aitolian *strategos* for the second time, and May 234, when Aratos ended his sixth term of office[35]. If the peace and the alliance must be separated and yet the two men were involved on both occasions, it is best to allocate the peace to their first conjunction, and the alliance to their second. The peace agreement would then come before the respective assemblies for ratification during 241, at the Aitolian *Thermika* held in September 241 when a new general would be elected to succeed Pantaleon, and either at the summer or early autumn meetings of the Achaian *ekklesia*.

The terms of the peace are not known. There was little enough to agree about. The Achaians would have to accept that the Boiotians had become Aitolian allies, the Aitolians would have to recognise Achaian possession of Corinth and the other recent acqusitions. The Achaians would recognise the Aitolian acquisition of the Akarnanian cities[36]. To others it may have looked fairly cynical. To Antigonos it was perhaps a signal that any hope he had of a recovery of Corinth was finally at an end.

The peace between the leagues was accompanied, it seems, by a

[34] Plut. *Aratos* 33.1; Pol. 2.44.1.

[35] For the Achaian *strategoi* see Walbank, *Aratos*, 203-211; for the Aitolians see the appendix to this volume.

[36] This peace is not listed in Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* III.

truce between the Achaian League and Macedon[37]. Whether this truce expanded into a peace treaty is unclear; if it did, it is not on record. What is clear is that over the next few years any hostilities involving both leagues and Macedon were conducted by way of surrogates. That is, a direct attack by the forces of any of them was only made on associates of the enemy, not on the enemy directly; where such an attack came too close to being directed at the main enemy it was disavowed. In a sense, this had begun before the peace and truce, for the Achaians had used the Boiotians against the Aitolians; and the Aitolians had been used in a sense by Macedon against Achaia; Aratos had made a practice of raids rather than open warfare – on Aitolia, on Corinth, on Attika, and soon on Argos. The peace and the truce disengaged these principals for a time, but they also left other intermediary states at the mercy of sudden attacks both from the principals and from other surrogates. The overall effect, of course, was to drive the non-attached states into one or other of the international groupings to try to gain protection, and thus thereby reduced the scope for such intrigues and increased the likelihood of an all-out war between the greater powers. It was a Greek version of the Cold War of the twentieth century – that is, normal practice in a condition of a balance of power.

The policy of the Aitolian League thus changed only to the extent that it was attacked in and after 245. Until then its expansion had been by peaceful means by persuasion, but in 245 came the sudden crisis which involved an attack by sea from Achaia in time of peace, and the threatening muster of the Boiotian army on the border. Such a crisis, unpremeditated, probably fairly sudden and unexpected, and from quarters with which friendly relations had hitherto obtained, would force a radical reconsideration of foreign policy. Aitolia's response in the short term had been measured, defeating the potential invasion, and sending out a replying raid, and then concluding peace after an interval for cooling off. But Aratos, the author of the treacherous attack, returned to power regularly in Achaia and he continued to use the same methods as he had applied in 245, sending raids into Attika, and plotting against Athens and Argos. In such circumstances all the states within Achaia's reach must feel insecure. Responses varied: some if them joined the Achaian League, some

[37] Plut. *Aratos* 33.2 – a truce, not a formal peace (not in Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* III).

submitted to tyrannies as a defence but these were responses of weak and small states. Aitolia, after a time, adopted the enemy's methods.

Once again, it is necessary to discuss the chronology first. The first piece of evidence consists of an inscription of a treaty between the Aitolian League, the city of Phigaleia in the western Peloponnese, and Messenia. It is dated by the Aitolian negotiators Timaios and Kleupatros[38]. Timaios was *strategos* of the league for 240/239, and had been Delphic *hieromnemon* recently; Kleupatros was presumably *hipparchos* of the league in the year of Timaios' strategy, and he was to be an *hieromnemon* a little later[39]. The name of the third Aitolian, who will have been the *grammateus*, is missing.

The second item of evidence comes, once again, from that speech of Lykiskos the Akarnanian to the Spartan assembly in 210, as written up by Polybios; he is made to say, again very rhetorically, that Timaios and other commanders operated in the Peloponnese[40]. Add to this two comments which are rather more easily acceptable as evidence: first, that the Peloponnesian cities of Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenos had been Aitolian allies until the 220s; second, that Mantinea was the ally successively of Achaia, Aitolia, and Sparta[41]. The involvement of Timaios as Aitolian commander dates this operation to the year he was *strategos*, that is 240/239, and since his term of office began in September, it is best to see him as operating in the Peloponnese in 239. However other commanders in the area are also named: Charixenos, Pharykos, and Polykritos.

Of Pharykos nothing more its known than what Polybios makes Lykiskos say: that he violated the sanctuary at Nemea, and it is only an assumption that he did so at this time, and that he was an official Aitolian commander[42]. The other two men are already familiar: Charixenos had been prominent in Aitolian affairs since 261/260, and had been *strategos* three times, the last time the year before Timaios (241/240); Polykritos had even longer service, including negotiating the original Akarnanian treaty; he had been *strategos* at least four times[43]. Now,

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[38] Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* III 495; cf. Roebuck, *Messenia*, 66-68.

[39] *Prosopography*, 'Timaios (1)', 'Kleupatros'.

[40] Pol. 9.34.9.

[41] Pol. 2.46.2 and 57.1.

[42] Walbank, *CAH* VII, 1 (2), 252-253 makes this and other raids seem to be the object of the Aitolian presence in the Peloponnese; he adds the usual anti-Aitolian cynical comment.

[43] *Prosopography*, 'Charixenos (2)', 'Polykritos (1)'.

while it is noticeable that the evidence of a new activism in Aitolian foreign policy occurs during terms of office of 'new men' – that is, men who were serving a first (or only) term as *strategos*, such as Neoptolemos in 245 and Timaios in 240/239 – the participation of old politicos such as Charixenos and Polykritos in the Peloponnesian business implies that these men were agreed on the new policy. In addition the *strategoi* of the years between these men – Alexander of Trichonos in 245/244, and Lykopos of Kalydon in 244/243 – were each holding the office for the third time. Given the presumed ages of these men, it might be that, having agreed to the new policy, they chose a younger man – Neoptolemos, Timaios – to carry it out.

The purpose of discussing these men is to show that this whole matter of the Peloponnese was not an aberration; it was a policy which had been clearly agreed by the Aitolian polity as a whole. In adopting the methods of their enemies the Aotolians were united. As a further indication, the preceding *strategos*, Pantaleon (another first time holder of the office), had been the negotiator of the peace with Aratos between May and September 241, which peace had been ratified at the same meeting of the *Thermike* in September 241 which had re-elected Charixenos as the new *strategos*, and which will have agreed the the new policy of activity in the Peloponnese, in which Charixenos was taking part.

There is an alternative theory, which might well reflect political reality better. For it is unlikely that the policy of peace and caution and expansion in central Greece could be replaced by one of expansion in the Peloponnese and military action there without argument and dispute. So in that case the term of office of Pantaleon stands out. That of Neoptolemos saw the battle of Chaironeia in Boiotian territory, one of those which followed saw the raid as far as Pellene in Achaia, and the war continued until 241. Yet the Aitolians did nothing, it seems, it counter Aratos' moves into Corinth and Attika in 243/242. Then in Pantaleon's strategy peace was negotiated, and ratified. But during the strategy of Timaios, a year later, the Aitolians were pursuing an active policy of involvement, diplomatic and military, in the Peloponnese.

It would seem then that the activities of Aratos, in threatening Aitolia and Athens, and in seizing control of Corinth, had met with two Aitolian responses. One, pursued and perhaps personified by Pantaleon, was in favour of a peaceful relationship, perhaps not seeing in Aratos' policies anything for Aitolia to be worried about, once

the fighting was over and the alliance made with Boiotia. The other response, that of Timaios, and perhaps Neoptolemos, was much more alarmed, more attuned perhaps to affairs in the rest of Greece, and thus eventually received the support of the old statesmen Polykritos and Charixenos. The combination of these two attitudes at the *Thermike* of September 241 might explain the conclusion of peace with Achaia, and the succeeding busy political, diplomatic, and military actions in the next two years. The peaceful policy of Pantaleon may well have seemed unacceptable in the years following, when Aratos was busy raiding and blackmailing. In foreign affairs it is scarcely surprising to find an expansionist party contending with a party opposed to expansion. The methods used by Aratos may well have seemed especially distasteful to men who had grown up in an Aitolia which was at peace and which used peaceful methods in its own process of expansion. In that case Pantaleon was the inheritor of the old policy, given a chance to work, but the others found it unsuccessful.

The diplomacy began with a negotiation to compose a disagreement between the cities of Phigaleia and Messene in the south-western Peloponnese. The leader of the Aitolian delegation was Timaios, the *strategos* who took office in September 240; he was accompanied by the *hipparchos* Kleupatros and by the *grammateus* whose name is lost. This dates the treaty probably to late in 240, since the later military and political events do depend on this agreement having been made before the armies moved[44]. And, since all three Aitolian officials are noted in the document, the agreement took place in Aitolia. This in turn might suggest that the negotiations had been initiated from the Peloponnese. Messenia had been neutral, like Aitolia, in the conflicts of the 260s, but the developing power of Sparta under Agis' revolutionary moves, Sparta's alliance with Achaia, and Achaia's growth in power under Aratos can only have appeared threatening. Aitolia was a traditional friend of Elis, Phigaleia's northern neighbour, and was in conflict with Achaia between 245 and 241. With Macedon largely eliminated from the Peloponnese after 243, the only protector the weak Peloponnesian neutrals could find was Aitolia. Aitolia in return would require the

[44] The date of Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* III, 495 is, of course, subject to dispute. Schmitt lists the various suggestions on p. 184-185; most centre in the late 240s.

settlement of old differences between Phigaleia and Messenia before any alliance could be made; hence the two elements of the treaty, for the agreement not only composed these mutual differences but made both states into formal allies of Aitolia. Thus the two Peloponnesians gained a powerful friend. But Aitolia's motives were more than defensive. The only possible reason for Aitolian diplomacy in this area were to prevent the growth of Achaian power, and to provide a secure base for Aitolia's own military actions in the Peloponnese, and this is what followed at once.

The Aitolian route to Phigaleia and Messene lay by way of Elis. The overthrow of the Eleian tyrant Aristotimos with the benign assistance of Aitolia in 272-271 was a generation in the past, and this action cannot be taken as evidence for the existence of any Aitolian-Eleian alliance, for friendship between the two, who had old ties, is well attested, though that is no real indication of constant political agreement. Elis, for example, had joined in the anti-Macedonian coalition formed by Athens for the Chremonidean war (as had Phigaleia), while Aitolia had stayed neutral – which is to say that Elis' government, not surprisingly, had its own policy; in this case the raw feelings left by Aristotimos' tyranny might have affected Eleian judgment, since he appears to have been supported by Macedon. Elis' preoccupation, traditionally, was with its land borders over against Arkadia and Messene. In Arkadia a new tyrant, Lydiadas, had recently secured control of Megalopolis, whose territory bordered on that of both Phigalia and Sparta. In 240 Sparta was coming to terms with the recent murder of its king Agis, the reformer, Aratos' former ally. The Achaian-Spartan alliance had collapsed, of course, as a result of the events at the Isthmus in 243, but revolution still stirred in Sparta, and revolution was a threat to all its neighbours. Lydiadas' tyranny appears to have been a defensive move against the threat from Sparta and from Achaia, with Macedonian support[45].

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[45] The situation in the Peloponnese was confused, of course. For discussions see M. Daubies, 'Un Chassé-Croisé diplomatique dans le Péloponnese au IIIe siècle avant J.-C.', *Antiquité Classique*, 42, 1973, 123-154; J. V. A. Fine, 'The Background to the Social War, 220-217 BC', *American Journal of Philology* 61, 1940, 129-165; R. A. de Laix, 'Polybios' Credibility and the Triple Alliance of 230/229 BC', *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* 2, 1969, 65-83; J. A. O. Larsen, 'The Aetolian-Achaian Alliance of ca. 238-220 BC', *Classical Philology* 70, 1975, 159-175; also, of course, the usual general works.

This was the situation in which Timaios negotiated the settlement of the old dispute between Phigaleia and Messene in 240. With Aratos preoccupied with Attika, the two other disturbers of the peace in the Peloponnese were Lydiadas and Sparta. The Megalipolitan tyrant had control over Arkadia as far west as Triphylia, the land between Phigaleia and Elis, but his city's real preoccupation was with Sparta. Lydiadas' political connection is usually presumed to be with Antigonos Gonatas of Macedon, but this is no more than presumption, and Antigonos' power in the area was much less after 243 when he lost Corinth. I suggest instead that it was Lydiadas who called in Aitolians and their allies. The clue to this is a passing remark that Lydiadas ceded the town of Aliphera to Elis 'for services rendered'[46]. Since Lydiadas was in office in his tyranny only until 235, the only opportunity he had of ceding territory to Elis was at the start of his rule, no doubt to pre-empt Eleian hostility. And in 240 the Aitolians invaded Sparta, by way of Elis and Phigaleia, and presumably also by way of Messene and Megalopolis. Geography requires that Megalopolis was involved. (See Map V.)

The Aitolian expedition was led by at least three commanders: Timaios the current *strategos*, Charixenos, and Polykritos. The main work was done by Timaios, who marched as far south as Cape Tainaron and as far north as the temple of Artemis at Lousoi, near Kleitor, close to the border with Achaia; Polykritos operated at Mantinea, perhaps as the commander of the supply base – he was clearly the oldest of the three men[47]. Polybios later rhetorically claimed that all these places had sanctuaries that were sacked by the Aitolians, but his word in this is not good enough[48]. At most we may accept that the Aitolians used temple property in some way, perhaps as a camping ground – as Romans later did at Delion. It seems highly unlikely that an Aitolian army under such distingushed commanders, men who were all *hieromnemones* at Delphi in the past, and of a polity which had Apollo of Delphi under its protection, would deliberately alienate the people of the Peloponnese in such a way.

The most telling argument against such conduct is that Mantinea, Orchomenos, Tegea, and Kaphyai, all of them cities which had clearly been part of the Aitolian campaign – and Mantinea had one

[46] Pol. 4.77.9-10.
[47] Pol 4.34.9.
[48] Pol. 9.34.9; see Chapter 2.

of the supposedly plundered temples – became Aitolian allies afterwards[49]. In addition, it seems that Megalopolis gained control over 'one of the gateways to Lakonia', Belbina, on the road between Sparta and Megalopolis[50]. This could only have been gained by Megalopolis with help, and the only help available was Aitolia's. The strategic purpose of controlling Belbina was clearly to block Spartan access to Arkadia. Similarly the strategic purpose of the Aitolian alliance with the four cities was to block Spartan access to the north – after all Agis had marched a Spartan army on that route against the Aitolians only four or five years before. That the alliances were not seen as a vital *Aitolian* interest is shown by the fact that they were easily given up a few years later. The cities themselves were no doubt unwilling to become a part of Lydiadas' tyranny just as they had no wish to be part of the Spartan kingdom. An Aitolian alliance, especially after the Aitolian ravaging of Lakedaimon, was a very acceptable protection, as it was also for Phigaleia and Messenia. Timaios took both treasure and slaves ('50,000', so Plutarch's source exaggerated[51]) out of Lakedaimon, which would pay his expenses for the expedition.

The question, of course, arises: why were the Aitolians attacking Sparta? Relations between the two had been minimal since the brief alliance between the Great Power and the tribes in the days of the Peloponnesian War and after. So far as can be seen the only contacts had been when Areus briefly intervened against Aitolian control of Delphi in 280 and when Agis brought his army north to help Achaia in the face of the Aitolian raid which only took place when the Spartans had withdrawn. Since then Agis had been killed, by the Spartans, and the Achaian alliance had been ended. So there was no direct cause for a quarrel between the two.

So the explanation must be in the series of alliances which Aitolia had made with other states in the Peloponnese. Lydiadas of Megalopolis had been joint-commander of an army which defeated a Spartan force[52], and hostility between the two cities was endemic. So when Aitolia allied with Messene and with Megalopolis, the oppo-

[49] Pol. 2.46.2.

[50] At least, under Kleomenes, Sparta had to make a special effort to gain control of the Athenaion close to Belbina (Pol. 2.46.5), which suggests that the town itself was under Megalopolitan control.

[51] Plut. *Aratos* 18.3.

[52] Paus. 8.10.5-10.

nent everyone had in mind was Sparta, and the confusion there after the death of Agis was an ideal opportunity to reduce Spartan power. But for Aitolia the other opponent was Achaia, which had been Agis' ally, but which was not involved in the Spartan business. The collection of Aitolian allies in the Peloponnese, however – Phigaleia, Messene, Megalopolis, Mantinea, Tegea, and Orchomenos, plus Elis as an old friend – all acquired in the course of a year or so, was as much a means of blocking Achaian expansion as it was directed against Sparta.

Two other items must be dealt with here. Mantinea is said later to have been an ally of Achaia, then of Aitolia, and then of Kleomenes of Sparta[53]. This last alliance is dated to 229/228. Polybios makes it clear that these changes were of Mantinea's own choice, though he claims that the Mantineans had 'deserted' Achaia. In another comment he states that Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenos were taken by Kleomenes, and that the Aitolians accepted this without protest, even though these cities were allies and members of the Aitolian League[54]. We have two contradictory statements here. Mantinea, I suppose, could be said to have joined Kleomenes voluntarily after he had captured it, but it strains belief to accept such an interpretation[55]. But for this study, the statement that the cities were both allies of Aitolia and members of the Aitolian League is a direct contradiction, for a city could not be both an ally and a member. It follows that the comment about the cities having been members of the league is Polybios at his distorting worst, accusing the Aitolians of a lack of will, a lack of faith to an alliance, desertion of a friend, and so on. The interpretation to be accepted is the easiest one, that Mantinea chose to leave the Aitolian alliance (it was not a member of the league) and to become an ally of Kleomenes. This will also explain the other problems: the city had earlier replaced its Achaian alliance with that of the Aitolians, presumably during Timaios' campaign in 240/239. It was a small town, it had to bend with the strongest wind.

This successful extension of Aitolian interests and influence was followed by another burst of *proxenos*-activity. This is the second occasion when major foreign policy developments were succeeded by new

[53] Pol. 2.57.1.

[54] Pol. 2.46.2; in fact, Orchomenos had been an Achaian ally c.234: Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* III, 499.

[55] Walbank, *CAH* VII, 1, (2), 456.

proxenoi appointments, the first being in 272-270 after the early expansion of the league and the conclusion of the Akarnanian treaty. The new agreements were made during the first and second strategies of Neoptolemos of Naupaktos in 246/245[56] and 239/238[57], with other agreements in 245/244[58] and 238/237[59], and they may be seen as more deliberate moves to consolidate Aitolian influence beyond its borders.

Once again Herakleia and Naupaktos were the major sponsor-cities, being the homes of ten out of the nineteen *proxenos* sponsors. Other eastern-facing participants were Opous in Lokris and Sosthenes in Ainis, in the Spercheios valley. Again the inland towns were present but not numerous, including, besides Sosthenes, Lysimacheia, Pholas, Kallion, and others sponsoring only one *proxenos* each. The objects of their solicitation, however, are notable: Eretria in Euboia had no less than six *proxenoi* appointed, and Athens four. These were both cities in the sphere of Antigonos Gonatas, whose death in 240/239 – before the second group of agreements were made – may be part of the reason for this diplomatic campaign. Opous concentrated on relations with its erstwhile Boiotian friends, Orchomenos and Megara, and Aiakidas the *strategos* of 238/237 sponsored a *proxenos* at Hermione at the eastern end of the Argolis one of the few places in that area which had not become part of the Achaian League since the capture of Corinth. These *proxenos*-agreements cannot be dissociated from the regular campaigns being waged by Aratos against Athens at this time, nor from the association of Macedon and Aitolia, while Hermione was one of the four non-Achaian places left in the Argolis, apart from Argos itself. This is another aspect of the Aitolian hostility towards Achaia, along with the Peloponnesian campaign. Aitolia was diplomatically lining up with the enemies of Achaia, a process which gives substance to the later complaint of Polybios that Achaia was surrounded by enemies.

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[56] *IG* IX.1.17 and 26.
[57] *IG* IX.1.25a and 25d.
[58] *IG* IX.1.11g.
[59] *IG* IX.1.25d.

PART THREE

STUDIES

INTRODUCTION

The study of a subject such as the Aitolian League requires to be done as a chronological investigation, largely because it has not yet been done, or done only in sections. It is thus necessary to work through the period of the league's existence adopting the point of view of the Aitolians, just as has been done with the Athenians, Macedonians, Achaians, and others. But this approach means that certain topics may be ignored, or tucked away in metaphorical corners, or in fragments between chapters, all of which may militate against understanding.

Such subjects are the ones included in this Part, which I have given the bland title of 'Studies'. Each of them is intended to cover the whole of the history of the league, but at the same time I hope not to forget the absolutely basic matter of chronology. All these topics require to be investigated with constant reference to the likelihood of change and development. After all, the league remained in existence for almost two and a half centuries; one must expect change in that time.

9. THE CONSTITUTION

The structure of the League of the Aitolians, born amid the turmoil of the Macedonian conquest of Greece and which survived with some difficulty the disintegration of that empire, is never described by any ancient source. It is thus not easy to discover, though a reasonable estimate of it can be made. It is possible to collect together all the references to the various institutions of the league, and thus make a reasonably tidy picture of a functioning polity[1]. But this is an unsatisfactory method of procedure, resorted to all too often in studies of the ancient world. It means using evidence from, say, 313 alongside evidence from the 240s and the 180s, assuming they can all be lumped together, and so paying little regard to the very great changes which took place over that period. In 313 the league was a defensive, new state; in the 240s it was one of Greece's secondary powers, only just less important than the Macedonian kingdom; in the 180s it was a defeated state, heading for civil war. The friction of events and the mere passage of time clearly had their effects on the league's institutions. The changes in Aitolia's international position over the period, for example, undoubtedly had their effects on the league's constitution.

We do know of one change, which will make the point. The league council originally had only one secretary (*grammateus*), and later, from a little before 200, it had two, one of them senior to the other[2]. This was no doubt due to the greater workload in later years, though allowance must also be made for the inherent tendency of a bureaucracy to expand. But the *grammateus* was an important official, and the doubling is a clear indication that the Aitolian polity was an adaptable organism. There is also another change, which may reasonably be postulated. The elected chief executive was the general (*strategos*), the earliest known being Alexandros, who commanded the Aitolian troops in 322/321 in the invasion of Thessaly[3], and presumably also in the siege of Lamia earlier. He is named alone as commander, and

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[1] As Larsen does, in effect: *GFS*, 195-205.

[2] The first instance of two *grammateis* is in 207/206 (*SEG* XII, 217); in 202/201, though, there was only one (*IG* IX.1.30a), and two again by 194/193 (*IG* IX.1.187).

[3] Diod. 18.38.1; at least it is assumed that he was the elected *strategos*.

it may be assumed that he commanded both infantry and cavalry (if there was any cavalry). Later, a second military official, the *hipparchos*, appears, acting as the the second-in-command to the whole army and as commander of the cavalry. In the force raised for the Thessaly campaign in 321 Aitolian cavalry was mentioned for the first time[4]. No *hipparchos* is noted, even though the cavalry force was four hundred strong, almost the later full strength of this branch. Or it may be that Diodoros did not feel the need to mention him.

Cavalry had their own particular needs, and usually operated in battle as a separate unit, and a separate commander was sensible and practical. The first Aitolian *hipparchos* is attested in 273/272[5], but records for the next two decades are intermittent. Indeed, it would seem that the office of *hipparchos* may well have been at first only an intermittent office. There are ten instances between 290 and 260 where the annual set of league officials is recorded; only in five of these are there all three names, and in two of these the *grammateus* is named before the *hipparchos*; and in others the *grammateus* is named but no *hipparchos*[6]. By the late 260s, however, the status order *strategos* – *hipparchos* – *grammateus* is set (noted first in 262/261), and it remained unchanged from then on until the doubling of the office of *grammateus*. The *strategos* and the *grammateus*, head of state and secretary respectively, were necessarily permanent officers from the very beginning; the *hipparchos*, as a new officer, was perhaps only elected when required in the early years, that is, when the league was at war, or when war threatened, as an emergency office. Command of the cavalry was, however, clearly an office of prestige, and ambitious men would wish to make the office a regular and permanent feature of the league's affairs, in order that they might hold it. This process would seem to have taken about two decades to work through: intermittent in the 270s and 260s, the *hipparchos* had become a permanent office by the late 260s. Ironically this was just the period when the league was at peace; this may be seen, if the intermittent nature of the office is accepted, as a demonstration of the inflation of offices, and as an example of the oligarchy's liking for status.

These changes, in both the composition of government officials and perhaps the composition of the army, was the result of the growth of

[4] Ibid.
[5] *IG* IX.I.12a.
[6] See the lists of officials in the appendix.

the league: the original Aitolian heartland was not cavalry country, either in its products or in its wealth, and in 426 Demostenes' hoplites were attacked only by infantrymen. The 'Acquired' Aitolia[7], along the coast of the Corinthian Gulf, was richer in both its water resources and in its agriculture, and so in its wealth; hence the later appearance of cavalry in the army. This simple case of the result of the league's expansion having its effect on the whole league was to be repeated later, though not always with the need for governmental innovation[8].

The fundamental governmental institution of the league was the Assembly (*ekklesia*)[9]. It was to this body that Aristodemos of Miletos spoke in 313 in his attempt to get the Aitolians to join actively in the war on Antigonos' side[10]. The Assembly, therefore, as is usual with such bodies in Greek states, had the power to decide matters of war and peace, and, like those other meetings, it could be persuaded by speeches – or even by just one speech: in 313 Aristodemos succeeded in doing so, though he was presumably not the only speaker. Unlike in other states, however, this Assembly only met twice a year. The main meeting was at Thermos in September, when there was a festival with games, the *Thermike*. The central purpose was a celebration at the temple of Apollo at Thermos, a festival which was centuries old, and it was the development of this gathering which formed this meeting.

The other meeting was in the spring, when a smaller festival, which became called the *Panaitolike*, was held[11]. This spring meeting might be in one of several places, but one wonders if this was also one of the changes brought about by time. When the league consisted of 'Old' and 'Acquired' Aitolia, that is, the inland areas plus the cities of the coast from Naupaktos to Oiniadai, Thermos was still the best meeting place, being geographically central, a traditional place of meeting, and a sacred place. As the league expanded, however, Thermos became far less central to the league as a whole, and a varying venue for one of the Assembly meetings might well be a response to the complaints of newer and more distant members. Herakleians, for

[7] Strabo 10.2.3.

[8] See chapter 11 for a discussion of the problem of Aitolia's forces.

[9] The basic study of the Assembly is by J. A. O. Larsen, 'The Assembly of the Aetolian League', *TAPA* 83, 1952, 1-33; see also M. Holleaux, 'Sur les Assemblées ordinaires de la ligue Aitolienne', *BCH* 29, 1905, 362-372 (= *Études*, 1.219-227).

[10] Diod. 19.66.1.

[11] Pol. 4.37.2.

example, or Dolopians, could scarcely be convinced that their interests were being heard if they could not reach the meetings in sufficient numbers.

In fact, it is also a question of when the spring meeting actually began. The Thermos autumn meeting, at the time of the equinox[12], was an Aitolian festival[13] which pre-dated the organised league, and which formed the social and political and religious nucleus around which the political league has coalesced in the 330s. The *Thermike* was thus the native focus, and it remained the more important of the two, when, for instance, elections to the league offices were held. But there was no real reason for a spring meeting, presumably in March, and presumably also at the equinox[14], before the league existed. The fact that it was not fixed in one place implies that it came into existence only after the league had been organised, and so presumably in response to its expansion both in size and in importance. The meeting was surely invented because there were decisions, particularly those concerning war and peace, which needed to be made in the spring, before the fighting season began. It would not be until the spring that the movements of the armies of enemies and potential enemies would become known. Decisions made in the autumn quickly became outdated over the winter, and new decisions would often be needed in the early new year. So the spring meeting is best seen as a product of the new league. The very name, *Panaitolike*, implies the pre-existence of the league: the name of the September meeting, *Thermike*, is purely local[15].

It is one thing, however, to hold regular meetings, still another to possess a functioning government. The *Thermike* festival centred on the temple and its games, and the political assembly was additional; the *Panaitolike* assembly, at which there were also games, was new; only a continuing physical authority, continuing to exist between these Assembly meetings, could provide a government and an administration. The earliest sign of such an authority is the *strategos*. When the Athenian general Demosthenes conducted his disastrous campaign into Apodotia in 426, the Aitolians resisted in a more or less

[12] Pol. 5.8.5.

[13] Larsen (note 9).

[14] Holleaux, 'Assemblées'.

[15] M. T. Mitsos' argument ('Thermika and Panaitolika', *Hesperia*, 16, 1947, 256-261) that there were other Aitolian assemblies, was demolished fully by Larsen (note 9).

concerted manner, but there is no sign of a commander[16], and indeed the Aitolian tactics look to be very much traditional, even improvised. Nor, again, is there any commander even hinted at until the appearance of Alexandros in the Lamian campaign in 322. When Antipatros and Krateros invaded Aitolia in 321, the reaction of the Aitolians, while superficially similar to their reaction to Demosthenes' attack, was in fact a much more sophisticated and well-organised version of guerilla resistance[17]. They faced a much greater threat in the invasion of 30,000 Macedonians, compared with Demosthenes' much smaller force, and their resistance was apparently Aitolia-wide. Similarly, when it seemed that Kassandros' brother Philip was about to invade in 312, the instant reaction of the Aitolians was exactly the same as in 321[18]. That is to say, on both occasions there existed a well-thought-out and fully agreed, understood, and appreciated defence plan which was put into effect throughout the land to combat invasions. More than that, the plan worked. The bloodthirsty threat to depopulate the land which was made in 320 is that of Macedonian soldiers facing a type of fighting they did not understand. It was the 'why don't they stand and fight?' reaction of professional soldiers who were facing unorthodox guerilla tactics. And it argues that there was a recognised, accepted, functioning government in Aitolia which was subject to decisions of the spring and autumn Assemblies, but which was expected to continue in existence between Assemblies, which was vested with emergency powers, and which was capable of issuing instructions which would be obeyed.

In the third century there was a council (*synedrion* or *boule*), which met more frequently than the Assembly, and which exercised powers delegated to it by the Assembly. It did not have the power of war and peace, however, though no doubt it could make recommendations to the Assembly. One may assume that it was needed as soon as the league was organised. In other words, if it did not exist from the start, it will have been soon invented. Yet it is worth pointing out that the earliest record of it is not until the strategy of Oiakides, which was in the 260s[19], and most instances came after 220; though it must also be pointed out that this is also the general trajectory of

[16] Thuc. 3.94-98.
[17] Diod. 18.24.1-2.
[18] Diod. 19.74.6.
[19] *IG* IX.1.15.

inscriptional evidence. In other words the absence of testimony before the 260s cannot be taken as anything more than an absence of evidence.

Given the normal organisation of a Greek state, therefore, one may assume the *synedrion*'s early existence. Its membership, however, is distinctly unusual. It consisted of men chosen by the local communities, which made up the league, their number in approximate proportion to the population of those communities, or more precisely, in proportion to the military contribution of their community to the league forces. The theory is, however, based on very thin evidence: an inscription of the late third century which records an arbitration between two communities in Achaia Phthiotis, Meliteia and Peraia, which had apparently originally been a single state. Now they were separating, and part of the decision was that, once the two communities are separated, Peraia will send one representative to the *synedrion*, with Melitaia retaining the rest (an unknown number), the original representatives having all been Melitaians. This implies that the number of representatives for a community was fixed, presumably when the community joined the league[20]. This, it will be noted, is not really representation by population, unless there was a mechanism for increasing or decreasing the representation as population numbers changed, and for which no evidence exists. In turn, this would require a regular census of some sort, for which, again, there is no evidence. It certainly seems unlikely to have happened. It would result in repeated disputes over redistribution, for which, again, no evidence exists.

The Aitolians did, however, have a model for such a body conveniently to hand, in the form of the Delphic Amphiktyony, where communities sent fixed numbers of representatives to the regular meetings. There was only the most minimal recognition of the varying sizes in this representation: one or the Malians, two for Boiotians, for example, though the larger states had more than the smaller. The scheme's basis could well be adapted to secular purposes, all the more readily in that the original Aitolian tribes had been accustomed act as equals, as in 426, when three ambassadors, one from each of the three main tribes, attended a meeting at Corinth to make an alliance

[20] *IG* IX.1.188 (= *Syll* (3) 546B); this is the explanation of Larsen (note 9), 11-17, *GFS* 198, and *RG* 66-70.

[21] Thuc. 3.100.

with Sparta[21]. Aitolia's tribal composition, however, changed, and even before the league existed there were also Aitolian cities, and its minimal governmental system in the 420s was very different from that a century later, and this was different again by the time of the Melitaian/Peraian arbitration.

Both Thucydides, in his account of Demosthenes' ill-fated adventure in 426, and Diodoros, in discussing the invasions of Antipatros and Krateros in 321, and that of Philip in 311, emphasise the fact that the Aitolians were village-dwellers. It may be, therefore that, within the tribes, these villages were the bases for electing the representatives. Tribal meetings are unattested in our evidence; they surely existed before the league was organised, but seem to have been superseded by urban groupings later. The evidence of Peraia, which was a small settlement and which would have one representative if it broke away from Melitaia, may be relevant. Yet it is not obvious that Melitaia had more than two or three representatives on the council, and there were a relatively limited number of such cities. By the third century the tribal territories contained cities, or at least urban centres, while the land around the Trichonos Lake had always been more a collection of towns than a wholly rural area. Each of these consisted of a *polis* and its *chora*, in the usual Greek way. The total number of these urban areas was not great, certainly less than fifty. By the time of the production of inscriptions in the area, from 280 or so onwards, men were identified by their urban origin, not their tribe. The members of the *synedrion* therefore represented an urban centre with its surrounding land. If there was an Amphiktyony-like representation, the total membership of the *synedrion* need not have been more than a hundred by the mid third century.

Beyond that change, brought about by urbanisation, the *synedrion*'s numbers were also inevitably affected by the expansion of the league as other communities joined it, particularly during the acqusition of territories in the first half of the third century. Some sort of mathematical yardstick must have been available to determine how many representatives should join the council from the new members, but it need not have been accurate. Perhaps use was made of the scale of military contributions to determine the number of representatives, for these numbers could be easily verified at a time of mobilisation. Since the weight of any particular community in the council depended on the number of its representatives, at least in part, it was in each community's interests to maximise its military contribution, thus also

enhancing the international stature – measured as often as not by the size of the army it could put in the field – of the league as a whole. Yet the size of the army was never great, and so the population as a whole, and the size of the various cities, were also relatively small. The new members of the league were clearly important in enlarging the league's power, but as the league expanded the internal balance between the Assembly and the *synedrion* would also shift. With the regular autumn meeting always at Thermos, it was impossible for many of the ordinary citizens of the league to attend if they came from communities at a distance, for instance in the east or the north, so their contact would normally be through their representative on the *synedrion.*

As the league grew, so therefore in all probability did the *synedrion*, both in size, with representatives of the new members, and in importance. At the same time the representative nature of any Assembly was distorted and devalued, thus enhancing the *synedrion*'s weight. On the other hand, membership of the *synedrion* was not something which individual Aitolians emphasised. The number of men recorded as *boularchoi* scarcely reaches double figures[22], which suggests a certain lack of local prestige; and some of these may refer to *boularchoi* of local communities.

The actual functions of the *synedrion* are nowhere specified. The main items of decision-making we have information about concern the declaration of war and the making of peace, and both of these were functions of the Assembly, at which votes were taken after speeches. The negotiations for peace treaties were handled by specially chosen envoys, sometimes the magistrates, and the Assembly ratified the decision, or rejected it. One odd item of procedure, attested at the end of the third century, was that the *strategos* was not permitted to make a proposal for a declaration of war[23]. This was presumably because he would be the commander and would therefore be an interested party. Whether this was the practice in earlier years is not known, but it does suggest the existence of a body of respected rules of procedure.

The *synedrion* had a number of routine duties and tasks: the many

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[22] E.g., *IG* IX,1,22 (Amynander, Charixenos, Dion), 9 (Aristarchos); 31k (Dorimachos) and others; most of these are undated, but *IG* II (2) 358, an Athenian decree of 333/2, honours an Aitolian *boularchos.*

[23] Livy 35.25.7.

proxenos decrees were the council's work, it had judicial duties, it appointed men sent to annual festivals (*theoroi*), it negotiated agreements with foreign states, such as *asylia* treaties, it appointed judges as arbitrators in such disputes as that between Melitaia and Peraia[24]. All these were no doubt also subject to ratification by the Assembly, though they were surely sent through 'on the nod' almost invariably.

The *synedrion* would be in existence on a permanent basis, but that would probably entail regular periodic meetings, or perhaps, as at Athens, a fraction of the total was in session for part of the year. We do not know. But its existence requires that it performed some function. The lack of a provision for urgently summoning the Assembly means that the *synedrion* must have been able to take emergency decisions, subject to their later ratification by the Assembly: the mobilisation of the army for defence is the obvious one, as is the choice of envoys. Perhaps the preparation of new laws was another. The one example of law-making attested in the sources, the attempt to solve the debt problem in 205, the new law was proposed by two or more men, apparently meeting as a committee. It was rejected by the Assembly[25].

The pressure of events and the need for decisions became especially severe in the late third and early second centuries, during the wars against Philip V of Macedon and Rome. There are two cases in this period which seem to be other examples of constitutional developments. In 192 a special meeting of the Assembly was called in October, when Antiochos III arrived. No earlier such meeting is known, though emergencies had happened in plenty in the past. Antiochos was awarded the honorary position of *strategos autokrator* at the meeting[26]. The only other example was Attalos I of Pergamon, who had been given the title in 209, presumably without having to have a special Assembly called for the purpose[27]. The year after Antiochos' arrival, it was proposed that a special Assembly be called to ratify a peace agreement reached by Aitolian envoys and the Roman consul M'. Acilius Glabrio, but the Assembly never met, supposedly because

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[24] Larsen, *GFS* 208-211.

[25] Pol. 13.1.1-3; it has been suggested that Skopas was acting in this case as a *nomographos*, a reviser of the laws, but this is not how he was working, nor is there any evidence for such an office in Aitolia. Larsen, *GFS*, 209, claimed to detect it, but his citations do not convince.

[26] Livy 35.44.9.

[27] Livy 27.29.10; App. *Syr*, 12.

of a widespread sentiment against the terms made it clear that the treaty would be rejected. In fact, it was probably impossible to call the meeting in time, and it looks more like a ploy by the magistrates to shift the blame for rejection[28].

There is another committee which appears in the sources for a brief time: a group called the *apokletoi*, at least thirty strong, who were appointed by the league to attend on Antiochos the Great when he arrived as Aitolia'a ally in late 192[29]. This group appears only for about a year, being named as the authority to send envoys the next year[30]. Otherwise it does not appear either earlier or later in the league's history, and it is much too difficult to accept this absence as due to the gaps in the evidence; at least when Polybios and Livy are the main sources, between c.225 and 167, Aitolia is relatively well known, and an important committee such as the *apokletoi* appears to be should be mentioned on other occasions[31]. It is thus more likely that this group was a special committee organised first for the purpose of planning a series of *coups* designed to show Antiochos that Aitolia was fully prepared to fight, and then for the express purpose of attending on him, just as a special Assembly had been called to welcome him. One would have expected the *synedrion* to do that, but it may be that by that time, when the league was at its greatest size, there were too many members. The *apokletoi* were presumably therefore a committee of the council, set up for the purpose of planning and of liaising with Antiochos.

Here then there may be another example of the league's constitutional adaptability. If the *synedrion* was divided into groups of men on duty for a short time, it may be that the *apokletoi* was a committee in permanent session. They were certainly selected, as the name implies, and, as their work implies, they were constituted for the specific emergency of the Roman war.

It would seem that one of the main elements in the development of

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[28] Livy 36.28.9.

[29] Livy 45.23.7: 550 'senators' murdered, and others exiled, suggesting a membership of a thousand or so in 167; it may be, of course, that Livy did not properly understand what the body was.

[30] Livy 36.28.8.

[31] W. Schwahn, 'Die Apokleten der Ätoler und die Apoklesia der Lokrer', *Wiener Studien* 48, 1930, 141-149; the equivalence of these must be doubted; the Lokrian *Apoklesia* appears to be an Assembly of notables (Larsen, GFS 54), the Aitolian *apokletoi* was a committee, secret and elected.

the Aitolian constitution was the sheer size of the state. It was too large for full attendances at any of the Assemblies, its size and the number of its constituent parts meant that the *synedrion* became very large, and therefore that an emergency committee had to be found. The press of business meant that the job of the *grammateus* had to be divided. Yet as the league declined in importance, and in size in the second century, the size of the government system did not decline – two *grammateis* continued to be appointed.

In fact the only indication we have of the absolute size of the *synedrion* comes almost at the end of the league's history, and certainly at the end of useful sources for that history. In 167 the 'senate', as Livy calls it, was subjected to a selective massacre, in which 550 men were killed, and others driven into exile[32]; this leads to the assumption that the *synedrion* – for that is presumably what the 'senate' was – numbered up to a thousand members[33].

The problem is that the equivalence of 'senate' and *synedrion* is not established; Livy was not clear on Aitolian institutions. It may have been the Assembly which was attacked, or even a different group altogether. It certainly seems that a council of a thousand would be utterly unwieldy, so large in fact as to be essentially useless for administrative purposes. There is certainly no indication that it was so large earlier.

But this was an event unique in Aitolian history. Only in the decade or so preceding the massacre had the internal situation in the league reached such a pitch of ferocity that civil war could be diagnosed[34]. It is not reasonable, therefore, to take this one item and use it as an indication of the size of the council at other periods, when conditions, internal or external, were very different. The Aitolian constitution has been shown to have been flexible. Indeed Polybios at one point complains about this[35]. I would suggest therefore, that this indication of the size of the council is so exceptional as to be misleading. If the council was over a thousand strong in 167, this does not mean it had been so large before.

The council, of whatever size, was composed of men sent from their local communities, and these local communities retained their

[32] Livy 45.28.7.
[33] So Larsen, *GFS*, 199-200 suggested.
[34] See chapter 22.
[35] Pol.13.1.1.

own local administrations, with *archons* and *boulai* and local assemblies. One inscription shows that they were expected to provide sustenance and accommodation to visiting *theoroi*[36], and local justice was also provided. It was through such a system that men could be elected to the league council, providing a sort of *cursus* along which men might progress. There is some indication that at the league level men went through the offices of *grammateus* and *hipparchos* before being eligible for that of *strategos*, though it was perhaps not so rigid as the Roman system.

There are indications also of other league officers. In the treaty with Akarnania which I would date to 271/270 three terms are used to designate different people[37]. One is *tamias*, of whom seven are named. Seven men are also named as *epilektarchon*. The first would seem to be a steward, and so a financial official. The second means something like 'chosen', or 'elected', but this provides no indication of function; it is not recorded again, so they may be a group especially chosen for the negotiation of this particular treaty (even, perhaps, the team which was to help sort out the disputed boundary of the area called Pras). One would expect the *tamiai*, in the sense of financial officials, to be a permanent institution, however, though none are ever again named. The league had its income, and spent money; a formal financial organisation is a certainty. Later a treasurer of the league has been detected[38].

The third term is *telos*, which does appear in later inscriptions as a term for district: the Stratos *telos*[39], the *telos* of Lokris[40]; the first in a boundary settlement, the second used in a dating formula in 189/188. In the Akarnanian treaty the term is indefinite. It has been assumed from these instances that all Aitolia was divided into these districts[41], but it is odd, in that case, that no other men or areas are so described. In fact, the two specific instances are in unusual circumstances: the Stratos case is in a settlement of a boundary dispute

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[36] *IG* IX.1.179.

[37] *IG* IX.1.3A.

[38] Larsen, *GFS*, 209, discussing *IG* IX.1.179. Larsen, p. 213, finds it a 'discrepancy' that here were seven *tamiai* in 271/270 and only one in 214. It is more a sign of his imprisonment in his theory. It is better seen as yet another exmaple of Aitolian constitutional development and change.

[39] *IG* IX.1.3B.

[40] *SGDI* 2070.

[41] Larsen, *GFS*, 197-198.

between two member states, Matropolis and Oiniadai; the Lokrian example is dated to a particularly fraught moment in Aitolian history, at the end of the Roman war, when it cannot have been very clear what the future would be. The man concerned, Damokles of Physkeis, is decribed as *boularchos* of the *telos* of Lokris, but on another inscription of the same year he is simply a *boularchos*[42]. This is very slight evidence on which to base a theory of local government, particularly when there is plentiful evidence that the local affairs of the Aitolian communities were in fact conducted by themselves without the use of such terms as *telos*. The two examples are thus best seen as either terms surfacing in emergency or unusually difficult situations, or as occasional informal terms of no real official significance.

The structure which is the minimum which was essential to the conduct of the league's affairs was therefore: the *ekklesia* (Assembly) to provide the basic political community, meeting regularly and exercising the supreme functions of election and discussion on peace and war and new laws; the *synedrion* (council) for representatives chosen from the local communities, for continuity, emergencies, preparation of changes, and as a law court; the *strategos* and other officers for executive actions, to command in war, and to conduct diplomacy; a group of financial officials, *tamiai* (stewards), only very rarely recorded. During the first generation of its existence the system had to cope with the dissolution and reconstitution of the league (either once or twice), one massive invasion and the repeated threat of more invasions by Macedonian armies, and the complex diplomacy of the new Hellenistic world. Whatever the original intention, the constant emergency situation in which everyone lived in those years – in direct contrast to the apparent somnolence of the previous generation and more – must have enhanced the authority of the *synedrion* and the *strategos* as against the *ekklesia*, and of the *strategos* as against the cumbersome *synedrion*. As the league expanded so did the council, and so also did its cumbersomeness. One is irresistibly reminded of the effect on the Roman Senate of the prolonged emergency of the Hannibalic war a century later: an example of like causes having like effects, perhaps. Further, the general success of the Aitolians in evading involvement in much of the fighting in the generation after 323 can only have enhanced the confidence the ordinary members of the Assembly

[42] *SGDI* 2139.

had in the conduct of affairs by the *synedrion* and the league officers.

The studies of Larsen have classified the league's constitution as a 'federal' state, with a 'representative' content in its government[43]. This, of course, followed on from studies by Dubois and Freeman[44] in the nineteenth century, and are all the product of the developing study of political theory in the modern world. It has not seemed particularly helpful to enforce their classification. It is certainly legitimate to search out early examples of modern phenomena, but one gains the distinct impression that the comparisons are somewhat forced. It is difficult, for example, to detect a really convincing version of the representative principle in the only inscription, of the result of the arbitration between Peraia and Melitaia, which can be said to have a bearing. Similarly the 'federal' principle is not, to an uncommitted eye, all that visible in the organisation of the league. I have, therefore, largely avoided using modern terms in the discussion. A better collection of evidence is needed before a firm classification and a convincing comparison can be made. However, a better stab can be made at the source of real power in the league, whether the many or the few, to which the form of the constitution is a necessary prelude.

According to Polybios, virtually our only source, the Aitolians had a particular reputation among the Greek states for perfidy, for barbarian behaviour, and greed. This is a matter I have discussed in the Introduction. They are also generally assumed to be a democratic society[45], at a time when real democracies had all-but vanished from the Greek lands, having been replaced by regimes in cities which practiced formal rather than actual democracy. This all conduced to a picture of rude hillmen, rough, outspoken and primitive, a throwback to an earlier Greece[46], a time before sophistication and power-politics had darkened the Greek scene, before the great monarchies loomed, a democratic island amid kings and rich oligarchs.

The view of the Aitolian League as a democracy, however, seems

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[43] Larsen *GFS* and *RG*.

[44] M. Dubois, *Les ligues étolienne et achéenne*, Paris 1885; E. A. Freeman, *A History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy*, (ed. J. B. Bury), London 1893.

[45] Larsen, 'Assembly', states this in his very first paragraph, anticipating the conclusion of his paper; he repeated this view in *GFS*, 195, where he claims that the league had 'a very active federal primary assembly to a late date'. This view underlies all modern treatments of the Aitolians, such as there are.

[46] This, of course, is an Athenian view, partly based on Athenian experience in 426, in Demosthenes' disastrous invasion.

to be wide of the mark. The governing assembly of such a wide-ranging state – even at its origin the league was several days' travel in width – could not possibly function in the way that the Athenian Assembly had in its heyday, as a direct, even instant, legislator on a regular basis: only in a ratificatory capacity could it operate at all. The powers exercised by the Assembly of such a large state are not those which could provide a day-to-day supervision over the league's affairs. A bi-annual meeting, totalling no more than two weeks out of the fifty-two, even if supplemented by emergency meetings – by definition very rarely used – could do no more than discuss every issue very briefly, if at all, and vote on matters of overall policy.

This is not to deny that the Assembly had the powers outlined above: making laws, electing officers, making alliances, and receiving embassies; but it *is* to deny that it could have regularly operated as a governing system. None of these powers is a continually active one. Instead, the governing power in routine matters clearly lay with the *synedrion*, the council of the league, and with the annual officers. It was this group which discussed and formulated the laws, which proposed candidates for office, and which negotiated the details of alliances and foreign policy.

The council consisted of men sent from the various communities which formed the league. These local communities retained their own administrations, and chose their own officers. Inscriptions from such places as Naupaktos, Arsinoe, Stratos, and others, contain references to *boularchoi*, *grammateis*, and local religious officials, all apparently holding office on the usual annual basis[47]. Information about the rural areas is much poorer, but it is reasonable to assume that, if the cities and towns continued to have their own administrations during their membership of the league, then those rural communities did so as well, in so far as these were not part of the territories of the cities. As the league expanded it did so by being joined by such communities, urban and rural, and as it declined these same communities separated off and their local administration continued. These processes applied both to the rural areas – Dolopia, for example – and to the cities. Further, some of the larger cities contained communities who also had their own identity. Bouttos, for example, a town inland of Naupaktos, appears to have been part of the Naupaktos

[47] Most of these are in *SGDI*, and are generally, but not wholly, manumissions.

polis, but it also sturdily maintained its own identity, and its own local administration, and men from there often insisted on identifying themselves as from Bouttos rather than Naupaktos, and sometimes as an alernative to the main city.

Men attended the Aitolian Assembly by right of their citizenship of their local communities, which provided them with Aitolian League citizenship. In effect, this meant that the Assembly was the male Aitolians of military age. On at least two occasions, at the siege of Medeon in 231, and at Naupaktos in 217, this is attested[48]. But the council was made up of men selected, or elected, in these local communities, and these men had to be able to attend the council for extended periods of time, and with some frequency. Membership of the two bodies clearly overlapped, but those who were eligible for council membership were clearly a more restricted group.

There is no trace of central control over the election process, though there was a set list of communities which could send representatives, as the Peraia-Melitaia arbitration shows[49]. The politicians who were prominent in league affairs are often identified as coming from particular communities – Phaineas of Herakleia, Dorimachos of Trichonos, and so on – which suggests that they owed their prominence in league affairs to a preliminary and simultaneous prominence in their local communities. Such offices as *strategos* and *hipparchos*, perhaps above all *grammateus*, were very time-consuming, and imply the possession by these men of sufficient wealth for their holders to be freed from daily cares. There are also men holding other offices who may be presumed to be of the same economic status. Indeed quite often they are the same men who held the league magistracies. The *engyonoi*, the sponsors for foreign *proxenoi*, will have had contacts with cities involved, no doubt of a commercial nature; some of the sponsors stood for several cities, implying operation of a considerable trade. The *hieromnemones* had to be able to travel to Delphi at least twice a year for meetings of the Amphiktyony. In 191 a considerable number of men from the Aitolian lands were found to have acquired property in Delphi. These are all men who were wealthy, and were prominent in both local and and league affairs; frequently their names occur in both these contexts. Thus, it is a reasonable conclu-

[48] Pol. 2.2.8. (Medeon) and 5.103.2-6 (Naupaktos).
[49] *IG* IX.1.179.

sion that the government of the league was in all essentials controlled by an oligarchy, a fairly large group of wealthy men, whose power was modified by the ratificatory process of the mass Assembly – of which they were also members, and which they could attend the more easily because of their wealth.

All these posts conveyed greater or lesser power to the men holding them, and many of the holders can be seen to be related to each other, or were from the same town. That is to say, those who occupied the offices of the state were from a relatively small group of families or from a fairly restricted group of cities: they were the Aitolian oligarchy[50].

The most important office, and the one for which we have the nearest to a comprehensive knowledge of its holders, was the annual *strategos*. Between 288 and 136 we know the names and origins of the holders for 115 of those years. (By contrast we know the names of only 32 *hipparchoi* and *grammateis* for that period.) Of those 115 *strategoi* thirty-two came from the city of Trichonos, seventeen from Kalydon, twelve from Arsinoe, nine each from Naupaktos and Kallion, and eight from Pleuron; a total of 87 from just six places. Add in seven from Stratos, five from Pholas, and four from Herakleia, and 102 out of 115 *strategoi* came from just nine places, leaving only thirteen from the rest of the league. Further, until the charmed circle of cities was broken by a *strategos* from the small town of Boukation in 216/215, only six places produced *strategoi* over the previous sixty years[51].

Further, twenty-two of the thirty-two Trichonian *strategoi* came from only four families; of the seventeen Kalydonians only three families account for twelve *strategoi*; from Kallion seven of the eight *strategoi* were in two families (actually just two men); from Pleuron all eight *strategoi* were members of the same family. And so on. Between 273 and 225, seven families accounted for 24 of the 31 known *strategoi*. Between 224 and 188, the period of the league's greatest power and activity, during its exhausting wars with Macedon, Achaia, and Rome, 23 out of 37 known *strategoi* came from just ten families. Between 187 and 136, out of 46 *strategoi* whose names

[50] The full detailed discussion of which this paragraph is the conclusion will be found in a companion volume to this study, *Aitolian Prosopographical Studies* in the section on 'Studies'.

[51] See appendix for the list and 'Origins' in *Prosopography*.

are known, 31 came from twelve families[52].

Several of these families occupied high positions in every generation between the Keltic invasion in 279 and the final expiry of the league records about the year 130. The Kalydonian families of the *strategoi* Lykopos I and Nikias can be traced from the 250s to the end of the second century and after – and this is only their visible activity: Lykopos I became *strategos* in 259 but he had surely been active politically for at least two decades before that to become well known enough to achieve election. Similarly two of the families from Naupaktos were politically active for a century in each case, and the family descended from Petalos of Pleuron is traceable for a good century as well. The Skopas/Dorimachos family of Trichonos was active, visibly – though the precise relationships within the family are not always clear – for five generations from 272/271 to 142/141 (that is, for the full extent of the surviving sources), and the descendants of Charixenos I can be seen to be politically active from 288/287 to 183/182; and these again are all minimum periods for the records are scarce before the acquisition of Delphi, and fade out after about 135, though the league continued for another generation at least after that.

The conclusion must be that the Aitolian League was not merely a working oligarchy with a ratificatory Assembly, but that throughout its effective life as an important power in Greece and in Hellenistic affairs, the league was dominated by a relatively small group of important families; that it was, in many respects, not merely an oligarchy, but an aristocracy, the members of which owed their positions of power as much to their inheritance and their family name as to their wealth and abilities.

The fact that the Aitolian magistrates came from the ranks of the wealthy is scarcely a surprise, nor is it unusual to find in any polity that the same families recur in the ranks of those magistrates over a fairly long period. It was not, however, wholly exclusive. Enough 'new men' rose to the senior positions to show that it was an 'open' aristocracy. And men could choose not to compete for office, yet still exercise influence and be employed in the public service. An example was Alexandros of Isios. In his day he was called, by Polybios, a contemporary, 'the richest man in Greece'[53], yet he came from a place so

[52] Cf. 'Aitolian Families', in the *Prosopography* for this and the following paragraphs.
[53] Pol. 21.20.9.

small that it cannot now be located. But this may be seen as an example of the workings of an oligarchic system, where election was not needed to give a man influence and a modicum of power.

Nor does this finding necessarily detract from the general power of the Aitolian Assembly. Yet the Assembly must not be seen as the engine of Aitolian policy. It met only twice a year, but these meetings appear to have been well attended – with one exception which shows that it was necessary to have a quorum for Assembly decrees to be binding[54]. Yet the fact remains that these Assembly meetings took decisions on war and peace, but on very little else. The meetings did not last long, perhaps a week at the most, and took place at the same time as games and fairs and festivals. Discussion certainly took place, in the usual Greek way, by means of speeches for and against, and decisions were made by majority voting[55].

In between the meetings of the Assembly, however, the oligarchs who were in office as magistrates and as councillors were the controllers of the polity, and they could perform acts which tended to pre-empt Assembly decisions. They could negotiate detailed peace terms, using the threat of a rejection by the Assembly as a means of modifying the offered terms[56]; they could carry on private warfare, with a view to committing the Assembly to a declaration of war at the next meeting[57]. The Assembly might not agree, but these intra-meeting activities were not illegal, nor were they apparently either condemned or even criticised. This is clear evidence that the Assembly was not feared by the magistrates, as the Athenian Assembly had been, for example; it would thus appear to have been a fairly docile institution, no doubt heavily under the management of the oligarchy.

[54] Pol. 20.10.1, though doubts are expressed by Larsen 'Assembly', 33, n.47.

[55] An early example is the decision to ally with Antigonos Monophthalamos as a result of the persuasion of Aristodemos at the Assembly; the minority went along with the decision (Diod. 19.66.2).

[56] As Phaineas did in 191 when faced with Glabrio's rough methods: Pol. 20.10.11

[57] See chapter 13.

10. AITOLIAN WEALTH

The casual assumption that Aitolia was a pirate-state, and its people addicted to an unusual degree to piracy by sea and brigandage by land has led to an equally casual assumption that these practices are the source of Aitolian wealth. I think I have disproved, in Chapter 2, the piracy and brigandage accusations, but it will be well to comment further on them, just in case the suspicion continues that such could be the source of wealth in a polity like the Aitolian League.

First, however, it is perhaps necessary to establish the fact of the wealth, and then to consider its possible sources. It is the case that Aitolia in the third century can be seen to be a relatively rich community, and as a state it was one of the two most powerful in Greece. By the end of that century one Aitolian was reputed to be 'the richest man in Greece', and worth two hundred talents. He and some companions were kidnapped and held by the Epeirotes, their ransoms put at five talents. These were later reduced to three talents[1]. At no time did any of these five men claim to be unable to pay the five talents, only that they *should* not. The tombs of the third century in Aitolia regularly yield items of gold buried with the dead[2]. The Aitolian state was fined five hundred talents after its defeat by Rome in 189[3], and that was after the land had yielded booty to the Roman commanders to the value of nearly thirty talents of gold and over 1900 talents of silver, plus gold crowns, statues, and unquantifiable amounts of private loot acquired by individual Roman soldiers and their generals[4]. This was, at least until it was looted, a rich society in ancient terms, with some men who were very rich, and a fairly wide spread of wealth through the population.

There is also considerable evidence for communal wealth as well

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[1] Pol 21.26.7-19.

[2] As examples note that British School at Athens *Archaeological Reports* of the 1980s list gold or other precious articles in third century tombs at Thermos, Gavalou, Kallion, Trichonos, Lithourni, and Angelokastro; the list could easily be extended, but this will make the point.

[3] Livy 38.9.9 and 11.8.

[4] I have calculated these figures already, in 'The Campaign of Cn. Manlius Vulso in Asia Minor', *Anatolian Studies* 45, 1995, 23-42, appendix, to which I may refer those wishing full documentation and calculations.

as the individual riches. It was during the third century that many of the urban centres developed. By the end of the century it was a land of towns and cities, so well fortified that the Roman army found great difficulties in essaying a conquest. It took Glabrio's legionary army more than three weeks to capture the city of Herakleia, not an especially large settlement, and prolonged sieges only failed to take Naupaktos and Amphissa. Where investigations at individual sites have been carried out there are repeated instances of building having taken place at that time[5]: at Oiniadai new baths and a theatre were built, and shipsheds and slipways have been dated to the Aitolian period (though the harbour works were by Philip V, according to Polybios); at Kalydon there were major extensions to the precinct of the temple of Apollo Laphria, and new city walls complete with elaborate gates; at Amphissa a powerful rampart was built enclosing the city and the acropolis, strong enough to defy Glabrio's army in the siege; new walls were constructed at Hypata; at Pleuron a whole new town was built on a new inland site after the old one was sacked, with walls stretching down to enclose a harbour. These are the most notable examples in an area which had not been well explored archaeologically. And at Thermos there were trophies and buildings, and new work on the temple.

But it was not only cities where building was done. Towns, even villages, were fortified[6]. Hill top refuges were available even in 320 when Antipatros and Krateros were foiled, and these were improved during the third century. Some places grew into cities. Kallion became Kallipolis, with walls and substantial buildings. Phystion gave itself new walls and a new temple of Aphrodite of Syria, of all deities to find in rural Aitolia. And more exploration will find more evidence.

All this building was expensive. The concentration of the work during the period of the league is clear on all of the sites in the area which have been investigated, even superficially. Such investigation is

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[5] The easiest reference, which I have used, is the *Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites*, ed. R. Stillwell, Princeton NJ., 1976; though it has some odd omissions, and some wrong-headed history, the archaeological summaries are sensible; see also annual archaeological summaries in BSA *Archaeological Reports*, and *BCH*, and D. Leekley and N. Efstratiou, *Archaeoogical Excavations in Central and Northern Greece*, Park Ridge, N.J., 1980.

[6] See on this P. Funke, 'Zur Datierung befestigter Stadtanlagen in Aitolien, Historisch-philologish Anmerkungen zu einem Wechselverhaltnis zwischen Fiedlungsstadter und politischer Organisation', *Boreas* 10, 1987, 87-96.

aided by the paucity of Roman remains, which in so many other areas are so obtrusive that they swamp the earlier remains. In Aitolia it is the third century Hellenistic work which obscures the earlier. This was a wealthy society, in which citizens did not begrudge contributions to their local cities, beautifying them, fitting them with amenities, fortifying them in the latest style.

The source of this wealth has been presumed to be at least in part piracy, but a moment's consideration suggests the fatal flaw in that idea. Piracy, being parasitic, is only very rarely a successful way even to individual wealth. Occasionally individuals may succeed, may gather gold and silver, and may use it to buy a country estate – Sir Francis Drake, for example – but the vast majority of pirates die young, by and of the violence they practice, of disease, or at a rope's end. The number of successful pirates, who lived to retire and enjoy their illicit wealth, is minimal. However, the matter is in a sense a diversion, for, as argued in Chapter 2, Aitolian piracy was a minor matter, no more important than piracy by the citizens of any other Greek state. If Aitolia had indeed become wealthy over more than a century by state piracy it would be unique in the history of the world[7]. It is better to consider alternatives.

Another possible source of wealth was the practice of Aitolian men enlisting as mercenaries in foreign armies. They are known in all the armies of the great kingdoms, in all ranks from private soldiers to commanding generals, all through the third century, though the numbers known by name are heavily biased towards those in Ptolemaic service, or in Attika, because of the survival of records on papyrus or in Attic inscriptions[8]. This seems, on the face of it, a more convincing source of wealth for Aitolia than piracy. Mercenaries are careful of their lives. They were well paid[9] and most of them were no doubt careful with their money as well. They had a reputation, reflected in

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[7] Perhaps the example in the minds of British histiorians was Drake and his fellows, whose piracies against Spain are supposed to have laid the foundations of English sea-power, wealth, and even the Industrial Revolution. These assumptions are wrong. On sea-power see now N. A. M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Seas*, London 1997, and K. Andrews, *English Privateering during the Spanish War, 1585-1603*, Cambridge 1964.

[8] A brief list is in G. T. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World*, Cambridge 1935, 245, to which should be added Aitolians in the service of the Seleukid kings; a prosopography is in M. Launey, *Recherches sur les Armées Hellénistiques*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1987, vol 2, 1131-1139.

[9] Griffith, *Mercenaries*, ch. 10.

the contemporary theatre, for being well-to-do[10]. They had gone for a soldier in order to be paid, after all. And many will have survived long enough to return home with their wealth. It is, of course, impossible to quantify any of this, but note the examples of Skopas, who was hired to command Ptolemy V's army in Palestine in 200-199[11], and of Theodotos and Panaitolos recorded in Antiochos III's service[12], the latter of whom was Aitolian *strategos* in 167/166[13]. Their examples will have been followed by more humble soldiers, such as the two young men in Demetrios Poliorketes' army in Syria in 285 who deserted to Seleukos Nikator[14]. Their action was typical of the self-preservation of mercenaries when faced by a certain defeat, and they knew they would be rewarded for their desertion. Aitolians are not in fact very prominent among known mercenaries for a long time, and they are certainly no more obvious than other Greeks. Only two are noted in Alexander's wars, for example[15]. The next we know of is Erymnon who in 306 was appointed by Agathokles of Syracuse as joint governor of the city while he was off on his African campaign[16]. Two decades later Pyrros of Epeiros had a contingent of Aitolians with him in his Italian campaign[17]. But none of these consisted of large numbers of soldiers. Pyrros' Aitolian contingent was brigaded with two others to make up one battle-unit, and so was probably only two or three hundred in number; others are not more than individuals: a gang of peltasts with Demetrios I[18], ten Aitolians with his son Antigonos Gonatas at the siege of Kassandreia[19]. The main mercenary market in the third century was Egypt, but there again only individuals are mentioned until the end of the century[20]. The one exception came in 203,

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[10] Soldiers portrayed in the New Comedy (e.g. Menander, *Perikeiromene*, Plautus, *Captivi*) are almost invariably well-off, but that is no doubt a funtion of the plot, not necessarily real life.

[11] Pol 13.2.3, for his rate of pay.

[12] Pol 5.61.3-5.

[13] *SGDI* 1728, 1783, 1854; Klaffenbach, *IG* IX, 1, 1, p. LII; *Prosopography*, 'Panaitolos (2)'.

[14] Plut, *Demetrios* 46.

[15] Arrian, *Anabasis* 3.16.2 (Glaukos) (omitted by Launey); 3.5.3 (Kykidas) (Launey 1135).

[16] Diod. 20.16.1 (omitted by Launey).

[17] Dionysios of Halikarnassos 20.1.

[18] Polyainos 4.9.2.

[19] Polyainos 4.6.18.

[20] Of the 103 Aitolians listed by Launey, including Lokrians, Malians and so on, 41 are noted in Egyptian records or Ptolemaic service in Cyprus, Samos, or elsewhere.

when Skopas recruited Aitolians among his force of 6,500 for service with Ptolemy V in his approaching war with Antiochos III[21], though not all of his recruits were Aitolians. This list cannot be said to imply that Aitolians were any more important as mercenaries than any other people, and, given the size of the state, they were probably a good deal less so.

Skopas' recruitment is in fact an important test for the notion of Aitolians as especially liable to mercenary service. Skopas was notably successful in his recruiting, so much so that the *strategos* intervened to stop him, since he was in danger of seriously depleting the military manpower resources of the league[22]. This in turn suggests that Skopas' recruiting was unusual in its large numbers, but also that large numbers of Aitolians did not normally enlist. Instead one may envisage a slow seepage of volunteers leaving home to seek their fortunes, and an even slower return of ex-soldiers. It also implies an early sensitivity in the Aitolian authorities to a sudden removal of men of military age, and this tends to confirm the relative smallness of the Aitolian armed forces[23].

The individual mercenary Aitolians we hear about are such men as Skopas, or Erymnon at Syracuse, or Theodotos and Panaitolos who commanded for Ptolemy IV, but who deserted him for Antiochos III; they operated as commanders of armies and governers of provinces, and commanders of garrisons. The private soldiers are all-but invisible except as anonymous groups, or on their gravestones. Nor do we know what became of even most of the general officers after their service ended, though in one case, that of Panaitolos, he founded a family which remained prominent for some decades[24]. It was these men, away from the firing line and often having moved to lucrative administrative positions, who were able to accumulate wealth, but the private soldiers would find it much more difficult.

Many mercenaries ended their service in death, of course. They were always the favourite assault troops for their employers, since by their deaths they would save those employers money, and by their success they would put themselves out of a job, and so relieve taxpayer

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[21] *Prosopography*, 'Skopas (3)'.

[22] Livy 31.43.5.

[23] See the next chapter (11), where a maximum of 12,000 men for the Aitolian army is suggested.

[24] *Prosopography*, 'Panaitolos (1)', and in 'Aitolian Ruling Families' under Phytaion.

subjects of a burden. And so many of the mercenaries, Aitolian or not, probably did not live long enough to retire, if that was their wish, and of those who did retire, only a minority probably went back to their homelands[25]. Even those who survived will have found that their employment was intermittent. It is even more unlikely that those who survived sent any money home. Mercenary pay was not large or regular enough – and it was probably often in arrears – and their employment was not constant enough to allow them to make any serious saving. On the balance of probabilities it is unlikely that the wages of mercenaries made much contribution to the increase in wealth in Aitolia in the Hellenistic period.

The assumptions that piracy and mercenary service were sources of wealth for the Aitolians may therefore be laid aside as misleading, since neither would be productive enough to make much difference to the whole country. Brigandage is a possibility, but again, it was not pursued often enough or on a large enough scale to be productive of much wealth. Organised, official, state warfare, however, was one method of enriching a victorious country: it was, after all, the source of Macedonian and Roman wealth.

Legitimate wartime targets undoubtedly provided the Aitolians with a certain degree of wealth, and, like all Greek states at war, their armies ravaged enemy territory, but this was not an economic system which could be relied on permanently – for the Aitolians were as often as not at peace, and particularly during the crucial period between 280 and 245 when the foundations of the land's wealth were laid. It must also be pointed out that Aitolia was not an aggressive state, and that much of its fighting was on a small scale and on its own territory. Not until 240, for example, was an Aitolian army in the Peloponnese, and not until 219 were Thessaly and Epeiros subjected to Aitolian raids. By then the society of Aitolia was already wealthy. Only in the raid into Lakonia in 240 is there serious evidence of large-scale loot, when it is said that 50,000 captives were led off to be sold as slaves[26]. One may doubt the figure, but not the fact. But this is the only example.

So piracy, brigandage, warfare, and mercenary service were not the source of Aitolia's third century wealth. But the raids by Philip V

[25] Several of those recorded from Egypt had actually settled there; cf. Launey, *Recherches*, 1131-1137.

[26] Plut. *Kleomenes*, 18.3.

on Thermos in 218 and again in 207 suggest a better source, for Polybios describes the place as full of corn for the fair and festival at the time of the Aitolian elections in September[27]. That is, a great market was created by the Assembly's meeting, one which would also attract merchants and visitors from the rest of Greece. The unfortified nature of Thermos demonstrates that the fair was a peaceful, law-abiding occasion, presided over and presumably adjudicated by the priests of the Thermos temple. It was a source, therefore, of wealth, in the same way as Delphi, where the festivals were of even greater renown and profitability. These activities were more dependable sources of wealth than any amount of casual raiding. The ports of the Corinthian Gulf were trading centres. The rise of the Aitolians was thus accompanied by, and was no doubt also in part the result of, the acquisition of wealth by commerce. And once a degree of wealth was present, it inevitably attracted still more wealth.

It is necessary to emphasise once again that the Aitolian state grew, for this is a fundamental fact of economic as well as political life. The original group of rural tribes which Demosthenes faced in 426 had become an organised league of both urban and rural elments by the time of Alexander the Great. It included numerous cities by 280, and the process of urbanisation continued, both in the sense of the growth of the existing cities and the development of new towns over the next hundred years. These cities were mainly on the coasts or close to them, or on well-used trade routes, particularly along the Gulf of Corinth, but there were other, smaller urban centres in formerly rural areas. The land was, that is to say, open to trade and the creation of wealth by that means. The control of Delphi was obviously a useful source of wealth, and there is an inscription which shows that many Aitolians acquired estates in the Delphian area, which they had to surrender when Delphi was once again detached in 189[28]. These people had had to become wealthy enough to make these purchases; their deprivation was a political act of the Roman conqueror, but there is no sign that the original acquisitions were political – that is, confiscatory.

The Aitolian system of *proxenoi* must reflect the commercial expan-

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[27] Pol. 5.7.4-9.

[28] P. Roussel, 'Delphes et l'Amphictionie après la guerre d'Aitolie', *BCH* 61, 1932, 1-36, and J.-P. Bousquet, 'Nouvelle Inscription de la base de M'. Acilius', *BCH* Supp IV, 1977, 125-136.

sion of the merchants of the league. This shows connections throughout Greece, as would be expected, with heavy concentrations on such cities as Corinth and Athens, commercial cities, and on those close to Aitolia, on the southern shore of the Corinthian Gulf, in Boiotia, and in Euboia. There was a good scattering of representations in cities round the Ionian Sea, and in a variety of places on the coasts and islands of the Aegean. Further off, contacts were much fewer, only occasionally with Alexandria or Syrian ports, never west of Sicily. That the contacts were not wholly political is demonstrated by the presence of Rome in the lists only once, in 272, where one might have expected that city to become more prominent as the third century drew on[29].

It is another sign of the increased importance of the league that Aitolian coins were produced for the first time after c.280[30]. The league was never a major producer of coins, presumably in part because it had no precious metal mines within its territory. Some of the component parts of the league had produced coins before they joined, and seem to have continued to do so even as members. Particularly the Opuntian Lokrian coins were reasonably prolific, but also the Ainianes, and perhaps Ambrakia and Amphilochian Argos minted small silver. But these coins were minted in even smaller quantities than those of the league, and are found only occasionally.

Judging from coin hoards found inside Aitolian territory, it was normal for more foreign-produced coins to be circulating within the league than Aitolian. There are in fact very few such hoards, and none of any size before c.200 BC[31]. But five hoards which can be dated about the end of the third century, the time of the last Macedonian and the Roman Wars, when Aitolia suffered invasions, provide a general overview. One hoard, from Amphissa, dated c.200, contained twelve Aitolian coins and about three hundred from elsewhere[32]; one from Makrokome in Ainis had four Aitolian and three Macedonian coins, and six other coins from six different mints,

[29] See maps III and V.

[30] The earliest coins show Aitolia sitting on Keltic shields, which dates them to after 278: *BMC* Thessaly to Aetolia, London 1883, 194-200.

[31] There are just three hoards dated earlier than 200 BC, two from Naupaktos with 'more than 5' and 'more than 2' coins (*IGCH* 174 and 196); the third is from Abai in Phokis (*IGCH* 195) which was Aitolian territory at the time, and included 65 coins; all these fit the pattern of those buried about 200 BC.

[32] *Coin Hoards* VIII 351.

ranging from Corinth to Rome[33]; the third is not precisely located, other than probably from Aitolia, and it is similar to that from Makrokome: five Macedonian and two or three Aitolian coins, and two from local cities[34]. These are all fairly small hoards. A hoard of a little later in date, but located only in 'western Greece', of c.190, is both larger and of different composition. It had forty to fifty Aitolian coins, and only four from four different mints[35]. The fifth, dated c.200 and unlocated except for being found in Greece, had 'a few' Aitolian coins and others from Athens and Elis[36].

Another group of six hoards are dated to the second quarter of the second century. One was similar in composition to that from 'western Greece' mentioned in the previous paragraph: it was from Naupaktos, dated 175-150, with 58 Aitolian coins and seven from Oitaia[37]. It seems reasonable to assume that these two were deposited by Aitolians who had deliberately collected local coins, perhaps even officials of the league. It may be presumed that taxes to be league were payable in local coin, perhaps with foreign coin discounted. It must have been foreign coin melted down which was the source of the silver for the Aitolian coinage[38].

The other, more mixed collections from the second quarter of the second century, have the appearance of reflecting the mix of coinage in actual circulation. This is certainly the presumption made about a major hoard found at Agrinion. It is dated to 146, but may be later. It contained the largest group of Aitolian coins in any hoard found in the country – 97 coins – but there were also over a thousand coins of the Achaian League, and others from Athens, Rome, the Euboian mints, and other places[39].

Three of the other hoards of this approximate date contained no

[33] *IGCH* 214.
[34] *IGCH* 208.
[35] *IGCH* 224.
[36] *IGCH* 197.
[37] *IGCH* 244.
[38] See R. P. Duncan-Jones, *Money and Government in the Roman Empire*, Cambridge 1994, ch. 5, for the interpretation of many hoards as 'official'; here it is only a suggestion, but these two hoards with only Aitolian coins are distinct from all the rest.
[39] M. Thompson, 'The Agrinion Hoard', *American Numismatic Society Notes and Monographs*, 159, New York 1968. The date is a problem because the Greek coins suggest a burial about 146, whereas the Roman coins imply a date about ten or fifteen years later. A variety of suggestions have been made to deal with this matter, the most obvious being a redating of the Roman coins.

Aitolian coins at all. From Oiantheia in Ozolian Lokris, but part of the Aitolian League at the date of burial, is a hoard of eleven Macedonian coins, dated to c.175-165[40]; from Kalydon a hoard dated to 168/167 had 35 coins from the cities of the Achaian League, and seventeen other pieces from various mints[41]; from Koniska, north east of Thermos, a hoard of c.150-140 had coins from a wide variety of mints, from Achaia, Euboia, and others, and one Ptolemaic coin[42]. This last hoard in particular was from a site which lay deep inside Aitolia; it must represent the coinage in circulation at the time it was buried. The other two could well be hoards brought into Aitolia from outside; they were, significantly, from coastal sites. The sixth of this group also suggests that it was a circulation hoard: it is from Stratos, and is dated to c.150: it had five Aitolian coins, and seven others from the Achaian League mints[43].

It may thus be concluded that the shortage of Aitolian coin was made up by the use of foreign coins, particularly Macedonian coins in the third century, and particularly Achaian coins after c.175. Apart from the Oiantheian hoard, there seem to be no Macedonian coins in hoards from within Aitolia after the end of the third century. And there are no Achaian coins in Aitolian hoards before c.175. This suggests governmental intervention. The coins of the great eastern monarchies of the Seleukids and the Ptolemies, and also the Attalids, are conspicuous by their almost total absence. From all the hoards from inside Aitolia, there are only three Ptolemaic coins (from two hoards), and only one Seleukid[44]. The absence of Athenian coin is also remarkable considering the large output from that city; an unknown number, but certainly small, in a hoard of c.200, and 39 in the great Agrinion hoard of 146 or later.

The conclusions to be drawn, rather tentatively, for this is intractable material, are that the quantity of coin minted in Aitolia was always small, that foreign coin made up the difference, and that coins from certain mints were carefully excluded. The absence of Achaian coins before c.175 is remarkable, considering that league's

[40] *IGCH* 238.
[41] *Coin Hoards* IV 54.
[42] *IGCH* 266.
[43] *IGCH* 251.
[44] *IGCH* 174, from Naupaktos, had two Ptolemaic and the single Seleukid; the other Ptolemaic coin was in the Koniska hoard (*IGCH* 251).

substantial production, and considering the longstanding contacts with the Achaian cities just across the Gulf of Corinth, and it would only have been accomplished by deliberate governmental decisions. The final conclusion to be drawn is that this evidence is very much at the mercy of discoveries: the small number of hoards from Aitolia does not necessarily reflect the paucity of coin, or the poverty of the land and its people, so much as the lack of exploration and excavation.

The coins produced were of only minor artistic merit. They showed a very limited range of images. The obverse type was usually a god or goddess: Herakles was the most popular, and others were Pallas, Artemis, and Atalante. The reverse tended to show the personified Aitolia armed and resting on a heap of enemy shields. The early types showed Keltic shields only, but later ones had a Macedonian shield included in the heap. Bronze coins show a boar, or a boar's jaw (from the Kalydonian boar of myth), Herakles' club, or a spear head[45]. The Herakles connection came not just from the Kalydonian boar but from Mount Oita, where a small temple commemorated the hero's death[46].

Aitolian coins are found outside Aitolia in even smaller quantities than within the league's territory. Two hoards, one from Delphi with 34 Aitolian coins out of 42[47], and one from an unknown location with 23 Aitolians out of 65[48], look very much like hoards from Aitolia; Delphi, of course, was effectively Aitolian during the third century – though the hoard is only vaguely dated to the second century. This hoard has an 'official' look to it, and five of the non-Aitolian coins are from lands of the league (Phokis and Lokris) if the hoard could be dated to c.220 rather than the 'second century'. In that case it would mirror almost exactly the hoards from 'western Greece' and Naupaktos discussed above.

Two other hoards, both from Achaia and both dated, significantly, to c.146, the date of the Roman sack of Corinth, have comparatively large numbers of Aitolian coins: one is from near Pellene, with 104

[45] *BMC* Thessaly to Aetolia, 194-200.

[46] Glabrio used a sacrifice at the temple as a ruse to get a force over the mountain in 191.

[47] *IGCH* 303.

[48] *IGCH* 453; the remaining coins were from the Achaian League (33) and Megalopolis (9); it is suggested that this may be part of *IGCH* 260 from 'western Greece'. The composition is not quite the same, however.

Aitolian coins out of nearly a thousand altogether[49]; the other is from near Aigion, with 63 Aitolians out of over three thousand coins[50]. Perhaps these were hoards which reflect the coinage in circulation in Achaia at the time, but they may also be official collections. Both were very large, and the contents heavily concentrated on local issues[51]. Comparing these two hoards with similarly dated ones in Aitolia, it can be seen that the coin circulating was more or less the same in both areas by this time. So the Aitolian area would seem to have become part of the general economic zone of southern Greece by about 150.

There are no other hoards which have more than seven Aitolian coins. Most examples (12 out of 21) have only a single coin. Even from areas geographically close to Aitolia – Zakynthos, Kephallenia, Akarnania, Achaia, Corinth – hoards even of large numbers of coins contain only odd Aitolian examples. It must be concluded that, not only did the Aitolians not produce many coins, but that the vast majority stayed within Aitolia. No doubt a good deal of self-selection went on, in that traders visiting Aitolia from elsewhere would choose to be paid in a more international currency, and Aitolians going abroad to trade would also be likely to take foreign coins with them. Mercenaries returning home would more than likely arrive with foreign-produced coins.

So coinage finds do not assist much in any discussion of the Aitolian economy. The relative paucity of hoards suggests that Aitolians did not feel much need to hide their wealth, except about the time of the Roman war, and in the time of the internal troubles in the 170s and 160s, but even then there are only a few hoards. Aitolian coinage did not leave the country of its manufacture in large numbers, though some did get across the Gulf of Corinth to the Achaian League, but not until the Aitolian League had faded to powerlessness. By that time, the mid-second century, the similarity of the composition of hoards in both countries suggests that circulation was producing a homogeneous mix of coins throughout the whole area.

The commerce of Aitolia could only develop seriously when Aitolia had access to the sea through important, developed ports, which is

[49] *IGCH* 261.
[50] *IGCH* 262.
[51] The Pellene hoards was over 82% local; that from Aigion 89% local. The difficult hoard *IGCH* 260 (see note 48) may be similar. It is dated to the same time and is 93% local; it also has 21 Aitolian coins, an unusually high number.

to say only once such places as Naupaktos and Oiniadai and Herakleia became part of the league. For it seems that Aitolian coins ceased being produced some time before the league itself came to an end, for no hoards after the mid-100s contain Aitolian coin[52]. But coin was not essential to the Greek economy, and the production of coin was not a necessary mark of a sovereign state. The general conclusion must be therefore that the existence of an Aitolian coinage between c.280 and c.150 implies a greater level of economic activity between those dates than either before 280 or after 150. This, for what it is worth, fits well enough with other indications.

Commerce was very largely conducted by sea. Given the costs of land transport, is only to be expected[53]. But Aitolia had by 280 gained control over one of the main land routes through Greece, the 'Great Isthmus Route', from the Malian Gulf at Herakleia and Lamia to the Corinthian Gulf at the Gulf of Kirrha – which also meant access to the sea at both ends of the route[54]. Control of such a route was an obvious source of revenue, more particularly when Aitolia was a neutral state during other states' wars, for the other side of collecting customs revenue and providing accommodation was to provide security and armed neutrality could do this. The Chremonidean War, with fighting in all the lands to north and east and south of Aitolia and on the Aegean, with Athens besieged and Corinth under repeated attack, would be a splendid opportunity for the Aitolians to profit by the transit trade.

It was commerce which will have been the source of the greater Aitolian individual fortunes, such as those possessed by the kidnap victims of 189. For the rest of the population, petty commerce in the towns and agriculture in the rural areas were their occupations and the source of such wealth as could be gathered. In Roman times the land was noted for its livestock, horses and cattle particularly, and arable agriculture was described as neglected[55]. Which is only to say

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[52] The latest hoard to contain an Aitolian coin is dated c.75 BC (*Coin Hoards* VIII 517, from north of Larisa in Thessaly). Otherwise the latest dated examples are c.140, though some second century hoards may be later.

[53] A. Burford, 'Heavy Transport in Classical Antiquity', *Economic History Review* 13, 1960-1961, 1-18.

[54] E. Kase et al., *The Great Isthmus Corridor Route, Explorations of the Phokis-Doris Expedition*, 1, Dubuque, Iowa, 1991.

[55] Paus. 8.24.11; Strabo 8.355; *Corpus Inscriptionem Latinarum* V 33937; T. Frank (ed.), *Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, 'Roman Greece', by J. A. O. Larsen, 259-498.

that the possibilities of agriculture were considerably greater than the actual practice at the time. The culling of the urban population to fill the Roman colonies at Nikopolis and Patrai[56] was partly responsible for the neglect, for arable crops had to have a market, and the obvious one was in the towns, both in Aitolian and overseas. Where a substantial urban population existed, as it did in league times, wealth existed also. The two went together, and the absence of one meant poverty for all but a very few.

Without any great surprise, therefore, the conclusion must be reached that the foundations of Aitolian wealth were agriculture and commerce, combined with the local security provided by the league, a peaceful polity, and the control of important ports and routes. Piracy, brigandage, looting in wartime, mercenary service, all provided their contributions to the communal wealth, but none was important in itself, and even cumulatively these sources were scarcely decisive. Similarly, none of them have ever been convincing as a means of personal enrichment, when compared with the more certain, if less spectacular, methods of trade and landownership, and, at a state level, successful conquest. The long period of peace achieved by the Aitolian League between 278 and 245 laid the foundations of the wealth of the area, and the deliberate promotion of trade, fairs, festivals, games, and such activities will have done the rest. Aitolia became wealthy by work, not by robbery.

[56] Strabo 10.2.1.

11. THE ARMED FORCES

The geographical size of the Aitolian League, and its wealth, lead to the presumption that it was a powerful state. Yet the real measure of a state's strength in the Hellenistic world was the size of its armed forces, and the efficiency with which those forces could be deployed and commanded. The efficiency of the Aitolian government seems clear enough, but some doubt must exist about its armed strength. This is partly due, as usual, to the sources available, but it is also due in a larger part, to the chosen methods of Aitolian warfare.

The fragmentary sources which are all that exist for the earlier periods of Aitolian history – down to the 220s – do contain references to Aitolian armies and ships, and to battles won and lost, but such vague terms are too indefinite for basing serious conclusions on. Polybios and Livy, who provide more detailed sources for the later period, also provide nice round numbers for armies and detachments. How accurate these are is a difficult matter, but it will be seen that they tend to be small, and it is easier to assume accuracy with small numbers than large. And it is sometimes possible to compare them with the numbers quoted for their enemies or their allies. Above all, it is likely that any distortion will have been the same for the armies of all states, so the figures will have a reasonable comparability. But it is the general and consistent smallness of the numbers which is the most significant fact.

Occasional figures are available for the early years. The Aitolian contingents at the occupation of Thermopylai in 322 is said to have been 7,000 men[1], which is equal, more or less, to the size of the contingent provided from Athens. This is thus not the total Aitolian available force, but an agreed equivalent force, and a year later they are credited with 10,000 men in defence against the Macedonian invasion[2], and a short time later they fielded 12,000 infantry and 400 cavalry[3]. The very variety of these figures carries a certain conviction.

None of these figures can be taken as the full military strength of the league at the time. First, only in one case are they said to have fielded

[1] Diod. 18.9.5.
[2] Diod. 18.24.2.
[3] Diod. 18.38.4.

their full force[4] and that is manifestly not correct, since it is stated in respect of the 7,000 men sent to Thermopylai, whereas a year later they had nearly double that number. The defence force against the Macedonian invasion is specifically said to be the men 'in the full vigour of manhood', which implies that older men were not called out, indeed 'the old' were said to have been evacuated to the hill-forts. The final figure cannot be accepted either, since it may well have included exiles driven from their homes by Antipatros' measures to install oligarchies[5]. It is also very odd that a force of cavalry should make a sudden appearance when it had been absent earlier. There is, that is, a degree of doubt that the 12,000 infantry and 400 cavalry was entirely Aitolian.

There is another factor to disturb these figures, one which recurs constantly in Aitolian history. In all cases in 323-321 the Aitolians were also concerned with other enemies than the one they are described as facing, in particular they had to be wary of the Akarnanians, and also the Epeirotes, either of whom might attack if the full Aitolian force was busy elsewhere. They therefore had to leave defence forces in place in the west to deter such an attack. The doubts and considerations over these figures therefore make it impossible to accept any one of them as the full Aitolian force. But they do provide a minimum and a range within which we may look. The most reliable figure is the 10,000 mustered to face the Macedonian attack – though a figure like '10,000' provokes suspicion in itself. This force was to face an invading army of 30,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry[6]. Since the Aitolians made no attempt to face it in the field, this force was clearly overwhelmingly strong. We may assume therefore that the Aitolian army was nowhere near that size, perhaps not half that. In 322, therefore, we may say that the total possible Aitolian muster was over 10,000 men, but not more than 15,000.

The next indication comes with the Keltic invasion of 278. The Aitolians sent 7,000 hoplites, 790 light infantry, and an unknown force of cavalry to Thermopylai[7], but other troops were clearly held at home to deal with any other invasion – as indeed did happen when the Kelts reached and sacked Kallion, and threatened Delphi[8]. There

[4] Diod. 18.11.1.
[5] Pol. 9.29.1 and 30.3.
[6] Diod. 18.24.1.
[7] Paus. 10.20.3.
[8] Paus. 10.22.3.

were also Aitolian troops in garrison at Herakleia[9], and so presumably in other Aitolian cities in the threatened area, such as Hypata.

By the time the Keltic attack came, the league was larger than it had been fifty years before, and had taken into itself several cities – Herakleia is an example – which would significantly supplement their forces. So in 278 the total possible military levy was clearly larger than that of 321. How much larger is impossible to say, but it must be recalled that Aitolia is a mountainous land, and even the areas into which the league expanded were by no means heavily populated. Dolopia, indeed, is one of the most thinly populated areas of Greece to this day[10]. Lokris and the Acheloos valley were richer, but none of the *poleis* in these areas was ever large, and in 278 neither Amphissa nor Stratos were in the league. In particular it seems unlikely that the cavalry numbers could be significantly increased without taking over richer agricultural areas, for the raising, feeding, and training of cavalry horses would require considerable resources, which, at least in the early years, Aitolia simply did not have.

The description of the Aitolian forces at Thermopylai introduces a new element to be considered. Pausanias divided the force into hoplites (7,000), light infantry (790), and cavalry (an unknown number). Earlier numbers had simply been of soldiers, and it is often assumed that the mountain-dwelling Aitolians were mainly light infantry, and that their method of warfare was essentially that of irregulars and guerillas. This, of course, is based on the defeat of Demosthenes' hoplites by the Aitolians in 426, on the defeat of Areus' Spartans in 280 by 'shepherds', and on the defeat of the Kelts after the sack of Kallion in 278.

The contingent at Thermopylai in 278, however, was mainly of hoplites and cavalry. This clearly reflects the recruitment of men in the urban areas and the arable lands, and in turn it reflects the enlargement of the league by the inclusion of Lokris and Oitia. Perhaps above all, though, it is the result of the selectivity of the sources in describing the exploits of the Aitolians. Each of the three defeats suffered by the invaders had been in mountain territory or close to it. We do not hear details of the capture of Herakleia, or of the Aitolian actions at Thermopylai in 323 and 278. And in the Macedonian

[9] Paus. 10.21.1.

[10] See the population distribution map (fig 42), in E. A. Walker, *The Mediterranean Lands*, London 1960.

invasion of 321 the Aitolians deliberately avoided battle because of their enemy's overwhelming numbers. But that is no reason to assume that they only had light forces. It seems only reasonable to presume that most of their army was composed in 323-321, as in 278, of hoplites.

From 278 onwards, the Aitolians remained at peace, and our sources had no opportunity to quote military numbers, though such an extended peaceful time would tend to increase the population pool from which soldiers were drawn. In 245 the Aitolian army defeated that of Boiotia, inflicting a thousand dead on the enemy[11], but the size of neither army is stated, nor are the Aitolian casualties known, though, being the winners, they were no doubt considerably less than a thousand. It is thought that the Boiotian military system was in decay at the time[12], and this is claimed as a reason for the defeat, but this scarcely helps with the Aitolian forces. Boiotia was traditionally thought to be hoplite country, and its army is quoted as 10,000 strong – once more, that convenient, if vague, figure[13]. Again, for the Peloponnesian campaign of 240, no numbers are quoted but the Aitolian raid on Pellene, in which 700 Aitolians are said to have been killed – but this is said by Aratos, who had an interest in exaggeration – was performed by no more than a detachment of the army[14].

Numbers of troops become more common and perhaps more reliable in the sources for the wars against Philip V, but Aitolian strategy was such that a clear estimate of their total forces is still not possible. There are several occasions when the full levy is described as being used – as at Medeon in 233[15], or in the Peloponnese in 221[16], but often this is simply not correct. In 219 Skopas is said, more plausibly, to have taken 'half the Aitolian forces', on the raid to Dion[17], and at

[11] Plut. *Aratos* 16.1.

[12] P. Roesch, 'Les lois fédérales béotiennes', *Teiresias* Supp 1. 1972, 66-68.

[13] They produced an army of this size at Thermopylai in 278: Paus 10.20.3.

[14] Plut. *Aratos* 32.3.

[15] Pol. 2.2.1-3.8, saying the Aitolians used 'all their forces' and that 'many' were killed and 'more' captured; but all this is far too vague to be reliable. They were defeated by the Illyrians, who are said to have been 5,000 strong, together with the Medeonites, whom they were besieging.

[16] Pol. 4.6.7-12: 'the whole of the Aitolian force' were used in Messenia, a quite unbelievable statement.

[17] Pol. 4.62.1-5; Skopas would not leave the homeland undefended, hence the 'half'; there eere also other Aitolian forces elsewhere: perhaps what Polybios meant was 'half of the *available* Aitolian forces'.

the Naupaktos confrontation in 217 the full force of the league is said to have been present[18]. But such phrases are so vague as to be meaningless, and anyway no even partway plausible numbers are quoted.

It was much more usual for the league to use fairly small groups of soldiers, sometimes reinforced by the addition of mercenaries[19], and often despatched in order to reinforce an allied force. This was especially a notable practice in the Second Macedonian War (220-217), presumably in part because, having enemies on all sides, most of the Aitolian soldiers were needed for home defence in case of invasion. So the Aigeira raid in 220 was made by 1,200 Aitolians[20], and 600 were sent to Elis the next year under Phillidas to join 500 mercenaries paid by Elis, 1,000 Eleian citizen soldiers, and a group of Tarentines (light horsemen) to form a combined force[21]. The contribution of this small contingent gave the Aitolians the local command, even when they were serving in Elis. There were also garrisons in the frontier towns and cities. They are known at Ambrakos[22], where it was 500 strong, and Phoitiai[23] during Philip's campaign in 219, and he also faced others at Matropolis and Oiniadai, and at the smaller places he took at the time[24]. These garrisons would seem to be separate from, or perhaps supplementary to, the normal citizen defence force in each place, part of which would be mustered into the field force, from which the small detachments were made. A garrison, described as 'freebooters' by Polybios, held Phigaleia to its Aitolian alliance and raided into Messenia until Philip's Triphylian campaign in 218[25]. These were all relatively small groups – 500 at Ambrakos, perhaps 400 at Phigaleia – and it would seem that another aspect of Aitolian strategy was a strong reliance on fortifications for their defence.

These garrisons are only known about because they were attacked by Philip. He had arrived in the area after an approach through Epeiros and after the siege of Ambrakos which lasted for some time.

[18] Pol. 5.103.2 and 6; this, for once, is believable, but there were also other troops scattered in garrisons.
[19] A much rarer prectice than with other states – see later in this chapter.
[20] Pol. 4.57.1-58.11.
[21] Pol. 4.77.7.
[22] Pol. 4.63.1.
[23] Pol. 4.67.7-10.
[24] Pol. 4.64.4-5.
[25] Pol. 4.79.5-8.

It is thus not possible to say that these garrisons were installed when Philip was seen to be a threat to the area, or whether they were permanent, and just happened to be in his line of march. The garrison of Ambrakos was certainly there when he arrived, and it seems likely that this was a regular force. The other places were on the border with Akarnania, an enemy, so they are likely to have been garrisoned at least in wartime.

In addition there are mentions, during Polybios' account of Philip V's campaign, of small relieving forces. A detachment of 500 men was caught and defeated by Philip near Phoitiai[26]. As he marched south towards Oiniadai he was shadowed by a 'a body of Aitolian cavalry' which was too weak to oppose his crossing of the Acheloos near Konope[27]. It will be seen that the total cavalry available in Aitolia never exceeded 500, so their failure to oppose the whole of Philip's army is not very surprising.

These small forces, in detachments and garrisons, make it clear that Aitolia's manpower resources were being stretched very severely in this war. Mercenaries were hired to reinforce the main army, and were usually brigaded with an Aitolian force. They appear in Aitolia's service after Philip's march along the Acheloos valley in 219, which caused significant Aitolian casualties, usually wthout a specific number being quoted. Euripidas had mercenaries in his force in Elis in the winter of 219, though it is not stated who paid for them; he was operating as *strategos* of Elis at the time, and so presumably Elis footed the bill[28]. Phillidas had more mercenaries in the same area later[29], who are said to have been 500 strong, and one group identified as Cretans hired by the Spartans[30]. The Aitolians had hired a thousand mercenaries from Knossos the year before[31], and of these half were sent from Aitolia to help out in Elis in 219. These were the only group which had been hired directly by the Aitolians[32]. All this seems to have been an emergency measure, however. This last group was the only one which appears to have been in direct Aitolian employ, and is probably the same force which appears a year later in garrison

[26] Pol. 4.63.9-10.
[27] Pol. 4.64.5-7.
[28] Pol. 4.68.1-69.8.
[29] Pol. 4.77.7.
[30] Pol. 4.80.1-8.
[31] Pol. 4.55.16.
[32] Pol. 5.3.1.

at Stratos[33]. The others seem to have been hired by Aitolian allies. There is no other example of the Aitolians employing mercenaries – ironically in view of the employment by others of Aitolians in that capacity.

The basic pattern of Aitolian military action all through the Macedonian wars and the Roman war was to rely on their fortifications, stand sieges where possible, and attack the enemy by raids when the chance appeared. Weaker allies of the main enemy were attacked by detachments and by Aitolian allies as a means of distracting attention. It worked against Philip for some years; it did not work against the Romans nearly so well. Only very occasionally is there any indication that a full call-out of the Aitolian army was made; instead the normal action was to use relatively small forces in a defensive role, or in offensive raids. The largest force deployed in the wars against Philip – apart from the full levy – was 3,000 men who were gathered to harass the retirement of Philip's army from Thermos in 218[34]; when he got to Stratos on his retreat another force totalling 3,900 was in that city, presumably gathered since he had passed on the way to Thermos (3,000 Aitolian foot, 400 horse, and 500 Cretan mercenaries)[35]; these then are two separate forces, a total of 6,400 Aitolians and 500 mercenaries. Therefore, since Skopas had taken 'half the Aitolian forces' on his raid into Thessaly, it follows that the Aitolians disposed of at least 14,000 men at that time – assuming near-accuracy in Polybios' 'half'. Yet not all of them were employed in these three ventures, for there were clearly other forces in other parts of the league territory. The 3,000 who pursued Philip's army were gathered locally in response to the attack; there were also other similar groups available in other areas.

The 14,000 will therefore be the Aitolian field army, the force with which the league could attack the enemy, but it was only very rarely that it could be gathered. Aitolia's geographical situation made a constant guard on all borders necessary. But there was also a reserve available, in the form of trained men not mustered for the main force, who were dispersed in garrisons or who were veterans, men who had served their time. Yet neither of these groups was normally available for service even inside the league's boundaries, and never outside.

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[33] Pol. 5.5.14.1-6.
[34] Pol. 5.13.3-7.

This Second Macedonian War saw much fighting by the Aitolians, but largely by these small units. Polybios figures show a total of at least 2,700 men killed, and over 1,300 captured[35]. The prisoners' fate is not always clear, though the garrison of Phthiotic Thebes was sold into slavery[36]. The casualties are not substantial when considered against the losses in the contemporary Italian, Spanish, and Sicilian fighting of the Hannibalic War, but with a probable field force of 14,000 as a maximum, the loss of at least 2,700 men was bad indeed – a lost of about one fifth of the league's military manpower. It is perhaps this cost which finally persuaded the league to make peace in 217.

The pattern of that war was repeated, but more unpleasantly, in the next, the third Macedonian (211-206). There was an early outing of 'all the men of military age' against the Akarnanians[37], but most of the other fighting was done by garrisons or detachments. There are garrisons noted at Echinos, Lamia, and Thermopylai at least[38]. The heavy concentration of fighting on the shores of the Malian Gulf ensures that we are informed of these, just as those in the Acheloos valley were noted in the earlier war; it seems reasonable to assume that these garrisons existed in both wars. This fighting was a resumption of Philip's determined attack on Phthiotic Thebes at the end of the previous war, the loss of which was perhaps the defeat which broke the Aitolians' spirits. It worked again. He captured Echinos, with all its garrison, and defeated an Aitolian relief force[39]. Advancing towards Lamia he fought 'the Aitolians' in two battles at Phalara, which cost them 2,000 dead[40]. This Aitolian force must have been the main field army, not a detachment; Philip was using a major force. A year later the allied force in Elis, Aitolians, Romans, and Eleians, was 4,000 strong[41]. This is the last mention of Aitolian forces in this war, and their effective retirement from the fighting may be, at least in part, the result of those heavy losses at Phalara.

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[35] Pol. 5.14.1-6.

[36] Most of 1,200 killed at Aigeira (Pol. 4.57.1-58.11); most of 500 killed or captured at Phoitiai (Pol. 4.63.9-10); 700 killed and 1,200 captured at Apelauros (Pol. 4.68.1-69.8); 130 killed and about the same captured at Thermos in the pursuit of Philip (Pol. 5.13.3-7); 100 cavalry killed (Pol. 5.14.1-6); 100 captured at Pharnakos (Pol. 5.96.6-7).

[37] Pol. 5.99.1-100.8.

[38] Pol. 9.41.1-10 (siege of Echinos); Livy 27.30.3 (Lamia); Livy 28.5.8 and Pol. 10.41.5 (Thermopylai).

[39] Pol. 9.41.1 (Echinos).

[40] Pol. 9.41.1-42.4.

[41] Livy 27.32.2.

In the Fourth Macedonian War, the Romans were able to concentrate fully on the Macedonian enemy and it was their forces which did most of the fighting. Aitolian forces took part in the Thessalian campaigns, but only in relatively small numbers. A force of 600 suffered casualties, killed and captured, in Thessaly in 197[42], and Aitolian forces are recorded, but not counted, in the same area next year[43]. In 197 the force was 6,000 foot and 400 horse[44]. It joined the Roman army at Xyniai, and later a force of 2,000 foot and 500 horse are mentioned[45], and these presumably detached from the original Xyniai troops, with cavalry brought up to full strength. Polybios makes an interesting comment on these, however, praising the quality of the cavalry as the best in Greece – for Polybios this is praise indeed – but he denigrates the infantry as much below the normal Greek standard[46]. This is more a social comment than a military one, however, and will be taken up later[47]. It may also account for the small forces deployed by the Aitolians in this war, if their infantry was of poor quality. In terms of actual numbers, never more than the 6,400 who joined at Xyniai are mentioned, though, again, there were undoubtedly garrison forces as well – one was noted at Thaumakoi, for instance[48]. But it is clear that the Romans were disappointed with the Aitolian forces; the strident Aitolian claims to have won the Kynoskephalai battle may have been a guilty conscience operating.

If there is any period when it should be possible to discern Aitolian military strength it is the Roman War, when the league was under serious attack. And, indeed, the Roman War (192-189) saw much more, and much more intensive, fighting by the Aitolians, than any of their other wars. Yet at no time is there a clear indication of Aitolian numbers. In the three exploits in 192 against Demetrias, Sparta, and Chalkis, a total of 3,000 foot and 230 cavalry are listed, but for Demetrias it is said that 'all the cavalry' were present, which cannot be correct, since 230 were elsewhere[49]. Later, forces of a similar size are

[42] Livy 31.41.1.
[43] Livy 32.13.10-15, referring only to 'the Aitolians'.
[44] Livy 33.3.6-7 says 600 infantry; Plut, *Flamininus* 7.2. has the correct figure.
[45] Livy 33.7.7; Pol. 18.21.5.
[46] Pol. 18.24.4-5.
[47] See chapters 17 and 22.
[48] Livy 32.4.1-2.
[49] Livy 35.34.9 (Demetrias); 35.35.4 (Sparta); 35.37.7 (Chalkis).

reported: 3,000 foot and 200 cavalry in Thessaly[50], 4,000 infantry at Thermopylai[51], the larger part of whom were killed or captured; 2,000 troops detached to assist Ambrakia in 189[52]. The Ambrakian siege brought a full muster of the Aitolian army, which was used in Akarnania[53], and from which detachments were made, into Ambrakia and to block the Illyrian raids on the coast[54]. The full force, however, was carefully not committed against the Roman army, but was used against Roman allies such as the Akarnanians, and to push the Macedonians under Perseus out of Amphilochia[55] and Athamania[56]. It had clearly become a regular pattern for the Aitolians not to risk their whole force. And the stubborn defences of Herakleia, Lamia, Hypata, Naupaktos, Amphissa, and Ambrakia against heavy Roman attacks, always with overwhelming numbers, testify to the power of their fortifications; and only Herakleia and Lamia were lost by conquest.

The obvious reason for not employing one's whole army is that it is likely to be beaten. In the Second Macedonian War, the Aitolians very carefully directed their army, when it was wholly assembled, in directions where Philip and his army of Macedonians soldiers were not – Skopas went to Dion when Philip was in Epeiros, and later, when Philip had returned to Macedon, Dorimachos raided Epeiros. When Philip marched and fought his way down the Acheloos valley in 219, capturing several Aitolian towns and cities, and even when he was ravaging the lands of Kalydon, no major Aitolian force turned out to face him. When finally Philip adopted the winning strategy of attacking Aitolian Thessaly at Phthiotic Thebes, even then the Aitolians did not turn out to face him.

In the Third Macedonian War (211-206), again, the Aitolians were extremely wary of facing Philip's army. On the one occasion when they did, outside Lamia after his conquest of Echinos, they suffered heavy casualties – 1,000 dead in each of two fights – and then returned to their strategy of holding fortified cities, even at the cost of letting Philip get through Thermopylai to make a serious attempt to reopen the central Greek route to the south.

[50] Livy 36.10.5.
[51] Livy 36.16.3.
[52] Pol. 21.27.7 and Livy 38.4.8 and 5.6.
[53] Livy 38.4.10.
[54] Livy 38.7.3.
[55] Pol. 21.25.3-6.
[56] Livy 38.2.4.

The largest single force at this period which may be Aitolian is in fact one of mercenaries recruited by Skopas for service with Ptolemy V in the Fifth Syrian War (202-196)[57]. It is, however, not wholly clear if the troops he recruited were entirely Aitolian, or, more likely, a mixed group. The league authorities certainly stopped him from recruiting after a time, on the grounds that he was draining the country of fighting men, but that does not mean that he had recruited solely Aitolian troops. Livy says he took 6,000 foot and 500 horse to Egypt; later Polybios refers to 'the Aitolians' and 'the Aitolian cavalry' in the battle at Panion[58], but this is unspecific, and it will not do to equate the two groups. It may be Polybios' shorthand for Skopas' force. Certainly Aitolians are known to have served as mercenaries, but then so are all other Greeks; to point to them as particularly notable as mercenaries is only to say that in the third century BC the Aitolian League was the largest Greek state.

If the quantity of soldiers produced in Aitolia is uncertain, the *naval* strength of the league is almost invisible. In fact, it is almost justifable to describe it as non-existent. When Skopas and Dorimachos wanted to transport their troops to Elis, they used the regular ferry boats, supplemented by Kephallenian ships[59]. The raid on Kynaitha with Skerdilaidas was carried to Achaia in the Illyrian's ships[60]. The joint naval defence of Epeiros in 230 sailed in Achaian ships, though Aitolian soldiers were carried as marines[61]. Thoas' expedition against Chalkis sailed along the Euripos in cargo-ships[62]. There is just one case of Aitolian naval vessels being mentioned. In 217 the Achaians and the Macedonians began a series of raids across the Gulf of Corinth; at one point they were opposed by two 'warships' and a 'galley' of the Aitolians, all of which were captured[63]. This sounds like a final desperate attempt to intercept these raids. Nearly thirty years later, in the same area, a Roman and Illyrian fleet was also raiding. This time a force of a thousand Aitolians was sent to march along the coast to intercept the raids if and when they were to land[64]. There

[57] Livy 31.43.5.
[58] Pol. 16.18.8 and 19.1 and 4.
[59] Pol. 4.16.8.
[60] Pol. 4.16.9.
[61] Pol. 2.9.8-10.9.
[62] Livy 35.37.7.
[63] Pol. 5.94.8-9.
[64] Livy 38.7.3.

was, it is clear, no provision for naval defence. These examples make it clear that the Aitolians did not have any naval strength to speak of. (In passing, this is of course very odd for a state reported to be addicted to piracy.)

As to land forces, the highest number of soldiers recorded was the force of 12,000 foot and 400 horse in 321, though that was not necessarily wholly Aitolian. A century later there could have been more, though casualties in the wars between 220 and 189 were heavy. It is noticeable, however, that never more than 500 cavalry are ever mentioned[65]. Although the infantry forces are said, at Kynoskephalai, to be less than satisfactory in quality, the cavalry apparently maintained their training and their numbers. In the Romans' auxiliary forces in the last Macedonian war, against King Perseus, the Aitolian contribution was 500 cavalry. This is described by Livy as 'the total force of the whole league'. There were blamed for a Roman defeat, probably unjustly[66]. Two years later a hundred of the cavalry were part of a force which was sent to prevent a Macedonian attack on Stratos. So some of them at least returned home[67].

This is the last mention of the Aitolian armed forces, except for their participation in the massacre of Aitolians in 167. From then on there is no sign that the Aitolians had any military power: the league stayed out of the final Greek cataclysm in 146. But in effect, 189 marked the end of Aitolian military strength, for it would seem that from then on, or perhaps even earlier, the infantry declined in quality as well as quantity. The number of foot soldiers may perhaps have reached 15,000 at times, though that number was never actually mustered in one place, so far as can be seen. With such long land frontiers, this is not surprising, and many troops were spread through the fortifications of the league at all times. After 189 there is no indication that the army mustered again.

The Aitolian method of warfare was clearly the result of this paucity of military manpower. Each community was fortified, and garrisoned, and the better the fortifications, the smaller the required garrison. But garrisons always absorb large numbers – only thirty places

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[65] 400 at Stratos in 218, of whom 100 were killed (Pol. 5.14.1-6); 400 in Thessaly in 197 (Livy 33.3.6 and 9); 500 at Kynoskephalai (Livy 33.7.3; Pol. 18.21.5), at Ambrakia in 189 (Pol. 21.27.7), and in Thessaly in 171 (Livy 42.55.9). Smaller cavalry forces are also occasionally mentioned, but never more than 500.

[66] Livy 41.55.9.

[67] Livy 43.22.4.

with 500 men each, the garrison of Ambrakos, would have accounted for the full Aitolian army. And when the numbers of Aitolian troops dropped, defence would become impossible. The casualties suffered during the wars against Philip V – over 2,700 in 220-217, well over 2,000 in 211-206 – and against the Romans, very seriously depleted Aitolian manpower. The cavalry was able to maintain its numbers because it was made up of wealthy men, and a cavalry force of 500 was quite possible. But the infantry, the hoplites, could not be replaced so easily. With territory lost in 189 on top of the casualties of the previous thirty years, the power of the Aitolian League was destroyed.

PART FOUR

THE MACEDONIAN WARS

12. THE FIRST MACEDONIAN WAR (THE WAR OF DEMETRIOS) (238-228)

In the whole two centuries of the Hellenistic period in Greece, say, from 360 to 146 BC, the reign of Antigonos Gonatas in Macedon (276-239) is an aberration when one considers Aitolo-Macedonian relations. Frequent outbreaks of hostility in the period of Philip, Alexander, and the Diadochoi, and equally frequent wars after 238, have the appearance of the 'normal' condition of affairs, and this has certainly affected modern studies, where hostility between Aitolian and Macedon is often presumed to be a constant[1]. The reign of Gonatas is, by contrast with this perception, a period of an apparent absence of hostility.

This episode of peaceful relations is all the more surprising in that the Aitolians had taken advantage of the Macedonian weakness in the decade after the Keltic invasions to advance their border northwards, partly at the expense of Macedon. Dolopia and Malis were both lands to which Antigonos as king of Macedon could have made a colourable claim, and Aitolian control of Thermopylai was an interruption of the easiest land route between Macedon and the Macedonian garrisons in central Greece at the Peiraios and Corinth. Given these Aitolian gains, it would appear that the absence of any detectable hostility involving Macedon and Aitolia between 280 and 239 must be put down very largely to the restraint exercised by Gonatas. Yet Aitolia was also in part responsible – it takes two to make a peace, just as it does a war. All the indications are that the league was a satiated power in that period, making no more attempts at expansion, at least not in a northerly direction. There are, in fact, no indications of Aitolian involvement in wars anywhere in that period, not even defensive wars.

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[1] Cary, *Greek World*, 147, refers to them as, after 239, 'habitual enemies'; Walbank, *CAH* VII (2), describes the Aitolians as exploiting 'the years of Macedonian anarchy' (p.236), as being able 'to threaten Macedonian communications' (242), even though Antigonos Gonatas had been 'patient and unprovocative' towards Aitolia (255); the whole amounts to an implicit advance condemnation of Aitolia for presuming to fight against Macedon; the implication is that Aitolia always operated in an underhand way against the staunch, upstanding Macedonians.

If this is the case then it follows that the resumption of hostile relations which occurred in the reign of Demetrios II (239-229) and which continued with few breaks until 189, must be in large part due to the policy of Demetrios himself and the later Macedonian kings, and not to that of Aitolia. And once hostile relations had been established, it was, of course, extremely difficult to remove that hostility. Peace is always a more difficult policy to pursue than war. But it is not enough to blame Demetrios II alone, for he was an experienced ruler, possibly having been his father's co-ruler for two decades and certainly having administrative experience. He understood and participated in his father's policy over that period, obediently marrying and divorcing in accordance with his father's wishes, leading the Macedonian army in battle, and no doubt counselling, judging, and celebrating as all Macedonian rulers had to do[2]. He was in his mid-thirties when he became sole king, a mature and experienced ruler and politician[3]. And yet, despite all this, within only a few years of his accession as sole king his kingdom was involved in a war against many of the states of Greece, including the Aitolians. How this came about is the initial problem in considering the war's events.

Even before the outbreak of that war, however, the order of events, as ever, must be determined. Antigonos died early in 239, probably in the spring, and Demetrios succeeded him as sole king peacefully and without any fuss[4]. In May of that same year Aratos of Sikyon became Achaian *strategos* for the fourth time: there is a lack of specific information about his doings during that term of office[5], and this may in part be put down in part to uncertainty about the intentions of the new Macedonian king, and partly also to the need for the Achaians to keep alert to the Aitolian activities in the Peloponnese – Timaios was Aitolian *strategos* until September of 239, and most of his campaigning in the Peloponnese will have taken place during the war-season of that year.

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[2] Demetrios' earlier career is summarised in *RE* IV, 2792-2793; cf. Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas*, 304, 348, 369-372, 383, 433-435.

[3] He was born about 274, and so was about 35 at his accession; the birth year is worked out from his age being 'about 12 or 13' in 261; he was old enough to be regent for his father in Macedon in c.257 (Justin 36.2.9; *SEG* XII 314; Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas*, 304, note 83).

[4] Assumed from the lack of evidence to the contrary; cf. N. G. L. Hammond, *The Macedonian State*, Oxford 1989, 317, as an example.

[5] Walbank, *Aratos*, includes only the alliance with Aitolia in this strategy, on p. 57, but this itself is misdated.

The next firmly dated event is the arrival of Demetrios with an army in Boiotia[6]. 'Firmly dated' is something of an exaggeration, but the indications are that this occurred in 236 or possibly 237. The problem with this date is that it is generally derived from information extracted from Attic inscriptions, which are themselves only very insecurely dated[7]. But on general grounds 236 is the best year. One of the results of his invasion of Boiotia – if that is what it was, for he may have moved in by invitation – was the loss of the city of Opous in Lokris by the Aitolian League. The city was still Aitolian in 237[8], so it seems, which implies that Demetrios must have arrived later than that. The Attic evidence refers to a year in which war began, which is dated in the usual way by the name of the Athenian city *archon*, but the order of Attic archons is highly uncertain for this period, and each reconstruction differs from the next, and all are dubious. It is best to rely on the evidence about Opous, rather than Attika.

The war between Macedon and Aitolia therefore began in 236, or just possibly the year before. This dating requires a change in the explanation for the cause of the war, which has usually been seen as beginning as a consequence of the crisis caused by the death of Alexander II of Epeiros[9]. When this was dated to about the same time as that of Antigonos Gonatas (about 240), the linkage was irresistible, but it has been shown in a previous chapter that Alexander had died some years before. Therefore Demetrios was not responding to an Aitolian-provoked crisis in Akarnania by commencing the war, as is usually stated. It follows that some other cause must be searched for, hence the need to determine the sequence and dating of events. If Demetrios was only beginning his war in 236 (or perhaps 237) it was not the direct result of either king's accession or death, but it was caused by problems which had developed since Demetrios' accession.

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[6] Pol. 20.5.3; Feyel, *Polybe*, 83-105.

[7] See W. B. Dinsmoor, *The Archons of Athens*, Cambridge, Mass, 1931, modified by R. D. Merritt, 'Athenian Archons 347/6-247/6 BC', *Historia* 26, 1977, 163-191, and C. Habicht, *Untersuchungen zur politischen Geschichte Athen in 3 Jahrhundert v. Chr.*, Vestigia 30, Munich 1979, ch 9, for the arguments. The dating of any particular *archon* may vary by up to three or four years, and this will affect almost every event in Greece, so fundamental is Athenian dating.

[8] R. Etienne and D. Knoepfler, *Hyettos de Béotie et la chronologie des archontes fédéraux béotiens*, Paris 1976, 331-337; Will, *Histoire Politique*, 348-349.

[9] As by Walbank *CAH* VII, 1 (2), 446-447.

The obvious problem Demetrios faced in Greece was the continuing efforts of the Achaian League, under the leadership of Aratos, to expand its control over its neighbours. Attacks were mounted on a more or less regular basis against Attika and Argos from 240 onwards. Macedon had a long and well-established interest in both cities, attested above all by a series of garrisons in various forts and towns in Attika. The Athenian government was in the hands of friends of Macedon – the alternative was a heavier Macedonian presence – and so Aratos' attacks on Attika were of direct concern to Demetrios[10].

Demetrios was clearly hampered by the fact that Aitolian power lay across his landward path to Attika. However, he did still control Chalkis in Euboia, and thus dominated the whole island, and also, with the city, the fortified area on the Boiotian mainland, Salganeus[11]. This gave him a pathway from his own territory in the Gulf of Pagasai as far as Salganeus, only thirty kilometres from Attika[12]. It appears, from an inscription found at the Athenian fort at Rhamnous, that the local shepherds were able to move their flocks into Euboia to protect them against raids[13]. These raids are thought to have been Aitolian[14], but they are much more likely to have been Achaian – there is no reason for Aitolians to raid Attika, so long as one may dismiss the piracy angle; the use of Euboia as a refuge, is, however, a clear sign that Demetrios and Athens were operating as allies.

In all this there is only one item which involved the Aitolians, a raid by Boukris of Naupaktos on Attika, from the sea, in which some Athenians were kidnapped into slavery. Our knowledge, in fact, comes from an Attic inscription[15], once again, in which a Cretan is thanked for interceding to ransom the captives. But the inscription dates from after 228, when the embassy took place, and the raid by

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[10] Plut. *Aratos*, 33-34; Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, 200-201; Walbank, *Aratos*, 57-58.

[11] J. Pouilloux, *La Forteresse de Rhamnonte*, Paris 1954, 103-104.

[12] J. A. O. Larsen, 'Phokis in the Social War, 220-217 BC', *Classical Philology* 19, 1965, 116-128, has argued that Euboia could not be the route because of a lack of roads connecting the north of the island with Chalkis; but the island in Macedonian hands did provide a favourable sea route along the Euripos. The need for a landing place in Boiotia was probably the reason for the seizure of Opous.

[13] Pouilloux, *Rhamnonte*, 21 and 129-132.

[14] No-one knows, and the coastal situation of Rhamnous encouraged the attribution to seaborne raids, but, apart from a single raid by Boukris of Naupaktos, the only raids into Attika known are by the Achaians.

[15] *Syll* (3) 535 (= Austin 88).

Boukris took place some years earlier, but cannot be dated precisely. There is no indication that Aitolia was involved in any war in central Greece before Demetrios' move south in 236 (or 237).

Demetrios' first public move in connection with the war may well have been a treaty whose terms are recorded in a fragmentary inscription from Gortyn in Crete[16]. It is dated to Demetrios' third year (and so after the spring of 237) and provides for an agreement between the two states, and the implication is that the king was hiring Cretan mercenary soldiers (though this is not actually stated in the document), for this was the usual reason for treaties with Cretan cities. Even if he was, however, it is not a clear indication that the war had already begun, for Demetrios may have made the agreement in preparation for the war, or indeed without any intention of going to war at all. In fact, the first *overt* action which shows that Macedon was actually involved in the fighting was the arrival of Demetrios in Boiotia with a Macedonian army in 236.

The Boiotian League had been an ally of Aitolia's since its defeat in 245, but the league's foreign policy alignment was, as with every other state, a matter of internal controversy. The presence, or proximity, of an army from another state was liable to tip the balance of the internal argument in its favour. In 245 the Aitolian forces' arrival produced an alliance of Boiotia with Aitolia, after the death in the battle of the Boiotian *strategos*. Now the presence of Demetrios and his army produce a new decision, in favour of an alliance with Macedon[17]. But it is likely that this move had been under preparation for some time, for Demetrios would need to have made contact with the politicians who supported him and they would need to lay down preparations for their *coup* before the Macedonians arrived. Like the agreement with Gortyn, it would seem that Demetrios had prepared his expedition with some care for some time in advance.

If the old explanation for the 'War of Demetrios' as originating over a dispute concerning Akarnania and Epeiros is discarded, then this development in Boiotia is only the remaining cause for the outbreak of the war between Macedon and Aitolia, for events in Attika and between Macedon and Achaia did not concern Aitolia directly. It is, however, a rather unfought war, at least on the Aitolian side.

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[16] Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* III 498.
[17] Pol. 20.5.3.

There is no sign of direct hostilities between Aitolia and Macedon, except for a late raid by Demetrios on Pleuron and its region, though Boukris' raid on Attika might also qualify. The 'arrival of Demetrios with his army', as Polybios puts it[18], implies a move through Euboia, and a crossing of the Euripos from Chalkis. Had Demetrios marched his army through Malis and Thermopylai, both of them parts of the Aitolian League, Polybios cannot have used such neutral language. Certainly a condition of war existed, but, in keeping with their well-established policy, the Aitolians were clearly intent on doing as little actual fighting as possible.

Thus the origin of the war would seem to be Demetrios' military move into Boiotia in 236, which had provoked an internal political change there – one hesitates to use the words *coup d'état*, but that may well be the best characterisation of what happened. It is obvious that Boiotian politics were a more than usually factional business, with changes there being as much the product of external pressure as any internal developments. Demetrios' military and political move was one which he made as part of the continuing contest with the Achaian League over control of Attika and Argos, and Boiotia was only a stage in his progress, so Demetrios, in other words, was not deliberately courting a war with Aitolia. Equally Aitolia showed no eagerness for a war either. This mutual unwillingness to fight each other directly is the best explanation for the conduct of the war on each side.

For Aitolia, of course, the breaking of the alliance with Boiotia was surely annoying, but the alliance was fairly recent, and had come about more as a move in the contest with Achaia, which contest had gone on in both hot and cold versions until only five or six years before. Demetrios' purpose will have been quite clear to his contemporaries, and that was to re-open easier land communications with Attika where he had garrisons which were coming under pressure from Achaian raids. To return the loyalty of the Athenian oligarchy Demetrios must do something to stop those raids. No large Macedonian forces need be postulated, and it seems probable that, like his father, Demetrios used Greek mercenaries rather than native Macedonian soldiers for his Greek garrisons – as is, indeed, implied by the treaty with Gortyn. No doubt one of the results of this southern expe-

[18] Ibid.

dition was to enable Demetrios to push reinforcements the more readily into Attika and the Argolid, and soon afterwards his general in the Argolid was strong enough to challenge the Achaian forces in open battle (the battle of Phylakia), though he was not strong enough to stop them continuing their raids. None of this implied any threat to Aitolia; and Boiotia under Macedonian influence, when Macedon was preoccupied with affairs in Attika, was as good a protection against Achaian raids as it had been while in an Aitolian alliance.

This was thus the situation when the alliance was made between the Aitolian and Achaian Leagues, dated to 235 by the fact that it was negotiated by Aratos and Pantaleon, whose terms of office overlapped between September 235 and May 234 – Pantaleon was Aitolian *strategos* from September 235, and Aratos in the same office in Achaia from May of that year[19]. The act of making the alliance with Achaia when it and Macedon were at active hostilities meant that the Aitolians would be involved also in hostilities with Macedon, even if no fighting had yet taken place. Yet it was a sensible diplomatic move, which need not mean more fighting. If Demetrios' military arrival in Boiotia in 236 had done no more than predispose the situation for war, the alliance with Aitolia and Achaia will have made war certain, though the date of the outbreak of war is not known. This alliance finalised the change in Aitolian foreign policy which had begun with the peace made with Achaia in 242/241. The change of alliance made by Boiotia had been one stage in the process, the marriage of Demetrios to Phthia of Epeiros (whenever it took place) another. This latter event meant an alliance with Epeiros, under Olympias' rule, which in turn brought the Epeirote part of Akarnania in on Demetrios' side. These Macedonian moves meant that Aitolia could only feel under threat, with Macedon and its allies in control of all its land frontiers, from Akarnania round to Boiotia. In the circumstances an alliance with the only other serious military power in Greece, the Achaian League, was a sensible defensive measure, perhaps the only one available[20].

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[19] Aratos' dates are worked out by Walbank, *Aratos*, and are firm; Pantaleon's are less so, being assumed from a later term (228/227) with seven-year gaps between terms; this is less than satisfactory, but the *strategoi* for the years 242/241 to 237/236 are known, as is that of 234/233; therefore the only available years for Pantaleon's second strategy are 236/235 or 235/234, and the second seems marginally more prefereable than the first; cf Klaffenbach's introduction to *IG* IX.1.

[20] J. A. O. Larsen, 'The Aetolian-Achaian Alliance of ca. 238-220 BC' *Classical Quarterly*, 70, 1975, 159-177.

The recent developments in the Peloponnese were also relevant to the decision. During the previous year, in the term of office of the Achaian *strategos* Dioetas, between May 236 and May 235, the Achaians had made a strategically important advance into the south-western Peloponnese by the capture of Heraia, a town situated on the main route connecting Elis and Triphylia on the west with central Arkadia to the east[21]. (It is assumed that this advance demands that the Achaians already held the towns of Kleitor and Telphousa, which may very well be the case.) This advance was, perhaps, one of the elements which contributed to the Aitolian decision, for it was clearly a move in the contest which the leagues had been waging through proxies in the Peloponnese, ever since the Aitolian expedition under Timaios in 240/239. By controlling Heraia, the Achaians had cut the main route from the Aitolian allies on the coast – Elis, Triphylia, Messenia – to the Aitolian allies in Arkadia – Orchomenos, Mantinea, Tegea, and Kaphyai, and perhaps Megalopolis (see Map V). The arrival of Demetrios in Boiotia and the new alignment of that land in foreign affairs thus also cut the Aitolian route through Boiotia from the league homeland to the Achaian-controlled Isthmus.

During the winter of 236/235 the Aitolians were thus faced with a new and complex situation. A revived friendship with Macedon would heat up their contest with Achaia, with the certainty that any fighting would then take place far off in the central Peloponnese, while Macedon was able to fight much more conveniently in Attika and the Argolid. The Aitolians could surely see no possible gain from that contest, for their allies in the Peloponnese would have been lost to them, the more easily now that Heraia was Achaian. The alternative was to finalise the break with Macedon and align with Achaia, which would at least provide some protection for their Peloponnesian friends. The election of Pantaleon as *strategos* for 235/234 brought to office a man already associated with such an alignment, for it had been he who had organised the peace treaty with Achaia in his previous term of office. His election is thus a sign that, as early as September 235, the Aitolian debate had come down on the Achaian side[22]. The alliance with Achaia was thus made, no doubt soon after Pantaleon took office late in 235, and it involved the transfer of the central

[21] Polyainos, *Stratagems* 2.36.
[22] See note 19.

Peloponnesian Aitolian allies to Achaian protection, at least by implication. This was a sensible Achaian move, for apart from the Achaian capture of Heraia, it must have become steadily clearer since Timaios' expedition, that those cities were liabilities to the Aitolians[23].

It was at that time also, of course, that Lydiadas, tyrant of Megalopolis – probably another Aitolian ally from Timaios' expedition – laid down his tyranny and brought his city to join the Achaian League[24]. He did so in part because of the threat to his city from Sparta, and it may well be that the alliance between Aitolia and Achaia, implying as it did a lessening of Aitolian involvement in the Peloponnese, was the trigger for Lydiadas' action. This development notoriously shifted the balance within the Achaian League towards hostility to Sparta rather than Macedon, but that could not necessarily be foreseen in 235. The year after one of Aitolia's allies, Orchomenos, made an alliance with the Achaian League[25]. This left only the tattered remnants of Aitolia's position in the south-east Peloponnese. Mantinea and Tegea, and perhaps Kaphyai, were left rather high and dry, and Mantinea later chose alliance with Sparta[26].

The Aitolian choice, again, does not require that a war would necessarily break out between Aitolia and Demetrios. Nevertheless the indications are that such a war did take place. The removal of Opous from the Aitolian League, of which it was a part in 237, to membership of the Boiotian League, which it had joined by 228/227[27], presupposes a conflict, and the Boiotian League was Macedon's ally. Also, of course, one of the presumptions of an Aitolo-Achaian alliance is a joint hostility towards Macedon. But the existence of a state of war does not always mean that much fighting took place. Certainly the Achaians continued their raids into Attika and their attempts on Argos, but only one event – other than the loss of Opous – can be assigned to the Aitolo-Macedonian conflict. This was a raid by Demetrios on the Aitolian coastlands about the mouth of the Acheloos which was so devastating, and apparently so likely to be repeated, that the inhabitants of Pleuron abandoned their city and founded a new one some distance inland[28]. It

[23] Pol. 2.44.1; Plut. *Aratos* 33.1 (misdating the alliance severely).
[24] Plut. *Aratos* 30.2
[25] Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* III 499.
[26] Pol. 2.44.1.
[27] Etienne and Knoepfler (note 8).
[28] Strabo 10.2.4; C. Eckhardt, 'Demetios *o Aitolos* and Antigonid Nicknames', *Hermes* 106, 1978, 251-253.

is surely no coincidence that Pleuron was also Pantaleon's home city; Demetrios was presumably making a political point.

The date of this raid is not known, nor the base from which it was launched. It does not seem to have been repeated, but from 234 onwards the lands beyond the Acheloos took up more and more of the Aitolian attention, and also that, presumably, of Demetrios, while unrest further north provided further distractions for Demetrios. Aitolia's attention was taken by events in Epeiros, where the two sons of Alexander II died within a short time of one another. The second, Ptolemaios, died in 234, and soon after, in the same year, his mother Olympias also died[29]. She had been the strongest member of the family for the previous twenty years, effectively ruling as regent for her sons during their minorities, and then dominating them in adulthood. The two deaths, and that of Ptolemaios' elder brother earlier, began the process of the destruction of the Epeirote monarchy, and this also brought down the whole state. After Ptolemaios' death there was only one member of the royal house left in the kingdom, Deidameia, a daughter of the great Pyrros, a woman and unmarried. Her sister Nereis was married to Gelon of Syracuse, but that alliance had no effect, in that Syracuse was now under Roman domination. Of course, Demetrios was married to a cousin of the two sisters, Phthia, and it was this which brought Macedon into the situation.

The developing crisis in Epeiros was clearly of urgent concern to Aitolia. Ptolemaios had controlled the larger part of Akarnania as *hegemon* of the Akarnanian League, and his death, like that of Pyrros in 272 and that of Alexander II in the 250s, meant that the western part of Akarnania was once more cut loose. In the period after Ptolemaios' death a short inscription was added to the much longer inscription which had recorded the old Aitolian-Akarnanian alliance of 270[30]. It is dated to the fourth strategy of Charixenos II (Pantaleon's successor, in office from September 234 to September 233) and it records the arbitration by the Akarnanian city of Thyrreion of a dispute between the cities of Oiniadai and Matropolis. These last had been part of the Aitolian League for some years, but Thyrreion had been in Alexander's and Ptolemaios' section. The arbitration suggests an internal Akarnanian dispute, and its settlement by Akarnanians: but the fact that it is record-

[29] Justin 28.3.1-3.
[30] *IG* IX.1.3B.

ed in an inscription which was set up at an *Aitolian* shrine (Thermos) and is dated by the Aitolian *strategos* in office shows the Aitolian interest. (No doubt another copy was placed at the Akarnanian shrine at Aktion.) It does not imply Aitolian control of Thyrreion, for the arbitration was presumably arranged by the two disputants, who must have agreed in advance to it, and to accept the ruling produced by the arbitrators. Since Oiniadai and Matropolis were part of the Aitolian League, the acquiescence of the Aitolian League in advance was also required – and was obviously forthcoming. On balance this event shows the continuing good relations between the various Akarnanian cities, whichever section they were in, and the acceptance of Aitolian League membership by its Akarnanian members. The dating, in the *strategos* year of 234/233, also means that the arbitration took place during the continuing Epeirote crisis, and while Akarnania and Aitolia were in opposing alliance-systems. The absence of any reference to Epeirote authority suggests – no more – that Thyrreion was acting as an independent city. (But the context does not call for any reference to a *hegemon*, nor is a reference to the Akarnanian League required.)

The deaths of the Epeirote kings will have severed the Epeirote-Akarnanian connection once more, and the failure of the royal line will have meant that the Akarnanians had no Epeirote protection available. In 234/233, however, the formerly Epeirote Akarnanians of Thyrreion had no difficulty in maintaining friendly relations with two of the Aitolian Akarnanian cities, and it follows, also with the whole Aitolian League as a body. This friendly relationship was, it also follows, reciprocal. In the next year the last royal Epeirote, Deidameia, was killed[31], and the Epeirote state collapsed into its constituent parts. Its main successor was a new Epeirote League of the tribal areas, centred on the Molossoi, the largest of the tribes, while other sections, notably the *poleis* of the southern lands about the Ambrakian Gulf and the Athamanians in the hills inland moved into independence[32]. The Athamanes were Aitolian neighbours, and they chose to be ruled by a dual monarchy[33]. The Akarnanians, if they were not yet independent, now became so.

[31] Justin 28.3.5.

[32] Cabanes, *L'Épire*, 200-202; Hammond, *Epirus*, 648.

[33] M.-F. Baslez, 'La Monarchie Athamane à la Fin du IIIe siècle et au debut du IIe siècle', in P. Cabanes (ed.), *L'Illyrie meridionale et l'Épire dans l'Antiquité*, Clermont Ferrand 1987, 167-173.

For the Aitolians this provided an obvious opportunity for expansion, if they chose to take it, and it also produced a major problem of instability on their western border, an area which had been stable for forty years. Add to that the fact that they were already at war with the king of Macedon, who was married to a member of the now-defunct Epeirote royal house, and there was plenty of dangerous and combustible material in the area to preoccupy the league's leaders. The obvious danger was that the smouldering war with Macedon would receive a blast of fresh air to bring it to a full blaze.

The collapse of the Epeirote kingdom had ended with the murder of the last member of the royal family as she sheltered at the alter of Artemis in Ambrakia, which had been the royal centre. Ambrakia was one of a group of cities around the Ambrakian Gulf, Akarnanian to the south, Epeirote to the north, who refused to join the newly constituted republican Epeirote League, whose centre was further north at Phoenike. The cities of the south were thus the obvious candidates for recruitment into the Aitolian League, and there were compelling arguments for them to join; particularly the likely attempt by the new Epeirote League to 'recover' them for itself. It seems that two, Amphilochian Argos and Ambrakia, soon joined the Aitolians, but the smaller coastal cities to the west of Ambrakia, places such as Bouchetion and Pandosia, were more resistant, and failed to join. It is worth remarking that it is likely that, had the method of Aitolian expansion been a forcible one, these small cities could have been taken without much difficulty. Another suggestion of the peaceableness of the Aitolian polity.

The evidence for the dating of these acquisitions is to some extent conjectural. Ambrakia was Epeirote until 233 or 232, for it was there that Deidamia was killed. By 228-222 an Ambrakiote citizen, Aristarchos, was serving as an Aitolian *hieromnemon* at Delphi, an office he held three times between then and 203/202[34]. Ambrakia's membership of the league has been assumed to imply that Amphilochian Argos, which lies between the two, had also acceded. This perhaps does not necessarily follow, though it is likely. Argos was certainly a member by 203/202, when Lamiskos of that city was an Aitolian *hieromnemon*[35], so its adherance does seem likely. The town of Limnaia,

[34] *Prosopography*, 'Aristarchos (3)'; the date of his first appearance is either 228/227 or 223/222: FI I 35; Lefèvre 68-71.

[35] *Prosopography*, 'Lamiskos'.

at the south-eastern extremity of the Ambrakian Gulf, might be reckoned to be in either Akarnania or Amphilochia; it was probably the place noted as the home of an Aitolian *hieromnemon* for 207/206[36], and is likely to have joined at this time if not earlier.

The idea that small cities were an easy prey for predatory armies, as suggested for the southern Epeirote cities, is, however, immediately confronted by the example of a small city which resisted incorporation into the Aitolian League by force, and successfully. Yet the circumstances were particular, and they depended not so much on the city's resistance – though that was a vital factor – as on external interference.

King Demetrios appears to have been fully occupied during this period, perhaps from 232 onwards, certainly in 231, with a developing problem on his own northern frontier, where a war broke out with the Dardanians[37]. This was clearly a factor in the Aitolian expansion. Then in 231 the Aitolians made an attempt to persuade the city of Medeon in Akarnania to join their league. This was their normal method, persuasion, and they would scarcely have essayed it without a reasonable hope of success. That is, they knew that a proportion of the politically important people of Medeon favoured joining their league. The attempt at persuasion, however, apparently failed; so the Aitolians brought up an armed force to exercise a more potent persuasion[38]. It is worth emphasising that this use of force is most unusual for the Aitolians, but it was the method which had worked fifty years earlier at Herakleia-in-Oitaia. In the case of Medeon, however, it did not work, but instead it seems to have stimulated Medeonite resistance. The city was, after all, in that part of Akarnania which had implicitly rejected Aitolian blandishments at the time of the partition with Alexander II. However, it is also clear that Medeon was fighting alone, with no Akarnanian allies, which suggests that any Akarnanian League which existed at the time was quite ineffective (assuming Medeon was a member, of course). In turn this may well be one of the reasons for the Aitolian forward move. The other nearby Akarnanian cities were clearly unsupportive, and so it seems quite possible that the Aitolians had the right of the dispute. Thyrreion, the mediator in the dispute between Oiniadai and

[36] Fl I 40 and 41; Lefèvre 86.
[37] Trogus, *Prol* 28; Will, *Histoire Politique*, 1.349-354.
[38] Pol. 2.2.6.

Matropolis only three years before, was Medeon's neighbour, no more than fifteen kilometres away, yet it was wholly uninvolved.

For Demetrios, however, right and wrong in this remote dispute will have had less relevance than the fact that both he and Medeon were at war with Aitolia. Preoccupied as he was with events in the north, he persuaded – 'bribed', says Polybios[39] – King Agron of the Illyrians to go to Medeon's assistance. Agron and Demetrios were already facing one common enemy in the Dardanians, and so they were allies. It has been assumed that either Medeon or the Akarnanians, either before or during the siege, had sent an appeal for help to Demetrios, but none of this is in the single tendentious source (Polybios) which survives. Certainly it must be assumed that Demetrios knew of the siege, but an actual appeal was perhaps not necessary. When the Illyrians arrived at Medeon the besieged citizens were as surprised as the Aitolians. And Medeon's geographical situation, eleven kilometres from the nearest shore of the Ambrakian Gulf, is such that direct help from Macedon or Illyria can have been the last thing they expected.

The siege went on for quite some time. After it had begun, Demetrios had to hear of it, decide on his response, and then communicate with Agron across the width of the Balkan peninsula; Agron had to make his own decision, then summon his troops and prepare his vessels – at least the vessels cannot have been instantly ready – and the fleet had then to sail over two hundred miles along the Ionian sea coast to the Ambrakian Gulf. All this took weeks rather than days, perhaps even two or three months. So the siege had lasted all the summer when the relief force arrived. This arrival took place in September, for Polybios notes that the time of the Aitolian elections was at hand; also the length of the siege helps to explain the decision by the Aitolians that the commanding *strategos* should be allowed a share in the booty of Medeon if the city was captured in his successor's term of office[40]. (The *strategos* of 232/231 who had initiated the siege is not known; his successor was the formidable Agelaos.) The surprise Illyrian attack, joined by a sortie of the army of the city, produced an Aitolian defeat[41]. The Aitolian survivors returned home. Medeon did not become a member of the league.

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[39] Pol. 2.2.4.
[40] Pol. 2.2.8.
[41] Pol. 2.3.1-8; Oost, *Roman Policy*, 9.

Aitolian policy following the defeat at Medeon is scarcely that of a predatory power thwarted at the last minute in its attack on a minor refractory neighbour. The immediate disappearance of the thwarting Illyrians will have left the rescued city even more vulnerable to attack than before. But the Aitolians did not return, despite being insulted by the gleeful Medeonites, who deliberately adapted the wording of the Aitolian decree on booty to their own victory[42]. Perhaps the timing had something to do with it. The defeat occurred in September, and any Aitolian reaction would thus be scheduled for the spring; the new *strategos* may have had a different policy.

But the spring brought another Illyrian attack, this time a seaborne raid on the coasts of Elis and Messene in the Peloponnese, with the surprise seizure of Phoenike, the Epeirote centre, on the voyage home[43]. In fact this last deed looks very much like the main intention, for the city's capture coincided with the approach of an Illyrian land force, commanded by Skerdilaidas, from the north by way of Antigoneia. So the raid on the Peloponnese might have been a distraction to fix the attention of Aitolia on the south, for both Elis and Messenia were Aitolian allies. Certainly the Epeirotes were taken by surprise, losing their city, and having their army beaten into the bargain. They appealed to Aitolia and Achaia for help, and these two responded by sending a joint army. Polybios claims that contingents from both leagues took part[44], but the Aitolians were surely the more numerous, given the recent events, their proximity, and their greater military resources. They had the defeat at Medeon to avenge, and they had marched to Epeirote aid in the same way in the past, and they were anxious to calm things down in the area: if the result was a friendly Epeiros this would be a major diplomatic gain. The Achaians (the ex-tyrant Lydiadas was *strategos*) had to maintain their guard in the face of the continuing threat out of Argos and Athens, both still under Macedonian hegemony. If the Aitolian army had already been mustered as a result of the Illyrian seaborne raids in the Pelponnese, the rapid military response which evidently took place is also explained. For the league army marched a long way into Epeiros

[42] Pol. 2.4.1-2.

[43] Pol. 2.5.1-8; H. J. Dell, 'The Origin and Nature of Illyrian Piracy', *Historia* 16, 1967, 344-358; Oost, *Roman Policy*, 9.

[44] Pol. 2.6.1-3; Oost, *Roman Policy*, 9-10; Cabanes, *L'Épire*, 212-214; Hammond, *Epirus*, 596.

before meeting the enemy, who had been in Epeiros even before the leagues had been appealed to.

There was no battle. The rival armies faced each other. Then the Illyrians retired home on news of a revolt there[45]; King Agron had died the previous year and the succession was at stake. The joint league army did not follow, but left it to the Epeirotes to negotiate the Illyrian occupiers out of Phoenike, which they could only do by agreeing to an alliance with the invaders. This certainly gave them protection from Illyrian attack, but at the cost of diverting those attacks onto others. The Aitolians went home, as did whichever Achaians were present. Sure enough, next year, 229, the Illyrians came back, this time concentrating on the coastal Greek cities of Epeiros and Kerkyra, who, as had the Epeirotes, appealed to the leagues[46]. This time the response was much less enthusiastic, since the Illyrians were now mainly a naval force, and it is evident that neither of the leagues was a serious naval power. All they could produce was ten ships of the Achaians, which were manned jointly by Aitolians and Achaians[47]. The Illyrians, reinforced by seven Akarnanian ships – presumably the Akarnanians had also bought them off by an alliance[48] – easily defeated this force, sinking a quinquereme, and capturing four quadriremes. This battle, however, took place near Paxos, an island closer to Kerkyra than to Aitolia, so the allies were making a serious attempt to bring aid to their friends and to carry the war towards the Illyrians. But the raiders were again interrupted, this time by the arrival of an altogether more formidable force, a Roman army and fleet who were bent on a serious campaign of suppression[49].

The Aitolian policy in all this had been clearly defensive. Only when called upon did the joint league army go to the assistance of the Epeirotes, and once there it was prepared to fight, but left the negotiating to the locals, who sensibly protected themselves from further attacks by concluding an alliance with their attackers. Evidently the Akarnanians had done the same. They were just as exposed to coastal raids as the Epeirotes, as the relief of Medeon showed, but they then found themselves, unlike the Epeirotes, actually called on to fight

[45] Pol. 2.5.4.
[46] Pol. 2.9.8.
[47] Pol. 2.9.9.
[48] Pol. 2.6.9-10; Oost, *Roman Policy*, 10.
[49] Pol. 2.10.1-11.9.

with the Illyrians in the sea battle. If the Akarnanians were thus active allies of the Illyrians, the Aitolians will have had to be on their guard all along their land frontier with Akarnania and Epeiros. The Aitolian army was surely mustered again in the spring of 229, as it evidently had been the previous year, in order to defend its territory against a possible Illyrian/Epeirote/Akarnanian attack either by land or by sea. Some of the troops were posted to the fleet. In all this, Demetrios might congratulate himself on a most successful ploy, in his 'bribing' of Agron; his Aitolian and Achaian enemies had been most successfully distracted. Whether he had had anything to fear from them in the first place is another matter.

Demetrios died not long before the Roman expedition arrived in Illyria, and so in the spring, and so, further, contemporaneously with the Illyrian raid on Kerkyra and the joint leagues' fleet's defeat. His death followed close upon his own defeat by the invading Dardanians, though the two events were perhaps not closely connected in anything but timing. As the news of his death spread, and with it the realisation that Macedon was under active attack by invaders and that its new king was a child of only eight years, the whole Macedonian position south of Mount Olympos collapsed. Compared to such an event, the Roman attack on the Illyrians was of relatively marginal interest, though it did have the effect of removing one Aitolian enemy from the scene, just as the Dardanian invasion removed another.

The collapse of Macedonian power in Greece was sudden, but it had actually been under preparation for years. The continual campaigns by Aratos against the Macedonian allies in the Argolid and Attika had forced Demetrios to transfer many local powers to the Athenians, even including the command of the Macedonian garrison in the Peiraios; in Argos the local tyranny of Aristippos, and later, Aristomachos, had actually been strengthened by Achaian opposition and by Aratos' unpleasant raids, but it was only intermittently supported by Macedonian forces, and the only known Macedonian expedition to Argive assistance in Demetrios' reign had produced no more than an ephemeral victory over Aratos. Talks had already been going on between Aristomachos of Argos and Lydiadas the Achaian *strategos* for 230/229, in which the obvious model for Aristomachos' future was Lydiadas himself, who had resigned his tyranny over Megalopolis to bring his city into the league. Demetrios' *coup* in Boiotia had been helpful by relieving Macedonian communication difficulties, but no-one could pretend that it rested on strong local foundations: such a

coup could be easily reversed. In all Greece, only the Macedonian garrisons in Euboia could be reckoned firm.

The Macedonian collapse after Demetrios' death was total. In the spring of 229 Aristomachos of Argos and the *strategos* Lydiadas came to terms: Argos joined the Achaian League and Aristomachos abdicated his tyranny[50]. At the time Aratos was in Athens, mediating an agreement between that city and the Macedonian garrison commander whereby the latter would defect[51]. Both agreements called for the soldiers to be paid off, and the Athenian money was not fully raised until the summer. Two of the places who contributed to the Athenian fund were Thespiae and Thebes, the two leading members of the Boiotian League[52], and this indicates that Boiotia's alliance with Macedon – it was probably with Demetrios personally – can be considered to have lapsed with the king's death.

In addition to Argos, Athens, and Boiotia, the Macedonian collapse extended into Thessaly. The new Macedonian ruler, Antigonos Doson, regent for his cousin Philip, is made to point out, when facing a mutinous crowd at Pella later that he had put down an 'allied rebellion', and had defeated both the Thessalians and the Dardanians[53]. Presumably the allies who rebelled are states such as the Boiotians, Athens, and Argos, but when Doson defeated these former allies is not known; perhaps he was exaggerating rhetorically. The Thessalians had been under Macedonian control since the 270s, under both Antigonos Gonatas and Demetrios. In 229/228, for the first time since the 270s, there was a hiatus in the long Macedonian control; the Thessalians, or at least some of them, struck out for independence.

It must be emphasised that all this happened more or less simultaneously. Demetrios died in the spring (before the Roman fleet arrived in Illyria), the Argive and Athenian defections took place before May, when Aratos took up the post of *strategos* of the Achaian League again in succession to Lydiadas, under whom the Argive negotiations had taken place and in whose time Aratos had been negotiating in Athens; Boiotia had cut its Macedonian ties before the summer,

[50] Plut. *Aratos*, 35.3.

[51] Plut. *Aratos*, 34.4; Paus. 2.8.6; Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, 206-207; Walbank, *Aratos*, 70.

[52] *IG* VII.1737, 1738 (Thespiai), and 2405, 2406 (Thebes); Feyel, *Polybe*, 122-123.

[53] Justin 28.3.14.

when the Athenian appeal for funds to pay off the Macedonian mercenaries who made up the Attikan garrisons was fully subscribed. The Thessalian revolt may well have happened even before May, since they would hear of Demetrios' death before anyone else, and the crisis in the kingdom caused by the king's death, the minority of the new king, and the Dardanian invasion, clearly prevented Antigonos Doson from intervening in the south. The collapse was all-but total and simultaneous, and, to a large extent, spontaneous[54].

These changes, affecting every state of any size in Greece, inevitably also affected the largest Greek state. Indeed Aitolia was surrounded by the changes, yet amidst all this upheaval, Aitolia pursued a very cautious policy. To the west early in the year occurred the joint Aitolian-Achaian naval expedition which failed to relieve Kerkyra. But then the Illyrian threat disappeared. To the east Phokis and the Boiotian League allied themselves to each other and to Achaia, and thus indirectly also to Aitolia, and cooperated in the removal of the Macedonian soldiers from Attika. The Aitolians made no attempt to move into either of these areas, and apparently accepted the changes without difficulty. Only to the north did Aitolia make an active move forward.

It must be remembered, in considering the events in Thessaly in Doson's first year or so, that Aitolia was still at war with Macedon. The death of Demetrios did not cancel that condition; instead it opened up a wide geographic gap between the combatants. Thessaly in revolt provided the same sort of combined problem-and-opportunity which had developed only a year or two earlier in Epeiros and Akarnania in the west. The problem for the Aitolians was whether the independence of the Thessalians should be recognised and supported. Their opportunity was whether the Thessalians should be invited or encouraged to join the Aitolian League. The danger was that Macedon under Doson would recover quickly and that the Macedonian war would grow from an almost unfought condition to one of direct and violent confrontation.

It is wrong, therefore, to conceive of the issue as one in which the Aitolians made opportunistic war on Macedon[55]. First, the war

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[54] Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.338-339; R. M. Errington, *History of Macedonia*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1990, 177; Walbank, *Philip V*, 10-11; all these are brief summaries, from the Macedonian point of view.

[55] Walbank, *Philip V*, 11 and *CAH* VII (2), 453: the Thessalians were 'stirred up by the Aitolians'.

already existed, though it was scarcely in an active phase, and both sides had very carefully refrained from tangling too directly with the other – indeed Demetrios' raid on Pleuron seems to have been the only occasion when Macedonian and Aitolian forces actually met in Demetrios' reign, though that may well have stirred a desire for revenge among the Aitolians. Second, Thessaly was automatically freed by the death of Demetrios, since its union with Macedon was only a personal union in that both lands had the same political head[56] – the same political situation which had released Akarnania from the Epeirote connection. So any Aitolian move into Thessaly had to be in the normal Aitolian way, in pursuit of new members who were to be persuaded to join the league – in the same way as Ambrakia, Amphilochian Argos, and Medeon had been invited to join. Only if an armed demonstration could accomplish the final persuasion would an invasion be mounted. Achaia Phthiotis, the area immediately north of Mount Othrys, the hills which had been Aitolia's northern boundary for the past forty years, did join the league, but the rest of Thessaly did not, and an invasion later in 229 or in 228 by Antigonos Doson returned the northern part of Thessaly to Macedonian control[57].

Once again the evidence for this has to be considered with some care. The main evidence is, in fact, the number of the Aitolian *hieromnemones* at the Amphiktyony, which rose from eleven in 229/228 (the archonship of Herys[58]) to fourteen at some point before 225/224[59]. But it has already been shown that the fluctuations in the membership of the Amphiktyony make that a most unreliable guide to Aitolian expansion – all the more so in that none of the Thessalian peoples whose supposed votes are said to have been taken up by the Aitolians, had sent any delegates since 278, the first meeting after the repulse of the Kelts. Suggesting that these former members' seats were in some mysterious way re-activated at Aitolian prodding, and then taken up by Aitolian *hieromnemones* in order to demonstrate the

[56] This had to be renewed by each king on his accession, something done by Alexander the Great (Diod. 17.4); the event is not recorded for other kings, but the 'rebellion' in 229 implies the personal nature of the union.

[57] G. Daux, 'L'Expansion Étolienne vers le Nord à la fin du IIIme siècle avant J.-C,', *Studia Antiqua A Salas septuagenario oblata*, Prague 1955, 35-39 and Tarn, *CAH* VII (1), 748, both exaggerate the extent of Aitolian acquisitions.

[58] Fl I 32; Lefèvre 66-67.

[59] Fl I 34; Lefèvre 68-71.

Aitolian control over various parts of Greece is not convincing. Instead we need to look at the other evidence which can be found for these lands being members of the Aitolian League.

This change of Aitolian representation on the Amphiktyony is in fact the second during the period of the recent wars. In the early 230s, the number had changed from nine, as it was until 240/239[60], to eleven in 238/237[61]. The precise dating of this change is not clear, since the archonship for 240/239 may actually be dated to 239/238, and the name of the Delphian *archon* is not known. The damaged nature of the stone also means that the names and origins of the other members are unclear. By 238/237, however, the archonship of P[...]as (this stone is damaged also), there were certainly eleven Aitolians on the board. The assumption has been that these extra two came from communities absorbed into the league, and Flacelière picked out the Malians and the Phokians as the communities who were thus deprived[62]. But Malis had not sent an independent representative to the Amphiktyony since the early 260s[63], and the Phokians had last sent one in 241/240[64], the archonship of Praochos (though there may have been one in the year after, but that stone, as noted, is damaged).

When the Aitolian numbers went up from eleven to fourteen, the same problems occur. First, the chronology is unclear. The last surviving list with eleven Aitolians is that of the archonship of Herys, now dated to 229/228[65]; the first with fourteen which is firmly dated is one from 225/224[66] (the archon is not known), but there are two others which may be dated between 229/228 and 225/224[67], and so these are the extreme dates for the change. Further, the source of these votes is just as unclear as is the earlier change. No other community ceased to send representatives at the time, so it is only a matter of guesswork that it was an expansion of the Aitolian League which had permitted the league to claim defunct votes, and this is not

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[60] Fl I 30; Lefèvre 63; Lefèvre suggests 240/239 or, less likely, 239/238.

[61] Fl I 31; Lefèvre 64.

[62] Flacelière, *Aitoliens*, 247; G. Klaffenbach, 'Zur Geschichte Aitoliens und Delphis in 3 Jahrhundert', *Klio* 32, 1939, 189-219, at 200, picked Malis and Phthiotic Achaia.

[63] Fl I 11; Lefèvre 29; the archonship of Athambos

[64] Fl I 29; Lefèvre 60-62; Lefèvre claims a Phokian in his number 64, but no-one from there is listed by Flacelière.

[65] Lefèvre 66-67.

[66] Lefèvre 68-71.

[67] Fl I 40 and 50; Lefèvre 72 and 80.

a particularly safe procedure. It must be noted, once more, that the membership of the Amphiktyony was not fixed, nor was attendance necessary or compulsory. Chios had been able to send a representative since the 240s[68], never having done so in the past, and Kephallenia was added later[69], and the fluctuations of Macedonian membership in the fourth century are notorious. In this period, the 230s and the 220s, Amphiktyonic membership is not a safe clue to Aitolian history, whatever may have been the case in the 270s.

A further example may be given. The Boiotians were allocated two votes, though on one occasion (272/271, the archonship of Eudokos) they sent three[70]. But on other occasions they sent none, and these occasions seem to have no connection to political events. No Boiotians attended in 254/253 or 252/251[71], for example, but two did attend in every recorded meeting between 251/250 and 238/237[72]. That is, the change of political alliance which took place in 245 appears to have had no effect on Amphiktyonic attendance. It had been thought that their absence in the 230s was due to the change of alignment brought about by Demetrios II in 236[73], but the inscriptions are simply not chronologically specific enough for such a conclusion to be drawn. The Amphiktyonic records are thus not a sufficient basis for explaining political events at this time, without further evidence. Further, no ancient source makes any such connection, and one might conjecture other reasons for absences – illness, lack of interest, personal factors – which in any one case may be sufficient explanations. And such explanations would have as much validity as political conjectures. To discover the extent of the Aitolian League, the evidence must come from the records of individuals, for there is no other.

In the case of Achaia Phthiotis, men from Melitaia appear in league official positions from 223/222 as Aitolians. Archippos of Melitaia was the league *grammateus* in that year[74], a post which suggests that he already had a fair familiarity with Aitolian procedures of government gained over a number of years, which takes us easily

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[68] *Syll* (3) 443.
[69] FI I 37; Lefèvre 25-26.
[70] FI I 8; Lefèvre 25-26.
[71] FI I 20 and 21; Lefèvre 47 and 48-50.
[72] FI I 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31; Lefèvre 55, 56-57, 58, 59, 60-61, 62, and 64.
[73] Flacelière, *Aitoliens* 200, 244 and 271-272.
[74] *IG* IX.1.31f.

back to 229; he was also an *hieromnemon* in 207/206[75]. Another Melitaian, Lykon, was *hieromnemon* in 209/208 or 205/204[76]. From Kyphaira came the significantly named Aitolionos, who was Delphic *hieromnemon* in 217/216[77], and whose son Aristarchos was Aitolian *epimeletes* at Delphi in 205/204[78]. Other men from Phthiotic Thebes[79], from Pharsalos[80], and from Thaumakoi[81] also held official posts, but only one of them, from Pharsalos, as early as 226/225. This, therefore, provides clear evidence that the southern part of the Thessalian area, that north of the Orthys and Achaian hills, became part of the Aitolian League during the 220s. The area north of that, which included Pharsalos and Phthiotic Thebes, was also Aitolian in the 220s[82].

It is usually stated that Aitolia brought much of the rest of Thessaly, including Hestiaiotis and Perrhaibia, into the league, but not Magnesia, where the city of Demetrias was a Macedonian stronghold, nor Pelasgiotis[83]. But there is no support for the extension of Aitolian power beyond Phthiotis and Pharsalos in the epigraphic

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[75] Fl I 41; for the date cf. Lefèvre, p. 206.

[76] Fl I 38.

[77] Fl I 36; Lefèvre 79.

[78] Fl II 90; P. Roussel, 'Les epimeletes Aitoliens à Delphes', *BCH* 50, 1926, 124-134.

[79] Fl I 44 (Pyrrias of Thebes); Lefèvre 97; Fl I 45 (Nikoboulos of Thebes; Lefèvre 99, dated 203/202 and 301/200 respectively.

[80] Fl I 39 (...bolos); Lefèvre p. 206 for the date (206/205); Fl I 43 (Polleas); Lefèvre 95.

[81] Fl I 40 (Amphiktyonic *grammateus*, name lost); Lefèvre 72, dated 226/225 or 222/221; Fl I 43 (Phaikos); Lefèvre 95, of 204/203; Fl I 45 (Eurymachos); Lefèvre 99, of 201/200; Fl I 46 (Lamedon), of 193/192.

[82] The assumption has been made that some of these men were really exiles, and that the evidence of their home-cities is not that those cities were in the league, but that the league was merely claiming them (Walbank, *CAH* VII, 1 (2), 454 and citations there). In support of this theory two men are noted, a Thyrreian in exile in Ambrakia and a Pheraian in exile in Stratos, both of whom were employed as Aitolian envoys to Rome (Pol 8.10.10). But the point is that these two are *explicitly* noted as exiles. It is not reasonable to transfer their exile-status to others who are not said to be exiles, merely to provide support for a theory of Aitolian expansion which cannot find support elsewhere. There is no justification for this procedure. The epigraphic evidence must be permitted to stand without interpretation, and if a man is said to be from Thebes, or Thaumakoi, or anywhere else, we must take that as accurate and current information, unless it is contradicted from some other, more reliable, source; cf. J. V. A. Fine, 'The Problem of Macedonian Holdings in Epirus and Thessaly in 221 BC', *TAPA* 63, 1932, 126-155.

[83] See the map at the end of Flacelière, *Aitoliens*; Walbank, *CAH* VII, 1 (2), 453-454 seems bemused; Daux, 'L'Expansion' (note 57).

evidence. None of the cities north of Pharsalos and Thebes show any evidence of Aitolian membership at any time.

Doson's reconquest of the northern parts of Thessaly – from their briefly independent rulers rather than from the Aitolians – brought him up against the new Aitolian border. Fighting took place, and it is tempting to link together the two items of information we have. Years later the magistrates of the city of Kytenion in Metropolitan Doris appealed to the city of Xanthos in Lykia for assistance in rebuilding their walls, which had been knocked down by an earthquake, an event which was followed by an opportunistic sack by 'King Antigonos'[84]. This can only be Doson. He is presumably also the 'King Antigonos' whose exploit in destroying an Aitolian force and capturing a town is noted by Frontinus[85], and it seems best to see these events as part of the same campaign, which can only have taken place in 229-228. Fighting at that time is certain, and that is the only occasion when Doson – or any other king called Antigonos, for that matter – and the Aitolians were at war. The result of the war, despite these recorded exploits of Doson, was essentially a victory for Aitolia, which kept Phthiotic Achaia, Pharsalos, Thaumakoi, and Kyphaira within the league. The rest of Thessaly returned to Macedonian control, and this could be summarised next year, with only a small distortion of the facts, as a conquest of the Thessalians by Doson[86].

It would be very much against normal Aitolian practice to be adventurous in recruiting new members. They can be assumed to have moved cautiously into southern Thessaly. The Peloponnesian expedition of Timaios was certainly adventurous, but it was not one in search of members, but of allies. Other expansions had been accomplished slowly, a place at a time. If we knew for certain who was *strategos* at the time it might be possible to detect a shift in Aitolian policy, but the *strategos* list for the early 220s is all too conjectural. As it is, the only lifeline we can use to detect Aitolian policy is past Aitolian practice, in which the league almost invariably recruited members by persuasion rather than conquest – and the recent defeat at Medeon in

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[84] J. Bousquet, 'Le Stèle des Kyteniens au Letoon de Xanthus', *REG* 101, 1988, 12-53; F. W. Walbank, 'Antigonos Doson's Attack on Cytinium', *ZPE* 76, 1989, 184-192; Walbank's interpretation is wholly convincing; the Kytenians were appealing to Xanthos as a kindred city, both descended from Herakles; S. Le Bohec, *Antigone Doson, Roi de Macedoine*, Nancy 1993, 159-162.

[85] Frontinus, *Stratagems*, 2.6.5.

[86] Justin 28.3.14.

Akarnania will only have reinforced the preference for peaceful means. It is, for instance, noticeable that, despite the defeat of Aitolian forces by Antigonos Doson, the areas recently taken into the league did not leave, though they obviously had the opportunity in that Doson was clearly intent on reconstituting Demetrios' former state, and his victory in Thessaly and Doris provided the Thessalians with the chance to evict the Aitolians had they wished to. They did not do so. That is, Aitolian methods were once more successful.

The attack on Medeon stands out as the one occasion we know of where Aitolia attempted to extend its league by direct attack. A war in Thessaly certainly resulted from the Aitolian expansion there, but this was a result of the Macedonian reaction to the Thessalian rebellion, not an Aitolian action – and the two states were at war already anyway. There is no evidence for occasional statements that Aitolia provoked the Thessalian rebellion, though it would be a legitimate war tactic in the circumstances[87]. No attempt was made by the Aitolians to recover the alliances of Boiotia and Phokis after Demetrios' death, nor was any attempt made to re-recruit Opous into the league, for Antigonos Doson was able to land there and meet a Boiotian commander close by in 227[88]. Boiotia and Phokis allied with each other, probably in 228[89], but no hint of hostility between these new allies and Aitolia exists.

There is thus no evidence of any change in the traditional Aitolian policies of cautious expansion and defensive warfare. The attack on Medeon fits in with the attack on Herakleia-in-Oitia as an extension of the previous attempt at persuasion, and when the attack failed, it was not renewed. Only those communities who were willing to be members of the league were recruited and no brutal conquests were undertaken; the length of the siege of Medeon is exceptional, even unique. Beyond the core area of the league allies could be made, as in the Peloponnese and with Boiotia, but no such alliance was to be regarded as more than a temporary matter, and it could be broken by either party[90]. No resentment is visible at the 'defection' of Boiotia.

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[87] See note 55.

[88] Pol. 20.5.7-8; Antigonos landed near Larymna, which was in Opountian territory (Paus. 9.23.4); the Boiotian magistrates were riding in the area; thus Larymna, and so Opous, were Boiotian at the time; Le Bohec, *Antigone Doson*, 162-163.

[89] Roesch, *Études*, 359-367.

[90] Larsen, *GFS*, 202-207, distinguished *isopoliteia* and *sympoliteia* in Aitolian citizenship, but this does not seem very profitable; I prefer to distinguish members and allies.

Such an alliance was not to be continued if it seemed to be pulling Aitolia into a war in which the league had no interest: and even when war resulted, Aitolia's commitment to the common cause was strictly limited to Aitolia's own interests. Thus the alliance with Achaia was no more than a temporary measure, on both sides.

It is easy to see how this policy could infuriate other states, most of whom were interested in an Aitolian alliance only to the extent that they wished to use Aitolia's power in their own interest. Aitolia's stubborn determination to look to its own interests first and all the time, while no different in essence from the policy of other states, was directly contrary to rhetorical statements about the common good made by its spokesmen, and to the constant references to Aitolian services against the Kelts which so bored other diplomats for half a century[91]. At the same time the league's slow and erratic expansion was a standing rebuke to the less successful and more violent policies of other states and leagues, particularly the Achaians. The Achaian League was always liable to lose members, but it is clear from their political behaviour that the members of the Aitolian League were thoroughly satisfied with their situation within the league. There are no records, even in times of stress and danger, of league members rebelling, unless Opous did so; there is good evidence that the benefits of league membership, in so far as these can be judged from the epigraphic records of offices held, were more or less impartially spread through all members, despite a strong concentration of the top officials among the oligarchs from the original member cities. When the time came and overwhelming force was brought against the league, even the most recent members – Thaumakoi and Ambrakia are particular examples – fought long and loyally for the league, against overwhelming odds.

There is no direct evidence for peace being made between the league and the new Macedonian ruler Antigonos Doson (just as there is no direct evidence for any declaration of war). By 228, however, both sides could claim a victory, Antigonos on the battlefield, Aitolia in new members recruited. Next year, Antigonos sailed on his expedition to Karia, which he would scarcely have undertaken had he still been at war with his most powerful neighbour. It seems reasonable, therefore, to postulate a peace agreement in the winter of 228/227.

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[91] As complained by Lykiskos (as reported by Polybios) in 211: Pol 9.35.1-2. Aitolia was shown as an armed figure resting on a heap of Keltic shields all through the monetary history of the league (*BMC* Thessaly to Aetolia, 194-200).

The terms are obvious, at least in gross terms: Thessaly was agreed to be divided between them, Aitolia would recognise Antigonos as king, Antigonos would agree to respect Aitolia's new boundaries. Whether there was any reference to the other states which had been involved in the war – Boiotia, Phokis, Athens, Achaia, Epeiros, Akarnania – is not known, and is perhaps unlikely: Antigonos could land next year in Opountian Lokris and make an agreement with leading Boiotians without any reference to Aitolia. One of Antigonos' purposes in making peace with Aitolia could well have been the subsequent prospect of dividing his enemies and subverting their alliance, an old and usually successful Macedonian diplomatic tactic. The Aitolian-Achaian-Boiotian alliance was hardly likely to survive long in the absence of Macedonian pressure, and in the presence of the restlessness of Aratos in Achaia. Within two years of Athens getting rid of its Macedonian garrisons in 228, an embassy was sent by the city to Pella for some unspecified purpose[92]: Athens might not wish to be garrisoned, but she did wish for Macedonian protection; even before that an embassy had been sent to Pella from Achaia[93].

The result for the Aitolians was, first, an expansion of their league, both to the north-east and to the north west, and this increased their power and prestige in Greece. But, second, there had been substituted for the Macedonian friendship of Gonatas the enmity of Demetrios II and Doson, which both came from the Aitolian alliance with Achaia and from their acquisition of part of Thessaly. And it seems highly unlikely that the alliance with Achaia could be considered either useful or permanent. The behaviour of that league's *strategoi*, whether it was Aratos, or one of the former tyrants – Lydiadas, and Aristomachos (of Argos), with Aratos, monopolised the Achaian strategy office between 235/234 and 227/226 – was far too erratic and expansionist for any of its allies to be comfortable. The Aitolian alliances with the mid-Peloponnesian cities – only Mantinea and Tegea, perhaps Kaphyai by now – were failing. The Aitolian ambitions in the Peloponnese had aways been limited and had now become restricted to the western coastlands, Elis and Messenia. It thus seems likely that the Achaian alliance had either ended or had become inoperative. The Peloponnesian crises of the next few years demonstrated this all too clearly.

[92] *ISE* 1.28.
[93] Pol. 2.48.6.

13. THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR (THE SOCIAL/SYMMACHIC WAR)
1. THE CAUSES (228-220)

The end of the 'War of Demetrios', by a presumed treaty between the Aitolians and King Antigonos in 228 or 227 which is nowhere actually attested, left Aitolia greater in size than ever before, but in an international situation which had radically changed, and was about to change still further. The collapse of the Epeirote monarchy had opened up the west to Aitolian expansion, but had also encouraged Illyrian seaborne expansion, which in turn had brought Romans onto the scene. The brief collapse of Macedon in Thessaly, had also allowed Aitolian expansion there but it had also produced, for the first time in four decades, a violent reaction from Macedon, and no doubt a continuing suspicion. To the south the same war had produced an alliance with Achaia, also now greatly swollen, but to be allied with such a lawless and unstable state was a problem in itself. And just as Aitolia's expansion had provoked hostility from Macedon, so Achaia's had produced hostility from Sparta.

It is not altogether clear if the alliance with Achaia continued in effect after the end of the fighting in 228. It had originated at a time when both leagues were threatened by Demetrios II, a situation which ceased to apply after the various settlements of 228 – peace between Aitolia and Macedon, Argos subsumed into the Achaian League, the Macedonian garrisons removed from Attika, the Illyrians subdued by Rome. Co-operation between the leagues had been ineffective, except in the Illyrian invasion of Epeiros, and the absence of any Achaian assistance to Aitolia in Thessaly was mirrored by the absence of any Aitolian assistance to Achaia in the Peloponnese. It seems reasonable to assume that the alliance may be defined as defunct by 228[1]. The delivery of the Peloponnesian cities of Mantinea, Tegea, and Kaphyai to Kleomenes of Sparta[2], with at least

[1] Walbank, more than once, remarks that the battle of Paxos was the 'last joint action' of the alliance (*CAH* VII (2) 453, and in Hammond *Hist. Mac* 3.335), but this is not necessarily the end of the alliance.

[2] Pol. 2.46.2.

Aitolian compliance, if not active assistance, was a development which will not have encouraged the continuance of that alliance.

The real problem was not the occasional disputes and other alliances of the two leagues, but their differing methods and policies. The Achaian tradition, as developed and exemplified by Aratos, was to threaten and use violence – *coups* at Sikyon and Corinth, raids into Attika and Argos – and it had a distressing tendency to favour deals with tyrants so that Lydiadas of Megalopolis and Aristomachos of Argos became *strategoi* of the league and other tyrants brought in their cities, despite the fact that Aratos had begun his political career as a liberator from tyranny at Sikyon. The expansion of the Achaian League had thus been accomplished by revolution, war and blackmail, and the smaller cities who joined it had clearly done so as a means of self-defence – defence, that is, against the Achaians. These methods were essentially the same as those used by the Illyrians in their brief imperial career.

The Aitolian method, however, did not rely on such procedures, but was cautious and non-violent in most cases. Since 278 the league had been involved in only one war, and had used violence to expand only in the cases of Herakleia and Medeon. The fighting in Thessaly against Antigonos had been unexpected, judging by the brief account we have of it. That is to say, the Aitolian League did not expand by the methods used by Aratos.

This difference in method is important, for Aratos' methods, presumably distasteful to the Aitolians, were liable to involve the Achaian League in conflicts, which, if the alliance of the two leagues continued, might drag in Aitolia as well. The Macedonian war had involved at least one Aitolian raid on Attika, which was not an area in which the Aitolians had ever shown much interest, and the only power which could reap advantage from such an action was Achaia. The presence on Achaia's southern flank of the four cities who were Aitolian allies, cut off as they were from easy Aitolian assistance since the Achaian acquisition of Heraia, was therefore an obligation which Aitolia could shed, leaving the decision to the local cities, though in doing so the Achaians would undoubtedly complain.

The developing crisis in the Peloponnese thus did involve the Aitolians at first, but they rapidly disengaged themselves from it. Kleomenes of Sparta engineered the annexation of the three Aitolian allies without any protest from the cities themselves – 'they showed

no resentment', says Polybios[3]. The Aitolians may not in fact have had any say in the matter, just as they clearly had had no say in the ending of the alliance with the Boiotians, but if the cities agreed with Spartan aims, then Aitolia and Sparta could be considered to be aligned together. Aitolia was, of course, still involved in the Peloponnese, in the alliances with Elis and Phigaleia and Messenia in the west. Since these two states were not involved in the subsequent events, Aitolia was obviously able to keep its distance all through the crisis which is associated with the exploits of Kleomenes.

Aitolia and Sparta were thus friends in the period when Kleomenes acquired the cities, and this event must mark the end of any alliance between Aitolia and Achaia[4]. The acquisition of the cities produced an immediate threat to the Achaian League, and it is this which seems to be behind the embassy of two Megalopolitans to Antigonos Doson in 227[5]. They failed to persuade him to take an interest, though the conclusion of treaties he made with two Cretan cities at the time suggests that he was making some military preparations[6].

Kleomenes and Aitolia were jointly antagonistic towards Achaia, and Antigonos was, as Macedonian king, and as heir to both Antigonos Gonatas and Demetrios II, similarly antagonistic towards Aratos and his league. Whether the three made a formal alliance, as Polybios suggests, may be doubted[7]. The immediate aftermath of the Thessalian conflict is an unlikely time for an Aitolo-Macedonian alliance, as is the fact that Doson went off to Karia for part of the year. But the end of the Thessalian war did remove the active conflict, and Doson had no old grudges to work off on Aitolia; an *entente*, if not an alliance, is quite possible.

The friendship of Aitolia and Sparta must be one of the factors behind the campaign which Kleomenes waged in north-west Achaia

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[3] Ibid.

[4] The fate of these cities is, of course, much more complicated than this; cf. Walbank, *Aratos*, 62-64, and *CAH*, VII 1 (2), 463.

[5] Pol. 2.48.2.

[6] Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* III 506 (with Eleutherna) and 502 (with Hierapytna).

[7] Pol. 2.45.1-5; this alliance is disbelieved by Walbank, *CAH* VII 1 (2), 419, and defended by R. A. de Laix, 'Polybios' Credibility and the Triple Alliance of 230/229 BC', *California Studies in Classical Antiquity*, 2, 1969, 65-83; neither considers that this 'alliance' may be a Polybian exaggeration of a brief diplomatic alignment; see also M. Daubies, 'Un Chassé-croisé diplomatique dans le Péloponnese au IIIe siècle avant J.-C.', *Antiquité Classique* 42, 1973, 123-154.

in 226. It appears he was hoping for an alliance with Elis, which, given the alliance of Aitolia and Elis, makes sense[8]. But neither Doson nor Aitolia was eager to see Kleomenes' Sparta replace Aratos' Achaian League in control of the whole Peloponnese. The crisis soon evolved into a question of the integrity and continued existence of the Achaian League, and when Kleomenes was able to seize control of Corinth, Antigonos Doson, who had been appealed to more than once by the Achaians, and, like Aitolia, to whom Aratos appealed at least once[9], had declined to involve himself, saw his chance of restoring the Macedonian position in Greece to what it had been in the time of Antigonos Gonatas. Deftly he gathered together many of the Greek states into an alliance, the Symmachy, with himself as *hegemon*. With some difficulty, he then finally defeated Kleomenes at Sellassia in 222[10].

In the process Antigonos had tested the will of the Aitolians by requesting their permission to march his army south through Aitolian-controlled Thermopylai[11]. It was refused, but the main point to note is that it had been requested at all. Neither Antigonos Gonatas nor Demetrios had ever needed or asked for such permission, for they had had a perfectly good route south through Euboia and Boiotia, though one which required transshipment[12]. But in the request Antigonos was not merely asking to go through Thermopylai; he was also asking to march through Achaia Phthiotis and Malis as well, only four years after the former land had become Aitolian, and he was asking to pass close to Doris, one of whose cities his men had sacked at that time. It is thus no wonder that permission was refused. The

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[8] Plut. *Kleomenes*, 15.1-2.

[9] Plut. *Aratos*, 41.2; the Athenians also refused to help.

[10] Walbank, *CAH* VII (2) 458-473, for a concise summary; these events, of course, have attracted much discussion: see especially Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.343-382, Walbank, *Aratos*, 70-113, P. Oliva, *Sparta and her Social Problems*, Amsterdam 1972, B. Shimron, *Late Sparta, the Spartan Revolution, 243-224 BC*, Buffalo, N.Y., 1972, R. Urban, *Wachstum und Krise aus achäischen Bundes: Quellenstudien zur Entwickland des Bundes von 280 bis 200 v Chr*, *Historia* Einzelschriften 35, Wiesbaden 1979; for the doings of Aratos, Plut. *Aratos* 41-45; id., *Kleomenes*, 16-28; Pol. 2.52.1-69.11; F. S. Gruen, 'Aratus and the Achaean Alliance with Macedon', *Historia* 21, 1972, 609-625; Will, *Histoire Politique*, 1.371-401.

[11] Pol. 2.52.8.

[12] J. A. O. Larsen, 'Phocis and the Social War of 220-217 BC', *Phoenix* 19, 1965, 1156-128, discusses possible routes, and suggests that the crossing point from Euboia to the mainland was from Aidipsos to Kynos rather than at Chalkis. It makes no odds in this case.

very request could only be seen by the Aitolians as a manifestation of continued Macedonian hostility.

The Aitolians, therefore, maintained a strict neutrality in the war over Kleomenes[13]. This meant favouring no side, neither Sparta, with whom the Aitolians are said to have been in collusion, perhaps even allied, nor the Achaians, with whom they had been allied beforehand. This stance implies that either alliance was strictly limited, perhaps in time, perhaps in space, but they appear not to have included co-operation against either Sparta or Achaia. This looks very much like a return to the old Aitolian policy, exemplified especially in the Chremonidean War, so that the Aitolian lands remained an island of peace in a peninsula devoted to war.

The anti-Aitolian animus which is clearly visible in the account of the causes of the Kleomenic War in Polybios[14] might therefore be explained by a feeling amongst certain Achaians that the Aitolians had deserted them when their assistance was most needed. Polybios' sources for these events were Phylarchos and Aratos' own *Memoirs*[15], the first adopting an anti-Aratos position, the second self-laudatory. Aratos clearly blamed Aitolia for permitting Kleomenes to seize the four cities, which might be seen, therefore, as a deliberate move to open up an invasion route to the heart of the Achaian League[16]. Aratos was also reluctant to call in Macedonian help, not surprisingly. This may be explained, not just as the result of his natural reluctance to pay the obvious price for Macedonian help – Corinth – but also that he hoped for some time that the Aitolians might help. Only when it became clear to him that they would not did he turn to Antigonos[17].

Antigonos, of course, went further than merely recovering control of Corinth. The wartime alliance, the Symmachy, was made a permanent institution, and consisted of all the leagues from Achaia to Macedon – with the sole exception of Aitolia. Much of the Pelopon-

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[13] J. A. O. Larsen, 'The Aetolians and the Cleomenic War', in L. Wallach (ed), *The Classical Tradition, Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1966, 43-57.

[14] As Larsen, previous note, makes clear.

[15] As he himself explains: 2.56.1-2.

[16] Larsen, 'Aetolians and the Cleomenic War', 55.

[17] This is, of course, contradictory, seeing Aratos as both blaming Aitolia and expecting Aitolian aid. To this I would reply that politicians can pursue contradictory policies without difficulty, so that if one fails the other is available, and second, I am concerned to suggest alternatives to Polybios' set of reasons.

nese, and Athens, also stayed out[18]. These abstentions – half of Greece – compel one to deny that this was a movement of Greco-Macedonian unification[19]. It was, in reality, another Macedonian attempt to control the Greek states; but it would not succeed while the most important Greek state, Aitolia, remained outside.

Antigonos thus contrived his Symmachy with a view to expanding his own power in Greece. His recent hostility towards Aitolia, and Aitolia's expansion, was the basis for the inclusion of the Epeirotes and the Akarnanians; the Phokians and the Boiotians were included also, having continued their joint alliance with the Achaians since their break with Aitolia. And, of course, the Achaians were included as the pretext for the reassertion of Macedonian power in the south. The geographical distribution of these members demonstrates quite clearly the primacy of Macedonian interests: Antigonos obviously feared Aitolian ambitions among the weak and fragmentary city-leagues which were Aitolia's neighbours. For Achaia his plans were more directly assertive and humiliating: garrisons in Akrokorinth, Orchomenos, and Heraia, and perhaps other places: a refounded Mantinea (it had been taken and sacked by Aratos during the war) was renamed 'Antigoneia'; a law passed the Achaian Assembly by which Antigonos could summon it to meet whenever he wished; cities were transferred in and out of the Achaian League. After all this Achaia must be seen as a Macedonian satellite.

In the meantime Aitolia had been active in such a way as to provide its western neighbours with a colourable justification for huddling under Macedon's skirts for protection. An Aitolian colony was planted at the town of Same on the island of Kephallenia. This is noted in the epigraphic record of the colonial law which was preserved at Thermos[21], and it was surely fully taken note of in Akarnania and Epeiros.

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[18] Pol. 9.5.4 for the numbers.

[19] Cary, *Greek World*, 164, regards the Symmachy as a step in 'the way of a reunion of Greece and willing co-operation between Greece and Macedon'; Walbank, *CAH* VII (2) 469, describes it as 'an alliance, not a superstate'; N. G. L. Hammond, *The Macedonian State*, Cambridge, 199 , 325-326, translates the *symmachia* as a 'coalition of Allies', and claims that the members were equal with one another, and that 'Macedonia was on a level with Phocis'. R. M. Errington, *A History of Macedonia*, 182, more realistically insists on seeing 'the league as a Macedonian creation', that is, an instrument of the Macedonian domination of Greece. The opinion of scholars in other countries are just as varied, with perhaps less idealism evident among the French and Germans.

[20] Plut. *Aratos*, 45.4-6; Pol. 4.85.6 and 5.1.6; Aymard, *Premiers Rapports*, 200.

[21] *IG* IX.1.2.

The episode implies a growing friendship between Aitolia and Kephallenia which became closer in the following years. Those vulnerable communities on the mainland no doubt saw it as a threat, but that is not necessarily the original Aitolian purpose in establishing the colony. In fact, the date of the foundation, in the strategy of Pyrrias of Herakleia, and so between September 223 and September 222, shows that, if it had any relevance to events in Greece, it is more likely to be an Aitolian reaction to the Symmachy than the other way about, though the Symmachy might be better dated towards the end of Pyrrhias' year. Perhaps more relevant is the Akarnanian participation on the Illyrian side in the battle of Paxos[22]. The Aitolians had no naval capability to speak of, but the Kephallenians did; an alliance was a suitable move by Aitolia to gain access to this naval power; the Aitolian colony will thus have boosted Kephallenian defences, and was an earnest of Aitolian commitment to the alliance. Geography also points towards a local involvement. Same is on the eastern side of Kephallenia, directly across the island-strewn gulf between Akarnania and Kephallenia, and so it commands the outlet of the straits which lead between Kephallenia and Ithaka and that between Ithaka and the mainland. It was no more than six years since the Illyrian raids had taken place all along this coast, and since then Demetrios of Pharos had joined in the Spartan war in the Peloponnese as an ally of Antigonos. He had sailed with a fleet of fifty ships south of Lissos, and this was a direct contravention of the treaty he had agreed with Rome only in 228[23]. The Aitolians had been personally informed of that treaty by the Romans[24], and they might justifiably consider that the Romans were failing to enforce the own treaty, and that they must look to their own defences in this area. The colony at Same is best seen therefore as a response to the Illyrian revival first and foremost, but also to the recent hostility from Akarnania.

The whole island of Kephallenia was involved. In the next few years ships from the island operated as allies of Aitolia in the Gulf of Patras[25] and in a raid on the Epeirote coast[26], and the island was

[22] Pol. 2.10.1; Oost, *Roman Policy*, ignores this Aitolian move.

[23] Pol. 2.11.17; Polybios is not clear that Demetrios had the same restrictions imposed on him as Teuta, but it would seem likely; and an Illyrian fleet at large in the Ionian Sea would certainly frighten the coastal peoples.

[24] Pol. 2.12.4.

[25] Pol. 4.6.8.

[26] Pol. 4.6.2.

invaded by Philip of Macedon[27]. Ten years or so later, Kephallenians were attending as Delphic *hieromnemones*, during the last decade of the second century[28]. All this implies that Aitolia and Kephallenia were allies from the time of the planting of the colony at Same, and further, that the colony was planted by the Aitolians by arrangement with the Kephallenians. This puts back the alliance to perhaps as early as 224, or even earlier, and makes it all more likely that the colony's foundation and the alliance were responses to the Illyrian problem, rather than to the Symmachy, which only came into existence in 223 or 222.

The Kephallenian connection is thus more or less contemporary with a new Aitolian connection with the city of Magnesia-ad-Maiandros in Ionia. An agreement between the two is dated to 221/220 by the latest study[29], and it involved, as did the Kephallenian agreement, the grant of an Amphiktyonic seat to the city, though this is only recorded for the first time nearly twenty years later[30]. Further, there is an agreement, preserved only in a fragmentary copy, between the league and the island of Tenos. The date is in the third quarter of the third century (i.e. 250-225), and the purpose of the agreement is not clear[31]. But it fits into this new expansionist process best in the late 220s. The Aitolian League's diplomacy was clearly active at the same time that the crisis was developing in the Pelponnese: Aitolia, faced by an alliance of Macedon, Epeiros, Boiotia, and Achaia, with Macedonian power returned to southern Greece, was taking defensive measures.

The near-encirclement of Aitolia by the members of the Symmachy was not a new problem for the league; the events of the 230s had produced a similar situation, in which the Macedonian king, then Demetrios II, had been allied with Boiotia, Medeon in Akarnania, the Illyrians, and perhaps the Epeirotes. Seen in this light, the Symmachy was only a beefed-up and extended version of Demetrios' system. But it was the very extension which was the threat, together with the formal nature of the organisation, which suggested that it was a more permanent entity, and so a longer-term problem.

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[27] Pol. 3.3.3-4.13; Polybios remarks on the island's useful strategic situation at 4.1.
[28] FI I 37 (Lefèvre 94, of 205/203), and 43 (Lefèvre 95, of 204/203).
[29] Rigsby, *Asylia*, 54.
[30] FI I 44; Lefèvre 97.
[31] Rigsby, *Asylia*, 67.

Antigonos went home late in 222 to deal with another barbarian invasion of Macedon, but he left Brachyllas as his representative in Lakonia, and Taurion as his agent in the whole Peloponnese to command the Macedonian forces there, and also as a sort of governor-general to supervise the whole area[32]. He also sent his ward and successor Philip south to became acquainted with the situation and the people in Greece[33]. It all added up to virtual Macedonian control of much of Greece.

From Aitolia's viewpoint it was all very dangerous. All its neighbours – Akarnania, Epeiros, Macedon, Thessaly, Phokis, Boiotia and Achaia – were members of the Symmachy, which was controlled by Antigonos, whose heir was clearly being groomed to take up this same position. Macedonian garrisons held Chalkis in Euboia, Corinth, Orchomenos, and Heraia in the Peloponnese, and a Macedonian-appointed overseer controlled Sparta. Of the rest of Greece, Elis and Phigaleia were Aitolian allies, and only Messenia and Athens otherwise remained outside the Symmachy, but neither of these had any real political might. If the Macedonian king wished to do so, control of all Greece was within his grasp: only the Aitolians stood in the way. This was well perceived in Aitolia, and explains the policies pursued in the next years.

Within Aitolia this pressure may well have produced an important internal political development. For the only time in Aitolia's history members of a single family held the office of *strategos* for three successive years: Ariston son of Aristolaos of Trichonos in 221/220, Skopas son of Sosandros next year, and Dorimachos son of Nikostratos the year after. Their exact relationship is not clear, but Polybios notes that it existed[34]. Ariston was a long-established politician, with a career going back to holding the office of *hipparchos* in 244/243 and probably earlier, but there was a long gap between that office and his strategy; Skopas had been *grammateus* when Agelaos had been *strategos* in 224/223 and was destined for a long political career; his brother Dorimachos similarly, though his first elective post we know of was as *strategos* in 219/218. Between them these three men held the office of *strategos* eight times between 221/220 and 202/201. However, it is the succession of the three in the office between 221/220 and 219/218

[32] Bengtson, Die *Strategie in der hellenistichen Zeit*, 2nd ed., 1964-1967, vol 2, 258.
[33] Plut. *Aratos* 46.2-3.
[34] Pol. 4.5.1; *Prosopography*, 'Aitolian Families', under 'Trichonos'.

which is most remarkable. There is no example of men even from the same city succeeding one another at any other time: for three to succeed not only from the same city but from the same family, is unique.

Further, it is this group of three men who were the leading spirits in pursuing a particular policy during their time in office. This policy originated with Ariston, who was old and decrepit by the time he took office[35], and who designated his cousin Dorimachos as his agent in carrying out Aitolian policy in the western Peloponnese. Ariston had been elected in the usual way, which included – as can be seen from the account Polybios gives of the elections held during the siege of Medeon[36] – the various candidates airing their views on policy. That is, Ariston will have made his policy clear before he was elected, and was thus elected to carry it out. It is worth noting also that his predecessor was Pantaleon, holding the office for the fourth time, a man associated also with a very different policy – he had been the *strategos* who made peace with Achaia in 242/241, and the alliance with Achaia in 235. This policy had clearly failed by 221, when Ariston's election took place, against the political background of the organisation of the new Symmachy. The defensive policy which Pantaleon's predecessor Pyrrias had apparently promulgated in the colonisaton of Same was another alternative, but one which was clearly not now sufficient in the eyes of the Aitolian electorate.

Ariston's long absence from office may well have been due to his espousal of a more aggressive, assertive policy, one which had been judged inappropriate until the manifest dangers of the encirclement by the Symmachy became clear, after the battle of Sellassia in 222. By 221 this danger was manifest, certainly, and was emerging as a threat to Aitolia's last remaining friends in the Peloponnese. There some sort of alliance existed with Elis, though when it had been concluded is not known, with Phigaleia and Messenia, dating from the treaty concluded by the *strategos* Timaios in 240/239, and this was now reinforced by the agreement with Kephallenia. The immediate problem Ariston had to deal with lay in Messenia.

Messenia at this time shows all the symptoms of a state divided over its international posture. It had remained neutral in the Kleomenic War, but some of its exiled citizens had taken Kleomenes'

[35] Pol. 4.5.1.
[36] Pol. 2.2.8-10.

part. When Kleomenes took Megalopolis in 223 it was Messenians who let him in; a Messenian was his go-between in negotiations with Aratos[37] but it was also to Messene that the fugitives from Kleomenes' sack of Megalopolis fled[38]. Within Messenia Polybios affirms that a group of oligarchs were in power in 220 and had been controlling the city's policy for some time[39]. The dispute was, no doubt, in part over internal power – and may have been oligarchs against democrats – but it was also in its external dimension a dispute over the choice of allies. Those in power in 220 were in favour of an alliance with Achaia, and membership of the Symmachy; those out of power would thus seem to be, as the exiles showed, in favour of a Spartan alliance, and were also pro-Aitolian[40].

Were the anti-Aitolians in Messenia to be successful, Aitolia's whole position in the Peloponnese would collapse, and this would leave the league almost wholly isolated in Greece. The only allies Aitolia had left were in the south. Without them the bad old days of Achaian intrigues and coastal raids and Macedonian invasions could recur. This is not to say that this was intended by any of the Achaian or Macedonian politicians, only that it was possible, and that the argument could well be made at the elections in Thermos. It is certain that Ariston radically changed Aitolian policy, and began a much more active process designed to prevent, at the very least, the further worsening of Aitolia's international position.

If Messenia was wobbling in its alliance with Aitolia, it was all the more important to safeguard Aitolia's ally Phigaleia. This city, situated on the border of Messenia, represented Aitolia's means of access to Messenia, but it was also uncomfortably close to the Macedonian garrison at Heraia. Phigaleia was threatened by Messenia – indeed it had been such a threat which had brought Aitolia into the area in the first place, back in the 240s. Now Dorimachos was sent to Phigaleia 'on public business', as Polybios admits[41]. He was to 'guard the city and its territory', though he had no Aitolian troops with him. Polybios ascribes to him also the task of gathering intelligence on Peloponnesian affairs, a likely enough assignment for a man on a public

[37] Megalopolis: Pol 2.55.2; go-between: Plut. *Kleomenes* 19.8 and *Aratos* 41.5.
[38] Pol. 2.62.10.
[39] Pol. 4.4.2-3; it was clearly a modified oligarchy, not an oppressive one.
[40] Pol. 4.4.8-9; on all this see Roebuck, *Messenia*, 66-73.
[41] Pol 4.5.5; Dorimachos' actual status is never made clear by Polybios, but 'on public business' makes him an official representative of the Aitolian state.

business in a foreign land. On the spot at Phigaleia, he assessed the Messenian situation as worse than had been thought in Aitolia, that is, that the anti-Aitolian faction in Messenia was clearly in the ascendant. Yet it was also the case that the power of this group was limited, and that the argument within the Messenian state was not yet over, and that the pro-Aitolians could be encouraged by activity on his part.

Dorimachos is portrayed by Polybios as acting unofficially, and as a brigand, using terrorist methods. Yet he was in Phigaleia officially, 'on public business'. The date is important in sorting this out: it is the summer of 221. In Aitolia Pantaleon was in office as *strategos* until September, a man whose policy had always been friendship with Achaia. It must have been with his agreement that Dorimachos was in Phigaleia, and Pantaleon cannot have been ignorant of Ariston's opinions, and those of Dorimachos. It would seem, therefore, that at the time, Pantaleon had public opinion on his side[42]. Yet the situation was clearly dangerous, and Phigaleia was one of the few allies left to Aitolia. Pantaleon must be assumed to have supported Dorimachos, having appointed him. The international scene also darkened during the year: Ptolemy III died in February, and was succeeded by his son, and the Alexandrian court descended into intrigue and murder[43]. Then in the summer Antigonos Doson died, to be succeeded by the seventeen-year-old Philip V, another unknown quantity, but one only too likely to be hostile[44]. Ptolemy III had been a friend, perhaps an ally, of the Aitolians[45]; with his successor fully preoccupied with survival, and almost at once also involved in a war with the Seleukids, the Aitolians were still more isolated, and still more needed all the friends they could keep. That included Messenia, where Dorimachos

[42] So Walbank, *Aratos*, 114, interpreted Pol. 4.5.2, as a 'majority of the Aitolian people were against war', though this is rather stretching the implications of what Polybios said.

[43] Pol. 5.34.1-11.

[44] The exact date of Doson's death is not known; Hammond, *Hist. Mac* 3.362, n. 9, points out that it must have been before October; in Walbank, *Philip V*, 20, he puts the new king's accession at the 'summer of 221'.

[45] *IG* IX.1.56, an elaborate monument erected by the Aitolians to honour Ptolemy III. Exactly what Ptolemy had done for the Aitolians is, however, unknown. It appears to be connected to Ptolemy's support for Kleomenes until just before the Sellassia battle, but further than this it is not possible to go; cf. J. Schwartz, 'Athènes et l'Étolie dans la politique lagide (à la lumière du P. Haun 6)', *ZPE* 30, 1978, 95-100. The size and elaboration of the monument at Thermos, however, argues a much greater importance to the relationship.

quickly detected the likelihood of a change in foreign policy, away from the Aitolian alliance. Indeed, the more one thinks about it, the more likely it is that the 'public business' he had to carry out was what he actually did, to exert himself to re-align Messenia with Aitolia.

The only ways of making an effect in Messenia were by intrigue within the city or force applied from outside, and both were used. Dorimachos could not use either Aitolians or Phigaleians, for fear of provoking a war, but raids by others were a different matter, and perhaps disavowable. A group of 'brigands' was recruited – really they should be classified as mercenaries, which was probably what they had been in the recently-concluded war – and set to carry out the raids. No doubt they selectively despoiled the property of anti-Aitolians with the object of both demoralising them and undermining their authority. Sure enough the Messenians protested directly to Dorimachos, several times. This eventually permitted Dorimachos to go to Messene itself, ostensibly to plead his case. Once there his men, surely by prearrangement, raided a farm near the city belonging to one of the Messenian magistrates, a man called Chyron, or Skyron. When directly accused, Dorimachos insisted he was operating as an Aitolian official, but then promised redress to those damaged by his raids[46].

Dorimachos had by these means issued a clear warning to the anti-Aitolian faction in Messenia, and had also encouraged the pro-Aitolians in both Messenia and Phigaleia. Indeed he had successfully fixed Messenian attention on the problem of Phigaleia, so much so that when they began serious negotiations with the Achaians it was the Aitolian position in that city which they wanted attended to first of all[47]. In other words, while he had not carried through a counter-revolution, Dorimachos had certainly halted the movement within Messenia towards Achaia.

The methods employed by Dorimachos were made necessary by the position Aitolia was in. It was obviously impossible for the league to challenge the Symmachy directly, but it was clearly a legitimate ploy to try to subvert it. Polybios gathers all the Aitolian initiatives together, and exaggerates: 'They made war all at once', he states, 'on

[46] Pol. 4.3.8-4.8.
[47] Pol. 4.31.1.

the Messenians, Epeirotes, Achaians, Akarnanians, and Macedonians'[48]. Yet this also contains the essence of what was happening. The Messenians were to be dissuaded, apparently with success, from joining the Symmachy. The others, already members, were to be persuaded to leave, or at least to reduce their enthusiasm for membership.

Polybios lists the attacks he says were made: the capture of a Macedonian ship off Kythera and the sale of her crew and passengers; a piratical raid on the Epeirote coast; an attack on the city of Thyrreion in Akarnania; the seizure of a place called Klarion in Megalopolitan territory as a base for raids. However specific these seem to be, in most of them there is a strong element of doubt and distortion, and the whole collection conceals as much as it reveals. The capture of the Macedonian ship is specifically said to have been by pirates, who may well have been Aitolians, but it is Polybios' own interpretation that these men were sent out by Ariston on an official voyage. The sale of the captives, who he says included Macedonian officers and soldiers, in an Aitolian port would not be construed by any other state as an act of war unless a pretext was deliberately sought, and this incident is never referred to again by any party[49].

The raid on the coast of Epeiros seems to have been by the same group of pirates, though again Polybios implies official Aitolian inspiration, and they were assisted by some Kephallenians, who were certainly Aitolian allies at the time. It is Polybios' own interpretation that the raid was Aitolian in both inspiration and origin[50]. The attempt 'to seize' Thyrreion looks very much like the same sort of attempt at expansion which the Aitolians had made at Medeon ten years earlier; it evidently failed, and it is very odd that nothing more is heard of it[51]. It is, however, worth commenting that Thyrreion was perhaps the most important of the Akarnanian cities still outside the Aitolian League. If it could be detached from the Akarnanian League, the league itself might well collapse; it had not been particularly useful to the people of Medeon a few years before. Polybios says it was an attempt the 'seize' the city, and later it was described as a *coup de main* made at night, so it was not an open attack. This would fit with the

[48] Pol. 4.5.10.
[49] Pol. 4.6.1.
[50] Pol. 4.6.2.
[51] Ibid., and Pol. 4.25.3; Oost, *Roman Policy*, 23.

method used in Messenia – as, of course, would the pirate-cum-Kephallenian raid on Epeirote shores. Both may thus be interpreted as warnings to the two leagues, but deniable if necessary.

Polybios' method of piling up guilt by suggestion is very well seen in his account of the affair at Klarion. He claims that the Aitolians sent 'a small force secretly' through the Peloponnese to seize Klarion[52]. Apart from this statement there is no need to involve the Aitolians in this affair at all. It was an attempt at pure brigandage, and was suppressed by the Achaians 'in a few days', though Taurion, the Macedonian commander in the area, was also required to lend a hand. Further, Polybios had already described the Aitolian force as 'small', yet this required the attentions of both the Achaian League forces and their *strategos*, and the Macedonian viceroy in the Peloponnese. Only if the brigands were the same men who had been Dorimachos' followers in Phigaleia earlier in the year can we find any Aitolian involvement in what, on the face of it, was no more than a piece of unrest typical of what might be found in a land recently subjected to a devastating episode of war. The site of Klarion is not known, but it was in the territory of Megalopolis, an area much fought over in the recent war. The 'brigands' had clearly been operating for some time, since they had collected enough loot to be able to organise its sale in a regular market. This cannot be ascribed to Aitolian initiative, and any Aitolian involvement was in all probability both minor and private.

All this, of course, is not to say that there was no Aitolian involvement in any of these events: the attempt on Thyrreion especially seems certainly to have been an Aitolian exploit; but it *is* to say that Polybios' word in such matters is not good enough, especially when he adduces secrecy. All of these events are capable of alternative explanations, in which the Aitolian element can be reduced or removed altogether; and little or no *official* Aitolian involvement can be seen. Above all, the wider context is necessary for understanding. Add these considerations to the ridiculous notion of a sensible state with a long record for great caution in its international relations deliberately setting out to make war on five surrounding states all at the same time, and it is evident that we are dealing here with an historian seeking to cast the blame for the outbreak of the war on the war's victim.

[52] Pol. 4.6.3-4.

Then the timing of events has to be considered. Ariston took up office as *strategos* in September 221. By then Antigonos Doson was dead, and Philip V was king. Doson had had to repel a Dardanian invasion the previous year, during which he died[53], and Philip's first crisis came with another such invasion, one which was not finally dealt with until late in 220[54]. Polybios fails to mention this, but it was clearly important, since it prevented Philip from attending to events in Greece during 221 and the first half of 220. That is, whatever the Aitolians did, they could be reasonably confident that the Symmachy would not react as a unit until Philip was freed from his Macedonian problems. They would perhaps assume that they had the campaigning season of 221 for their projects, but they could not expect to have 220 as well, which will have come as a bonus.

And yet, when the various actions are considered, in total they are fairly unimportant: a couple of seaborne raids, an attempt on Thyrreion – the Klarion affair was clearly not an Aitolian matter at all. The main official Aitolian concern throughout remained with Messenia. Dorimachos returned to Aitolia after his activities in Phigaleia and Messenia in the summer of 221, probably after Ariston's election. Ariston, too unwell for much exertion, left much of his work to Skopas and to Dorimachos. As a group, they made the Aitolian plans for the coming year. Once again understanding these plans is bedevilled by Polybios' deliberate bias, and this had to be discounted. He claims that the Aitolian move was made just before the next Achaian *strategos* (Aratos, for the thirteenth time) took office, and from this we are supposed to take the impression that the whole thing was somehow unfair[55]. But Timoxenos, the *strategos* for 221/220 was no shrinking violet; he had vigorously suppressed the nest of brigands at Klarion. If, as Polybios implies, Timoxenos did not oppose the Aitolian move, it must be for a good reason. Polybios says it was because the Achaian forces were in a bad state of training[56] – but Timoxenos used these men against the Klarion brigands, and it was no more than a year and a half since Achaian troops had been in action at Sellassia,

[53] Pol. 2.70.1; Plut, *Kleomenes*, 30.1.

[54] Justin 29.1.10-11.

[55] Pol. 4.6.7; but the election of Aratos had already taken place, and so the Aitolians knew it would be him they would have to face. In fact, it may be that the preferred to face Aratos rather than Timoxenos, who had at least shown a modicum of military competence at Klarion.

[56] Pol. 4.7.6.

and Aratos was able to raise a substantial army only a short time later. So this ostensible reason is Polybios' misdirection. Nor was it a matter of timing, for Timoxenos clearly had the responsibility for acting, and had not been afraid to do so earlier. Neither of Polybios' reasons will do. What we can see is that Timoxenos and Aratos disagreed over how to cope with the Aitolian actions.

After Ariston's election in September the Aitolians sent an expeditionary force to Phigaleia commanded by Dorimachos and Skopas to exert more pressure on Messenia. This was a move clearly designed to reproduce the events of the previous year on a larger scale. Ariston authorised them to take a portion of the Aitolian forces with them, whereas the year before Dorimachos had recruited men locally. This was a deliberate raising of the stakes in the dispute. Further, these forces – not 'the whole of the Aitolian forces', as Polybios says, but only a fairly small force – were ferried across the Gulf of Patras and landed at Rhion, in Achaian territory[57]. From there they marched past Patrai, Pharai and Tritaia, all Achaian cities, in whose territory, so Polybios says, they indulged in pillaging, though he does concede that they 'pretended' not to wish to do so[58].

This is all very odd. The choice of Rhion as the disembarkation point for the Aitolian forces was clearly a careful one, but one does not disembark directly into enemy territory if an alternative exists: the Aitolians could have sailed directly to Phigaleian territory, or they could have disembarked at an Eleian port – and they intended to return by way of Kyllene in Elis[59]. So the choice of Rhion as the disembarkation port was quite deliberate, either because they knew they would not be opposed, or to test Achaian reactions. If the former, they will have checked in advance with Timoxenos, which is a possible explanation for his unwillingness to oppose them; if the latter, the test will have been to see if the Achaians thought that the alliance originally negotiated between Aratos and Pantaleon was still in operation. Such an alliance would clearly allow for small forces to transit the ally's territory. Of course, both motives could have existed. Whichever was paramount, the Aitolians discovered that the Achaians were

[57] Pol. 4.6.8. Polybios has his geography wrong here; he says the forces gathered at Rhion and were transported to the Peloponnese, where he means Antirrhion; Rhion is the Peloponnesian landing place.

[58] Pol. 4.6.9-10.

[59] Pol. 4.9.9.

divided over the issue, but that the predominant view was one of hostility to them. Timoxenos was compelled to surrender his office of *strategos* five days early so that Aratos could take up the office, and Aratos called out the Achaian forces to assemble at Megalopolis[60], a suitable mustering point to watch events in Phigaleia and Messenia, neither place more than thirty kilometres away.

Meanwhile Dorimachos and Skopas had raided into Messenia from Phigaleia, not this time using 'brigands', but actual Aitolian forces. The Messenians did not contest the raids, but sent envoys to Aigion to ask for Achaian help, an appeal which helped persuade the Achaians to mobilise. Then the Messenians turned up at Megalopolis, and offered to join the Symmachy. The Achaian Assembly at Aigion also heard complaints from Patrai, Pharai and Tritaia about the Aitolians' conduct on their march[61]. It was not in the Megalopolis Assembly's gift to induct the Messenians into the Symmachy, but it did respond positively to the Messenians' alternative suggestion of an alliance between the two states[62].

Aratus had with him the Macedonians of the Peloponnese under the command of Taurion, who had been left by Antigonos to supervise the area, and at least one Akarnanian, and possibly a contingent from there. Even though the Achaians could not admit the Messenians to the Symmachy, they could provoke Symmachic reaction to an Aitolian attack by forcing the Aitolians to fight the combined army. This Aratos accomplished.

He sent a message to Dorimachos and Skopas at Phigaleia demanding that they evacuate Messenia. This they began to do[63], aiming to re-embark at Pheias in Elis instead of Kyllene, where Ariston was waiting for them with ships. Aratos brought up his mixed army to shadow their moves. Afraid of being attacked, the Aitolians sent on their baggage to Pheias and turned their main force to march towards Aratos' army. Taurion and Aratos were at Kleitor, to prevent the Aitolians re-embarking at Rhion, so the Aitolians marched due east, past Olympia and into the centre of the Peloponnese to camp at Methydrion, in Megalopolis' territory. This drew

[60] Pol. 4.7.10-11.

[61] Pol. 4.7.2-5.

[62] Pol. 4.9.2-5; Schmitt, *Staatsverträge*, III, 513; the Messenians had to give hostages and agree not to make terms with the Aitolians without Achaian agreement; Roebuck, *Messenia*, 71-76.

[63] Pol. 4.9.7-8.

the Achaian force south from Kleitor since the Aitolians seemed to be threatening Megalopolis, or perhaps the Macedonian post at Orchomenos. The Aitolians then marched off again towards the north-east, a direction which would give plenty of alternatives for their future marches. Aratos sent a detachment to hold up the Aitolians before they could get away. He was evidently quite determined to force a fight, which the Aitolians, equally clearly, wished to avoid. The problem was that, when Aratus succeeded in getting his battle, near Kaphyai, he lost. The Aitolians defeated his attack, which was launched in driblets, then did as they had evidently intended all along and marched off home, choosing a route past Pellene and Sikyon and through the Isthmus – and therefore past the Macedonian garrison, which did not react, and through Boiotia and Phokis as well. It is noteworthy that no-one made any attempt to stop them, but in the process they had successfully annoyed an inordinate number of the members of the Symmachy[64].

The battle, even in Polybios' account, was clearly the result of Aratos' actions, and the outcome was due to his military incompetence. The Aitolians had tried to avoid the fight by hard marching and changes of direction, but had been eventually forced to fight when attacked. In other words, the Aitolian intention in all this had been to insist that they had the right to send troops to Phigaleia, that they had the right to march through Achaian territory, that they aimed above all to maintain their alliance with Messenia. Aratos, on the other hand, was busy engineering a crisis of much wider scope, in which the Symmachy would take on the dispute with Messene, one which in reality was a dispute with Achaia alone, or even an internal matter within Messenia. By dismissing some of his own forces but retaining those of Taurion, and perhaps some Akarnanians, he was successfully forcing a bloodletting between Aitolians and other forces besides the Achaians. And as soon as he had survived the row in the Achaian Assembly[65], he sent envoys to all Aitolia's neighbours – Epeiros, Akarnania, Phokis, Boiotia – giving his own very tendentious account of events, and also to the new Macedonian king, Philip V[66].

The Aitolian reaction was to insist on the Messenian alliance's validity. It was this which the Achaians denied. The Aitolians pro-

[64] Pol. 4.9.9-13.5.
[65] Pol. 4.14.1-2.
[66] Pol. 4.15.1-2.

claimed their peaceful intentions; they would not be at war with the Achaians, so long as the new alliance with Messenia was abandoned. Polybios makes heavy weather of this, insisting that the threat of war came from Aitolia, when in fact it came from Achaia[67]. This was quite clear to the other addressees of the Achaian complaints. The Boiotians and Phokians both ignored them, despite the fact that the Aitolians had marched home through their territory; no response is known from the Akarnanians; the Epeirotes agreed that Messenia should join the Symmachy, but also agreed that they should remain at peace with the Aitolians; and this was the line Philip took as well[68]. The Achaians were on their own. Aratos mobilised once more, and demanded contingents from the Messenians and the Spartans. The latter sent a few men; the former demanded that the threat to them from Phigaleia's enmity should be removed before they sent their army away[69].

The Aitolians proclaimed that it was their wish to be at peace with everyone, a claim all the more convincing given their essentially peaceful history over the previous sixty years. But the party now in power was not content to simply let the Achaians rouse the rest of Greece against them. Intrigues were set on foot to undermine the unity of the Achaian League. This was not a difficult matter, for the unity had crumbled rapidly only a few years before under the impact of Kleomenes' victories. The city of Kynaitha, captured by Aratos a decade and a half before, contained disaffected elements. Dorimachos arrived outside the city with an Aitolian force.

Here again we have an example of Polybios' attempt to mix up two elements. There was an Illyrian raid in progress at the time. Skerdilaidas and Demetrios of Pharos had sailed to Messenia, trying to seize on Pylos, presumably as a base for their raids. They failed and separated, Skerdilaidas sailing north, Demetrios sailing round the Peloponnese, and into the Aegean. Skerdilaidas sailed to Naupaktos, presumably to sell his loot, and there he and his fleet were hired by Agelaos of Naupaktos, who had been *strategos* three years before, an experienced Aitolian politician, who will have known what he was

[67] Pol. 4.15.8-11.

[68] Pol. 4.16.1-2; this was now late in the year, the Aitolian response having been formulated at their annual Assembly in September; maybe Philip was still involved in Macedonia, clearing out the Dardanians.

[69] Pol. 4.16.6 and 31.1.

about. Polybios also notes that Skerdilaidas had gone to Naupaktos at the request of Amynas (or Amynander) the king of Athamania, with whom Skerdilaidas had a marriage connection[70].

These connections suggest what the Aitolians were doing, Amynandros was king, or perhaps joint-king[71], of one of the fragments of the old Epeirote kingdom, which had asserted its independence in the 230s, when the kingdom broke up, and which had been an Aitolian friend since then. His colleague Theodoros was also, so it has been conjectured, related to the Macedonian royal house in some way, and to the Illyrian king Agron. Thus it is quite reasonable to accept Polybios' assertion that Skerdilaidas went to Pylos to raid Messenia as an associate of the Aitolians: it was what they had done themselves, and was a version of what Dorimachos had done when he had hired the band of local 'brigands' during his first visit to Phigaleia, and, more ironically, it was more or less what Demetrios II had done to stop the Aitolians taking Medeon.

Agelaos of Naupaktos was a senior Aitolian statesman. He had already been *strategos* twice, the second time in 224/223 at the time when Antigonos Doson was setting up the Symmachy, and was thus influential in formulating the Aitolian policy of neutrality in the Kleomenic War, and of abstention from the Symmachy. In that year his colleague as *grammateus* had been Skopas[72]. All this suggests that he was inclined towards the assertive policy of Ariston, and his relatives. In addition it is probable that he was the brother of Kleonikos of Naupaktos, who was an Achaian *proxenos* there, and who thus will have had good information about internal Achaian affairs, including the problems of Kynaitha[73].

This combination of Amynandros, Skerdilaidas, and Ariston and his family and party was thus continuing the policy of the previous year with vigour. Skerdilaidas and Demetrios had first raided into Messenia, perhaps as a device to force the Messenians and Achaians to test their new alliance, perhaps to dissuade the Messenians from contributing to the force being recruited by Aratos. It was Skerdilaidas' men who were now taken by Dorimachos, with some Aitolian

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[70] Pol. 4.16.1-10; Schmitt, *Staatsverträge*, III, 515; Oost, *Roman Policy*, 20-22.

[71] M.-F. Baslez, 'La Monarchie Athamane à la fin du IIIe siècle et au debut du IIe siècle avant J.-C.', in P. Cabanes (ed.), *L'Illyrie meridionale et l'Épire dans l'Antiquité*, Clermont Ferrand 1987, 167-173.

[72] *IG* IX.1.4c.

[73] *Prosopography*, 'Aitolian Families', under 'Naupaktos'.

forces, to the subversion of Kynaitha. This city had been rent by faction for years, with the current rulers supported by Achaia. The dispossessed had appealed to Aitolia, and they were now re-installed in the city by Dorimachos, Skopas, Agelaos and Skerdilaidas. The internal affairs of the city were irreparable, however, and various massacres and plunderings took place, for which, of course, Polybios blamed the Aitolians. The expedition then marched by way of Lousoi, a temple briefly raided years before by Aitolians, in the expedition of Timaios, to Kleitor, where they tried the same ploy as at Kynaitha, but without success. Returning to Kynaitha, they offered the city to Elis, who carefully refused it, and it was then burnt and abandoned[74].

This raid, presented in Polybios' terms as a typically brigandish Aitolian action, designed to provoke the Achaians, is in a fact a carefully calculated move. It was a reply in kind to Achaia's diplomatic intrigues in Messenia. For the problem there was not of Aitolia's origin. The Aitolians in Messenia were trying to retain their alliance; it was the Achaians who were upsetting the situation by attempting to detach Messenia from Aitolia and make it their own ally. In the Kynaithan affair the Aitolians were doing unto the Achaians what the Achaians had done to them. They were removing Kynaitha from the Achaian alliance, just as Messenia had been detached from their own. The Aitolians were thus showing the Achaians that their situation was vulnerable to their pressure. The Aitolian move, it must be remembered, came just after the declaration at the Achaian Assembly in May, whereby Achaia demanded that Aitolia renounce its alliance with Messenia, and can best be seen in the light of that move. The rapid collapse of the Achaian system in the face of Kleomenes' assault three years before showed that Aitolia knew what it was doing. The threat was a destruction of the Achaian League.

To this the Achaians had to reply. They were still on their own. None of the allies of the Symmachy had responded to their appeal, though Taurion had now hired Demetrios of Pharos, fresh from raiding the Cyclades, to try to intercept the Aitolian force as it returned from Kynaitha, again by way of the Isthmus. Demetrios missed them and set about raiding the Aitolian coast from his base at Corinth[75]. Aratos, having burnt his fingers earlier in the fight with the Aitolians

[74] Pol. 4.16.10-19.6.
[75] Pol. 4.19.7-9.

at Kaphyai, now made no serious attempt to intercept the Aitolians, who got away with ease[76].

All this took place before King Philip, now presumably free of the Dardanian troubles, came south into Greece to see for himself. Significantly he did nothing at first over this dispute, other than summon delegates to a meeting of the Symmachy, but instead attended to a problem in Sparta[77]. Polybios suggests that it was another Aitolian intrigue[78], and he has also alleged a secret treaty between Sparta and Aitolia[79]. But the problem in Sparta was one of internal faction, not external intrigues, and it had culminated in a party massacre just before Philip arrived. Philip accepted the situation, as it had now developed, and then returned to Corinth, where he met the members of the Symmachy[80].

Aratos bombarded him with complaints, some of which were exaggerations, and others pure inventions. Other delegates joined in, no doubt coached in their parts by Aratos, dragging up every grievance they could remember for the past generation: the Boiotians went back to 245 and the attack on the temple of Athene Itonia at Koroneia[81]. Philip responded by agreeing to a declaration of war on Aitolia by the Symmachy[82]. Polybios, of course, implies that Philip was responding to the righteous complaints of his allies, but it is more likely that he had his own reasons for the war. In personal terms, he was clearly anxious to emancipate himself from his inherited council, and to prove himself as a commander of the army in action. Politically he required a victorious war to establish himself fairly as Macedonian king, and as *hegemon* of the Symmachy. Certainly he was in favour of the war, and the council of the Symmachy at Corinth was unanimous in voting for it, though, since the Symmachy was composed of the very states which had been making the complaints the issue had been pre-judged. And, of course, they expected Philip and the Achaians to be doing most of the fighting.

[76] Pol. 4.19.11-12.
[77] Pol. 4.22.2-3.
[78] Pol. 4.22.5.
[79] Pol. 4.16.5; this 'secret alliance' is, of course, by its very secrecy, only a conjecture by Polybios; Hammond, *Hist. Mac* 3.372, attributes this to 'an opposition group', which piles conjecture on a guess.
[80] Pol. 4.24.9-25.1.
[81] Pol. 4.25.2; other complaints, it must be admitted, were of more recent vintage.
[82] Pol. 4.25.5.

The Council stated three war-aims[83]: to recover any territory acquired by the Aitolians since the death of Demetrios, which applied to the Thessalian lands lost by Antigonos Doson; to free any community which had been compelled to join the Aitolian League against its will, a category of peoples which would be defined by the Symmachy once the war was won, but which also invited rebellions in the course of the war, and which was presumably aimed to attract the Epeirotes (over Ambrakia), the Akarnanians (over such places as Oiniadai and Stratos, even Agrinion), and Phokis; the third aim was to deprive the Aitolians of their control of the Amphiktyony, which in turn meant the temple and city of Delphi, and which was designed to give the war the character of another Sacred War. The whole package was designed to push back the Aitolian frontiers on all sides, and to reduce the league's power to that of a minor state, and to attract support from Aitolia's neighbours. In practice, only Philip and Achaia showed any serious interest in waging the actual war. The Achaian Assembly ratified the declaration of war with enthusiasm[84].

This was the outcome Aitolian policy since 222 had been intended to avert, and that policy had apparently therefore failed. Yet there was a marked lack of enthusiasm amongst most of the members of the Symmachy: only Achaia and Akarnania agreed with any degree of alacrity to the declaration of war, and Philip did not exhibit any real urgency. The lack of interest by other members – Phokis, Boiotia, Epeiros – may well be the result of the policy pursued by Aitolia in the recent past.

That policy had combined intrigue and carefully calculated displays of violence. By repeatedly humiliating Achaia on the battlefield, at Kaphyai, at Kynaitha, the Aitolians demonstrated to other members of the Symmachy the hollowness of the Achaian pretensions; by repeatedly insisting that the issue was Messenia the Aitolians brought it down to a quarrel between a non-member and a member over another non-member, and forced the Achaians to bring in Philip to redress the balance, where many members of the Symmachy cannot have been pleased at the further demonstration of Macedonian control. Philip's reasonableness at Corinth and in the discussions with

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[83] Pol. 4.25.6-8.
[84] Pol. 4.26.7.

Sparta did not wholly cancel out the Achaian unreasonableness, and no-one could ignore Achaian instability.

The violence which emanated from Aitolia was carefully directed, and much of it was deniable. The raid on the Epeirote coast, the attempted *coup de main* at Thyrreion, the involvement of Skerdilaidas and his men in the Kyraithan raid – hired by a private Aitolian citizen! – the use of a group of 'brigands' in Dorimachos' first involvement at Messenia, were all projects which spread the apparent responsibility and succeeded in fogging the issue. And the results suggest a measure of success: Messenia failed to join the war on the side of the Symmachy, Sparta made diplomatic contact with Aitolia, Epeiros was unenthusiastic over the war, Phokis and Boiotia stood aside, despite participating in the complaints and the declaration of war. These must be taken as in part at least the result of Aitolian policy, and they successfully reduced the roster of enemies by so much. But the main enemies, Achaia and Macedonia, were unmovable.

14. THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR (THE SOCIAL/SYMMACHIC WAR) 2. THE FIGHTING (220-217)

The declaration of war by the Symmachy at Corinth was implemented first by Achaia, with its own declaration in the autumn presumably at the equinox meeting of the league Assembly[1]. At the same time, the Aitolians held their electoral Assembly at Thermos. There, Skopas was elected *strategos* for the coming year[2]. Between the Symmachy's declaration and these simultaneous meetings, Philip had attempted to bring the Aitolians to negotiations. Indeed this may have been the purpose of the declaration of war in the first place. Yet if the letter he sent is summarised accurately by Polybios, it is surprising that they even replied, since it was so thoroughly offensive[3]. But Philip was actually invited to a meeting in their reply, and the Aitolians named Rhion as the place of appointment. Polybios said that they then pulled out, but in fact they pointed out that no decision could be made until the annual *Thermike* meeting[4]. Given the events of the last year, and the closeness of the election and the Assembly of Aitolian citizens at which the election took place, and which had the power of decision of war and peace, the Aitolian point was clearly a reasonable one.

Whether Philip would have made another attempt at negotiations we cannot tell, for he did not get the chance. Before any results could come from the Aitolian meeting, the Achaians at their own meeting accepted the Symmachic decree, and went further: they proclaimed Aitolia subject to reprisal, by which its people would be enslaved and its lands plundered[5]. This clearly went much further than the original Symmachic decree concerning war aims; and it pre-empted any attempt at negotiation, since Philip's invitation had been intended to avoid the war which had now been declared. Philip could do nothing about it. In many ways he had been inveigled into the war by Aratos,

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[1] Pol. 4.26.7.

[2] Pol. 4.27.1.

[3] Pol. 4.26.3-4; it is scarcely to be believed that Polybios summarised accurately; it is in most undiplomatic terms.

[4] Pol. 4.26.5-6.

[5] Pol. 4.26.7.

and now he had been bounced one stage further, so that the war had become unavoidable[6].

The other members of the Symmachy had been notified also, as were Messenia[7], Achaia's ally, and Sparta[8], the ally of Macedon. Each was, in effect, invited to join in the war, with the prospect of acquiring land, or loot, or both, from Aitolia. But after the meeting of the Achaian Assembly, Philip and the Macedonian army marched home[9]. It was thus clear that nothing would actually happen in terms of active warfare until after the winter. And so the allies were given plenty of time to consider their responses, but, in the same way, the Aitolians were also given that time to prepare for the war, and to make their own diplomatic moves to try to limit the threat they faced. Thus the period following the declaration was a clear continuation of the situation as it had been beforehand.

The Aitolians sent out their own envoys to dispute with those of the Symmachy, or to persuade the assemblies of the members of the league to stay out of the war. They were unable to affect the Achaians, for the decision to send these envoys was only taken at the September assembly at Thermos, too late to affect the simultaneous decision at Aigion. Nor do they seem to have been able to reach the Akarnanians in time to put their point of view. The Symmachy envoys were apparently sent to visit the members in sequence, so the Akarnanians were first on their list in the north west. They forthwith declared their acceptance of the decree, earning a nonsensical tribute from Polybios for forthrightness[10]. By the time the envoys reached Epeiros, however, the Aitolians had realised what was happening and had reacted by sending their own envoys to the Epeirote centre at Phoenike.

From Polybios' description the Symmachic envoys had been able to persuade the Epeirotes to declare war, but the Epeirotes, hemmed in by Aitolians, Macedonians, Romans, and Illyrians, were wary. They made their participation conditional on Philip himself taking the field[11], which put off the moment of actual decision for several

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[6] This is Walbank's point in *Aratos*, 119; he is not so explicit in Hammond, *Hist Mac*, 3.372-373.

[7] Pol. 4.31.1.

[8] Pol. 4.34.1.

[9] Pol. 7.27.9.

[10] Pol. 4.30.1-2; Polybios' tribute follows (3-5) and has little or no connection with what has gone before.

[11] Pol. 4.30.6.

more months, and allowed them the chance to reconsider in the spring. The Aitolian envoys arrived, it seems, after the Epeirote meeting, and were told, truthfully enough, that the Epeirotes intended to maintain peace with the league[12]. No doubt the Aitolians soon discovered the actual wording of the Epeirote resolution, but they could taken comfort from the fact that the Epeirotes were not about to launch an attack for months, if then.

Philip himself was busy in Macedon with preparations for the war. The army was subjected to continual training, but the most important matter was to neutralise the Dardanians, who were very likely to take the opportunity of Philip's absence to invade his kingdom. Apart from strengthening his defences, Philip confirmed his alliance with Demetrios of Pharos, and hired Skerdilaidas (who had fallen into a dispute with the Aitolians over the booty from Kynaitha)[13]. Skerdilaidas was to participate with a fleet of thirty ships. Demetrios had twice broken the Roman treaty, and Skerdilaidas once, by sailing south of Lissos[14]; no doubt they assumed Rome would ignore yet another breach. Unfortunately for them, Rome happened to be free next year to interfere in the east and sent another expedition into Illyria[15]. But Philip's alliance with the two Illyrians also put pressure on the Epeirotes, whose indecision was clearly a problem.

The Aitolians sent out an embassy also to Sparta, headed by Machatas of Naupaktos[16]. Again they only arrived after the Symmachic envoys had been and gone. In this case, however, those envoys had been heard and their invitation to join in the war had been rejected[17]. Sparta was not a member of the Symmachy, and after a change in the ephorate (there was no king for the moment) the Aitolians were invited to send an envoy by a party in the state. This envoy, Machatas, succeeded in addressing the assembly, but was unable to persuade its members to break the Macedonian alliance. His visit, however, had been used as a cover for the royalist party to prepare a *coup*, which they carried through soon after Machatas'

[12] Pol. 4.30.7; Polybios accuses the Epeirotes of two-faced conduct, but they were merely tailoring their replies to their audiences, in good diplomatic fashion.

[13] Pol. 4.30.6; Hammond, *Hist. Mac* 3.374.

[14] Demetrios in 221 and 220 (Pol. 3.16.3 and 4.16.6); Skerdilaidas in 221 (Pol. 4.16.6).

[15] Oost, *Roman Policy*, 20-21; Errington, *CAH*, VII, 2 (2), 92-93.

[16] Pol. 4.34.4.

[17] Pol. 4.34.1.

departure. The new government set about restoring the type of regime overthrown by the Symmachy under Antigonos Doson two years before, including the old dual kingship. This in itself was a direct challenge to the Symmachy, and Machatas happily returned at once to persuade the new regime to declare war. In this he was now successful, and the Spartan army invaded and conquered part of the territory given to the Achaian League between Parnon and the sea. Machatas crowned this achievement by persuading Elis that the Symmachy was a threat to it as well[18]. And the Messenians, true to their constant concern, refused to take any military action until Phigaleia had been removed from Aitolian control, a task they were clearly unwilling to attempt themselves, and which Achaia does not seem to have been able to undertake. Polybios distinguishes two parties in the oligarchy: one which pushed through the stated policy, the other which was opposed to it, though he does not explain what the opposition actually wanted. But the policy really looks like a Messenian excuse for doing nothing, the party in power not being particularly confident[19].

The result of all this diplomatic activity was not wholly satisfactory to either side. Philip and the Achaians had received only one unequivocal endorsement of their policy of war, from the Akarnanians, hardly the most useful of allies. The Aitolians, on the other hand, had received the support of only two other states: Sparta, whose party in power had its own purposes, which had little correspondence with those of Aitolia, and its old ally Elis. Messenia and Epeiros had both made conditions for joining the war which looked very much like excuses for staying out for as long as possible.

This winter of diplomacy had thus defined Aitolia's enemies more clearly, and this enabled military planning to go ahead. The most powerful military enemy was Macedon, but the key political opponent was Achaia. So the Aitolian plans for the military defence of their lands involved conducting raids into Achaia in which the political object seems to have been to promote a break-up of the league. Two attacks were launched at the start of the campaigning season of 219. One, under a commander called Euripidas, was based in Elis

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[18] Pol. 4.34.3-36.6; most of this is an account of the revolution in Sparta; P. Oliva, *Sparta and her Social Problems*, Prague 1971; B. Shimron, *Late Sparta, The Spartan Revolution, 243-145 BC*, Buffalo, N. Y., 1972; Walbank, *Aratos*, 125-126, and *Philip V*, 35-37.

[19] Pol. 4.31.1-2; Roebuck, *Messenia*, 77-78.

and made attacks into western Achaia: the second, under Dorimachos and a commander called Alexandros, crossed from Oiantheia in Aitolian Lokris to attack Aigeira, an Achaian town halfway between Aigion and Sikyon. At the same time Lykourgos the new Spartan king attacked Argive territory, and Philip began to march his way south out of Macedon[20].

Euripidas' forces were mainly locally-recruited Eleians. They raided the lands of the three easternmost Achaian cities of Dyme, Patrai and Tritaia. A counter-attack by a small Achaian force was defeated. A second raid was launched which captured a coastal fort in Dymaian territory which would be useful both for communications with Aitolia and as a base for further raids. The victims now turned to the league authorities – Aratos, that is, the new *strategos* – for assistance[21].

Dorimachos' raid across the Gulf of Corinth was initially even more successful, but actually failed. The force he commanded, 1,200 Aitolians, landed near Aigeira before dawn and launched a surprise attack on the city, catching the guard asleep. But the attack on the acropolis was beaten off, in part because the Aitolians scattered to loot once they got into the city: they were then driven out of the city altogether. Considerable casualties were caused, and the dead included the joint commander Alexandros and Archidamos the son of Pantaleon the former *strategos*. Dorimachos brought back the survivors and the ships[22]. It may have been the news of this second attack which prevented any assistance being sent to Dyme by the Achaians against the attacks by Euripidas, though Polybios blames Aratos' negligence and laziness. Equally, the Achaians were also beset by the Spartan invasion, when Lykourgos switched from attacking the Argive territory to besiege and capture the Athenaion, a fort protecting Arkadia[23]. No doubt, having got Macedon involved Aratos had then relaxed, expecting Philip's Macedonians to shoulder the burden of the fighting. The three victim cities in the west thereupon withheld their taxes and used the money to hire their own troops[24]. In this connection it is noteworthy that Aigeira, the other target of the Aitolians, was situated geographically between the old league founder-cities to

[20] Polybios claims that all these began at about the time that the new Achaian *strategos*, Aratos the younger, took office, that is, early in May.
[21] Pol. 4.59.1-60.2; Walbank, *Aratos*, 128.
[22] Pol. 4.57.2-58.12.
[23] Pol. 4.60.3.
[24] Pol. 4.60.4-5.

the west, and the later additions to the league, Pellene and Sikyon, to the east. Thus the Aitolian strategy would seem to have been aimed at carefully selected political targets, presumably with the intention of slicing the league into pieces – as had happened in Kleomenes' war. The fragile nature of the Achaian League was, no doubt, a commonplace among Greek statesmen.

Euripidas, however, was the only successful Aitolian commander so far. Now he probed to the southward and captured a place – town, fort, or village is not stated – called Gortyna in the territory of Telphousa[25]. This was on or close to Achaia's main line of communication leading towards Messenia and Phigaleia. Euripidas was thus protecting Phigaleia, Aitolia's ally, whose political condition was keeping Messenia inactive, and also opening up another route for sending raids into Achaian territory, that is, into northern Arkadia.

The number of Aitolian troops involved in all this was small. Euripidas' force was largely made up of Eleians, with a small number of Aitolians added. Dorimachos had taken 1,200 Aitolians on the Aigeira raid, and most of them survived the defeat – Polybios claims that many died, but carefully does not indicate precise numbers. The garrison at Phigaleia included 600 Aitolians a little later, and this number will probably have been a fixture. Thus for an investment of about 2,000 soldiers, the Aitolians were in a fair way to destroying their main enemy in the Peloponnese; together with the Spartan revolution and Lykourgos' successes against the Argive lands and the Arkadian borderlands the whole basis of the Symmachy was thus being destroyed.

If Philip was supposed to be distracted by this, however, and dissuaded from this own intentions, which is one possible interpretation of the Aitolian moves, the plan failed. Instead, with admirable sense, he concentrated on the main point: Aitolia itself. The likelihood of his attack, given the enthusiasm of the Akarnanians, was the real reason for the attacks on Achaia – hoping he would have to go to Achaian assistance – and for the very limited deployment of Aitolian military manpower in the south, for most of their troops were obviously held back for home defence in the knowledge that Philip was approaching. Philip might have invaded Aitolia from almost any direction – southwards out of Thessaly, through Phokis from the east, from Epeiros

[25] Pol. 4.60.3.

from the north-west – but he actually chose to react to the Akarnanians' declaration of war. These were the most vulnerable of Aitolia's neighbours, and the speed of their declaration of war suggested the need of the ruling group to use all means to keep control. In the past ten years two Akarnanian cities, Medeon and Thyrreion, had almost become part of Aitolia when attacked, attacks which presuppose that some support existed for these cities becoming members of the Aitolian League. Calling in Philip was perhaps a tactic designed to discourage both the Aitolians and the pro-Aitolian Akarnanians.

Philip had to make war as the *hegemon* of the Symmachy, not merely as the Macedonian king. That meant he had to respond to his allies, and it also meant ensuring that the allies contributed at least something to his force and the common cause. His approach march towards Aitolia was routed to emphasise this, and at the same time perhaps to confuse the enemy. From Macedon he marched into Thessaly, thus threatening an attack from the north, perhaps to recover Achaia Phthiotis; then he crossed over Pindos to Epeiros, where his armed presence finally convinced the Epeirote leaders that they should come off the fence and join him. With his own army of 10,000 phalangites, 5,000 peltasts, and 800 cavalry reinforced by 300 Achaian slingers, 500 Cretans, and the full levy of the Epeirotes (which must have brought his full force to well over 20,000 men) he marched south to the Ambrakian Gulf[26]. To please the Epeirotes[27] he laid siege to a fortified outport of Ambrakia called Ambrakos, on the Gulf, taking forty days to capture a place garrisoned by 500 Aitolians – and then he let the garrison go on easy terms in order to speed events[28]. He then crossed the gulf at its seaward end, ferrying his army across to Aktion and so into Akarnania[29]. Why he did not march along the Amphilochian coast route is not stated, but presumably the prospect of meeting a series of stubbornly-defended Aitolian forts like Ambrakos, each garrisoned by Aitolian soldiers, and all covered by an Aitolian field force operating out of the hills on his flank, was sufficient deterrent.

The Aitolian response which we know about – there may have been others – was a raid led by the *strategos* Skopas into Macedonia.

[26] Pol. 4.61.1-2; numbers: Pol. 4.37.7.
[27] Pol. 2.62.1.
[28] Pol. 4.63.1-4.
[29] Pol. 4.63.4-7; Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.374; Walbank, *Philip V*, 38-39.

While Philip was blocked at Ambrakos Skopas took a force through Thessaly and into Pieria, that part of Macedonia along the coast to the north of Mount Olympos. He faced, so it seems, no opposition in either Thessaly or Pieria, no doubt because he moved quickly and did not stop to attack anything on the way. He ravaged the fields in Pieria and looted the local centre of Dion (whose inhabitants had fled to the hills). The town was destroyed, the royal statues overthrown and the colonnade around the sanctuary burned. Polybios does not say that the temple was destroyed though he comes as close as he can to suggesting it. His circumlocution demonstrates that the temple was actually left untouched and unlooted[30].

This raid was intended to divert Philip from his activities in Epeiros and Akarnania. It did not do so. But it is worth noting that Skopas had marched through Thessaly, but had not ravaged and looted until he reached Pieria, that is, not until he entered Philip's ancestral kingdom. This may well be another Aitolian ploy similar to that being executed simultaneously in Achaia: the aim being to divide Philip's subjects. It was, after all, only nine years since the Thessalians had struck out for independence after the death of Demetrios II, and it would be a reasonable policy of the Aitolians to encourage them to try for it again. That Philip was not distracted from his work in the west testifies to his strong nerves, but it is just as likely to be the result of good garrisons in the Thessalian cities. Skopas' move was, after all, a fairly obvious one, and Skopas moved quickly. Once Philip heard of it, therefore, he must also have known it was all over; there was no point in marching off to intercept the raid.

Once across the mouth of the Ambrakian Gulf, Philip's army of Macedonians and allies was joined by 2,000 Akarnanian infantry and 200 cavalry[31]. (Presumably the Epeirote contingent had gone home: some at least of them will have had to garrison Ambrakos, particularly since the city of Ambrakia was still Aitolian.) Philip, once again doing the bidding of his ally, attacked the Akarnanian cities which had joined the Aitolian League back at the time of the partition with Alexander II. Phoitiai was taken after two days, the Aitolian garrison being released on terms, as at Ambrakos, though an Aitolian relief force was detected approaching. This was only 500 strong, so it was

[30] Pol. 4.62.1-3; Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.375 (by Walbank), says that 'sacred as well as secular buildings', were destroyed, but his goes beyond what Polybios states.

[31] Pol. 4.63.7.

presumably intended as a reinforcement for the garrison rather than a serious attempt to interfere with the siege. Its late arrival perhaps explains why the place gave in so quickly when Philip attacked. The approaching force was ambushed and destroyed[32].

The city of Stratos was too strong to be attacked, but its lands were ravaged. Matropolis was burned, though the Aitolians held on to the acropolis. Philip took his army across the Acheloos to menace Konope. A unit of Aitolian cavalry disputed his passage, but only briefly. By advancing in this direction, due east, Philip appeared to be intending to invade the lake district of Aitolia, for Konope lay near the western end of Lake Lysimacheia, astride the road leading towards such important Aitolian cities as Trichonos along the southern road, or Agrinion to the north, and ultimately to the federal centre at Thermos. But he turned away. Polybios notes that the Aitolians from now on stayed behind their fortifications, which was only sensible of them: they could not possibly hope to dispute the march of an army of that size. But there had been little sign of any serious intention of facing Philip's army in the field. The Aitolian army, even at full strength, could not possibly hope to defeat Philip; the various detachments meant it would be well below his full strength, but the Aitolians had in fact been very carefully avoiding contact. Further, Philip's lunge east will have had the effect of a feint, and when he turned south, away from Konope, he signalled that he had a different target in mind.

The next point at which he had to make a decision on his route was at the the head of the lagoon which separated the lands of Kalydon and Naupaktos from those of Oiniadai. But to march against Naupaktos would leave his flank exposed to Aitolian attacks out of the hills to the north, and Naupaktos was well-fortified. Instead he continued on south, west of the lagoon, taking the fortified town of Ithoria, by holding which he could block any Aitolian moves to follow him, then taking Paianion, another well-fortified but small place. The walls of these places, and the towns themselves, were razed, and the surrounding lands thoroughly pillaged. His object now turned out to be Oiniadai, which, thanks to his campaign so far, was now wholly isolated. An attempt was made by the Aitolians to hold the acropolis, but only long

[32] Pol. 4.63.9-65.11; this campaign, in its topographical sense has been studied by W. K. Pritchett, 'Philip's Campaign in Northwest Greece in 219 BC', *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography* 7, Amsterdam, 1991, 3-39.

enough for the Aitolian garrison to get away. Philip then returned over the land already devastated by his march, to attack the town of Elaos, fortified by King Attalos of Pergamon as a gift to the Aitolians. He took the place and ravaged the surrounding lands, which were part of the territory of Kalydon. Meanwhile his men were at work at Oiniadai[33].

Philip strengthened the fortifications of the Oiniadai acropolis and walled-in the harbour and the docks. If all that required doing, it suggests that the place was only minimally fortified, which in turn suggests the real explanation for the Aitolian forces abandoning the city before Philip arrived. The city was apparently intended as a future base from which Philip could dominate the entrance to the Gulf of Corinth; it does not seem that the Akarnanians were going to get it back[34].

This was a relatively swift campaign with tangible results. But very few Aitolian troops had been involved: none of the garrisons which were attacked was large, and none of them was captured, though two had agreed to leave after being attacked. Only the Phoitian relief force suffered serious casualties. The ravaging of the land was, of course, unpleasant, but casualties will have been few, given the long period of notice running ahead of Philip's force. The Aitolian main force kept well out of the way, and their detachments were withdrawn as Philip's army approached – though the withdrawal is usually attributed to fear in Polybios' account. But where a resistance was feasible, as at Ambrakos, Phoitiai, Matropolis, and the forts in the south, a fight was made; and in only one of these cases was Philip able to take the place by assault. In the open, or in small or poorly fortified places, there was no point in sustaining casualties uselessly, so those garrisons were withdrawn – as at Oiniadai, or at the pass near Ithoria, or the crossing of the Acheloos. The only places he was able to take by direct assault were two small forts. The Aitolians had come through this invasion with few casualties.

And during the invasion, not only had the expeditionary force under Euripidas in Elis moved on, deeper into Achaia, but it had provoked the Achaians into sending an appeal to Philip for help, which reached him at Stratos[35], not long after he had entered Akar-

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[33] Pol. 4.64.7-65.7; Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.375; Walbank, *Philip V*, 39-42.

[34] Excavations have revealed the harbour works, shipsheds and slipways; they have been dated to before Philip's attack, showing the value of the place to him: R. Stillwell (ed.), *Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites*, Princeton, N.J., 1976, sv. Oeniadai.

[35] Pol. 4.64.1; Walbank, *Aratos*, 129-130.

nania. No doubt Euripidas had deliberately increased the pressure on Achaia precisely in order to provoke such an appeal. Philip had ignored the plea, no doubt calculating that the Achaians could well hold out for a time, and that he could extract a better price for his help when they were truly desperate – as Antigonos Doson had done. It would do no harm for the Achaians to appreciate that they were not the prime members of the Symmachy, and that they depended on Macedonian support. They had, after all, been the prime movers in the war; a callous Macedonian would not worry that they were suffering. Philip's true concerns were demonstrated at Oiniadai. Not only was the city fortified and prepared as a naval base, but when news arrived of a threatened invasion of Macedon by the Dardanians, he marched home at once[36]. Whether this was a true danger – the invasion never happened – or a well-planted Aitolian rumour, or a device of Philip's to get out of Oiniadai without crossing to the Peloponnese, or simply a way of getting his army home in time to help with the harvest, is not clear – perhaps all these were in his mind[37]. There was also the problem of the Roman campaign to re-establish their authority in Illyria which was going on while Philip operated in Akarnania. The refugee Demetrios of Pharos, whose repeated violations of the peace terms had provoked the new Roman campaign during the year, met Philip on his way home[38], but Philip seems not to have been too concerned about these events, just as there is no sign that the Romans were bothered about Philip's own activities[39].

Philip positioned himself first at Larisa in Thessaly[40], perhaps to prevent another Aitolian raid in that direction during the vital harvest season, but of course the Aitolians then went elsewhere. It was their constant policy to avoid Philip's main forces. After the September *Thermike*, when Dorimachos was elected as *strategos* for the coming year in succession to Skopas[41], he led a raid into Epeiros, to punish

[36] Pol. 4.66.1-3.
[37] Pol. 4.66.6-7.
[38] Pol. 4.66.4.
[39] Polybios links these events Philip and the Romans – only in the most cursory way. There is no reason to believe that Philip returned north because of Roman activity, though he must have arranged to be kept informed of their progress; cf Walbank, *Philip V*, 41. Earlier authorities, notably Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce*, 140-142, and Tarn, *CAH* VII(2), 765, tended to attribute all Philip's moves to reactions to Roman moves.
[40] Pol. 4.66.7.
[41] Pol. 4.67.1.

the treacherous league there, which had promised to remain at peace with Aitolia, and had then joined in Philip's attack on Ambrakos, even apparently suggested it. The heart of the Epeirote League was the lands of the Molossi, in the long valley of the Arakthos river, and it was ravaged in the usual way – though Polybios gratuitously claims that the Aitolians operated especially vindictively[42] – and the invaders then captured the shrine at Dodona. This was treated in the same way as Dion had been dealt with earlier in the year. The non-religious buildings were burned, but in this case the fire is said to have spread to the temple itself, though the cella survived[43]. It is difficult to believe that this was deliberate. Indeed, the excavations at the temple have discovered no evidence of burning. One of the main elements of the cult was a great oak tree, which survived all through antiquity without being destroyed, until cut down by Christians[44]. Polybios' account of the raid thus may well be largely imaginary, or it may reflect Philip's and the Epeirotes' subsequent propaganda. The local Molossian centre at Passaron has also been claimed as another Aitolian victim at this time, but no evidence for this is adduced[45]. The raid, which began late in September, lasted for some time, and appears to have been uncontested by the Epeirotes from beginning to end.

Meanwhile in the Peloponnese Euripidas was still active. He commanded a force of 2,200 foot and a hundred horse, mainly Eleians plus mercenaries, relatively large for an Aitolian force, though there were only a small number of Aitolians present. After seizing the fort at Gortyna in the summer, he had worked his way across the north of Arkadia, by way of Psophis, Pleneus and Stymphalos, raiding and collecting booty[46], just as Philip had done in Akarnania. It had been these activities which had provoked the Achaians to appeal to Philip for help when he reached Stratos in August, but he had sent them nothing. No doubt he considered a force of 2,300 troops to be something even the Achaians should be able to deal with on their own. If so he was wrong, as Euripidas' continued and widening activities showed, and by the time he reached Stymphalos Euripidas was close

[42] Pol. 4.67.1-2.

[43] Pol. 4.67.3-4; Hammond, *Epirus*, 604.

[44] S. Dakaris, 'Dodona', in E. Melas, *Temples and Sanctuaries of Ancient Greece*, trans M. Broughton, London 1973.

[45] Hammond, *Epirus*, 576 and 604; S. I. Dakaris, *Dodona*, Ioannina, 1972, 23.

[46] Pol. 4.68.1; Walbank, *Aratos*, 131-132.

to cutting the league in two by separating Arkadia from coastal Achaia. And from Stymphalos he was threatening a march to the coast and Sikyon, which would divide the league yet again.

Once the Macedonian harvest was in, however, and the alarm caused by Dorimachos' activities in Epeiros had died away, Philip brought a select force south to Corinth, moving secretly and at great speed[47]. Euripidas had moved towards Sikyon from his advanced base at Stymphalos, and it would seem that it was this threat which had brought Philip south – in other words, he was reacting to Aitolian activity, which happened to threaten Achaia; it was not that he was responding to the earlier Achaian appeal. He had held the initiative during the summer in Epeiros and Akarnania, but first Dorimachos in Epeiros and now Euripidas in the Peloponnese had taken it from him. Their campaigns late in the year had forced Philip into a reaction.

Euripidas' campaign was in the process of cutting Achaia in two. It was a shocking display of paralysed ineptitude by the Achaians to permit a small force such as his to move right across through the northern Peloponnese, apparently with impunity. So Philip had arrived with the immediate political aim of shoring up the tottering state which was his principal ally. But the reverse of the medal was that Euripidas' force was too small to put up very much of a fight if caught by the larger royal army. Philip's force was 3,000 heavy and 2,000 light infantry, 300 Cretans and 400 cavalry – 5,700 against 2,300, while he could expect still more troops, if not very many, from the Achaians. No wonder Euripidas beat a rapid retreat when he was surprised to find that Philip's force was nearby, in the territory of Phlious; no wonder that, when caught, his force was totally destroyed, most of his men being killed or captured[48].

Euripidas himself escaped the defeat, but Philip, reinforced by 4,000 Achaians – and where had they been when Euripidas was attacking? – followed him to Psophis, which fell at once when Philip agreed to leave both the citizens and the garrison free[49]. The Eleians then retreated from Lasion and Stratos as Philip marched down the Erymanthos and the Alpheios to Olympia. Stratos was returned to

[47] Pol. 4.67.6-8; Walbank, *Philip V*, 42-43.

[48] Pol. 4.67.9-69.7; Walbank, *Aratos*, 133-134; Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.376; Walbank, *Philip V*, 43-44.

[49] Pol. 4.70.1-72.10.

Telphousa, and Psophis and Lasion went to the Achaians[50]. From Stratos Philip launched into a lucrative ravaging to southern Elis[51], and then turned south to his Macedonian garrison-town of Heraia and threatened an invasion of Triphylia[52]. The ultimate threat was to Phigaleia and its Aitolian garrison, whose capture would relieve Messenian anxieties and thus bring that state actively into the fighting. The Eleians had quickly appealed for help to Aitolia and Dorimachos sent over a contingent of 600 Aitolian soldiers commanded by Phillidas to reinforce the local army of 500 mercenaries, 1,000 citizens and some light horse[53], but this was hardly enough to face Philip's army, now about 10,000 strong with the addition of the Achaian levy. When he invaded Triphylia, therefore, the towns succumbed rapidly, and the Phigaleians expelled their Aitolian allies as well. The Aitolian commander Phillidas escaped with his men, but without his baggage[54].

The whole Aitolian position in the area was seriously damaged in this model little campaign, which lasted only six days, according to Polybios. The overwhelming strength Philip was able to bring against each of the cities rapidly brought the citizens to surrender, particularly as he was always willing to let the various garrisons – Aitolians, Spartans, Eleians, Cretans – go free. And yet the Aitolians had not really suffered a grievous blow, for the area was of peripheral concern to them. They had thus succeeded in deflecting the main fighting away from their own territory. And the Macedonian and Achaian garrisons which had to be installed in the conquered places were expensive to maintain, and were a drain on the military resources of the kingdom and the league as well. And if these places could fall so easily to Philip, they could in all likelihood fall equally easily back into Aitolian or Eleian hands if attacked.

Philip took his army off by way of Megalopolis to spend the rest of the winter at Argos. In the spring of 218, he ravaged Elis once again[55], and then brought up his fleet to Patrai, with an army of 7,000 men, Macedonians and mercenaries. The Eleians were sus-

[50] Pol. 4.73.1-2.
[51] Pol. 4.73.3-75.8.
[52] Pol. 4.77.5.
[53] Pol. 4.77.6-7
[54] Pol. 4.77.8-80.16; Walbank, *Aratos*, 134-135; Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.377; Walbank, *Philip V*, 44.
[55] Pol. 4.82.1 and 83.1-5.

tained by another reinforcement of 500 Cretan mercenaries paid by the Aitolians under the command of Agelaos and Skopas, whose mission was surely as much political and diplomatic as it was military. Philip had already tried to persuade the Eleians to make a separate peace, without success. In the face of the continued resistance of the Eleians – no doubt in part the accomplishment of the two Aitolians and their mercenaries – Philip left a substantial part of his force at Dyme, to which were added some of the Achaians and more mercenaries[56]. Thus the prospect of the break-up of the Achaian League was scotched, but Philip was again employing about 10,000 troops, while the Aitolians used only 500, and not even Aitolian soldiers at that.

Philip took his main force of Macedonians across to the Aitolian ally Kephallenia. He also took the opportunity to involve others of his allies, and ships were contributed by Skerdilaidas, Epeiros, and Akarnania, and now that Phigaleia was no longer a threat, by Messenia as well[57]. So another of Aitolia's allies now suffered from Macedonian ravaging, though Philip's assaults on the city of Pale failed[58]. It is noticeable that the Aitolian colony at Same on the island is not mentioned, and was apparently not attacked. It looks as though Philip was deliberately attacking Aitolia's allies – Triphylia, Phigaleia, Elis, Kephallenia – rather than Aitolia itself. While he was out on this limb, Lykourgos of Sparta had launched an attack on Messenia, which now found itself fully involved in the war, and some of the Messenian forces were with Philip. Meanwhile, Dorimachos had taken half of the Aitolian forces off to invade Thessaly[59].

The Aitolians had thus managed the war so far with considerable skill. Above all, they had to avoid having their main field army meet Philip's Macedonian army, for such a meeting would be a comprehensive disaster for the Aitolians, whose main forces would be both outnumbered and outfought. The Aitolians had not fought a serious battle since 245, and the recent small actions with a few hundred men, at times not Aitolian at all, but allied or mercenary, were no training for full-scale warfare. Any fights directly between small groups of Aitolians and Macedonians – as in the Acheloos campaign

[56] Pol. 5.3.1-2.
[57] Pol. 5.3.3.
[58] Pol. 5.3.4-4.13; Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.379; Walbank, *Philip V*, 52-53.
[59] Pol. 5.5.1-7; Roebuck, *Messenia*, 79-80 (misdated to 217).

the year before – had usually ended in Aitolian defeats. This meant that the Aitolians had to use their main army wherever Philip was not, raiding Thessaly when he was in the Peloponnese or Kephallenia, raiding Epeiros when he was in Macedon. They also had to keep as many of their allies actively fighting as possible, by exhortation, or by feeding in relatively small groups of reinforcements from Aitolia. Where Philip attacked he was to be opposed only when prolonged resistance was feasible behind fortifications, for above all Aitolian manpower was to be husbanded. Weak positions were to be given up at once, for then in that case Philip would release the soldiers, who could fight again. So the reinforcements to allies were sometimes in the form of mercenary contingents, and the assaults by Philip's forces were not to be resisted to the end: evacuation on truce after as long a resistance as possible, which would use up Philip's campaigning time, was the mode.

This had all resulted in Philip marching all over Greece, besieging and capturing a long series of small towns, all of which had to be subsequently protected by installing a garrison, composed of Macedonians, or of men from his allies, or of mercenaries paid for by Macedon. The longer this went on the more attenuated became Philip's own manpower, and the thinner would grow his purse. Even in the winter of 219/218, for all Philip's successes, he had ended up out of pocket, and had had to demand a subsidy from Achaia[60]. Meanwhile the Aitolian forces were all small, and therefore less of a strain on Aitolian finances and resources. Only one group of mercenaries is known to have been hired by Aitolia[61]. All this was clearly a considered Aitolian strategy based upon the fairly obvious problems Philip would face as king of Macedon, *hegemon* of the Symmachy, as an inexperienced commander, and in attacking a compact state from exterior lines.

His inexperience showed itself once the assault on Pale on Kephallenia had failed. At the urging of the Akarnanians and of Aratos, Philip decided on a raid into Aitolia, a revenge attack on the Aitolian federal centre at Thermos. The proximate cause of this was Aratos himself, who, at Pale, after the siege had failed, pointed out that Aitolia had not yet been damaged in any serious way – and that

[60] Pol. 5.1.6-12.
[61] See Chapter 11.

Dorimachos was off ravaging in Thessaly. Philip could therefore play the Aitolians at their own game[62]. The lure was irresistible. Philip sailed his forces past Leukas, into the Ambrakian Gulf, and landed at Limnaia in the south east corner of the gulf. The Akarnanians under their *strategos* Aristophanos joined him, but the Epeirotes did not, alleging shortage of time. Without waiting he marched to the Acheloos crossing south of Stratos and then straight on along the route south of the Aitolian lakes. The whole march from Limnaia to Thermos was accomplished in two days and a night, a remarkable march, but one which throws in doubt Polybios' assertion that the army looted and plundered on the way. The soldiers would scarcely have time for anything but marching, resting occasionally, and eating[63].

At Thermos Philip copied the damage done to his own Macedonian sanctuary of Dion the year before: destroying the auxiliary sanctuary buildings such as the colonnades, overthrowing the statues. He also gathered up a great quantity of food and booty[64]. The retirement was accomplished successfully, though the Aitolians – no more than 3,000 of their troops were available – attacked his rearguard both at Thermos and at Stratos[65]. It was all very spectacular, but it was also somewhat adolescent. It advanced his cause not one inch, for it was only by defeating the Aitolians in the field that he could win the war. Instead it angered the Aitolians and disgusted some of the friends he had made when he complained virtuously of the Aitolian attacks on Dion and Dodona[66]. Before he went in on the rapid march, Leontios, one of his councillors, argued that the troops should be rested first[67]. Had Philip agreed, the Aitolians could have gathered their forces and he may well have had the chance of defeating them in a pitched battle. It is true that Leontios is said to have had other motives for advocating the delay, but the whole episode illustrates Philip's short-sightedness, abetted by Aratos, that addict of raiding warfare. The only way he could win the war in any decisive way was by defeating the

[62] Pol. 5.5.8-9.

[63] Pol. 5.5.11-8.4; W. K. Pritchett, 'The Route of Philip's March on Thermon in 218 BC', *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, 6, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1989, 126-140, effectively criticising and correcting Woodhouse, *Aetolia*, 254; Walbank, *Philip V*, 53-56.

[64] Pol. 5.8.5-9.6.

[65] Pol. 5.13.1-14.7; Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.380.

[66] Polybios reflects some of this in his criticisms (5.9.8-12.8).

[67] Pol. 5.7.1-3.

Aitolians severely enough to make them sue for peace. A rapid in-and-out raid on their sanctuary would not win the war. The Aitolians were thus, even when the enemy army raided their innermost sanctuary, effectively dictating the terms of warfare.

The Aitolians and their allies had meanwhile profited from his distraction in Kephallenia and at Thermos. Dorimachos with half the Aitolian army had menaced Thessaly. He found two Macedonian commanders present in sufficient strength to deter any serious attack[68]. If his purpose was really to pull Philip away from the attack on Pale – which in a way he did – Dorimachos would not wish to become too involved in Thessaly; one must doubt this, however, given the distances involved, and it seems probable, though certainty is not available, that Dorimachos had set off on his expedition while Philip was still active in Achaia and Elis, and that the object was to distract him from that campaign – this he had, however, achieved for himself. Meanwhile, in the Peloponnese, Lykourgos of Sparta raided into Messenia, now that these two ancient enemies were once more on opposing sides. Philip had left the matter to the Achaians, but what they did is unknown, though Polybios claims that Lykourgos achieved nothing[69]. The Eleians, stimulated no doubt by the presence of Skopas and Agelaos and their Cretan mercenaries, and by the absence of Philip and his Macedonians, returned to the attack on western Achaia as soon as Philip had gone, despite the substantial guard he had left at Dyme[70]. Perhaps this guard had been taken to deal with Lykourgos' move in the south, for the Eleian attack was opposed only by Philip's Gallic mercenary cavalry. With active fighting in Thessaly, Messenia, and Achaia, the raid on Thermos was of little importance, though the identification of Aitolia as the main enemy, as Aratos had done, was surely correct. But Philip was the *hegemon* of the Symmachy, and he had therefore to respond to his allies.

Philip sailed from Limnaia to Corinth, then marched into Lakonia[71]. Meanwhile Dorimachos hurried back from Thessaly, too late to deal with the Thermos raid, and too late to counter a passing raid by Philip on Oiantheia as he sailed to Corinth[72]. The campaign in

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[68] Pol. 5.17.5-7.
[69] Pol. 5.17.1-2.
[70] Pol. 5.17.3-4.
[71] Pol. 6.17.9-18.3; Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.380.
[72] Pol. 5.17.8.

Lakedaimon reached as far as the sea at Gytheion, but a fairly serious attempt on Sparta city failed. And Lykourgos had the great satisfaction, for a Spartan, of driving off a contingent of Messenians who had attempted to join in the pillaging[73]. Philip's later return to Corinth produced another threat: he was concerned in the autumn of 218 with a project in Phokis[74], the details of which are unknown, and the secrecy no doubt cloaks plans for an attempted *coup* somewhere. He also allowed envoys from Rhodes and Chios to go to Aitolia to discover if negotiations for peace could be started[75].

While they were there, Philip's Phokian project fell through[76]. No details emerge, since Polybios was more concerned in this section with the crisis which had simultaneously developed inside the Macedonian royal command. Philip travelled as far as Elateia, however, before the failure of the Phokian project became clear. It may have been a plot to seize an Aitolian-controlled Phokian town or city, as has been suggested[77]. But the Aitolians had long kept well clear of Phokis, except for the area round Delphi, and had not done more than make an alliance with it, nor had they reacted when the alliance was broken off. Philip's return from Elateia was by way of embarking on a ship 'near Kirrha'[78], which is an odd place for him to use. His most obvious embarkation point coming from inland Phokis was Antikyra; 'near Kirrha' was dangerously close to Delphi for the lightly escorted Macedonian king – unless 'near Kirrha' is a Polybian circumlocution for Antikyra. Since he was going to Sikyon, Antikyra would be the better port, being nearer. There is clearly more to this Phokian matter than Polybios could tell. Its frustration was obviously a success for Aitolia, even if Aitolians were not directly involved.

The neutral envoys from Chios and Rhodes reached Aitolia about the time of the September *Thermike* when the new *strategos* Agetas of Kallipolis was elected. Remembering the confusion at the time of the outbreak of the war, when the proximity of Aitolian elections interfered

[73] Pol. 5.18.4-24.11; Roebuck, *Messenia*, 79.

[74] Pol. 5.24.12; J. A. O. Larsen, 'Phocis in the Social War of 220-217 BC', *Classical Philology* 19, 1954, 116-128, at 120; Walbank, *Philip V*, 59-60.

[75] Pol. 5.24.11.

[76] Pol. 5.26.1 and 26.16-27.1.

[77] By Larsen, 'Phocis', 120; Walbank, *CAH* VII (2) 479, suggests that Philip was aiming to 'tighten Macedonian control', which implies a plotted *coup* against his own allies; Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.382.

[78] Pol. 5.26.3.

with Philip's original attempt at negotiations, the timing was presumably carefully chosen. So when the envoys returned to Philip it was with a firm agreement, emanating from the Aitolian Assembly, and under the authority of a newly elected *strategos*, for a thirty-day truce and a peace conference to be held at Rhion. Philip accepted and sent off to his allies to meet in a preliminary conference at Patrai to work out a joint proposal of terms[79]. But in the meantime the crisis in the Macedonian high command came to a head, and this evidence of weakness helped to persuade the Aitolians to suggest a postponement of the main peace conference[80]. There must be more to it than this, though. The pre-conference of the allies at Patrai had not yet begun, but Philip had been staying with Aratos, who may not have been too keen on a peace in which all the honours of victory would go to Philip. Also the neutral envoys had rather exaggerated the Aitolian readiness for peace, implying that they were willing to consider almost any terms[81]. This was manifestly not true, for Aitolia had been fighting a skilful and successful defensive campaign. And Philip, having emancipated himself from the tutelage of those who had surrounded him since his accession, was now rather less keen on entering negotiations. He would also need to ensure that the high command problems had not extended any further. These various uncertainties and misapprehensions prevented the meeting[82].

In addition there is a hint that the crisis in the high command had been in part the result of Aitolian actions and intrigues. Megaleas, one of Philip's men, had fallen foul of the king, been fined, and had then absconded from Corinth. But he went no further than Thebes, whence he wrote to the Aitolians. Polybios summarised these letters (there was more than one) as 'exhorting them to persist in the war', and containing allegations against the king and others of the high command[83]. Megaleas had clearly been corresponding with the Aitolians for some time – there were several letters. He had been head of Philip's secretariat, and will have had full experience of the diplomatic contacts of the Macedonian state; his signature on a letter would carry considerable weight. The Aitolians may even have initiated the contact when Megaleas was

[79] Pol. 5.28.1-3.
[80] Pol. 5.29.3.
[81] Pol. 5.28.1-2.
[82] Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.380-383, for a discussion of Philip's internal problems; Walbank, *Philip V*, 60-61.
[83] Pol. 5.28.4.

first disgraced. It would be a classic case of subversion, to find the disaffected man with the knowledge and turn him round. At the same time the letters which were handed over to Philip were those actually addressed to the Aitolians by Megaleas, not those received by him. This could have been Aitolian doing, to sow further dissension in enemy ranks. The Aitolian suggestion of a peace conference certainly came at a suspiciously difficult time for the king, and this may well be deliberate; certainly he was very pleased to be able to avoid the meeting. Megaleas had perhaps given out too much confidential information[84].

Philip went home to Macedon for the winter and in his absence the Aitolians once again beefed up their war against Achaia. They could only be encouraged by the campaigns of the last two years, for they had successfully deflected all serious attacks, except that of Philip along the Acheloos in 219 – the raid on Thermos had not been important. They sent a new commander across to Elis, Pyrrias of Herakleia, *strategos* in 223/222, with reinforcements. He was made *strategos* in Elis, and so had control of the Eleian forces as well. With a mixed force amounting to 3,000 men, 1,300 of them Aitolians, the rest Eleians and Eleian-paid mercenaries, he raided the western Achaian lands, the area which had threatened to secede already, and then established himself in a mountain base above Patrai, from which he raided into the lands of the surrounding cities, as far east as Aigion. The victims reacted to this just as had Dyme and its neighbours the year before, by refusing to pay their tax contributions to the confederacy, while the unpaid mercenaries hired by the Achaians disbanded themselves. The Achaian *strategos* Eperatos – elected in part by Macedonian influence – had little authority. He was from Pharai, one of the cities threatening to secede, and he was undermined both by his dependence on Macedonian support, and by his enmity to Aratos, who replied in kind[85]. It would clearly not take much more pressure for the whole Achaian League to collapse. But if this particular enemy was crumbling, Aitolia's own ally Sparta was in equally bad shape. It had suffered defeat and a very thorough ravaging at Philip's hands during the summer, and now King Lykourgos was driven out: he took refuge in Aitolia[86]. He had good hopes of returning, but it was clear that Sparta was not up to much as an active ally any more.

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[84] Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.380.
[85] Pol. 5.30.1-6; Walbank, *Aratos*, 147-148.
[86] Pol. 5.29.8-9.

These developments showed that the Aitolians were quite willing to fight on, and that they had plenty of options left to them. Lykourgos was reinstated in Sparta in May, and his brief period of refuge Aitolia produced a collaboration with Pyrrias in the summer in a joint campaign against Messenia. It was only fairly successful, as neither of the invasions of Messenia got very far, and the attempt to link up the two invading forces also failed[87], but it did compel Aratos, now Achaian *strategos* once again, to detach a force to help protect Messenia – and he also had to put a force forward to protect the western Achaian cities from another invasion from Elis. He had begun to raise a substantial army in Achaia, but already much of it was being absorbed by the defensive needs of the league[88].

The Aitolians themselves launched ravaging attacks on the Akarnanians and the Epeirotes, meeting with little or no resistance, for the only counter-attack, by the Akarnanians, was seen off by the garrison of Stratos. The full Aitolian military levy was used in this campaign, under the command of the *strategos* Agetas[89], and was made possible by Philip's preoccupation with precautionary work on his northern frontier. It was clear that, in the absence of the Macedonian forces, the allies were liable to lose the war. Hence Aratos' insistence on the development of Achaian military power.

In May of 217 the installation of Aratos as *strategos* of the Achaian League for the fourteenth time had therefore produced the revival of Achaian resolution, which was signalled by the acceptance of the decree authorising the new army. An active commander, Lykos of Pharai, took charge of the dissident westerners as *hypostrategos* of the league[90]. Aratos persuaded the assembly to agree to finance a new recruitment of mercenaries and a new league levy of soldiers. These measures produced an army of 8,000 mercenary infantry and 500 mercenary cavalry with an Achaian force of 3,000 foot and 300 horse. In addition two naval squadrons of three ships each were to cruise off the Argolid and at the narrows of the Corinthian Gulf as seaward defences[91].

The ability of Aratos is demonstrated quite clearly by these mea-

[87] Pol. 5.91.1-3; 92.2-6.
[88] Pol. 5.91.5-8; 92.7-10; Walbank, *Aratos*, 148-149.
[89] Pol. 5.96.1-3.
[90] Pol. 5.94.1.
[91] Pol. 5.91.5-8.

sures. Instantly the situation in the Peloponnese began to change. Aratos helped to thwart the joint attacks on Messenia by Pyrrias from Elis and Lykougos from Sparta by moving his Achaian forces to Megalopolis, and re-established relations with Taurion, the former Macedonian viceroy, now commander of the Macedonian forces in Triphylia[92]. Pyrrias' performance as their commander dissatisfied the Eleians, who got him replaced by their old commander Euripidas, who led a new raid into Achaia. Lykos of Pharai with the Achaian mercenaries ambushed him on his retirement[93]. Meanwhile the Achaian ships raided the coast of Aitolian Lokris on the north side of the Corinthian Gulf, plundering the lands of Molykreion and Chalkis and capturing three Aitolian ships. A new raid by Euripidas was countered by Lykos' own raid into Elis; another cruise by the Achaian ships raided the coasts of Kalydon and Naupaktos[94].

None of this would win the war, though it was no doubt annoying to the Aitolians to see the sudden revival of Achaia and to suffer the pain of these raids. But the pain of the Akarnanians and the Epeirotes was much greater than that of the Aitolians, and potentially more of a problem to the Symmachy. One ally, Skerdilaidas, had already changed sides, having quarrelled with Philip over his contribution of ships, and over Philip's contribution of money, neither of which was complete. Skerdilaidas sent his ships to raid the allies at Leukas, and then to lie off Cape Malea to intercept shipping[95]. The revival of Achaia was also countered by the revival of Sparta after Lykourgos' return, and Aratos had to use his new army to protect the Argolid at harvest time, which allowed Euripidas to raid into Achaia again[96].

All this action in the Peloponnese, however, was on a fairly small scale. The real war, as ever, was between Aitolia and Macedon, and until something decisive took place in central Greece all these sideshows would continue. Another of them took place at this time in Phokis, where an Aitolian plot to seize Phanoteus failed. Capture of this place would have interrupted Macedonian land communications with the south through Phokis. Its failure cost a hundred Aitolian soldiers their liberty[97], but the potential prize had been worth it; Philip's

[92] Pol. 5.92.7-10.
[93] Pol. 5.94.1-6.
[94] Pol. 5.94.7-8; 95.11-12.
[95] Pol. 5.95.1-4.
[96] Pol. 5.95.5-10.
[97] Pol. 5.96.4-8; Larsen, 'Phocis', 121-122.

abortive scheme in the same area the year before had perhaps been something of the same sort.

Philip returned to deal with the Aitolian war after attending to his northern frontier problem, and recruiting new forces. His absence in the north had also allowed him to put a useful distance from the Peloponnesian problem, and it appears to have led him to clarify his ideas about the war. And he may well have met criticism that he and the Macedonians were doing all the fighting in order to benefit the allies, who did little, while Macedon was gaining nothing in return. It must also have sunk in during the winter that the only way to end the war was by a victory large enough to persuade Aitolians to stop fighting, though not one which would stiffen their resistance too much, and that meant a return to direct attacks – conquests, not raids – on Aitolia[98].

So Philip brought his main field army to the frontier of his kingdom with Aitolia in Thessaly. An initial attack on Melitaia failed[99], but perhaps it fixed the attention of the Aitolians on that place. He then switched his attack to Phthiotic Thebes. This was the city which had been the Aitolians' base for raids into Macedonian Thessaly – presumably also during Dorimachos' campaign the previous summer – and it was unpleasantly close to Philip's own main base at Demetrias. It was also the Aitolians' farthest base from their centre, and so the more difficult for them to assist. The assault on Thebes was a much more determined and professional affair than that which had failed at Melitaia or than that on Pale the year before. Where he gave up at Melitaia after three days, Philip's attack on Thebes went on for three weeks, and ended successfully when the citizens – not, apparently, the Aitolian garrison – surrendered to avoid an assault. It saved their lives, but not their liberties, for Philip sold the whole population – including the Aitolian garrison – into slavery, and replaced them with a Macedonian colony, renaming the city Philippi[100].

This was the sort of clear victory which was more convincing than all the raids carried out in the war so far, done with bravery, intelligence, determination, and speed, and capped by a display of ruthlessness which had been missing in the war so far. Right on cue, more peace intermediaries arrived and were sent on to the Aitolians with

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[98] Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.386.
[99] Pol. 5.97.5-6.
[100] Pol. 5.99.1-100.8; Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.386; Walbank, *Philip V*, 62-64.

Philip's encouragement. They were a rather more commanding group than before, with representatives from Ptolemy IV and Byzantion, in addition to the original Chios and Rhodes[101]. Each, no doubt, had their own interests at heart: Chios was a longtime friend of Aitolia, Ptolemy was fighting a desperate war against Antiochos III in Syria, and wanted peace in Greece so that he could recruit mercenaries there, and Byzantion and Rhodes looked for peace for good commercial reasons. That these last two had recently been fighting each other was thus a convincing sign that they were serious in their attempts at negotiation.

While the mediators were talking to the Aitolians, Philip went on with the war. His fleet sailed into the Corinthian Gulf, and, after a lunge into Elis to keep Euripidas quiet, he camped with his army at Panormos, directly opposite Naupaktos. He clearly had the capability now to invade Aitolia in force, and this was a signal of that possibility to the Aitolians. Having done all that, he sailed off to Zakynthos, where he established his suzerainty, a display of naval capability which only emphasised his strength[102]. The Aitolians assembled their own full force at Naupaktos to resist[103]. This time, with Euripidas in Elis cowed, and the Achaian army watching Lykourgos, none of the sideshows could distract Philip from the main enemy. He had, in fact, and at last, called the Aitolians' bluff.

The negotiations for peace had already begun. Philip sent Kleonikos of Naupaktos, who had been captured in one of the Achaian naval raids, over to propose discussions. Kleonikos had been spared slavery because he was Achaian *proxenos* in Naupaktos; he was also, in all probability, the son of Agelaos, or possibly his brother, who had been Aitolian *strategos* twice, was a political ally of Skopas and Dorimachos, and was to be elected *strategos* again in September[104]. Kleonikos may well have been spared slavery because he was the *proxenos*, but his political connections made him even more valuable. One would not sell such a captive. He had been kept at Aigion, ostensibly waiting for a meeting of the Achaian Assembly to release him, but no doubt these political and diplomatic thoughts had gone through Aratos' mind.

[101] Pol. 5.100.2-10.
[102] Pol. 5.102.2-10.
[103] Pol. 5.103.2.
[104] Pol. 5.95.12; 102.4; *Prosopography*, 'Aitolian Families', under 'Naupaktos'.

Having established, through Kleonikos, the willingness of the Aitolians to talk, Philip then sent over a more high-powered delegation, which included Aratos and Taurion, to push the process onwards. According to Polybios the Aitolians then invited Philip to bring his army across to camp near Naupaktos[105]. This, if it is correct, is surely an extraordinary invitation, but it is also confirmed by the corresponding Aitolian gesture of assembling their army nearby, but unarmed. Yet the Aitolians were not actually exposing themselves to a military massacre. One assumes that their troops' weapons were nearby, and that the nearby towns and cities were fully alert to prevent trouble. The two military camps were actually well separated, and so clashes between the troops were unlikely; no doubt also a keen watch was maintained by both sides to prevent surprises. Further, with the Macedonians army hemmed into a narrow camp in Aitolia[106], it was no longer available to attack Aitolia's allies, while Philip's ships will have been fully occupied in bringing in supplies. If the peace negotiations did not succeed, Philip would have to go ahead with his invasion. In that case he would certainly be able to ravage the land, but he would win no battles, since, as they had all along, the Aitolians would avoid a set-piece fight. Perhaps the sight of the walls and fortifications of Naupaktos chilled Macedonian ardour. The phalangites would never conquer Aitolia themselves, especially with the cities all fortified and the hills alive with guerillas.

At the same time the Aitolians were now faced by the necessity of agreeing to terms which would make it clear that they had suffered an overall defeat in the war. They had lost territory on two frontiers, in Akarnania and Thessaly, and the peace treaty was agreed with the enemy army encamped, fully armed, within striking distance of some of their main cities. Yet it is clear that there was no difficulty on the Aitolian side in agreeing to the terms which Philip presented, nor that Philip, who had consulted his allies, insisted on terms which were liable to be rejected. And the Aitolian army was in effect the Aitolian Assembly, so the army was able to ratify the terms immediately.

Polybios deliberately evades providing the terms as they were agreed[107]. For Aitolia they must have included the cession of Phthiotic Thebes to Macedon, the fort of Ambrakos to the Epeirotes, and

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[105] Pol. 5.103.1-3.
[106] Pol. 5.103.5-6; Walbank, *Philip V*, 65-66.
[107] Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* III, 520.

Phoctiai to the Akarnanians; Oiniadai will have remained Macedonian. None of these losses were seriously damaging to the league. The Eleians and the Spartans may well have come out of the war with minor gains. The Messenians had the menace of Aitolian-controlled Phigaleia removed from their doorstep, but that city now remained under Macedonian control, along with nearby Heraia, which was not necessarily an improvement. At the same time, Messenia's internal situation did not improve, while that of Sparta did, under Lykourgos' rule. Similarly Oiniadai, newly fortified by Philip's engineers, was held by its Macedonian garrison as a military and naval base, and as such it was a threat to both the Aitolians and to the Akarnanians, and indeed, to all those along the nearby coasts in the Gulf of Corinth, the western Peloponnese, and the Ionian islands. Philip was, in fact, now a major power in the west, with Oiniadai, Zakynthos, Phigaleia, and Triphylia under his control. The one great political gain for the Aitolians was the subsequent rapid fading away of the Symmachy, though Macedonian hegemony did continue at least in formal terms. For the allies in the Symmachy had, in many cases, suffered more from the war than had either of the two principals: for Epeiros, it seems unlikely that the new possession of Ambrakos was an adequate compensation for several ravagings. And Achaia had suffered far more severely than had Aitolia. Macedon had suffered scarcely at all, except in financial terms.

The Aitolians' conduct of the war had too often been at the expense of their own allies, and it cannot have been a popular memory for either Sparta or Elis. But Aitolia's strategy had in fact been highly successful. The league had preserved its own territory from more than momentary invasions, husbanding its own forces with care, repeatedly carrying the fighting into enemy territory. By keeping their forces small and hiring very few mercenaries, the Aitolians had not suffered the financial problems which beset the Symmachy from the start. Given that Aitolia's overall war aim, faced by attack from all sides, can only have been survival, the league had been very successful, whereas the three main aims of the Symmachy had none of them been met: the 'recovery' of lands taken by the Aitolians since 229 had been only partial, and in particular Ambrakia and parts of Thessaly had never been in any serious danger; the 'freeing' of Aitolian members coerced into joining the league was actually a cover for conquest, since no Aitolian community showed any desire to leave the league, and the Akarnanian cities in particular had had more

than one chance; depriving the Aitolians of their control of the Amphiktyony, like the other aims, was never even attempted, nor even, so far as can be seen, discussed.

The two main contestants, Aitolia and Macedon, had thus collided and fought for the second time, and much more seriously this time, but neither had gained a clear advantage, though Aitolia had been given a clear warning. In a straight fight, Aitolia would clearly be at a powerful disadvantage as against Macedon, since it was clearly the weaker of the two states militarily. It now consisted in large part of a league of cities, and those cities were vulnerable to Macedonian expertise in siege warfare. Aitolia would thus be well advised to avoid further quarrels with Macedon, unless a clear advantage presented itself.

15. THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR
1. THE CAUSES (217-211)

The Aitolian League had suffered a defeat. It had lost territory, its main shrine had been sacked, its armies were defeated. The main league territory was, however, intact, and its military casualties had been relatively few. Considering that the league had fought for three years against a coalition of virtually all the states of Greece, plus the Macedonian kingdom, the defeat was scarcely unexpected and certainly nothing to be ashamed of; and its losses were minor compared with what might have been suffered. The Aitolian record was a good one, its government system had operated well, and its leaders had formulated and executed league policy with success. A comparison with the record of the Achaian League demonstrated this quite clearly; and Philip V's governing system had suffered badly under the strains of the war as well.

The Aitolian League showed, accordingly, none of strains which manifest themselves in a polity which has been seriously defeated. There was no overhaul of the system of government, and the same league leaders who appear in the league offices before and during the war, were re-elected afterwards. Agetas of Kallipolis, *strategos* in 218/217, received the honour of a statue from the city of Lamia[1]; Pyrrias of Herakleia, *strategos* in 223/222, and commander in Elis for a time, was re-elected as *strategos* in 215/214[2]; Pantaleon of Pleuron, by now surely an old man, was elected *strategos* for the fifth time in 214/213[3].

Not surprisingly, however, Aitolia's international situation remained unpleasantly isolated, when the war ended. The Greek Symmachy, with King Philip at its head, continued in being, placing an armed ring around the league. There is, to be sure, little evidence of any relations at all, neither friendly nor otherwise. To some degree, this must be evidence in itself, for this was a busy time in military and diplomatic affairs, with Philip continuing to be restlessly active until he entangled himself into a war with Rome. Aitolia, of course, eventually

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[1] *IG* IX.1.59B.
[2] Or so it is assumed from a later term of office.
[3] *IG* IX.1.177 and 31s.

became involved in that war as well, but by no means eagerly, and its actions during the active phase of warfare were on the reluctant side. It would seem that for the five years or so following the Peace of Naupaktos, Aitolia remained deliberately quiet.

There are some hints, however, as to the league's international position, if not its actions. A number of inscriptions seem to date from this period, though only two are more or less certainly dated. The problematic ones are run-of-the-mill Amphiktyonic honours for *hieromnemones* from Chios and Athens, and one for a Koan doctor[4]; little of political significance can be read into these, although Aitolian approval would be necessary for the decrees they record since the Aitolians by this time had an overwhelming majority of members – twelve out of eighteen – on the Amphiktyonic board. More significant is an Aitolian decree of immunity for Mytilene, dated to the strategy of Pantaleon, 214/213[5]. This confirms the continuing Aitolian interest in the eastern Aegean area – Chios had had isopolity, an Amphiktyonic seat, and *asylia* for thirty years and more, and Tenos had (possibly) an *asylia* agreement[6].

In that same year, there were more proxeny decrees, one in Pantaleon's time[7] and a second in his successor's strategy, that of Straton of Arsinoe, in 213/212[8]. The cities with whom proxeny-relations were established or renewed are partly the nearby ones whose citizens might be expected to visit Aitolia for a variety of reasons: Aigion in Achaia, Athens, and the two Euboian cities of Histiaia and Chalkis. They are, however, an interesting group: the chief city of the Achaians, a professionally neutral city, and two cities with close Macedonian connections. More far-flung were Chios and Lakedaimon, both places with longstanding political connections with Aitolia. But there are also four unusual cities. Gortyn in Crete would fit with the longstanding Aitolian connection with various cities on the island, a connection which included Cretan mercenaries serving with the Aitolian forces, and Aitolian guards serving in Crete[9], though Gortyn itself normally had strong Macedonian connections. But a connection with

[4] *Syll* (3) 538B, 539a and 545.
[5] *IG* IX.1.189 (= Benecke 27-29).
[6] Rigsby, *Asylia* 54.
[7] *IG* IX.1.31s.
[8] *IG* IX.1.59.
[9] In the 220s Aitolian troops helped put down a revolt in Gortyn (Pol. 4.53.3); the government of the city after this would be Aitolia-friendly.

Smyrna is new, as is one with 'Antiocheia'. Since this is unqualified, it is best to assume this meant the Syrian Antioch, by now serving as the capital of the Seleukid state. The appearance of these two cities in the proxeny list attests Aitolian awareness of the political developments in the east, where Antiochos III had recently recovered control of inland Asia Minor – hence the Antioch link – but had not yet swamped the various cities of the coast – hence Smyrna.

The final connection was with Kerkyra, the island to the north-west, off the Epeirote coast. Despite the size, wealth and importance of this island-state, this was its first *proxenos*-linkage with Aitolia. But the date and place are even more significant than before. Since 229/228 Kerkyra had been in close association with Rome, relations at least of *amicitia*, in Roman terms. This connection had been reinforced since 216 by the outbreak of war between Rome and King Philip. Philip had sailed his fleet of small ships past Kerkyra in 216 in order to attack in Illyria[10], and in 214, he had led a second expedition there[11]. On the first occasion the approach of a Roman squadron forced him to retreat; on the second he was trapped at the mouth of the River Aous, and burnt his ships, before escaping inland. Kerkyra served as Rome's naval base in 216, though in 214 this was established at Oricum, a place taken by Philip and then recovered by the Roman fleet. It is obviously significant that relations were established with this Roman 'protectorate', and it is yet another clear indication that the Aitolians were fully alert to changes in international alignments.

These activities, or rather certain gaps in the record of the activities, have led to a theory that Philip captured Kerkyra late in 215[12]. The evidence is partly indirect, that the Roman naval commander P. Valerius Laevinus did not use Kerkyra as his winter base in 214[13], and partly direct but indefinite: Appian claims that Laevinus 'attacked' Kerkyra in 215[14] and Zonaras that he advanced 'as far as' Kerkyra[15]. None of this is much good as evidence of anything other than Kerkyra

[10] Pol. 5.109,5-110.11; he actually passed the island twice, the second time in flight from a rumour.

[11] Livy 24.40; the island was to go to Philip as part of his share in the spoils by the terms of his treaty with Hannibal the year before.

[12] Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.395.

[13] Not a good basis for an argument, of course; he was in fact at Oricum (Livy 24.40.17).

[14] App. *Mac* 1.

[15] Zonaras 9.4.

being involved in some way. Neither Appian nor Zonaras – both of them disquietingly late sources – say more than that Philip approached the island; Laevinus' choice of naval station in 214 was dictated by the need first of all to recover Oricum, which Philip really had captured, and then to guard the Illyrian coast – and Oricum is a good base. It seems odd also that considerable attention should be directed in the sources at the fighting at Oricum, when Kerkyra was a vastly more important target. It is best to conclude that Philip threatened Kerkyra, but did not actually land. A mainland port was surely his priority, since the year before he had made an alliance with Hannibal, currently roaming southern Italy, and he needed to establish secure communications both across the Straits of Otranto and back into Macedonia.

So it is best to see Kerkyra as consistently Roman in its political orientation all through this period. Yet Philip's threat to the island, and the use of its port as a base by the Roman fleet, precisely in these years, 216-213, inevitably drew attention to it. Now Pantaleon's strategy in Aitolia, during which the Aitolian proxeny-connection with Kerkyra was made, began in September 214, and lasted to September 213. In other words, by the time Pantaleon took office, Philip's latest threat to Kerkyra was over, he had burnt his ships and had retreated across the mountains to his homeland. And this came on top of the ignominious failure of the surprise attack two years earlier. The establishment of the Aitolian connection with Kerkyra at just that time had thus a distinctly political significance. Kerkyra was loyally, and now firmly, Roman. Philip's threat to it had evaporated, along with the destruction of his ships. So the Aitolian *proxenos* for Kerkyra was an indirect connection with Rome, and it was a political statement of Aitolian sympathy for Rome in its war with Philip. The dating is still more significant in that the connection was made *after* the war with Philip began, but without any connection with the Hannibalic war. Aitolia was thus neutral in the greater conflict bwetween Rome and Carthage, but pro-Roman in the lesser conflict between Rome and Macedon, just as the league was neutral in the friction which soon developed in Asia Minor between Antiochos III and the coastal cities.

It is worth commenting that this pre-Roman orientation was not new for Aitolia. Similar proxeny-relations had been established in 271/270 (if my dating is correct) with Rome and Metaponton[16],

[16] *IG* IX.1.17.

immediately in the aftermath of the completion of the Roman conquest of Italy, and with Thourioi a generation later[17]. Even more telling is the establishment of relations with Syracuse. An Aitolian had been prominent in the government of Agathokles[18], and proxeny-relations were established with the city in 271, after the career of Pyrros ended, and these relations were renewed in 210/209, shortly after the Roman conquest of the city[19]. Relations were established also with Taras soon after the expulsion of the Carthaginian garrison[20]. These may well not be the sum total of Aitolian proxeny-relations in the west, but they are very clearly indicative of a deliberate Aitolian policy of recognition of political changes, including prompt recognition of Roman conquests. No doubt it was in large measure a selfish policy, one designed to smooth the way for its own merchants and to provide a mechanism for resolving disputes, but it also shows a clear understanding of the power balance in the area. In particular it shows that Aitolia had a diplomatic relationship with Rome of long standing, dating back to the unification of Italy under Roman auspices and to Aitolian emergence as an important power. This had been reciprocated in 228 when the Senate sent information to Aitolia concerning the suppression of the Illyrians[21]. To establish a proxeny-relationship with Kerkyra when it was the base for the Roman fleet was intelligent statesmanship.

It has been supposed that the events in Messenia during this period were in some way of concern to Aitolia. The events themselves are obscure, but involved at least one, and perhaps two revolutions, two visits by Philip V, a Macedonian *coup* which failed, and a ravaging by the Macedonian forces, which was all too successful[22]. In all this, there is, in fact, no hint of Aitolian involvement other than in the minds of modern commentators[23]. Whatever Philip's motives in involving himself in Messenian affairs – and it was regarded as discreditable at the time, so it seems – it was not connected with Aitolian

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[17] *IG* IX.1.24b.
[18] Erymnon (see *Prosopography*).
[19] *IG* IX.1.17 and 29.
[20] *IG* IX.1.31b.
[21] Pol. 2.12.4.
[22] Pol. 7.10-5, 12.1-10; 8.8.1 and 12.1-8; Plut. *Aratos* 49-51; Roebuck, *Messenia*, 80-84.
[23] Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.397, assumes that Aitolia was likely to intervene, more or less echoing Walbank, *Philip V*, 73-78.

affairs. He did succeed in alienating virtually all Messenians, where the net result was to replace the old cautious oligarchy with an 'extreme' democracy[24], and in quarrelling with the two Aratoi, and thus loosening the lynch pin of the whole Symmachy.

Modern commentators on these events assume that an alliance between Aitolia and Messenia which is known to have existed by 210[25], was in fact concluded as a result of Messenian 'revulsion' at Philip's actions[26]. But Messenia had been less than enthusiastic about any alliance in the previous ten years, and the death of the elder Aratos in 214/213 combined with Philip's intensified war in Illyria provided a respite for Messenia from pressures. One may assume, as usual, that foreign policy was one of the sources of dispute within the state. In the Roman-Aitolian treaty of 211 Messenia was not listed as an Aitolian ally[27], and this seems better (if negative) evidence than an assumption of what must have (or should have) happened. Aitolia's partiality for the anti-Macedonian side in the Messenian internal dispute is perhaps signalled by the fact that the Messenian poet Alkaios was given refuge in Aitolia, and published his powerful denunciations of Philip in safety[28], but the alliance cannot be dated before 210.

Rome declared formal war on Philip in 215[29], and this seems to have involved a technical state of war also with the Symmachy[30], but the alliance members showed no interest[31]. C. Valerius Laevinus, in charge of the war in the Roman side, was wary enough not to provoke any activity in Greece, so the war slumbered on. Since Philip was technically the aggressor, the Greek allies were not about to join in on his side, nor were they obliged to by the terms of the Symmachy's treaty. Even more certainly were the Achaians quite unin-

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[24] Pol. 7.11.1-17.6.

[25] Pol. 9.30.6.

[26] 'Revulsion' is Walbank's term (*Philip V*, 78); Roebuck, *Messenia*, 84, used 'reaction'; Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce*, 203, n. 3, suggested the date 213 for the alliance, accepted by others.

[27] Pol. 7.11.1-17.6.

[28] *Anthologia Palatina* 7.238, 247, 9.518-519, 11.12.

[29] App. *Mac* 2.

[30] The alliance of Philip with Carthage, the immediate cause of Rome's declaration of war, was technically one which also involved Macedonia's allies, the Symmachy (Pol. 7.9.1-17).

[31] The allies, as had been seen at the outbreak of the war against Aitolia, were entitled to make their own decisions for war; in this case it seems that none did so. It marked the effective end of the alliance, since if all the numbers do not support one another, it has no point.

volved, as were the much nearer Epeirotes, at least for the present. Philip was on his own.

This survey suggests strongly that we must not import supposed reactions by the Aitolians to events outside the boundaries of the league without clear evidence. The only reliable guide to Aitolian international behaviour and policy is the actions of Aitolians themselves. Messenia is a good example. The fact that Aitolia was involved in that land earlier, and that they were both Roman allies later, does not require us to believe that Aitolians were involved there in the Messenian crisis of 215-214. Still less does it require us to invent Aitolian reactions for which no evidence exists. Holleaux, for example, affected to find that the Aitolians had reacted with indignation to the news of the ravaging of Messenia by Philip's force. 'Un tumulte d'indignation', is his characterisation of Aitolian reactions[32], but this is based on a phrase in a speech said to have been made by the Aitolian envoy Chlaineas to the Spartan assembly three years later. Apart from the fact that this speech is a Polybian construct, and so not to be wholly relied on, the words attributed to Chlaineas are no more than a comment on Philip's 'perfidy and treachery to the Messenians'[33]; it is impossible to see a 'tumult of indignation' here.

All along the understanding of Aitolian policy is bedevilled by being viewed through the distorting lenses of enemies and outsiders which see them as pirates and brigands. Walbank imagined that Aitolia was bursting with social tensions after only a few years of peace, unable to go out looting[34]. Once again, for this tension there is no evidence. That there was some social tension in Greece generally at this time is certain, though there was never a time in Greek history when such tensions were absent[35]. It is legitimate to presume such

[32] Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce*, 203.

[33] Pol. 9.30.2.

[34] Walbank, *Philip V*, 72-73; the only reference in this passage is to Holleaux' article on 'Les Aitoliens auxiliaires d'Achaios', *REA* 18, 1916, 233-247, which says little or nothing about the social tensions within Aitolia. Since there is no evidence on the subject this is not surprising.

[35] D. Mendels, 'Polybios, Philip V and the socio-economic question in Greece', *Ancient Society* 8, 1977, 155-174; A. Fuks, 'Patterns and types of social-economic revolution in Greece from the fourth to the second century BC', *Ancient Society* 5, 1974, 51-81. It is a commonplace that there were 'social tensions' in Greece in the Hellenistic period, but there is no specific evidence for Aitolia until later; it is impossible to think of any period or place which could be said to have had no 'social tensions'; the phrase is essentially meaningless.

tensions in Aitolia, but it must be marked as what it is: presumption. It is *not* legitimate to make that presumption the (presumed) fount of Aitolian policy, without any evidence to back it.

The only evidence for internal affairs in the league in this brief period between the Second and Third Macedonian Wars (217-211) is, in fact, concerned with the very opposite: the easing of inter-community tensions. Two inscriptions record decisions of the league concerning Melitaia and its territory, decisions reached by arbitrations by panels of judges from various communities in the league. One of them is dated to the fifth strategy of Pantaleon[36] (214/213), the other is less clearly dated, but is, judging by the known people on the panel, perhaps a year later[37]. In the first the boundary between Melitaia and the small town of Xyniai was defined; in the second the town of Pieria was recognised as a separate community, distinct from Melitaia, and a constituent member of the league.

These decisions give a glimpse of what must have been a continuing aspect of the work of the league. They are the same sort of decisions which two Akarnanian cities of the Aitolian League got from Thyrreion twenty years before; there will have been others, just as, later, the fashion for manumission became part of the business of local communities of the league. But none of these is necessarily evidence of social tensions. They are better seen as evidence of the continual process of adjustment within the league, a process which was perhaps one of the elements which made the league both successful and an object of remarkable loyalty by its members. It bears repeating: no members ever seceded from the league, nor, so far as can be seen, did any even voluntarily attempt to secede. The dispute between Melitaia and Pieria is worth considering in this respect: Pieria was actually on the very border of the league, with Philip's part of Thessaly just to the north. The town could well have used its wish to separate from Melitaia to leave the league; conversely Melitaia, losing part of its territory, could well have been so aggrieved at the decision of the arbitrators, that it could have seceded, and no doubt Philip would have welcomed either of

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[36] *IG* IX.1.177.

[37] *IG* IX.1.188; the main judge is Dorimachos, whose dated career began in 221; witnesses include Pantaleon, the ex-*strategos* and Nikostratos, ex-*hipparchos*. Other men involved are not known otherwise. The main indication is Dorimachos, whose position as first in the list of judges implies a high political standing, and so after his first term as *strategos*. The proximity if the decision on Xyniai (*IG* IX.1.187) also implies a set of solutions to a group of problems in the area.

them. Neither community did; and both remained loyal in the next war. It is a testimony to the league's fair-mindedness, internal political harmony and cohesion, and to its acceptability to all its members.

Having cleared the decks like this, it is now possible to consider the events of 212-211 which led up to the outbreak of Aitolia's third war with Macedon. The enmity between the two states was by now two decades old or thereabouts, sufficiently long for it to be regarded as a political fixture. But Aitolia had very carefully not involved itself in the Romano-Macedonian conflict in the four years since it began. The technical defeat in the Second War with Macedon had clearly not been so hurtful as to produce a serious pressure within the league for revenge. After all, Philip's misadventures since his first attempt on Roman territory had been serious and numerous enough for a state which was really thirsty for revenge to have been able to seize a good opportunity to indulge itself more than once in the last years. The Messenian crisis might have produced a useful *casus belli*, one which might well have brought a good deal of sympathy from other Greek states, many of whose citizens had been horrified by Philip's treatment of the Messenian countryside.

We can thus only consider that Aitolia's policy was one of peace, yet the 'traditional' enmity towards Macedon was well known, and it could be assumed that Aitolia would wish to gain revenge for its defeat in the last war. This meant that, when the Roman Senate decided that a Greek ally was needed in order for Philip's conquering progress in Illyria to be halted, Aitolia was the obvious choice. Most of the rest of Greece was allied to Philip in the Symmachy anyway. But Rome's envoy still had his work cut out to persuade Aitolia to war. That envoy was Laevinus, the naval commander who had blocked Philip's progress in Illyria and the Ionian Sea several times already. A well-experienced commander, he had also had time by now to become familiar with Greek politics and attitudes. Indeed he may well have had contact with the Aitolians already: he had wintered at Kerkyra in 214/213, which was just the time when the Aitolians were concluding their proxeny agreement with that island.

A couple of hints in Livy suggest that Laevinus had made a first serious attempt to persuade Aitolia to an alliance during 212. 'Secret conversations with the leading men' of Aitolia are mentioned[38].

[38] Livy 26.24.1.

Where such exploratory talks took place is not known, but since Rome was the suppliant in the matter it was presumably in Aitolian territory; who these 'leading men' were is also unclear. The *strategos* in 213/212 was Straton of Arsinoe, and he had another Arsinoean as his *hipparchos*, Ladikos: these are the two obvious candidates. Others must be Skopas, who became *strategos* again for the year 212/211, and Dorimachos, his successor (again) for 211/210. These were two of the triumvirate who had been particularly anti-Macedonian in the crisis which led to the outbreak of the Second War in 220; there is no reason to suppose that they were less committed to that policy in 212. It may be, in fact, that they were elected precisely because of their political attitudes and that Straton had not been sufficiently belligerent and anti-Macedonian in his attitude. Indeed, the very phrase 'some leading men' which Livy uses to identify Laevinus' interlocutors may imply that it was not the elected officials he was dealing with, but non-elected politicians such as Skopas and Dorimachos were in 212.

It must thus be taken as a sign of the change of general Aitolian sentiment that Skopas was elected in September 212[39]. His political preferences were known, and he and Dorimachos will have restated them at the time of the elections. The international situation was also well enough understood amongst the men who formed opinion in the league. We must also assume that the 'secret conversations' with Laevinus or his envoy were secret only from their enemies, but perhaps fairly widely known inside Aitolia, and that the possible terms of the proposed alliance had been discussed in the period since the conversations took place.

Even so, no decision was reached at the time of Laevinus' visit. He had, in fact, to make three attempts before finally persuading the Aitolians into the war: the first was the 'secret conversations' which took place before Skopas' election in September 212. We must presume a second attempt once Skopas was elected in which outline terms were discussed, but which could result in no decision in the absence of a meeting of the Aitolian Assembly. It was during a third visit, in autumn 211, that the treaty of alliance was agreed, and was accepted at the *Thermike* in September. The reluctance of the Aitolians is clear, and this fits with their apparent attitude all along. Also it

[39] Livy 26.24.7.

is noticeable that the power of the *strategos* was limited: he could not commit the league to war without discussion and persuasion. Indeed later, the Achaian leader Philopoimen remarked that the Aitolian *strategos* was not permitted to make a proposal for a declaration of war to the Assembly[40]. This long-drawn process of discussion must by then have been increasingly public until openly debated at the *Thermike*[41].

Both sides had therefore a good idea of the possible terms when Laevinus returned to Aitolia in the autumn of 211, since discussion, private and public, had been extensive. In the meantime Rome's own affairs had improved: the siege of Syracuse had ended in a Roman victory, that of Capua was almost over if not actually so[42]; the years before had been the reverse, with the capture of Tarentum by Hannibal and other disasters in Italy and Spain. But Philip was still making progress in the Illyrian interior, and had captured the coastal fort of Lissos the year before[43]. Rome could scarcely spare an army to go campaigning in the Balkans, not with Hannibal still loose in Italy – 211 was the year he actually reached the Roman walls. So, even if Rome's conditions had improved, Laevinus was still the suitor, and Aitolia had still to be persuaded.

The agreed terms reflect these positions, and have been preserved in summaries in the ancient historians, and in an inscription, partly damaged, from, of all places, Thyrreion in Akarnania[44]. The two states made an alliance with each other and in effect invited five others to join them – Elis, Sparta, and three kings, Attalos of Pergamon, Skerdilaidas and Pleuratos of Illyria; the omission of Messenia, supposed to have become hostile to Macedon after Philip's actions there in 214, is notable. Rules were laid down for the division of any conquests and of the portable spoils; the Romans agreed to provide

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[40] Livy 35.25.8; discussion of the date of the treaty has centred on almost anything but Aitolian constitutional practice, but this is clearly central to the issue. Livy (26.24.1) refers to Laevinus crossing to Aitolia for a conference on the proposed alliance; this was clearly in confidence, a negotiating process. Only when that was concluded could the result be presented to the Aitolian Assembly, and only at the spring and autumn meetings could that be done. So Laevinus had a deadline, September 211, which would operate to help the Aitolian negotiators.

[41] Livy 26.24.1-5.

[42] As Laevinus is made to point out: Livy 26.24.2.

[43] Walbank, *Philip V*, 80-81.

[44] Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* III 536, based on Klaffenbach's second version in *IG* IX.1.2.241. Discussion has been extensive, listed conveniently by Schmitt.

twenty-five warships to the joint effort, and the Aitolians their army; rules were also laid down for making peace, since it was clearly envisaged that separate peace agreements with Philip could be made: if one partner did agree to peace with Philip, the other was supposed to be included before the peace was finalised. The Aitolians emphasised the possibility of expanding their league, for they would take over any cities which were conquered, and the Romans would take the moveable booty; but there was to be a northward limit to Aitolian expansion, marked by the latitude of Kerkyra – presumably the southern tip of the island. This would put all Akarnania, Ambrakia and the small southern Epeirote cities into Aitolia's sphere, and would leave the central parts of Epeiros as a neutral zone between Aitolia and the Roman territories in Illyria.

The exact date of this treaty is disputed, but September 211 seems the best choice, with the preliminary discussions spread over the year before. King Philip heard of the alliance while in winter quarters at Pella[45]; September or October is rather early for an army to bed down for winter, especially since Livy then goes on to list a long sequence of actions which Philip took *after* he heard of the alliance[46]. These include a campaign in the north-west, one into Thrace, which included a siege, and two visits to his southern border with Thessaly. This is enough activity for a full campaigning season. In actual fact, this is probably a record of all Philip's campaigns in that year, with an introductory remark about winter quarters which is just Livy being careless, and almost certainly relying on a source equally inaccurate.

If the comment about winter quarters is ignored, Philip can be seen to be described as reacting twice to the Romano-Aitolian alliance: in the first case, after two rapid campaigns in Illyria and Dardania, he came south to the borders of Thessaly, where he left a detachment of 4,000 men at the Tempe pass[47]; in the second, he heard that active hostilities had begun, by which time he had marched to Thrace and besieged and captured a town there[48]. His first visit was obviously a false alarm, perhaps a response to the news

[45] Livy 26.25.1; this is a distinctly odd notice, referring as it does to the 'revolt' of the Aitolians; no contemporary could possibly consider Aitolia a subject of Philip's.
[46] Livy 26.25.2-5.
[47] Livy 26.25.2.
[48] Livy 26.25.3.

that Laevinus and the Aitolians had begun negotiations; certainly he will have understood that no alliance had been made. He had then turned away, though leaving a precautionary blocking force at Tempe. He still had time during the campaigning season to march to Thrace and undertake a siege. This must therefore be during the summer rather than later. This therefore may be taken as evidence that the negotiations between Laevinus and Skopas were protracted. Philip's second march south was thus in response to actual fighting, which had begun as soon as the alliance had been agreed and so in October. News of this had to reach him from Akarnania and so he will have heard of it some time after the fighting began. Definite details of the alliance did not reach him until he had actually returned to Pella for the winter late in 211, by which time it was all rather academic anyway.

The account of the negotiations in Livy is somewhat compressed, but it can fit well enough with Philip's actions. Laevinus sailed to Greece, presumably when the sailing season opened, in April or May. He then had to negotiate in Aitolia, and the Aitolians had to be persuaded. This clearly took some effort on Laevinus' part, judging from the record of Philip's movements, and the Aitolians drove a hard bargain. So Philip's first move south may well have been in, say, June, when he heard that Laevinus had arrived; his second would then be in September, for he only heard of the alliance when the fighting began, and the alliance could only be ratified at the *Thermike.*

Much of the discussion concerning the treaty has centred on technical details of the date and the wording. Much less attention has been paid to the motives of the two parties. In part this is because the treaty and the war which followed are generally studied as part of the greater conflict we call the Second Punic War. Indeed, the war which the Aitolians joined is normally called the 'First Macedonian War', and the treaty is usually called the 'Romano-Aitolian Treaty', in both cases adopting a Roman vewpoint. But for Aitolia this was not the 'First' but the *Third* Macedonian War, the third within the last two decades, and the treaty had been negotiated with such difficulty that it deserves to be considered Aitolo-Roman as much as the reverse.

Rome's motives are fairly obvious. Philip was nibbling away at the Roman territores in Illyria, and Rome had no strength to spare to stop him, hence the recruitment of Aitolia to distract him. To Rome, the whole affair was a sideshow, of minor importance compared with the presence in Italy of a Carthaginian army commanded by

Hannibal. To the Aitolians, however, it was very much more important. It is safe to assume that the Aitolians had no interest in Illyria – and the northward limit to their expansion incorporated in the treaty makes that clear – but the fact that they agreed to commit their whole army to the war, whereas Rome's commitment was no more than 25 ships, is a clear sign both of the difference in scale of the power of the two allies, and of the greater importance of the issue to the Aitolians.

The terms of the treaty suggest that one of the prime Aitolian motives was an extension of the league territory. Attention is directed to the limitation on the west (only south of Kerkyra), but one of their main aims would surely have been to recover the territory in Thessaly lost to Philip in 217. On the west, as Livy notes, the main target for the Aitolians was Akarnania, not necessarily as he states, the conquest of all that land[49], but the recovery, at least, of the cities taken by Philip in 219. For such exploits the full Aitolian army would clearly be needed. That is, when the Aitolians agreed to join the war, they did so for clear and well-defined reasons of their own, and, having recognised those reasons, they intended to commit the force necessary to accomplish those aims. But at the same time it seems likely that Aitolia's aims were actually quite limited, just as Rome's were. The alliance was thus a remarkably fragile affair, with both parties having different aims, different areas of operation – land and sea – and separate and distinct reasons for fighting. No wonder it ended in tears.

The agreement of the Aitolians to commit their whole army may be an indirect reference to their practice in the previous war, of using only small forces, though the use of larger groups, even the whole levy, had not been unknown. But that Aitolia agreed to such a stipulation was an acknowledgement that this was going to be a very different sort of war, one in which a major military effort would be required. It was clearly going to be a more difficult contest than one against all Greece and Macedon.

[49] Livy 26.24.5; later at 25.6 the Aitolian targets are defined as Oiniadai and 'Nassus'.

16. THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR
2. THE FIGHTING (211-206)

The decision of the *Thermike* to accept the Roman alliance was followed very quickly by an Aitolian attack on Akarnania[1]. Rome was already at war with Philip, of course, though as it happened, the ratification of the alliance treaty at Rome took a long time. The Aitolian envoys were in the city at the time of the elections for the consuls of 210, which took place late in 211[2]. One of those designated for election was Laevinus, and ratification was perhaps somewhat delayed in order that he should present the treaty in person to the Senate. In the event he and the Senate quarrelled over the procedure for the election and it seems that the ratification fell by the wayside for a time[3]. It was, of course, a fairly minor matter for the Romans, for the Aitolians had already entered the war against Philip and that was, for the Senate, the object of the agreement.

The fact that Philip was away in Thrace, fighting and conducting a siege at the time the treaty was agreed, was known to Skopas at the time of the *Thermike*, as Livy makes clear[4] – and thus also to other Aitolians and to the Romans. The opportunity was too good to miss. Laevinus and the new Aitolian *strategos* Dorimachos concerted plans at once, and launched an immediate attack on Akarnania. Laevinus' exploits are the ones we are told about, reasonably enough, since Livy was writing a history of Rome. He took the fleet, overran the island of Zakynthos, which Philip had seized back in 217, except for the citadel of the only city. Then he sailed back to capture the city of Oiniadai and an island called, simply, 'Nisos', which is presumed to be one of those nearby[5].

Meanwhile, Skopas had mobilised the Aitolians[6], presumably at

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[1] Livy 26.25.6-8.

[2] Livy 26.24.10.

[3] E. Badian, 'Aetolica', *Latomus* 15, 1958, 197-211, at 205-208.

[4] Livy 26.24.6.

[5] Livy 26.24.15; Livy calls 'Nassus' a city, but the name must mean an island; Oost, *Roman Policy*, 34-35.

[6] Livy constantly refers to 'Skopas' in this section. If the treaty had been ratified at the *Thermike*, Skopas ceased to be *strategos* at that time, and was succeeded by Dorimachos. Badian, 'Aetolica', 202-203, denies that Dorimachos was *strategos*, and shifts

the *Thermike*. Laevinus sailed away to Zakynthos first, perhaps while awaiting the *Thermike* decision. The Aitolian forces attacked Philip's part of Akarnania from the land side[7], no doubt more or less at the same time as Laevinus returned to capture Oiniadai. This was clearly intended as a surprise attack, and it seems clear that Oiniadai fell at once, without resistance. Again, like Zakynthos, this was one of Philip's conquests, from the Aitolians, during the last war. It was also an important Macedonian naval base, and as such was an ideal target for both allies. By the terms of the treaty the Aitolians would therefore recover one of their lost cities, while the Romans would gain booty and the elimination of an enemy base – two bases, perhaps, if Zakynthos was also important. But Laevinus had not taken the acropolis at Zakynthos and it is probable that Philip's men recovered the whole island as a result.

This sudden attack, and in particular the swift capture of Oiniadai, both alerted and frightened the Akarnanians, who reacted hysterically. They mobilised all men below the age of sixty, sent their women and children and old men for refuge in Epeiros, and took an oath to die to the last man[8]. This reaction is said to have come as a result of the Aitolian mobilisation and the threat to invade Akarnania. But there is something seriously wrong with the timing. The Akarnanians passed their resolution and appealed to Philip for help; Philip was a long way off, campaigning in the Strymon valley, when he got the appeal, and he then marched south as far as Dion in Pieria. At that point he heard that the Aitolians' threatened invasion had ceased[9].

Whether any invasion of Akarnania took place, or whether it was all a ploy by the Akarnanians, is a moot point. What is conspicuously missing in Livy's account is any indication of what the Aitolians accomplished by their attack. But if the attack actually took place, they may well have achieved some success. They certainly penetrated into Akarnania, because Livy mentions that they returned home. The understanding of all this is bedevilled also by misinterpretations as to

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Skopas to 211/210, pointing out that Aitolian nobles could command without holding public office. But this argument can be used to have Skopas operating under Dorimachos as well as the reverse. And if Skopas was not *strategos* in 212/211 who was in charge of the Roman negotiations? For Skopas' name is firmly fixed to these events.

[7] Livy 26.25.16; he says the attack was delayed, not that it did not take place.

[8] Livy 26.25.11-15; Pol. 9.40.4-6.

[9] Livy 26.25.17.

Aitolian war aims, which in turn are distorted by being viewed through Polybios' account, with its manifest anti-Aitolian bias. Neither Polybios nor Livy had any interest in or intention of explaining Aitolian achievements, interests, or aims.

Yet if the Romans could capture Oiniadai by surprise with men from the Roman fleet, the Aitolians could equally well capture Akarnanian cities at the same time, for the same conditions of surprise and Akarnanian unpreparedness applied. But, after the increasingly public negotiations between Laevinus and the Aitolians, spread over more than a year, why were the Akarnanians surprised? The real surprise was the sudden Roman capture of Oiniadai from the Macedonians, and its immediate delivery into Aitolian control. This would entail an Aitolian army marching down the Acheloos valley and across the marshes to the captured city. None of this was in Akarnania, nor had it been for decades. But the Akarnanians may have expected attacks on them next. Their gains in the last war, Phoitiai and perhaps Matropolis, were obvious Aitolian targets.

There is one clue which may provide information as to the Aitolian achievements. About 207 the Akarnanian League passed a decree recognising the inviolability of the festival of Artemis Leukophryene at Magnesia-ad-Maiandros in Asia Minor[10]. The date is presumed from other instances of this recognition, but may well have been a year or two later. For my purpose here, however, knowledge of the precise date is not essential. At the end of the inscription recording the decree, found at Thyrreion, is a list of the Akarnanian cities which participated in the decision, and to whom the decree applied. Three of the names are too badly damaged to be legible, but the other six are all of places which are concentrated in the north-eastern third of the area called Akarnania. In particular four cities which are normally thought of as Akarnanian are missing: Oiniadai, Phoitiai, Matropolis and Astakos, all of them in the southern and eastern parts of the land. One more is noted as the home city of the league *strategos*, Nikanor of Korontai. The missing cities – far too geographically concentrated for their absence to be a mistake or a coincidence, were, I suggest, those which were taken by the Aitolians during the war. Oiniadai we know was handed over to them by Laevinus in fulfilment of the terms of the treaty and anyway had not been in Akarnanian

[10] *IG* IX.1.2.582.

possession for decades. It had been held by the Aitolians until 219, and since then by the Macedonians. Of the others, two – Phoitiai and Matropolis – had been Aitolian in the past and had been taken by Philip during his campaign of 219, before he captured Oiniadai. Philip appears to have handed them over to the Akarnanians, just as he gave Ambrakos to the Epeirotes. It is true he kept Oiniadai, and he may well have kept garrisons in Phoitiai and Matropolis until the end of the earlier war, but retention of such small places does not seem worth while. The main reasons for assuming that he gave the cities to the Akarnanians is that they would need to be rewarded in some way for their enthusiasm for the war, and Philip would not wish small packets of Macedonian soldiers to be scattered too widely: he needed them at home.

So far, this city list might apply to almost any period, though the inscription dates it precisely to 207 or 205. But the omission of Astakos is new. This was a city on the Ionian Sea coast, a useful port and anchorage. It is not known to have been taken by any power in the third century, but by the time of the decree it clearly did not belong to the Akarnanian League. It would seem, therefore, that the list of cities is relevant to the result, for the Akarnanians, of the war.

The date is significant, in that it is either in 207, in the last year of the war, or, if 206/205, in the first year following the conclusion of the separate Aitolian peace with Philip. In either case the inscription clearly reflects the condition of the Akarnanian League at the time. During the war, therefore, the Akarnanians had lost control of at least these four missing cities, a situation which is confirmed by the peace treaty, which froze the respective political boundaries. This does not provide a precise date for the Aitolian conquest, but the very beginning of the war, the time of the great Akarnanian fright, the swift Roman capture of Oiniadai, and before Philip began to monopolise Aitolian attention in Thessaly and Epeiros, is the obvious time.

It is perhaps permissible to go one stage further. Most of the area retaken by Aitolia had been Aitolian earlier – Phoitiai, Matropolis, and Oiniadai – and had been that part of Akarnania which had been acquired decades before in the time of Alexander II of Epeiros or thereabouts. It had been Akarnanian for only five or six years since Philip's conquest. It would not be surprising if there were substantial parties in the cities who favoured a return to membership of the Aitolian League. This had been the case back in Alexander's time, when parties had favoured him or Aitolia; it is reasonable to suppose

an Aitolian party still existed. The Aitolian *revanche* is therefore most likely to have taken place in a territory in which they were already regarded with favour. One Akarnanian city, Stratos, had never been lost and was apparently fully content. And now three were recovered, and another, Astakos, had been added.

Geographically, of course, these conquests gave Aitolia full control once more of the whole length of the Acheloos valley, no doubt an important trade route, and certainly a helpful defensive area protecting the Aitolian centres of the Lake Country, including vulnerable Thermos. They also removed the standing threat posed by the presence of Macedonian forces in Oiniadai, and perhaps elsewhere. These are sufficient reasons for Aitolia's actions. The achievement, once made clear, explains the emphasis on Akarnania which appears in Livy's account of the pre-war negotiations, and which must reflect Roman concerns, not those of either Aitolia or Akarnania. This did not mean that the Aitolians were ambitious to conquer all Akarnania, but only to recover that part of it which had been part of their league before the Second War with Macedon. From, the Roman point of view, also, the elimination of the Macedonian naval bases at Oiniadai and in Zakynthos could only be helpful, and the Aitolian control of Astakos removed yet another possible enemy base.

Aitolian war aims, therefore, may be said to have been the recovery of the lands they had lost in the previous conflict, together with the acquisition of some other areas where their persuasiveness might attract new members to their league. Apart from Akarnania, this meant two areas in particular. The small cities of southern Epeiros, such places as Kassiope, Charadra, Thesprotian Argos, and Pandosia, were clearly envisaged as being likely candidates for membership of the league by the terms of the Roman alliance treaty. The other area was Thessaly. When Philip came south for the first time in 211, he blocked 'the pass into Thessaly' from Macedon with a detachment of 4,000 men[11]. That is, he expected to have to face trouble in Thessaly if and when war began. He had deprived the Aitolians of Phthiotic Thebes in the last war, and he could expect the Aitolians to try to recover that city, all the more so since refugees from Thebes had been settled by the Aitolians at Thronion in Opountian Lokris[12].

[11] Livy 26.25.5.
[12] Livy 28.7.12.

The Roman war aims, however, did not necessarily coincide with those of the Aitolians, nor those of Aitolia with Rome – this had been the basic reason for the difficult negotiations. It was Laevinus' purpose to distract Philip from pursuing his aims in Illyria, and so to ensure that the Macedonian army was never available for use in Italy. Thus the aim of Roman policy was to involve Philip in land fighting within Greece. No doubt this was fully appreciated by the Aitolians, but they still had to accommodate themselves to Roman wishes. In the spring of 210, therefore, when Laevinus returned from his winter quarters in Kerkyra with a plan to capture Antikyra, a small Phokian city on the Gulf of Corinth, the Aitolians agreed. It was a well-chosen target, for it was the southern terminus of the Macedonian route through central Greece as well as being just across the boundary from Aitolia. Aitolian control of the city would restrict Macedonian access to the Peloponnese to sea transport – which in turn was very vulnerable to Roman sea power. This was a route which had taken up a good deal of attention in the last war, when Philip was involved in a mysterious plot at one point, and the Aitolians attempted to seize Phanoteus by a *coup de main.*

Laevinus attacked from the sea and the Aitolians by land, and the city was rapidly captured[13]. The city itself now became Aitolian, the booty, including the people, went to the Romans, the inhabitants being sold into slavery. The property in the city was, so it seems in the words of an enemy of Aitolia reported by another Aitolian enemy, then divided by lot among the Aitolians[14]. It is to be presumed that Aitolian settlers then moved into the empty city. This had been Philip's conduct at Phthiotic Thebes.

This was a new practice by the Aitolians. Ever since the failure of their colonising attempt on Oiniadai in the time of Alexander the Great the Aitolians' practice in expanding their league had been to *persuade* the inhabitants to join their league, and not to exert force unless a section of the people of the city was blocking such a union and could be overcome easily. There is no record of forcible depopulation such as had occurred at Antikyra. But then the Aitolians had never had allies such as the Romans before, nor, in all likelihood, a treaty dividing the conquests in such a way. Once they had the empty

[13] Livy 26.26.2-3.
[14] Pol. 9.39.3.

city, of course, there was little they could do but repopulate it, since that was the only way to hold it.

It did, of course, provide their enemies with another stick with which to beat them. During the same spring active diplomacy was pursued, in accordance with the terms of the treaty of alliance, by which more allies were recruited. Sparta and Elis had been noted in the treaty as likely allies, and in spring 210[15] two Aitolian envoys went to Sparta on a recruiting drive. The two envoys were Chlaineas and Kleonikos. The former was to be a Delphic *hieromnemon* in 207/206, and came from Kalydon. The second man, Kleonikos, was either the son or, less likely, the brother of Agelaos of Naupaktos, the speechmaker at the peace conference in 217; Kleonikos had also been Achaian *proxenos* in Naupaktos, and had been captured in the previous war; he was thus very well connected to a politically active family with wide connections[16]. This was, in other words, a powerful delegation. When they arrived at Sparta they were pitted against an Akarnanian envoy in speeches to the Spartan Assembly. The Akarnanian was a man called Lykiskos, probably from Thyrreion – the only epigraphic examples of that name in Akarnania are from that city[17]. Polybios gives his own version of the two speeches to the Assembly, the more persuasive of which seems to be that of Lykiskos; yet the Spartans decided in favour of an Aitolian alliance[18]. Here is another example of Polybian bias, for he is addressing his own audience of Greeks and Romans, and seeking to persuade it that the Aitolians were the villains of the Greek piece, not the Achaians, who had much more to answer for.

The outbreak of war in Greece, of which the attack by the Romans and the Aitolians on the Akarnanians was the first event, should have automatically activated the Symmachy. Its Greek members had so far kept out of the war with Rome, but now the Akarnanians were involved because they had been beneficiaries of Philip's victory in the previous war. There were also Macedonian holdings like Oiniadai in the Peloponnese. By enlisting Sparta, the Aitolians now re-started the previous war between Aitolia and Macedon's allies. In

[15] This visit is often dated to 211, but it contains a reference to the enslavement of the Antikyrans, which did not take place until 210.

[16] See *Prosopography*, 'Chleinias' and 'Kleonikos'.

[17] Cf *IG* IX.1.2, and index; a Lykiskos in Aitolian history came from Stratos.

[18] The two speeches are: by Chleinias, Pol. 9.28.1-31.5; by Lykiskos, Pol. 9.32.3-40.7.

southern Greece, this meant that the war between the Aitolians and the Achaians began again, and this in turn permitted the Aitolians to re-commence their diplomatic offensive. Even before the rival embassies had reached Sparta, both Elis and Messenia had joined the Romano-Aitolian alliance, since Chleinias is made to refer to the possibility of a concentric attack on Achaia by the four allies – Aitolia, Elis, Messenia, Sparta[19]. And, since the capture of Antikyra, such an attack was rather less likely to be interfered with by Macedon. Messenia had not been mentioned in the original treaty, perhaps because of the confused political situation there, but it had joined in now, as did Elis, still smarting no doubt from Achaian enmity in the previous war.

A further Aitolian embassy has to be presumed, one to visit King Attalos at Pergamon, who had also been named as a possible ally in the Roman treaty, but this envoy's name is not known. He could call on several years of contacts between the two states, both of whom disliked Philip's policies. Attalos had paid for the fortification of Elaos, which Philip had taken during the Oiniadai campaign in 219[20]. Attalos was reluctant to become involved, judging by the length of time he delayed before participating. It will have taken as much effort by the Aitolian envoy to bring Attalos in as it had by Laevinus to bring the Aitolians in. Attalos required a substantial offer if he was to engage Macedonian forces, which was a dangerous pastime. It seems likely that the Aitolians had to call in Roman diplomatic assistance before Attalos would agree, with the result that these negotiations will have taken up much of 210. Chleinias claimed in Sparta, according to Polybios, that Attalos' navy would be as active as the Roman ships[21], but this cannot be pressed too far as evidence for the timing of Attalos' entry into the war. It may have been said by Chleinias more as an expectation than a fact, or it may simply be part of Polybios' rhetoric, assuming that Attalos was already involved because he knew he did join the war.

The Roman commander Laevinus fell ill soon after the capture of Antikyra in the spring of 210, and then he returned to Italy where he

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[19] Pol. 9.30.6.

[20] Pol. 4.65.6; this puts the friendship between Aitolia and Attalos back to the 220s, or perhaps even before. A place in Aitolia was named Attaleia: presumably this was Elaos.

[21] Pol. 9.30.7.

had been elected consul. His successor in Greek waters was P. Sulpicius Galba, consul in the previous year, who arrived only in the later summer. He then sent his fleet round to the Aegean and captured the island of Aigina, which had been part of the Achaian League for thirty years. This activated the treaty terms again, and the island became Aitolian. Galba relented from his initial intention to enslave the whole population; this was no doubt in part at Aitolian request, for the Aitolians had no wish to inherit an empty island. Nor had they, in fact, any wish to possess Aigina at all, for it was far too vulnerable to a rapid recapture by the Achaians, or by Philip's fleet. The lack of Aitolian naval strength, once again demonstrated, ensured that. So it would seem that Aigina had been captured as part of the process of bringing Attalos in, as his prize for entry, or perhaps his price. The island was sold to him by the Aitolians, for the knock-down price of thirty talents, as part of the terms of the alliance they made. It seems probable that the island was even suggested by Attalos as his price[22]. Attalos' possession of a navy made it a more useful acquisition for him.

Another element in the alliance was the election of Attalos himself as *strategos* of the Aitolian League for the next year, 210/209[23]. This was no more than honorary post, which, when conferred later on Antiochos III was referred to as *strategos autokrator*, since Attalos could not possibly attend to the detailed administration involved. So a regular *strategos*, Pyrrias of Herakleia, was also elected. Not until the next year, 209, did Attalos himself arrive in Greece, though he sent some troops across earlier.

Much of this diplomatic activity had to be carried out by Aitolia. There is no sign of Roman involvement in the Spartan negotiations, still less in whatever talks took place with Elis and Messenia, and it seems that the Roman involvement with the Pergamene talks only took place when the original Aitolian attempt failed, and then perhaps only in a supporting role, as at Aigina. This was a reasonable division of labour, for the Aitolians were clearly more familiar with the Greek diplomatic terrain than the Romans, and they had old

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[22] Pol. 9.42.5-8, 22.8-10; Flacelière, *Aitoliens*, 300, R. B. McShane, *The Foreign Policy of the Attalids of Pergamum*, Urbana, Illinois, 1964, 117; Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, 69; E. V. Hansen, *The Attalids of Pergamon*, 2nd ed., Ithaca, N.Y., 1971, 47-48.

[23] Livy 27.29.10; the precise title is not recorded. It may be *strategos autokrator*, on the model of the later grant to Antiochos III, which seems the most likely, and is adopted here, or it may be *hegemon*, as Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, 69, assumes.

contacts with her allies; but Attalos' tenacious insistence on a direct agreement with Rome is interesting[24]. This will have been a separate agreement, involving the division of the booty, and perhaps the same sort of territorial arrangement as with the Aitolians, though Attalos does not seem to have been very interested in such gains on the Greek mainland[25]. Attalos was perhaps better informed as to the importance and power of Rome than the Peloponnesian cities, whose perspectives were shorter. He was playing a larger game than Elis, Messenia, or Sparta, whose war was essentially with Achaia.

An indication of the scope of Aitolia's foreign connections is given by a new list of *proxenoi*, dated to Pyrrias' third strategy, and thus to the year 210/209[26], and to that of Philleas of Stratos, which was probably the year after[27]. These are the central years of the Third Macedonian War, and the connections will reflect Aitolia's foreign policy, as such connections always had, but with an added urgency, given the state of war existing at the time. Furthermore the sponsors of the *proxenoi* are a distinguished group of Aitolians. Both of the *strategoi* and the *grammateus* appear, as do Skopas, in both years, and Alexander of Isios, later described as the richest man in Greece. But it is the states with whom connections were made which are the most enlightening.

The most significant connection is that made with Aigina. No earlier *proxenos* with this island is known, and to form a link at this precise date, shortly after the Roman conquest and the purchase of the island by Attalos, shows Aitolian alertness. The island had, of course, been Aitolian for a short time; the *proxenos*-connection will have been made once Attalos acquired it, for no *proxenos* would be needed until then. The sponsor of Aigina was Skopas, and he also sponsored *proxenoi* from three other cities. To the northeast he sponsored Kalchedon, on the east side of the Bosporos. This had an earlier connection with Aitolia dating from 271/270[28], and this was to be developed again in

[24] J. A. O. Larsen, 'The Peace of Phoenice and the Outbreak of the Second Macedonian War', *Classical Philology*, 32, 1937, 17-18, argued for a formal alliance between Attalos and Rome in 210 or so; K. E. Petzold, *Die Eroffnung des zweiten romisch-makedonischen Krieges*, Berlin 1940, 14-18, argued against a treaty; it is thought that a treaty of *amicitia* may well be the answer: cf Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, 69. Some sort of agreement seems certain.

[25] Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, 69-70.

[26] *IG* IX.1.29.

[27] *IG* IX.1.31i.

[28] *IG* IX.1.17.

the next four years[29], once the war ended. To the northwest Skopas also sponsored a connection with the Molossi of Epeiros, and to do so in 210 when Epeiros was technically an ally of Macedon suggests that that alliance had become scarcely more than technical; certainly it would seem that the Epeirote League was doing its best to remain a neutral in the war. Epeiros features not at all in the war until its leaders mediated an end to the fighting; the Aitolian connection here can best be seen as an Aitolian reassurance to nervous Epeirotes that there would be no repetition of the Aitolian raid on Dodona; it is also a sign that Epeiros' sympathy with Akarnania, on which the Akarnanians had relied for succour in 211, had faded – if it had ever existed – and this may be one of the reasons for the complete absence of activity on the Akarnanian front for the rest of the war. It may also be, of course, that the Aitolians had no wish to go further in that area.

Skopas' last sponsorship was of a *proxenos*-connection with Syracuse. Again the date is significant: the city had just been captured by the Romans, its political regime had changed, so now it seems that the Aitolians were re-establishing their older links. But it was also a political gesture towards Rome, amounting to a formal recognition of Rome's possession of the city and the extinction of the Syracusan monarchy. The same gesture was made concerning Tarentum once the Romans had retaken that city, in this case by a sponsor whose name has disappeared. It is the more or less joint appearance of Aigina, Syracuse and Taras specifically at this time which is the most convincing argument that these connections reflect political developments. Other connections made in 210-208 were with Lakedaimon and Korone in Messenia, both of which were Aitolian allies in the war, with Athens, with a city in Thessaly whose name has gone, with Kyzikos in the Propontis, and with Soli in Kilikia. Athens was an obvious city for *proxenos* connections, more perhaps for economic than for political reasons, though the city had an active diplomacy; Kyzikos fits in well with the subsequent Aitolian connection with Kalchedon and the later Aitolian development of interests in the area of the Straits and the Propontis. The one connection it is difficult to account for in this way is with Soli, but there was a tradition

[29] Kalchedon is known to be an Aitolian ally in 202, but exactly when the alliance was made is not known; it is generally assumed to date from this war, but the argument is tenuous and full of assumptions; cf Walbank, *Philip V*, 306, n.7.

of *proxenos*-connections with southern Asia Minor – Knidos, Kaunos, Perge, and of course Rhodes[30] – and there was the recent establishment of relations with Antioch[31]. The revival of Seleukid power in the east since the conquest of Achaios in Asia Minor in 213 required Aitolian attention just as much as did the contemporary Roman growth in the west.

Philip was not idle during 210. The capture of Antikyra had cut one of the possible routes he could take towards his Peloponnesian allies, and the conquest of Aigina had put a Roman naval force in a position to block his sea-communications south through the western Aegean. His alternative was to batter his way through along the main land route, and this required the capture of a series of well-defended cities. A possible first attempt by way of Xyniai on Mount Othrys[32] was followed by a full scale siege of the city of Echinos, on the Malian Gulf. The fact that he could reach it implies that he had already taken Larisa Chremaste, which could dominate his rearward communications, though he relied on ships for supplies, so perhaps he had ignored the land route. He set up a regular siege of the town, complete with towers, saps and rams. He had time to set all this up, together with an entrenched camp to defend his works. The city was clearly well-defended, which pre-supposed that the Aitolians were fully aware of the likely area of attack; but it does not seem that they attempted to interfere with the attack by themselves. Instead a joint relief expedition was organised. Galba sailed round from Kerkyra with the Roman fleet, and Dorimachos, the Aitolian *strategos* for 211/210, arrived by land with the army. Their co-ordination seems to have been good, which will mean that the Aitolian army had been mustered ready to wait for the Roman arrival[33]. But this also gave Philip time to prepare his defences. These defensive preparations were fully adequate, and when Dorimachos' assault on the entrenched camp was repulsed, he withdrew, at which the besieged city surrendered[34]. Galba seems to have done nothing; perhaps he was involved in the talks with Attalos. He had had to dismiss his

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[30] *IG* IX.1.13 VII (Knidos), 31f (Kaunos), 25a (Perge), 17 (Rhodes).

[31] *IG* IX.1.31s.

[32] Suggested by Walbank, *Philip V*, 88 n.5.

[33] This was obviously a large Aitolian force, which had to be able to face Philip's army; the Aitolian commander was thus, equally obviously, the league *strategos*, not a subordinate, as Badian, 'Aetolica', 202-203, suggested.

[34] Pol. 9.41.1-42.4.

troops when he took over the command; perhaps he had only ships, but even so he does not seem to have been able to interfere with Philip's seaborne supply line. It may have suited the Romans to see the Aitolians defeated, since this would fasten them into the war all the more securely.

If Galba had no military (as opposed to naval) strength, there was no point in him sailing all the way to Echinos, for he could contribute nothing. It follows that he had made the voyage for another purpose, and in fact it was immediately after the repulse of Dorimachos' force that Galba took Aigina. Hence the thought that he had been involved in negotiations with Attalos. It must be assumed that Galba had sailed to the Aegean to take Aigina, or at least to secure the participation of Attalos, and not to help at Echinos.

The capture of Echinos which was followed within the next year by the capture of Phalara further west[35], gave Philip a port on the Malian Gulf, closer to both Euboia and his landing place in Boiotia, than his main port at Demetrias, and the other ports around the Gulf of Pagasai. Indeed, the threat posed by the arrival of Roman and Attalid sea power in the western Aegean may have been one of the spurs to Philip's actions. Access to his outposts in the south was now much more difficult for him. In the Peloponnese the alliances forged by Aitolian diplomacy did not produce any action by anyone yet. There was a clear reluctance by all in the area to become seriously engaged in the fighting, and while the Aitolians were preoccupied with the defence of Echinos and its neighbours, they had no time to spare for the Peloponnese. Nor would Achaia wish to provoke hostilities, surrounded as it was by enemies by land and sea. Next year, however, the Aitolians opened up the southern front by sending a force across into Elis, apparently at the request of the Eleans, and coordinated this with an advance by the Spartan regent Machanidas, who apparently conducted raids into the Achaian territory. The Achaians had seen this coming, and had sent an appeal for help beforehand to Philip[36].

Philip meanwhile had returned to the assault on the main route south. He was met by the Aitolian main army under the new *strategos* Pyrrias, and they fought two battles between Echinos and Lamia.

[35] Livy 27.30.3; Stahlin, *Thessalien*, 217-218.
[36] Livy 27.29.9-10.

After the second both armies retired, Pyrrias into Lamia, which had been provisioned for a siege, and Philip to Phalara, a Malian port on the coast of the Malian Gulf back towards Echinos. The Aitolian casualties are said to have been a thousand in each of the battles, implying a large force on either side; they had been reinforced by a thousand Roman soldiers from Galba's fleet, and by an Attalid contingent of unknown size[37]. Attalos had now been appointed as *hegemon* or *strategos autokrator*. The reinforcements sent to the Aitolians suggest that both sides had put forth their full strength. The interpretation of this fighting by Livy makes Philip the victor, but the campaign as a whole looks more like a draw. Aitolian casualties are mentioned, but not those of the Macedonians, and there were sufficient Aitolian forces left, behind the fortifications of Lamia, to deter Philip from pushing on with the campaign. The opportune arrival at Phalara of intermediaries representing Ptolemy of Egypt, Athens, Rhodes, and Chios – three of the same group of four which had helped to end the last Aitolo-Macedonian war – anxious to prevent the war from spreading further, provided Philip with a colourable excuse to break off the fighting[38].

This was as similar group to that which had attempted to mediate in 217, with Athens replacing Byzantion. It was neatly balanced: Chios could be seen as an Aitolian friend, and Rhodes as an enemy of Philip, with Ptolemy and Athens as concerned neutrals. In addition they were accompanied by one of the Athamanian kings, Amynandros. His kingdom was uncomfortably hemmed in by Macedon and Aitolia and Epeiros, and he could perhaps see that if hostilities continued his land would become involved. Later he was to make an agreement with Philip, and later still he was an Aitolian friend and eventually a Roman ally, but at this point he was perhaps another concerned neutral. The intervention of this delegation allowed both sides to agree to a truce for thirty days, until a peace conference could be convened at Aigion in Achaia.

Both sides used the truce to try to gain an advantage. The Romans sailed their fleet from the Aegean to the Corinthian Gulf[39]; Philip

[37] Livy 27.30.1-3.

[38] Livy 27.30.4-5; Walbank, *Philip V*, 89, makes Philip march to Phalara because the envoys had arrived, but Livy's words do not bear this sense; and this, of course, in turn puts a different light on the preceding battles.

[39] Livy 27.30.11.

crossed with part of his army to Boiotia and, calling in at Chalkis on the way to put in reinforcements, then marched on to Argos. His cover for this move was attendance at the Nemea[40], in June 209, as well as the need to attend at the Aigion conference. But he carefully brought an army with him. In addition a Carthaginian fleet was expected in Greek waters, and he surely knew about its appoach.

With all this activity indicating continued preparations for further action on all sides the conference at Aigion was an inevitable failure. The Aitolians were encouraged by the arrival of Galba and his fleet at Naupaktos, and by the imminent arrival of Attalos with more troops. Philip first conferred with his allies, who in turn were encouraged by this, and by his troops' arrival. At the conference the Aitolians presented terms of peace, but Philip and the Achaians affected to be horrified and at once broke off the discussions[41]. Yet the terms were moderate. Each of Aitolia's allies was to get something: Pylos, which had apparently been taken by the Achaians, for the Messenians, Atintania for the Romans, the lands of the Ardiai to Pleuratos and Skerdilaidas. The list given in Livy is clearly a Roman version, concentrating on Illyria. There is no mention of Aigina or Attalos, of Echinos or any of the Akarnanian places; one must thus assume that these lands were to be kept by the conquerors or current holders. Philip was being asked in effect to exchange Echinos for Atintania, the Achaians to give up Aigina and Pylos. For the state of the war as it was at that point, these terms were fair enough. But Philip thought he was winning and instantly took umbrage. But then it is probable that neither side expected anything to result from the conference.

The moderation of the terms is, however, interesting, for it put the onus of breaking off the talks on Philip and his allies. In addition it implies that the terms were those devised by the Aitolians. The Romans must have been consulted, by the terms of the treaty of 211, and, since it was in Rome's interest to have the war continue, while they had little interest directly in Greek affairs, no moderation could be expected of them. Yet Aitolia had entered the war only reluctantly, had gained a good deal, had lost something, and clearly now wished for peace. Philip claimed victory in battle, and had a conquered city to his name. Aitolian calculations may well have been that moderate terms of peace would attract him. They were wrong.

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[40] Livy 27.30.7.
[41] Livy 27.30.14.

The arrival of Galba with the Roman fleet at Naupaktos, and the rapid disappearance of the Carthaginian fleet, which came no farther east than Kerkyra, left sea power still in the hands of the Romans and Aitolians. Galba made a raid into the lands between Sikyon and Corinth – thus striking at both Philip and the Achaians – but Philip intercepted the scattered looters and defeated them[42]. He had left four thousand of his troops with the Achaians, and after the Nemean Games were over he led them and the Achaians in an attack on Elis. Galba landed troops, partly Aitolian and partly Roman, at Kyllene by night, and they saw off Philip's raid, though he captured quantities of peasants and livestock[43]. Then news of a Dardanian raid into Macedon called him home.

Galba took the Roman ships back to the Aegean and spent the winter with Attalos at Aigina[44]. The Aitolians and Eleians marched south into Messenia where they met and were defeated by an Achaian force[45]; who was attacking who is unclear, though in all probability the Achaians were the aggressors, Messenia being one of Aitolia's allies. The Aitolians seem now to have withdrawn their force from Elis, and the war in that area languished once more. This was in part because of the vigour of Machanidas, who at some point, either in 209 or 208, took Tegea from the Achaians[46]. This meant that Achaian attention was now directed to the south and east; the Aitolian troops in Elis were no longer required to help defend that land.

The active involvement of Attalos, the presence of the Roman fleet at Aigina, and Philip's need to maintain contact with the Peloponnese made the western Aegean and central Greece the main focus of the war in 208. The Aitolians showed their appreciation of this by appointing their spring *Panaitolike* meeting for Herakleia, close to where their main forces were located in garrison at Lamia and Herakleia, and near to the new fortifications they had made in the Thermopylai pass[47]. The Roman fleet raided and captured Oreus in Euboia and Opous in Epiknemidian Lokris[48], behind the shelter of

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[42] Livy 27.31.1-2.
[43] Livy 27.31.11-32.7; Plut. *Philopoimen* 7.6-7; Paus. 8.49.7.
[44] Livy 27.33.4-5.
[45] Livy 27.33.5.
[46] It was Spartan in 207: Pol. 11.18.8.
[47] The meeting: Pol. 10.41.4, Livy 28.5.13; new fortifications: Pol. 10.41.5, Livy 28.5.8.
[48] Oreus: Livy 28.5.18-6.7; Opous: Livy 28.7.4-9.

these Aitolian forces. Philip attempted a raid to disrupt the meeting at Herakleia, but was too late; he did, however, slip a force through Thermopylai to rescue Opous, almost capturing Attalos in the process[49]. All this fighting was caused by Philip's concern to establish contact with the Macedonian communities and garrisons in the Peloponnese. The net result was that Philip succeeded in opening up his route, though not in wholly breaking the Aitolian grip on it. He lost control of Oreus, and had failed in his attempts on Lamia and Herakleia, but he recovered Opous and conquered Thronion. He then marched up the Kephisos valley to establish control of that part of Phokis, from Elateia to Drymeos[50]. But the route was still blocked at the Corinthian Gulf end by the Aitolian possession of Antikyra, and he could only use it with an army; anything less would not get through.

The Herakleia *Panaitolike* meeting had included discussions with two of last year's mediators, from Egypt and Rhodes, and these men then went on to meet Philip. They found him at Elateia, fresh from rescuing the surviving Opountians, but he had no intention of making peace yet[51]. The Aitolians had been no more interested in negotiations while meeting at Herakleia, but for different reasons. Philip was desperately fighting to preserve his power, and having to respond to appeals from allies all over Greece, who clearly expected him and his Macedonians to do most of the fighting[52]. On the other hand, the Aitolians and their allies thought they were winning, and this impression was obviously conveyed by and to the men at the *Panaitolike*. But in the short space of time between the two meetings the envoys had, Philip had succeeded at Opous and had captured Thronion and the Upper Kephisos valley. These were solid gains, contributing to renewed pressure on Aitolia. He had been repulsed from Lilaia, but this was a small city no more than a day's journey from Delphi. The city was seized by the Macedonians, but they were then driven out by a citizen's rising, led by a man called Patron, assisted by some Attalid

[49] Raid to Herakleia: Pol 10.41.4-5; Livy 28.5.14-15.

[50] Livy 28.7.9-13.

[51] Livy 28.7.13.

[52] Appeals had come at the beginning of the campaigning season from Akarnania, Boiotia, Achaia, Euboia, and even Epeiros (Pol. 10.41.8; Livy 28.5.9; Justin 29.4.7-8), though there is little indication that the Akarnanians or the Epeirotes were threatened seriously, and none of any threat to Boiotia; in addition his own kingdom was threatened from Illyria and from Thrace.

troops[53]. This would seem to have been a raid rather than an attempt at conquest, perhaps with the hope that the Aitolians in Lamia and Herakleia would come out to the rescue.

Philip will certainly have thrown a fright into both Attalos, who only just escaped capture at Opous, and the Aitolians. And Attalos was now called home by the outbreak of a war with Prusias of Bithynia, who was Philip's brother-in-law. Without Pergamene naval support, the Roman fleet also now returned to Aigina[54]. What is especially notable, however, is the apparent inactivity of the Aitolians amidst all this frantic raiding and marching. The Aitolian troops had been withdrawn from Elis; their garrison at Thermopylai had let Philip through with only a token resistance; at Lilaia it was Attalid and citizen forces who had thrown out Philip's men. Yet it was the Aitolian army which should have been the backbone of any land force of the alliance. The Romans had a fleet with some soldiers, but nothing numerous enough to face any Macedonian force of any size. Attalos had a naval force as well, but only detachments of soldiers in Greece, and the Attalid army was never large. The conference of Herakleia had been followed by immediate Roman and Attalid actions, at Oreus and Opous, but also by no reported actions by the Aitolians. If the conference was about anything, it must have been to co-ordinate the allied activities for the coming campaigning season. No doubt the Aitolians' assigned task had been to block Thermopylai and prevent Philip's main force, stationed at the time in Thessaly, at Skotoussa, from marching south. But they made no attempt to follow or intercept Philip when he got through with a small force.

In all these notices we hear of movements or marches or actions. Yet most of the armed forces in Greece did not take part. Most of Philip's army remained in Macedon, and all his marches and actions only involved small groups. This is the same with Attalos, most of whose forces remained at home. So also with the Aitolians, whose overall strategic situation had not changed: they were still ringed by enemies or potential enemies. Despite all this the numerous appeals for help from Philip by all his allies in the early part of 208 were presumably based on some realistic apprehensions that they were in danger from the Aitolians or the Romans. The Akarnanians, for

[53] Paus. 10.33.3; Flacelière, *Aitoliens*, 301-303.
[54] Livy 28.7.10; Dio Cassius, frags 57-58.

instance, will have known that an Aitolian force existed in the Acheloos valley garrisons; the Achaians knew that an Aitolian force could easily cross into Elis to raid into Achaia. These forces may not have actually done anything, but their very existence must have been the source of the allies' fears.

The main danger to Aitolia came from Philip, and that was concentrated above all on the Thessalian front. It was here that Philip had achieved his main success in the last war, at Phthiotic Thebes, and so far in this war, at Echinos. Two battles, costing a thousand Aitolian lives in each, had been fought between Phalara and Lamia. So it is here that the main Aitolian forces were concentrated, in the fortified cities of Lamia and Herakleia, in Hypata and Spercheios, in Melitaia and Pereia and Xyniai, placed there to block any new attack on this front by Philip's main army. And these forces will have become cautious after the two unpleasant and costly battles, and were no doubt posted in the cities This would mean that Philip could get through Thermopylai with small, swift, light forces, but anything larger, and more cumbersome would be blocked.

The very fact that Philip was using such small forces implies that the front line Aitolian cities were too strongly held for him to contemplate attacking. In these circumstances it made sense for the Aitolians to leave only a small force in Thermopylai: a large force in the open would be attacked by Philip's main army, and would probably be beaten. And if it was at Thermopylai, where an army was only poorly protected by the fortifications, then the city garrisons would be drastically reduced, leaving the cities vulnerable. The Aitolians were thus using their assets, their fortified cities, to offset their basic weakness, a shortage of military manpower.

It is quite possible also that the Aitolians were still interested in moderate peace terms, such as those they presented at the abortive conference at Aigion the year before. It may thus be significant that Philip was met by some Aitolian envoys when on his way to Thermopylai, and detained them for a time so as to keep his movements secret[55]. This may well have been a tentative move on the Aitolians' part towards a separately negotiated peace, but if so it came to nothing. The revival of Philip's fortunes which followed the difficult days of early 208 meant that any further negotiations would be

[55] Frontinus, *Stratagems* 1.4.6.

unproductive. He marched to the Peloponnese once more, and led a joint raid with the Achaians on Erythrai in Aitolian Lokris by way of Antikyra[56]. It was surely the recovery of Antikyra which was the main purpose of the expedition, in order to reopen the route through Phokis which he had been fighting for in the last year. But from Antikyra the expedition – partly Achaian, partly Macedonian – went on to ravage in the Erythrai area. It would seem that Antikyra had been recaptured already since Philip had sent ships there beforehand, which he used to take his troops to Erythrai. The Aitolians who had taken up residence there will have been expelled, or had perhaps left when the place was threatened. Much of the route through Phokis was in Philip's hands again, and by sailing from Kenchreai to Chalkis through the enemy fleet, he demonstrated a remarkable freedom of movement.

The alliance against Philip had thus all but faded away. Attalos had gone home to defend his kingdom; the Aitolians were clearly unenthusiastic and remained on the defensive; the Romans apparently did virtually nothing in the next year. This last is the essential element, for the Greeks, as they must have come increasingly to appreciate, were only fighting because the Romans had persuaded them to. In 209 the Romans recovered Tarentum, and next year in Spain they captured Carthago Nova; the year before, the last Carthaginian toehold in Sicily had been removed. The danger to Rome from Philip was now much less, because the crisis in Italy was much diminished and the Carthaginians had been driven onto the defensive everywhere. Laevinus had recommended the withdrawal of the legion he had commanded in Greece[57], and this was decreed by the Senate for 210. None of this will have been lost on the Aitolians and Attalos. Without the Roman drive and power behind it, an attack on Philip had no momentum of its own. Hence the lack of Greek interest and the repeated attempts by the Aitolians to open negotiations.

So the war devolved into its Greek components, of which the main one was Aitolia's fight with Macedon. Philip, on the other hand, was still mainly interested in defeating the Romans in Illyria. To him the Aitolian war was a distraction – as the Romans had always intended it to be. In 207 therefore he concentrated on Aitolia, with the clear

[56] Livy 28.8.7-13.
[57] Livy 26.28.10.

intention of knocking the league out of the war so as to return to the main war. He tried negotiations first, for the mediators turned up again early in 207, this time from Ptolemy IV, Rhodes, Byzantion, Chios, and Mitylene[58]. This attempt at peace failed, but since nothing is know of the terms which either side offered or would accept, no blame can be assigned[59]. Since it is likely that the Aitolians were as keen on peace as Philip at this point, it seems likely that Philip demanded too high a price. There were also Aitolian scruples about making a separate peace, which had been discouraged in their treaty of alliance with Rome. This, of course, did not prevent negotiations, but they would presumably have to get Roman approval for the final treaty; this would only come if the Romans regained what they had lost to Philip in Illyria; but Philip was hardly likely to give up his conquests, so any truce the Aitolians could produce would be unacceptable to either Rome or Philip. When the negotiations failed once more, Philip resolved on a new offensive, directed against the Aitolian heartland.

Philip succeeded in buying passage through Athamania, whose King Amynandros had been part of the attempted negotiations in 209. Philip had recovered control of Zakynthos since Laevinus' raid in 211 – Laevinus did not take the acropolis[60], so recovery will have been easy once the Roman troops left – and now Philip gave the whole island to Amynandros[61]. This bargain gave Philip the right to march an army through Athamania to attack Aitolia from the west, and at the same time it removed a liability from his possession. No doubt the main Aitolian forces were still locked into the defence of the approaches from Thessaly, so if Philip could cross the Pindos mountains secretly and swiftly through Athamania it should be possible for him to break into western Aitolia as he had before, without too much chance of facing the full Aitolian army.

Hammond has proposed the theory that Philip's immediate target was Ambrakia, and that he captured it as the first move in his 207 campaign after crossing the mountains[62]. The theory is based on a

[58] Pol. 11.4.1; App. *Mac.* 3.
[59] Pol. 11.6.9-10.
[60] Livy 26.24.15; Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.405, proposes that Philip retook the island with naval forces in 207, 'perhaps in April'.
[61] Livy 33.31.11.
[62] Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.405-407.

sentence of Appian[63], who is not usually a very dependable source. But neither Livy nor Polybios is any better at this point, the former dismissing events in Greece as of no importance[64], the latter being fragmentary. One of these fragments, however, does preserve a brief account of Philip's sacking of Thermos, which clearly was one of his main aims in this campaign[65]. To reach Thermos from Athamania he must have marched south along the valley of the Acheloos, as he did in the campaign of 218. Yet he did not capture any of the Aitolian cities along that valley – Stratos, Phoitiai, Matropolis, for example – since they were not Akarnanian later. So the campaign was actually a raid, not a deliberate attempt at conquest, though, as at Thermos, he was willing to capture and loot any places which were vulnerable. Further, it seems that he marched on Thermos along the southern shore of Lake Trichonos, the easier of the two routes, presumably for speed's sake[66], and the same route he had used in 218.

One other item is relevant here. An Amphiktyonic list now dated to 204/203 contains the name 'Damokritou Ambrakiota'[67]. It is dated also by the Aitolian *strategos* Lattamos, who may perhaps be an *agonothetes* instead; to make it worse the stone is broken where the Delphic archon's name was, leaving only '...eos' as a time guide; further, the precise number of Aitolian *hieromnemones* is unclear because of the break, though there were probably eleven men named. However, the list is certainly to be dated to after c.220, since the Aitolians are listed with their home cities, a practice only adopted about then. Now, the Ambrakiote Damokritos is listed separately from the Aitolians, at the end, along with *hieromnemones* from Thespiai, Athens, Chios, and Kephallenia. This means that he and his city were not Aitolian subjects or league members at the time, though friendship is presumed, even political alignment, as was certainly the case with Kephallenia and Chios, though not with Thespiai or Athens. There are no grounds for assuming that Ambrakia ceased to be a member of the league before 207, but it is clear that at the time of the compilation of the list of *hieromnemones* in 204/203 the city was independent, though possibly allied with Aitolia.

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[63] App. *Mac.* 3.1.
[64] Livy 29.12.1.
[65] Pol. 11.7.1-3.
[66] Pol. 11.7.1, specifically noting the route.
[67] FI I 43; the dating is discussed by Lefèvre 95.

Two conclusions follow. The first is that Ambrakia was detached from the league by 204/203, and that this can only be the result of the exploits of Philip in 207-206. Given Appian's words, referring to 206, where he said that Ambrakia was taken *by* the Romans and Aitolians, then recovered by Philip, it follows that Philip first took the city in 207, lost it in 206, and then quickly retook it, so that when he made peace soon afterwards with the Aitolians, the city remained independent – unless Philip held on to it. The second conclusion is that the Aitolian *strategos* Lattamos is to be dated after the peace treaty, which has a certain effect on the list of *strategoi.*

Philip, therefore, took Ambrakia as his first move after crossing the mountains, presumably by a surprise attack after the swift march through Athamania. Livy indicates that he then led a raid into the Aitolian uplands, the valley of the Inarchos and Dolopia[68], no doubt returning with his booty through Athamania. For the Aitolians, this development was catastrophic. They had relied on the inaccessibility of their western lands, once Oiniadai was in their hands, protected by Epeirote neutrality and Akarnanian weakness, to allow tham to concentrate their forces in defence of the approaches from Thessaly. Now Philip had been able to reach the west, and so he now had the choice of either an eastern or a western attack next year. The Aitolians could not hold both approaches, since if they did they would be weak everywhere, and to hold one strongly meant weakening the other so that Philip could break through. His capture of Ambrakia showed this; his battle victories before Lamia had showed the same earlier. The Aitolians simply did not have the military manpower to block both routes.

The Aitolians reacted to the dilemma by appealing to the Romans for help, at which Galba brought the Roman fleet west to Kerkyra[69], and by listening to the Greek peace intermediaries, perhaps at the *Thermike* in September[70]. No doubt these two moves were undertaken together, the one reinforcing the other. The Romans replied by promising substantial military help for the next year (206), and by insisting that the Aitolians should not make a separate peace. This message persuaded the Aitolians to fight on. At least this is the assumption which must be made, for the Aitolians had clearly indicated their wish

[68] Livy 36.31.10-11; interpreted by Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.406.
[69] App. *Mac.* 3; Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.406.
[70] Pol. 11.4.1; Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.406.

for peace, and only substantial Roman assistance would persuade them otherwise.

Accordingly the Roman forces arrived next year, 206, and helped the Aitolians to recover Ambrakia[71]. But, having done so, the Roman troops returned to Italy, though not before landing at and sacking Dyme in Achaia[72]. No Roman army of '10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry' – no doubt a substantial exaggeration – could be allowed to hang about in Greece while Hannibal was still camped in Italy. It was too small to attack Philip, and too large to be attacked. Once they had gone, Philip returned, retook Ambrakia, then led an audacious raid on the Aitolian centre at Thermos, a repeat of his great raid of 218[73]. The Aitolians once again appealed for Roman help, but this time the Senate refused[74]. In this year also, Aitolia's only active ally – active in Greece, that is – Machanidas of Sparta, was killed in battle with the reformed and revived Achaian army led by Philopoimen[75]. If the Spartans could not beat the Achaians, then neither could the Eleians and Messenians, and the Aitolians could no longer spare any forces to help in the Peloponnese while Philip was so menacing in the north. At the autumn *Thermike* of 206, therefore, held in the burnt and broken ruins of Thermos, the appeals of the Greek mediators were at last heard and accepted by the Aitolian Assembly. Peace was made soon after, on, says Livy, Philip's terms[76].

The actual terms are nowhere detailed. Livy casually states that the Aitolians accepted Philip's terms, which is not to say that it was a Macedonian *diktat*. Philip's object was not to crush the Aitolians, which would take a greater effort than he could afford. Instead he wanted to remove Aitolia from the war in order to allow him to concentrate on the war in Illyria against the Romans and their local allies. He had administered a couple of severe shocks by the conquest (and reconquest) of Ambrakia and by his raids into Aitolian territory, but, despite Livy's comment that this broke Aitolian spirits[77], these were not enough to force Aitolia to make peace on terms they found oppressive. The Aitolians had shown only the year before that they

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[71] App. *Mac.* 3.
[72] Livy 32.22.10; Paus. 7.17.5.
[73] Pol. 11.7.1-3.
[74] Livy 32.21.17.
[75] Pol. 11.11-18; Plut. *Philopoimen* 10; Paus. 8.50.2; Errington, *Philopoemen*, 65.
[76] Livy 29.12.1; omitted by Schmitt, *Staatsverträge*, III.
[77] Livy 36.31.1.

could be very obdurate. And the Romans might have refused to help, but the plain prospect of an Aitolian peace might change their minds – and in fact next year they did send a substantial force to Illyria. It follows that Philip's terms were reasonably generous. The Aitolian conquests in Akarnania were retained, as the inscription concerning the Akarnanian recognition of the Magnesian festival shows[78], but Ambrakia was detached from the league and became an independent city, as the separate *hieromnemon* of 204/203 indicates. Possibly the city was occupied by a Macedonian garrison, though this must be doubtful. On the eastern front, the territories in contention were those between Pharsalos in Thessaly and Thronion in Lokris. Philip's conquests in Lokris and Phokis (places such as Opous), are unlikely to have been maintained, though it is perhaps unlikely that they were handed over to the Aitolians. Their possession was not essential to Aitolian defence: they could be taken easily, if necessary; in all likelihood they were simply evacuated, if indeed they were still held. The Aitolians would not be able to move back into these places, and so the 'Great Isthmus Route', would remain open for Philip to use at need.

The southern part of Thessaly had been conquered by Philip, partly in the Second War, partly in the Third. He now held Phthiotic Thebes, probably Larisa Chremaste, Echinos, and Pharsalos, all of which had been Aitolian. However, Thebes and Pharsalos were stated to be the homes of men who acted as Aitolian *hieromnemones* in the years after the peace[79]. This contradiction has produced three possible explanations. One is that Philip kept the cities, and that the Aitolians maintained a claim to them by choosing as *hieromnemones* from these cities men who were presumably exiles; a second is that Philip promised to return the cities in the peace of 206, but did not deliver them, hence the Aitolians' continued claim and the appearance of the *hieromnemones*; the third is, therefore, that the cities were promised by Philip in 206, and delivered over to the Aitolians. This problem is complicated further by a demand for the four cities which was made by the Aitolians in a conference in 198, when Philip offered to return two of them[80].

[78] *IG* IX.1.2.582.

[79] Thebes, Pyrrias, 204 (Fl I 44; Lefèvre 97) and Nikoboulos (Fl I 45; Lefèvre 96); Pharsalos: Polleas, 204/203 (Fl I 43; Lefèvre 95).

[80] This is an insoluble problem with present evidence, or lack of it. It is dismissed,

This demand in 198, however, does mean that Philip held all four cities in that year, and, since there had been peace since 206, he had also held them in 206. It would be unlikely in the extreme for him to give up these conquests when he had been victorious. But that still leaves the problem of Aitolians claiming as their home-cities places under Philip's authority. The argument that the *hieromnemones* from Thebes and Pharsalos are evidence of a continued claim by the Aitolian League to the lost cities is very weak; there is no reason for it, for the league had surrendered any legal claim by the peace treaty, and the Aitolians did not do this in other cases, at least so far as can be seen. The league did not maintain a 'claim' – whatever that means – to Ambrakia, though the city was recovered later, and the listing of the Ambrakiot *hieromnemon* Damokritos separately from the Aitolians in 204/203 is a clear indication of Aitolian practice. It is thus a weak and insubstantial argument and may be dismissed. So may the argument that Philip promised the cities but did not deliver. Philip's aim was to secure peace with Aitolia; reneging on such a substantial section of the peace treaty, when the Romans were still in the field against him, would be an excellent way of forcing Aitolia back into hostilities. And finally, he had enslaved or driven out all the Aitolians from Phthiotic Thebes in 217. Any man claiming to be from there was automatically a refugee, probably one of those settled at Thronion by the Aitolians. It was, therefore, a personal description by the man himself, not an official 'claim'. The conclusion must be that the peace treaty included a recognition by the Aitolians that all four cities were Philip's.

The explanation is thus, perhaps, personal. It must be accepted that the men named were actually from those cities, but that is not in this case a clear sign that the Aitolians possessed the cities themselves. The men will have been exiles hoping to return home, but that is not an official 'claim'. It was, however, a situation in which the exiles could continue to agitate for their restoration, a piece of grit in the Aitolian body politic which would irritate all other parts. It is the reverse of the process of expansion. If expansion is mainly achieved by persuasion, loss of territory leaves one open to persuasiveness by those who had been harmed.

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with differing conclusions by all historians, notably Walbank, *Philip V*, 100, Flacelière, *Aitoliens*, 307, Tarn, *CAH* VII (1), 745, Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce*, 255, n.1. Neither Errington *CAH* VII (2), chapter 4, nor Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.407 discuss the matter.

The Aitolians had survived yet another war against Macedon, with further losses of territory in Epeiros and Thessaly, but with acquisitions in Akarnania and, perhaps, in Phokis. The experience had been a bruising one, in which the league had been unable to use its military strength in its chosen way, and had been compelled to fight pitched battles and stand behind fortifications. Further, the league had, for the first time, to fight alongside powerful allies who could not be controlled as could the earlier, weaker, allies such as Elis or Sparta. The result of the end of this old policy of self-reliance and domination had been defeat, desertion, casualties, and loss of territory. Attalos, for all his old friendship and generosity, had involved himself in the war for no more than a couple of years, but had kept his gain, Aigina, when he went home. Rome had quite cynically exploited Aitolia for her own purposes. It was not an experience the Aitolians would wish to repeat.

17. THE SOCIAL PROBLEM, AND THE CAUSES OF THE FOURTH MACEDONIAN WAR (206-199)

The conclusion of peace between Rome and its allies and Macedon and the Greek Symmachy (the Peace of Phoenike)[1] followed Aitolia's separate peace with Macedon by less than a year, thereby demonstrating Aitolian good sense: Rome could only continue the war in the east by the use of Greek soldiers, specifically Aitolians, who were defeated by the Macedonians with depressing regularity. Rome had committed a new army and a new commander, P. Sempronius Tuditanus, to Illyria at the start of the campaigning season of 205, but he could made no progress; at the same time he was too strongly placed for Philip to dislodge him[2]. Without Aitolian troops to assist, and without the accessibility to Aitolian territory which would provide a new means of attacking Philip's own lands, and without that Aitolian territory being available for Philip to attack, neither side could make any progress. Aitolia, if nothing else, had proved that the league's participation was essential for the war to continue.

The Epeirotes, dangerously close to the fighting, brokered a conference at their main city, Phoenike, which produced the peace settlement[3]. The terms which were agreed ensured that it would be little more than a truce, and that when either side felt strong enough and undistracted enough, the war would resume. No-one seems to have expressed any appreciation of the actions of the Aitolians, whose decision for peace the year before was the essential preliminary to this wider agreement.

The essentially temporary nature of this peace agreement will not have been lost on the rest of Greece. If the speech recorded by Polybios under the name of Agelaos of Naupaktos in 217 bears any relation to what he actually said[4], then the enormous conflict between Rome and Carthage in the west will have been watched with anxiety in political circles in Greece, at least when they could spare attention

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[1] Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* III 543.
[2] Livy 29.12.1-6; Walbank, *Philip V*, 102-103; Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.408-409.
[3] Livy 29.12.11; App. *Mac* 3.
[4] Pol. 5.104.1-10.

from their own affairs[5]. There was still no real sign of it ending when the Peace of Phoenike was agreed, but when it did end then the Romano-Macedonian conflict would surely be reignited. If Rome lost the greater war, then Philip would attempt to gain at her expense, either at the peace conference or soon after; if Rome won, then Philip would be expected to suffer an attack so that Rome would recover her losses in Illyria. Philip's martial and naval activities in the next five years are thus best seen as attempts to build a stronger political and military position in preparation for the future and expected conflict.

The Aitolians will have had to be especially alert to these nuances of international politics, since they had managed to gain the ill-will of both principals, by intervening to prevent Philip from achieving a quick victory, as he might have claimed, and then by making a separate peace, so leaving Rome to fight on alone. At the same time they had shown themselves to be the essential key to victory for both. Rome had found it impossible to penetrate seriously into Macedon from the west and so would need Aitolian assistance; Philip had been seriously distracted by the danger to his position in Central Greece and Thessaly by Aitolian enmity. Any war which recommenced would thus in the end involve Aitolia; even maintaining neutrality would need constant effort and vigour, for there would be constant pressure, both from outside and from internal sources, to join in. Yet involvement in the war on either side was a daunting prospect. In the last two wars against Macedon, it had been the enemy which had been victorious; and the Aitolians had also seen how well the Romans could fight, so joining Macedon against Rome, if it was ever considered, was just as unpleasant an idea. The disparity between the Aitolians' power and that of either of its potential enemies was immeasurable.

The Aitolian military performance in the last war (211-206) had been much poorer than in the one before (220-217). The general levy may have been called out in 211 to invade Akarnania, and the army which was beaten twice, with casualties, in the battles near Lamia in 209 may also have been the full levy, though this is not certain. But

[5] Polybios records that Philip received private information by courier of the defeat of the Romans at Lake Trasimene in 217 (Pol. 5.101.6); one would imagine other leaders had access to similar sources; W. L. Adams, 'Philip V, Hannibal, and the Origins of the First Macedonian War', *Ancient Macedonia* 5, 1990, 41-50.

after that date the full levy was never used, so far as can be seen. On the only occasions it had been called out, it had had a weakened enemy to face – for Akarnania had also faced Laevinus' naval forces – or it had been beaten. Philip had exploited the Aitolian strategy of holding fortified positions to pick them off singly, as at Echinos, or to slide between them, as at Thermopylai. And for the second time in fifteen years, he had been able to march right to Thermos and sack the town, without the Aitolians being able to do anything to stop him, or even to gain revenge. And in the end, he had shown, first at Echinos, and then, decisively, at Ambrakia, that he could take, and retake, major fortified cities. On its own, the Aitolian League was now no longer a match for Macedon.

These considerations would seem to be the essential background to understanding the episode, commonly seen as a social problem, which is recorded in three brief fragments of Polybios. The problem, as Polybios explains it, was one of debt, in which 'the Aitolians' had become enmeshed, suddenly and unexpectedly. To deal with it, Dorimachos and Skopas were appointed to draw up legislative proposals[6]. In the second fragment, these proposals are opposed by 'Alexander the Aitolian'[7]. The third explains that Skopas (but not Dorimachos) was driven from office as a result of his proposals, and went off into exile in Alexandria[8].

The onset of the problem is described as unexpected, and it is ascribed to the preceding war and to the Aitolians' extravagant ways. While Polybios implies that the whole population of the state was involved, it seems that it was, in reality, the same problem which had afflicted other Greek states in the past, and other ancient societies as well, and would affect them and Rome in the future: the enlargement of the wealth gap between rich and poor, and the indebtedness of the latter to the former[9]. Characteristically, Polybios also ascribed to

[6] Pol. 13.1.1-3.

[7] Pol. 13.1a.1-3.

[8] Pol. 13.2.1; it is perhaps necessary to emphasise that this marked the defeat of the proposal for cancellation; Walbank, *Philip V*, 109, n. 2, supposes that it was passed.

[9] The problem lay at the roots of Solon's legislation in Athens four centuries earlier, and still existed in late Roman times, to look no further. For an overview of the Hellenistic period, cf. A. Fuks, 'Social Revolution in Greece in the Hellenistic Age', *La Parola del Passato*, 21, 1966, 437-448, and 'Patterns and Types of social-economic Revolution in Greece from the fourth to the second century BC', *Ancient Society* 5, 1974, 51-81; J. Briscoe, 'Rome and the Class Struggle 200-146 BC', *Past and Present* 36, 1967, 3-20.

Dorimachos and Skopas a personal interest, in that he supposes they would personally benefit from the proposed solution, which was a general cancellation of debts; Skopas' time of exile in Alexandria is also described in such a way as to imply greed and monetary carelessness[10].

The connection between the debt problem and the preceding war is made quite explicit, and in the summary of Alexander's opposition to the cancellation, Polybios also reports that the equation was made between the sacrifice of lives in war and of property in the proposed debt-cancellation solution. The poor performance of the Aitolian army in the recent war was also relevant, and a comment by Polybios on the state of that army at the battle of Kynoskephalai in 197 provides the real context. He contrasts the performance of the Aitolian cavalry 'who fought with desperate gallantry' and with 'high spirit', with that of the infantry, which 'is inferior in equipment and discipline'[11].

The connection is thus clarified. The cavalry was the military contribution of the rich, since it required wealth to keep the horses and provide the more expensive equipment of a trooper. The infantry was the contribution of the less well-off; not the poor, but those with some land or property, who may be termed a middle class. They had to provide armour and weapons, which was a lesser burden than a horse and its equipment, but which was still too much for men without means. Polybios' criticism is supported by the deteriorating performance of the Aitolian infantry as measured during the whole span of the league's wars from 245 to 189. Not only that, but the numbers of foot soldiers which the league could field had steadily declined. There were only 6,000 at Kynoskephalai. There were, of course, plenty of places which needed to be guarded around the league's boundaries, but in this case most of those were not under threat[12]. In the past the league had been able to muster a considerably larger number of troops for such an important expedition[13].

In the case of the cavalry, there had been no reduction in numbers.

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[10] Pol. 13.2.2-5.

[11] Pol. 18.22.4-5.

[12] Only Akarnania was hostile in this war; by the time of Kynoskephalai, Epeiros and Athamania were Roman allies, Boiotia and Phokis were under Roman occupation, and Achaia was an ally; so, apart from the garrisons in the Acheloos valley, there was no call on Aitolian military manpower, yet they only provided 6,000 infantry.

[13] See chapter 11.

The regular cavalry contingent is always about 500, and no higher number is ever mentioned. Polybios' comment on their quality implies that not only were their numbers mentioned, but that they trained regularly, again a consequence of wealth. Their numbers continued to be maintained after the Roman war, and in 171, 500 is said to be 'the total force of the whole league'[14].

The contrast between the condition of the cavalry and the infantry is a reflection of the widening wealth gap between the rich and the rest of the population. The rich were maintaining their possessions and their normal style of life, including the time- and resource-consuming cavalry equipment and practice; the poor were increasing as a proportion of the general population because of the indebtedness of the 'hoplite class'[15], and the size and quality of the infantry force available to the league was declining. During the Third Macedonian War (211-206), this will have become an increasingly obvious problem, and will have been one of the factors which persuaded the league to seek and make peace separately from its ally. But only with the arrival of peace will it have become possible to face the problem and discuss ways of solving it.

In the wider contemporary Greek area, this was a problem which had been the impetus for the several revolutionary outbreaks in Sparta in the previous forty years, but those events had also been fuelled by the perceived need of Spartans to recover the city's ancestral political power, and by the ambition of its kings to enlarge their kingdom and their own power within it. In 207 another upheaval brought to power Nabis, in succession to the dead Machanidas, whose revolution was more thoroughgoing and successful than those of Agis or Kleomenes before him. This revolution was also one of the fruits of the previous war, in which Nabis' predecessor Machanidas had been defeated and killed[16].

The Aitolian solution which was adopted was less drastic than that

[14] Livy 42.55.9.

[15] It is not clear if the Aitolian infantry were actually hoplites – the term is somewhat anachonistic by this time – but it is a handy term in this context. The 'cavalry-class' were, in general terms, the lenders of money; the poor would not be able to borrow, having no resources to pledge; therefore, it was the 'middle' or 'hoplite-class' who were in debt, since they were the group with property to mortgage.

[16] The Spartan problem and revolutions have produced a large sequence of studies, notable P. Oliva, *Sparta and her Social Problems*, Amsterdam 1971, B. Shimron, *Late Sparta, The Spartan Revolution 243-145 BC*, Buffalo 1972, J. L. Texier, *Nabis*, Paris, 1975, P. Cartledge and A. Spawforth, *Hellenistic and Roman Sparta*, London 1989.

of Nabis, but then Aitolia did not have Sparta's tradition of internal violence, and perhaps the debt-problem in Aitolia was not as serious as that in Lakonia. Instead two experienced men, Skopas and Dorimachos, who had been at the centre of affairs for twenty years were appointed to draft laws which would cope with the problem. Polybios regards this as an example of Aitolian instability in constitutional matters, which in itself is an interesting comment[17]; in reality, it would seem to be an example of Aitolian adaptability to circumstances, though this adaptability is something which must be accepted by all sections which have any political power. It was here that the crux of the issue lay.

Skopas was elected *strategos* of the league in September 205[18]. It is not clear whether he had already been charged with the responsibility for drafting the new laws, but his cousin Dorimachos was associated with him in this task. These two had been close colleagues since the 220s, and Dorimachos had twice already directly succeeded Skopas in the office of *strategos*, in 219 and in 211. From their association in this task, it may be presumed that Dorimachos was intended again to succeed Skopas, and that, if Skopas' legislative work had not been completed during his own term of office, then Dorimachos would continue it[19].

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[17] Pol. 13.1.1; see Chapter 9, on the constitution.

[18] *IG* IX.1.31n and p; Walbank, *Commentary* 2.414, suggests that Skopas was not in fact *strategos* but elected as *nomographos*. But this is an office otherwise unknown in Aitolia and Skopas certainly had a third term in office; see next note.

[19] The sequence of the *strategoi* in this period is unclear. Dorimachos had been, so to say, pencilled in for 207/206, but there is no specifiic evidence for this; he had a fourth term in 202/201, and his second was in 211/210, so his name was suggested for a third in that year. But Bousquet, 'La Stèle des Kyténiens', *REG*, 101, 1988, has found three new *strategoi* for this period: Ma[...]s, Menestratos, and Lattamos; and the first is almost certainly to be dated to 208/207. Skopas' resignation necessitated a suffect to be appointed, and I suggest Lattamos for the post; Menestratos would thus fit in to 207/206, ousting Dorimachos. The unsatisfactory suggestion of Straton for a second strategy for 206/205 has been corrected by the appearance of a new strategy for Agelaos. The list therefore should now read:

209/208 Philleas
208/207 Ma..s
207/206 Menetratos (?)
206/205 Agelaos
205/204 Skopas; suffect Lattamos

There is no place for Dorimachos' third strategy Assuming the inscription naming his fourth is correct (not a necessity), he may have filled in as a suffect for a deceased *strategos*, though detecting one is not possible in the light of our information. One of the bases for reconstructing the list of *strategoi* is that iterations are well separated, and

By choosing these two men, the Aitolian electors were, therefore, in a sense, prejudging the result. Polybios notes that they were themselves thought to be in debt, and he described both as having 'revolutionary tendencies'. Admittedly this is both vague and tendentious, coming from the historian's political principles, but in the context of the time it can only mean that they were expected to propose some sort of cancellation of debts, and the two men will have made this clear before their appointment.

Cancellation of debts meant that those who had loaned money would lose it, though they had presumably been collecting interest payments. The cancellation could be done in a variety of ways: abolition of the interest so that only the principal was repayable; the state taking over the debt; cancellation of some debts and not others; a strict limitation on the interest charged and the time for repayment. In Sparta it had been linked with the redistribution of land – whose ownership had in part become concentrated in a relatively few hands because land had been accepted in payment for the debts – but this does not seem to have been part of Skopas' proposals, so far as can be seen, and we really have no specific details of them. But, whatever the full scope of the proposals they certainly provoked opposition.

The rich had no wish, naturally, to suffer loss, and so they generally opposed cancellation. And they had a sensible case. The leader of the opposition was Alexandros, son of Nikias, of Kalydon. He was a rising politician, having been *hipparchos* once, a *proxenos*-sponsor, and Delphic *hieromnemon*[20]. His *strategos* when he was *hipparchos* had been Dorimachos, though he is called *boularchos* in the inscription[21]. Their *grammateus* at that time had been Phaineas of Arsinoe, who was also elected as *hipparchos* to Skopas' *strategos* in September 205. The *grammateus* in that panel of magistrates was Thoas of Trichonos, another rising politician. These men – Alexandros, Phaineas, and Thoas – all had long political and military careers ahead of them.

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a gap of seven years or so is usually assumed. Having Dorimachos as *strategos* in 211/210, 207/206 and 202/201 is one too many. Skopas in 205/204 is just seven years after his second in 212/211, and Dorimachos would thus be 'entitled' to hold office in 204/203. The election of Alexandros in this year upset the sequence, and was clearly the result of the political changes of Skopas' year. But Dorimachos was still present, and still 'entitled' to another term, which he finally got in 202/201, after a gap of nine years. It may be that Dorimachos' service with Skopas on suggest the debt commission was counted as a third strategy.

[20] *Prosopography*, 'Alexandros (12)'.

[21] *IG* IX.1.31k.

Alexandros was successful in his opposition to Skopas' proposed new laws. He pointed out that the cancellation of debts was not a solution to the problem which would be in any way permanent. It was in fact a measure which would need to be repeated in the future. In the same way, Agis, Kleomenes, and Nabis had all cancelled Spartan debts – which is to say that as soon as debts were cancelled, new ones were contracted, whose cancellation then became a cause of agitation. He may well have pointed out that cancellation did not prevent indebtedness: instead it made it worse, since the lenders would naturally charge more for the next loans, and would require quicker or more drastic repayment. Further, the knowledge that cancellation had been performed once made it easier to accomplish another cancellation later, and so the demand for loans would rise, on the assumption that they would not need to be repaid. The solution thus simply aggravated the problem. As Alexandros is said to have remarked, it was necessary to look to the future, as well as to the present predicament[22]. His argument carried the day. Skopas had so identified himself with his programme that he had to resign as *strategos*, and went into exile in Egypt[23]. Just so had Kleomenes, when defeated by Antigonos Doson.

The effect of the defeat of Skopas' proposals was that the debt problem continued. Those in debt were unable to extract themselves, and remained mired in their debts, and the rich continued to amass wealth and land at the expense of their clients. The military consequences for the state was a reduction in the available pool of military manpower – for those who succumbed to their debts were no longer wealthy enough to afford the equipment – and so this led to a sensible weakening of the league's military and political power. This would not, however, become wholly visible until another war broke out, though it was surely in the back of all the politicians' minds from now onwards.

In immediate terms, a new *strategos* had to be found to replace the resigned Skopas. We do not know what the Aitolian procedure was for this, but one may perhaps assume an election at the *Panaitolike* in the spring. The proposals made by Skopas were for new laws, and these could only have been put to the vote at that meeting or the

[22] Pol. 13.1a.1-3.
[23] Pol. 13.2.1.

Thermike. Their rejection was the immediate cause of the *strategos*' resignation – which rules out the *Thermike* – and the meeting will thus have continued in session until a replacement *strategos* had been chosen. It seems that the suffect was a man called Lattamos of Boukation[24], of whom nothing further is known, except that he was a Delphic *hieromnemon* in the same year, and again three years later[25]. He would need to serve out only the second half of Skopas' term. His inconspicuousness may well have been one of his main recommendations for the office.

The next election, in September 204, therefore, will have partly turned on the debt issue, and the election as *strategos* of Alexandros of Kalydon, the leader of the opposition to Skopas' proposals, effectively settled the matter[26]. Skopas' colleagues in office had clearly deserted him, as had Dorimachos, for Alexandros' successors as *strategos* were, first Thoas (203/202), Skopas' *grammateus*[27], and then Dorimachos, *strategos* for the fourth time in 202/201[28]. They were then succeeded by Agetas of Kallipolis[29], who had been *strategos* as long before as 218/217, the successor of Dorimachos then as later. It seems clear that the oligarchs were consolidating their power most effectively, having squeezed out the radical member of their group. Dorimachos' next turn as *strategos* may be seen as their reward to him for his defection, and also as a sign that he and his party had accepted the rejection of the proposals as definitive. The defeat of the debt proposals also implied the defeat of any democratic tendencies in the league, at least at the federal level.

It seems probable that these internal problems preoccupied the league for most of Skopas' truncated term of office, and before it and after it as well, and so from some time in 205 (when the international situation eased, following the Peace of Phoenike) until after

[24] See note 19.

[25] Fl I 43 and 45; Lefèvre 95 and 99.

[26] This election confirms the identity of the Alexandros; he is sometimes (e.g., by Flacelière, *Aitoliens*, 310) identified as Alexandros of Isios, but these are two different men, and the Isian never held elective office, while the Kalydonian was *strategos* more than once.

[27] Thoas: this is not directly attested, but he was *strategos* for the second time in 194/193, and there is no space for his first except in 203/202; it must be after his term as *grammateus*, for there is no instance of a man being *grammateus* after being *strategos*, and all other *strategoi* are known.

[28] *IG* IX.1.30a.

[29] *IG* IX.1.2.614 and *SGDI* 2049.

the elections of September 204, when the possibility of a revolutionary outcome to the crisis was ended. At the same time, however, it also became clear that the international situation was as dangerous as ever. For the friendless Aitolians, it was perhaps even worse than before. In the west, the Romans successfully transferred the war to Africa in 204; in the east, Antiochos III had returned from his great expedition to Baktria and India with his power enlarged, and immediately moved back into Asia Minor; in Egypt, Ptolemy IV died, and was succeeded by a child; this gave Antiochos the opportunity to renew the war for Syria which was no doubt widely anticipated; in the Aegean Philip V was increasingly active and theatening.

Philip's policy in the Aegean is usually seen as either almost mindlessly aggressive, or as specifically anti-Roman[30]. In fact, it appears to be in large part the result of the decay of Ptolemaic power, and in part also directed at the friends of Aitolia, as well as being indirectly anti-Roman. That is, in more positive terms, it was an assertion of Macedonian power and interest in areas – the Aegean, western Asia Minor, the Straits, Crete – which had been of continuing Macedonian concern since the time of Philip II. The methods used by the Macedonian king, superficially shocking, were no different from those used by other conquerors in the region for the past half a dozen centuries, though they were scarcely designed to enhance Macedonian popularity. Considerations of these campaigns have not usually emphasised the Aitolian aspect, but from an Aitolian point of view it must have seemed that Philip was carrying out a deliberate programme aimed at undermining their interests in the Aegean and the Straits.

Aitolia had longstanding relationships with many of the states of the Aegean basin. The link was especially strong with Chios, which was an old and friendly colleague, and, by agreement with Aitolia, sent an *hieromnemon* to Delphi for Amphiktyony meetings[31]. But many of the islands of the sea and cities of the coastlands had agreements of various sorts with the league as well: *asylia* with Delos[32], Tenos[33],

[30] Walbank, *Philip V*, 108-137 remains the best account.

[31] *IG* IX.1.195; Benecke, 17-19; Chios sent an *hieromnemon* from 247/246: Fl I 25; Lefèvre 56-57.

[32] *IG* XI.4.1050; Benecke, 20-21.

[33] *IG* IX.1.191; Benecke, 21 (= Rigsby, *Asylia* 54).

Keos[34], and Mitylene[35], other agreements were with Smyrna[36] and Miletos[37], and there were proxeny-agreements with islands from Thasos to Rhodes, from Peparethos and Euboia to Ephesos and Kaunos[38]. Links also existed with several Cretan cities, from Polyrrhenia in the west of the island to Gortyn and Knossos in the centre[39]. These agreements in some cases dated back to the Aitolian proxeny-offensive in the 270s, but they were often renewed, and new contacts were regularly established, particularly in the aftermath of political upheavals. The old pattern resumed after the peace agreements of 206-205. For instance, the proxeny-agreement with Cretan Polyrrhenia was made in 207/206, and an *asylia* agreement was made with Teos on the Ionian coast during the term of office of Alexander of Kalydon (204/203). Aitolia was still fully engaged and concerned in the affairs of the Aegean.

The new activities of Philip V in the Aegean after 205 impinged on several of these Aitolian relationships. In 204 he employed an Aitolian, Dikaiarchos, about whom nothing more is known, to command a fleet of ships in raids on the Cyclades and the Hellespont area[40]. This was part of his aim of weakening Rhodes, which had interests in the Island League (whose headquarters were on the Cycladic island of Tenos, with which Aitolia had had an *asylia* agreement since the 220s or before), and which was instantly sensitive to any disruption of trade through the Straits. Philip also extended help to a group of Cretan cities which were at war with Rhodes[41], and one of his men, Herakleides of Taras, made an attempt to burn down the main shipyards at Rhodes[42].

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[34] *IG* IX.1.169A; Benecke, 25-27 (= Rigsby, *Asylia*, 132); this agreement was concluded in the strategy of Alexandros of Kalydon, 204/203.

[35] *IG* IX.1.190; Benecke, 27-28.

[36] Benecke, 23.

[37] Benecke, 23.

[38] Benecke provides a list, 32-33, in no particular order; datings may be improved by reference to Klaffenbach's second edition of *IG* IX.1.

[39] Polyrrhenia: *IG* IX.1.31k (207/206); Gortyn: *IG* IX.1.31s (214/213); Knossos supplied troops to Aitolia in 220: Pol IV.26.3; Eleutherna: *IG* IX.1.17 (271/270), 31g and m (223/222).

[40] Pol 18.54.8-12; Diod 28.1; Walbank, *Philip V*, 110; Holleaux, 'L'expédition de Dikaiarchos dans les Cyclades and sur l'Hellespont', *REG* 33, 1920, 223-247; the date of Dikaiarchos' depradations is not wholly clear, but was certainly between 205 and 202, though both of these extremes are unlikely.

[41] Pol 13.5.1; Polyainos 5.17.

[42] Polyainos 5.17; Holleaux (note 40), 237, n.2; Walbank, *Philip V*, 111.

The background was the decay of Ptolemaic power, which for much of the previous century had dominated Aegean affairs. This recession affected Crete, where the city of Itanos was a Ptolemaic naval base, the island of Samos, another such base, the Cyclades, an area of longstanding Ptolemaic interest and power, and the Hellespont, where a Ptolemaic governor had been established in 246, but where direct Ptolemaic power had faded away since[43]. Since Ptolemaic power faded in the north, several of the cities in the Straits and along the shores of the Propontis had established a relationship with Aitolia.

This is only known indirectly, by Polybios' account of Philip's actions in the area in 202. After an account of the conquest of Kios by Philip, Polybios almost casually reports that this annoyed the Aitolians, for Kios had had an Aitolian as its *strategos* when Philip took the city[44]. Two other cities in the area, Lysimacheia on the Hellespont and Kalchedon on the Bosporos, had also been Aitolian allies, but Philip had compelled them to transfer to his alliance instead[45]. He had built up a major fleet during 204 and 203, and it was this which gave him the power to reach the area and enforce his will[46]. Since the Aitolians were not a naval power, they were unable to dispute Philip in the area. The league's isolation is clear, but by moving into the Straits and the Propontis, Philip would rouse the Rhodians, and so, with a common enemy, Rhodes and Aitolia would clearly draw closer together. But the Aitolians were very badly exposed to Philip's land power, and would need a stronger partner than Rhodes if they were to challenge Philip again directly.

Polybios also reports that the alliances of the cities of the Straits with Aitolia were recent, and later puts a claim into the mouth of an Aitolian that Lysimacheia and Kios were actually members of the league, and that Lysimacheia had an Aitolian *strategos* as well[47]. However, there are contradictions even in these brief notices, and perhaps misconceptions as well. It was not necessary for a city or state to be a member of the league for an Aitolian to be its *strategos*: Elis had on

[43] Cf. R. S. Bagnall, *The Administration of the Ptolemaic Possessions outside Egypt*, Leiden, 1976, *passim*, for the details.
[44] Pol. 15.23. 9-10.
[45] Pol. 15.23.9.
[46] Walbank, *Philip V*, 112.
[47] Pol. 18.3.11.

several occasions chosen an Aitolian for such a post[48], and Dorimachos had acted in such a capacity at Phigaleia in 221[49]. Second, the title of *strategos* does not by this time necessarily imply military responsibilities; it may simply be an administrative title, though command in war may well be part of those duties[50]. Third, cities which are allies are not also members of the league: in fact, the two categories necessarily exclude one another.

These cities were thus allies of the league, not members of it. The Aitolian's speech, in Polybios, may be put down to rhetorical exaggeration and the heat of the moment, if it was not, perhaps more likely, due to Polybios' misunderstanding of the situation[51]. Aitolians were posted as military commanders to these allies, presumably at the request of the citizens, and with the intention, unrealised, of deterring an attack by Philip, or perhaps for the Asian cities, by Antiochos. When this relationship began is not known, but it is unlikely to have been before the end of the Third Macedonian War in 206 or 205. It was certainly before Philip's extension of power into the Aegean in 204. And, since the area was one of extreme sensitivity to Rhodes because of the commerce through the Straits, the alliances were presumably accomplished by agreement with that city, or at least with its acquiescence. For, while Philip was attacking Kios, Rhodian envoys had sought to mediate, and the city then felt insulted by Philip's conduct in conquering Kios while his envoy was speaking soothing words at Rhodes, and this could only be because Rhodes was concerned if any power intervened in the area of the Straits, and clearly was happy enough that Aitolia was involved[52].

The obvious occasion for the installation of the *strategoi* in the Straits cities, and for these cities to seek the alliance of the Aitolians in this period, soon after the conclusion of peace, was when Dikaiarchos was actively raiding in the Aegean, which seems to have been during 204[53]. Philip, if he was the mainspring behind Dikaiarchos' activities, as seems to be more or less established, would not wish to collide with

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[48] E.g., Euripidas (Pol. 4.19.6), and perhaps Phillidas (Pol. 4.77.7).

[49] No title is given for Dorimachos at Phigaleia, but he certainly acted as a commander in the city (Pol. 4.3.5-13).

[50] Bengtson, *Die Strategie in der hellenistichen Zeit*, 2nd ed., Munich 1964-1967.

[51] He had already written of allies being league members in communication with Mantinea etc, in the Peloponnese (2.46.2).

[52] Pol. 15.22.4-5 and 23.1-6.

[53] Walbank, *Philip V*, 110-112.

the Aitolians so soon after making his peace with the league, less than two years earlier at the time. Dikaiarchos, however, did raid in the Hellespont area, though exactly where is not known[54]. The cities would thus gain a certain degree of protection if they were associated with the league, particularly if it was known by that time that Dikaiarchos was by origin an Aitolian. This association with the league would not be something which was of serious concern to the Rhodians. Indeed, the Rhodians were Dikaiarchos' original target more than any other state[55], and they already had good connections with the Aitolians, both by proxenies, and by Rhodian offers of good offices more than once in the Macedonian wars[56]. The raids of Dikaiarchos thus seem to be the best occasion for the Aitolian alliances with the Straits cities. Dikaiarchos may have been employed by Philip – though this was not clear at the time of his raids – but he, as an Aitolian, would scarcely wish to fight against an ally of his own land, not, at least, if he wanted ever to go home again.

Aitolia was only marginally less interested in this area than in the Aegean as a whole. There were, so far as is known, no *asylia* agreements with any of the Straits cities, but there were several *proxenoi* involved. Indeed a renewal of such a relationship with Kalchedon – one of those who received an Aitolian *strategos* – had taken place as recently as 209/208[57], and a new *proxenos* agreement had been made with Herakleia Pontike a year or so later[58]. Other connections of the same sort existed with Kyzikos, a city which was also a firm and long-standing friend of the Attalids[59], with Byzantion[60], and further afield, with Sinope[61].

Given that background, one of distant friendship, perhaps, but not more, the installation of Aitolian commanders in some Straits cities, and the conclusion of alliances with others was a clear advance by Aitolia into an area as traditionally a concern for Macedon as it was for Rhodes. Given an Aitolian-Rhodian *entente*, Philip could only be

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[54] Pol. 18.54.6, simply 'cities of the Hellespont'.

[55] Diod. 26.1.

[56] Again, good relations between the aggessively anti-pirate Rhodes and Aitolia implies that piracy was not a serious Aitolian activity.

[57] *IG* IX.1.31i.

[58] *IG* IX.1.31n.

[59] *IG* IX.1.17 and 24; Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, 14-15; McShane, *Foreign Policy of the Attalids*, 26-28, 161.

[60] *IG* IX.1.21.

[61] *IG* IX.1.25a.

concerned. Both Greek states had, so far as he could see, good relations with Rome. With Rome in Illyria and hostile to him, Aitolia in the Straits, and Rhodes a power at sea and among the islands, a paranoid king could scent encirclement.

Philip's Aegean campaigns were therefore directed against the incipient Aitolian-Rhodian alliance, to which Attalos of Pergamon was also attached loosely. His naval manoeuvres in 204 and 203 (by Dikaiarchos and Herakleides) were aimed mainly at Rhodes; when no hostile reaction emerged from either of the two, he could move against the Aitolians in the Straits, and on his way home he seized control of Thasos in a brutal way[62]. Together with his control of Lemnos and Peparethos[63], this meant that he now controlled the whole northern half of the Aegean, and would thus be able to keep Rhodes at a distance. An agreement with Antiochos III provided him with a clear run in the rest of the Aegean and parts of Karia[64], and in 201 he seized control also of many of the islands of the Cyclades[65], then of Samos[66].

Since this campaign was by sea, resistance to Philip's advance had to come first of all from those states with fleets, which were the only ones capable of challenging the new Macedonian naval power. Rhodes first, then Attalos, moved to fight him, and they were joined by such minor powers as Kos, Chios, Byzantion, and Kyzikos[67]. All of these states were friends of Aitolia. Aitolia itself, not a naval power, turned to diplomacy. An envoy went to Rome asking for Roman assistance in this new Macedonian crisis. It is reported, in a speech said to have been made by a Macedonian when arguing later that Aitolia should ally with his king, that the envoy received a rude and dusty answer, referring to the separate Aitolian peace of 206[68]. The source is thus tainted, quite apart from being retailed by Livy, who

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[62] Pol. 15.24.1-3.

[63] These were defended by Philip against attack by Attalos in 209: Pol. 10.42.1 and Livy 28.5.10; no doubt Philip had held them since.

[64] This is the notorious 'secret agreement' over the division of the Ptolemaic lands: Pol. 3.2.8, 15.20.1, 16.1.9; Livy 31.14.5; App. *Mac* 4.1; Justin 30.28; Hieronymos, *In Danielam* 11.13; R. M. Errington, 'The alleged Syro-Macedonian Pact and the origins of the Second Macedonian War', *Athenaeum* 49, 1971, 336-354, does not believe in it.

[65] Livy 31.15.6 and 31.4, naming Andros, Paros, and Kythnos.

[66] Pol. 3.28, 16.2.4. 2.9 and 7.6; Livy 31.31.4; App. *Mac* 4.1; G. Klaffenbach, 'Sämische Inschriften', *AM* 51, 1926, 28-33.

[67] Cf. Walbank, *Philip V*, 118-119 for the details.

[69] Livy 31.29.4; also App. *Mac* 4.2.

was fond of such tight-lipped Roman answers, and the report cannot be accepted as verbatim. What can be accepted is that Rome refused the request for assistance against Philip, though it is noticeable that the reply, even in Livy's Macedonian's words, was not a direct refusal. The reason for refusal was probably more connected with the unfinished state of the Carthaginian War than resentment at Aitolia's separate peace, but there was also the unwillingness of Rome to be dragged into a war in the east at another's behest: the Senate wished to pick its own time and occasion.

The date of the envoy's visit is unclear, and has been put at almost every year from 206 to 201. It is certainly before 200, for that is the date of the report of the Roman answer by the Macedonian. Since Philip was interfering with Aitolian allies during 202, the appeal may have come after that, for not until then did the Aitolians have a concrete case against him; on the other hand, the Roman refusal may have been the green light for him to start that interference, though Philip scarcely needed any such encouragement in this stage of this career, and certainly not from Rome. On the whole, late in 202 or early in 201 is perhaps the most convincing time, after the news of the final defeat of Carthage by Rome had arrived, thus potentially freeing Roman attention, and after Philip's campaign in the Straits, by which the Aitolians were clearly harmed and affronted[69]. The news of Rome's reply could only encourage Philip. Next year he was at Samos, a Ptolemaic island technically, but Ptolemy was now at war with Antiochos III, and he then attacked Pergamon. King Attalos, with Philip ravaging his lands, appealed to Aitolia to make a diversion into Macedonia to draw Philip off[70].

The Aitolians did not respond. They knew full well that there was little they could do. Philip did not respond to distractions. They had tried such a tactic with Philip before, when Skopas had raided Pieria

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[69] The various dates assigned include 206 or 205 by T. Walek-Czenecki, 'Les origines de la seconde guerre Macédoine', *Eos* 21, 1928, 369-404; 205-204 by A. Passerini, 'I moventi de Roma nella seconda guerra macedonica', *Athenaeum* 9, 1931, 542-562; 202 by Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce*, 293, Walbank, *Philip V*, 116-117 and 310-311, J. Carcopino, *Points de vue sur l'imperialisme romain*, Paris 1934, 62, and G. de Sanctis, *Storia dei romani*, IV.1.39.

Other comments are in Hammond, *Hist Mac.* 3.412-413; and Walbank, *Commentary* 3. The embassy as a fact is denied by E. Badian, 'Aetolica', *Latomus* 17, 1958, 208-211 and its existence is asserted by T. A. Dorey, 'The alleged Aetolian Embassy to Rome', *Classical Review* 74, 1960, 9.

[70] Livy 31.46.4.

and Dion to try to draw the king away from Kephallenia, and it had failed; similarly Dorimachos had marched to Thessaly to try to distract him, but he had gone ahead and raided Thermos. There was no reason to expect it to succeed in 201, when Philip could not possibly get home in time to do anything about such an attack. Nor would Philip, based as he was at his fleet in Samos, remain for long in Attalos' territory. He was not equipped to besiege Pergamon, an immensely strong fortress, his supplies would run short quickly – and he had to appeal to Antiochos III's governor in Sardis for help[71] – and Attalos' lands would then be out of danger. Attalos' appeal, if it was not actively rejected by the Aitolians, was at least tactfully ignored.

One fear was laid to rest, though. The 'secret agreement' between Philip and Antiochos III became known during 201, and was reported to Rome by Rhodes[72]. It may have seemed to be more binding than it really was when Antiochos' governor in Sardis, Zeuxis, assisted Philip with supplies, though it looks more as though Zeuxis was simply getting rid of the Macedonian troops from his neighbourhood. During 201, however, Antiochos was in receipt of an honorific decree of the Amphiktyony[73]. This was presumably enacted in response to a contact initiated either by Antiochos or by the Aitolians, and such contact, in the context of the year, can only have been part of the diplomacy surrounding Philip's actions in the Aegean. It may have been one of Aitolia's requests for help, or a query respecting the scope of the kings' 'secret agreement', or it may have been reassurance for Antiochos that he had no designs on Aitolia. In whatever case, the fact that he was honoured by the Amphiktyony implies that moderately friendly relations, at least, existed between the two states.

There was also another dimension to the general problem. War had begun in 202 between Antiochos and Ptolemy V. The 'secret agreement' had been a reassurance to each of the parties that neither would trespass on the other's area, and that neither would join Ptolemy's side in the coming war. The Ptolemaic government meanwhile made its own preparations, part of which were to have Skopas, who had fled to Alexandria once his debt-cancellations plan had been

[71] Pol. 16.24.6.

[72] As interpreted by Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce*, 312-314.

[73] F. Lefèvre, 'Antiochos le Grand et les Étoliens à la fin du IIIe siècle', *BCH* 120, 1996, 757-771.

rejected, sent to Greece to hire a mercenary army to bolster Ptolemaic military manpower[74]. The exact date of his visit is not clear, but the war began in 202, and that year or the next, is the most likely.

Here, therefore, is another reason for Antiochos and Aitolia to make contact. Skopas was a well known Aitolian, though acting in this case as a Ptolemaic mercenary recruiter. Antiochos had Aitolian mercenaries in his own forces. An appeal to the Aitolian state to block Skopas' hiring would not be unlikely. In fact, the Aitolians were concerned that he was taking too many men of military age out of the country at a time when it seemed likely that trouble was approaching. The *strategos* Damokritos (200/199) did indeed stop Skopas hiring in Aitolia[75], though the reason was more likely to be Aitolian-selfish than to oblige Antiochos. If the prohibition looked to do both, all the better. And an honorific decree by the Council of the Amphiktyons, the great majority of whom were Aitolians, was a useful oiling of the diplomatic process, which would be fully appreciated by its recipient: the Amphiktyons, after all, administered Apollo's temple, and Antiochos was a descendant of the god.

The Aitolian appeal to Rome was accompanied by appeals from Attalos and from Rhodes[76], and all these came as signs that more and more Greek states were lining up against Macedon. Rome may well not have wished to respond at the time of the Aitolian appeal for its own reasons, but there could be little doubt that a new Romano-Macedonian war would come soon. The appeals by Rhodes and from Attalos were followed eventually by one from Athens[77]. It become clear in Rome that the correct political conditions for a Macedonian war were developing. The alliance of Greek states was necessary for the successful prosecution of such a war; this had been one of the lessons learned in the earlier war. In the last year of that war, without local allies, it had proved impossible for the Roman army in Illyria to make any serious direct impression on Macedon, since the geographical barrier of the Pindos mountains made defence relatively straightforward; therefore, Greek allies were required so that Roman access to the enemy should be possible. Once the Greek embassies to Rome had made clear their fear of

[74] Pol. 15.25.13.
[75] Livy 31.43.5-7.
[76] Livy 31.2.1; App. *Mac* 4.2.
[77] Livy 31.1.10; App. *Mac* 4.2.

Philip, the declaration of war by the Senate was only a matter of time. It is evident, therefore, that the Senate intended that Rome would be the initiator of the conflict, which would put the city in a stronger diplomatic position; there was no intention of joining merely to assist another state, nor was there any intention this time of merely using a Greek state. Only in such a way would this put the Roman commanders clearly in charge in the war, and so keep the diplomatic initiative in Roman hands. And, above all, there was to be no bilateral alliances of the type made with Aitolia. This was another lesson learned from the previous war[78].

The Aitolians had been as seriously affronted by Philip in his recent campaigns as anyone, yet they were clearly unenthusiastic for a new war. Their manpower problem may have been part of this, but the main element was surely the knowledge that if they became involved in a new war, they would be the people who would suffer most. The fighting would take place in part in Illyria, but the Aitolian commanders could see as well as anyone that the main field of battle must be in central Greece, as it had been in every other war they had fought with Macedon. The involvement of Rome would not alter that, except to bring Roman forces into central Greece. And the men at the head of Aitolian affairs in the years before the war were very experienced in Macedonian wars: in September 202 Dorimachos became *strategos* for the fourth time, and he was succeeded by Agetas: both of these men had been in similar positions during the two previous Macedonian wars. Nor did the election of Damokritos, son of Stratagos, in September 200, indicate any change in Aitolian policy or preferences[79].

Agetas was the *strategos* who met a trio of Roman envoys who were touring Greece during the first half of 200[80]. The three included two

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[78] The Roman purposes in moving to this 'Second' Macedonian War have been extensively explored: E. Bickermann, 'Les Préliminaires de la seconde guerre Macédoine', *Revue de Philologie* 9, 1935, 59-81 and 161-176; A. H. McDonald and F. W. Walbank, 'The Origins of the Second Macedonian War', *JRS* 27, 1937, 180-207; J. P. V. D. Balsdon, 'Rome and Macedon, 205-200 BC', *JRS* 44, 1954, 30-42; A. R. Meadows, 'Greek and Roman Diplomacy on the eve of the Second Macedonian War', *Historia* 42, 1993, 40-60. Also, of course, Errington, *CAH*, VIII (2), 244-261; Walbank, *Philip V*, ch. 4; Will, *Histoire Politique*, 2.113-127; C. D. Hamilton, 'The Origins of the Second Macedonian War', *Ancient Macedonia* 5, 1994, 559-567.

[79] Dorimachos: *IG* IX.1.30a; Agelaos: *SGDI* 2049; Damokritos: *SGDI* 2116 and Livy 31.32.1.

[80] Agetas is not named as meeting the envoys, but they came to Naupaktos (Pol 16.27.4) and will obviously have met the league *strategos*, and indeed, all the league officials.

consulars, C. Claudius Nero, the victor of the Metaurus battle in 207, and P. Sempronius Tuditanus, who had been the commander who last faced Philip, in Illyria in 205, and who had negotiated the Phoenike peace agreement. The third member was M. Aemilius Lepidus, much younger and junior to the others, but with a bright future[81]. These men knew that a decision for war had already been taken in Rome, and that one of the consuls for 201/200 P. Sulpicius Galba, had been allocated Macedonia as his province[82]. Galba had been the naval commander in the east for several years in the last war.

The purpose of this embassy was to investigate Greek attitudes on the spot, and then to go on to see Ptolemy's government in Alexandria and Antiochos III in Syria. These two were at war, and that stage of the envoys' travels was clearly investigational and observational. But the first stage, in Greece, was the most important. The envoys crossed the sea at the start of the sailing season, no doubt as early as possible, and went first to Phoenike, to sound out Epeirote attitudes, then travelled up into Athamania to see King Amynandros[83]. Ignoring Akarnania, which was a firm ally of Philip's, and which was known to be deeply involved in a dispute with Athens in which Philip was providing support to Akarnania, the envoys went next to Naupaktos, where they will have seen the Aitolian magistrates, including Agetas the *strategos*. They then sailed across to Aigion, to speak to the outgoing *strategos* of the Achaian League, Philopoimen, and the new *strategos*, Kykliadas, who would take up his office in May[84]. The envoys then went on to Athens, where they found that Philip's troops were ravaging the countryside as part of the Akarnanian quarrel, and where Athens had been helped already by Attalos' forces from Aigina, and by the Rhodians[85].

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[81] Livy 31.2.3.

[82] Livy 31.6.1; it is this allocation which marked the real decision for war by the Senate; the subsequent rejection of the motion for war by the *comitia centuriata* is of little importance. For the latest attempt to disentangle the difficult chronology of these events, cf. V. M Warrior, *The Initiation of the Second Macedonian War, an Explication of Livy Book 31*, *Historia* Einzelschriften 97, Stuttgart 1996.

[83] Pol 16.27.4.

[84] Ibid; cf. Errington, *Philopoemon*, 82, where he calls the Romans' journey a 'propaganda mission'. It was rather more than that in sum, but in Achaia they had no success.

[85] Events at Athens and Attika: Livy 31.14.6-15.8; Pol. 16.25.1; the Roman envoys at Athens: Pol. 16.25.2-27.3.

These envoys had clearly had a hard time until then. Their message, as summarised by Polybios, was that 'Philip should make war on no Greek state'[86]. Apparently innocuous and easily accepted, this nevertheless implied Roman authority over any enemy of the Macedonians, or indeed any Greek state, and this could not be accepted either by the Aitolians or by the Achaians. The Epeirotes, scarcely in a position to argue, may have mumbled some sort of acceptance, and Amynandros, a neighbour of Philip's and a former ally of his, may well have done the same. He was approached as a friend also of the Aitolians, with the implication that he had accepted a Roman commission to go and argue their case in person in Aitolia, which further implies that he was prepared to join the Roman war on Macedon. The Achaian *strategos*, Philopoimen, will have agreed with the sentiment, but not with the implication, for his whole policy during four terms in that office had been to assert Achaian independence and to increase the league's power and authority and territory. Above all others, the Aitolians will have been annoyed at the very idea that they should accept the implied protection of Rome. No more than a year earlier they had asked for Roman help and it had been implicitly refused, apparently rudely, and now Rome was demanding acceptance of its authority. And Aitolian memories of their previous joint war with Roman as an ally were still sore. And to all of these it will have become clear that Rome was now intent on a war with Philip, there was thus no call for them to become involved; they could all sit back and let Rome take the heat and the casualties.

There is, in fact, no evidence for any of this, but the fact that the Romans visited all these places and yet no response is recorded for any other visits seems significant enough. Only when they reached Athens did they find a situation which they could exploit. Their basic difficulty remained an absence of a legal declaration of war at Rome, an omission which was surely known in Greece. Yet they permitted Athens, a state by now which was virtually powerless, to declare war on Macedon all by itself, and then to spray appeals for help in all directions. Only Rhodes and Pergamon did anything in reference, and they were already fighting Philip anyway. Aitolia was appealed to, both by Athens and by King Attalos, but refused to participate[87]. Achaia was not even asked.

By the late summer, however, the Romans had got what they

[86] Pol. 16.27.2.
[87] Livy 31.15.9.

needed: good evidence of Philip's continued aggressions, in Attika, along the north Aegean coast, where he captured Ainos and Maroneia in Thrace, and on the Hellespont again, where he besieged Abydos[88]. A declaration of war was finally achieved at Rome and the consul shipped his forces across to Illyria, while a fleet was sent round to the Peiraios[89]. This all took place about the time of the Aitolian *Thermike*, where elections for the next *strategos* were held, at Thermos, which no doubt still bore the scars of Philip's ravaging only seven years before[90]. The new *strategos* was Damokritos of Kalydon, another experienced politician, who had been *hipparchos* in 209/208. He had, earlier, been one of those involved in the judgement between Melitaia and Pieria, and was named in the decree of his home city which recognised the Leukophryene festival at Magnesia-on-Maiandros. He had thus been an active political leader, locally and nationally, for fifteen or more years, including the period of the last war with Macedon, when he had held high command[91].

The outbreak of the war between Rome and Macedon was surely discussed at the *Thermike* meeting, and Damokritos and his fellow magistrates will have gained a clear impression of the feeling of the Aitolians. This was obviously in favour of staying out of the war. For a decision for peace or war was the power always reserved to the primary Aitolian Assembly. This, however, would not end the matter, as all would know. During the winter Amynandros of Athamania joined the Roman side openly, along with several of Philip's other neighbours and enemies. Amynandros was regarded as having influence in Aitolia and was sent by the consul Galba to exercise his persuasiveness there[92]. The Aitolian decision at the *Thermike* had clearly been for peace, and any new decision had to be another public one, by their Assembly, and so the question was aired again at the *Panaitolike* meeting, held at Naupaktos in the spring[93].

Representatives came to the Assembly from Philip, from Attalos,

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[88] Livy 31.16.1-17.11; Pol. 16.30.1-33.5; D. Golan, 'Autumn 200 BC, Events at Abydus', *Athenaeum* 63, 1985, 389-404; Warrior (note 82).

[89] Livy 31.18.9 and 22.4-5.

[90] The stoa was rebuilt to a smaller size, with the burnt stubs of the old columns of the former stoa still standing and visible: R. Stillwell (ed.), *Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites*, Princeton N.J., 1976, sv. Thermos.

[91] *Prosopography*, 'Damokritos (2)'.

[92] Livy 31.28.1-3.

[93] Livy 31.29.1 correctly calls it the *Panaetolica*, the name of the spring meeting.

from Rome (said by Livy to be L. Furius Purpurio), and from Athens. Livy provides a set-piece of three speeches, a process so formal, even 'contrived', as to destroy any possibility that the speeches represent accurately what was actually said[94]. The result was a decision not to take a decision, that is, to maintain the policy decided six months earlier by the *Thermike* meeting. This favoured Philip, of course, for it confined the war to the mountains between Illyria and Macedon, where Romans and Macedonians could reach each other, and to the Aegean. In neither of these areas would the Romans be able force a decision, but the very fact that more discussion had taken place held out hope to the Romans that the Aitolians would opt for their side later. Damokritos proposed to call a special meeting when a decision was due, which implies that negotiations with both sides were authorised by the meeting[95]. It seems to have been made clear that Aitolia would join the winning side.

This meeting put off the decision for some months, during which reports arrived of more allied naval activity in the Aegean, and of an invasion of Macedon by Galba's army from Illyria. It appeared clear that Rome was winning, and pressure inevitably grew for Damokritos to call his promised special assembly. In August, news arrived of a defeat for Philip personally in a cavalry encounter at a place called Ottolobos[96], and of a naval raid by the combined Roman, Illyrian, Rhodian, and Attalid fleet on Macedonian coastal towns[97]. In fact, none of these was in any way decisive. The fleet was driven away from the Macedonian coast by a storm, and raids on coastal towns were not going to have much effect. As to the invasion from Illyria, the Roman army was unable to penetrate into the real heart of Macedon, and Galba was marching about somewhat indecisively in Orestis and Eordaia, when he met and beat a detachment of Philip's cavalry. For the Aitolians, however, this took place very close to their northern borders, while the allied fleet was using Euboia as its base. For the Romans, the need for Aitolian assistance was becoming ever more urgent, while the Aitolians themselves were gaining the impression, partly from allied propaganda, that they would miss out on the victory if they delayed any longer.

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[94] Livy 31.29.3-31.30; it is called 'contrived' by Briscoe, *Comm. Livy*, 1.129.
[95] Livy 31.32.1-5.
[96] Livy 31.36.7-37.12; Dio 17.58.1-4.
[97] Livy 31.44.1-45.16.

Attalos and the Roman naval commander, L. Apustius, came to Herakleia Trachinia to confer with Pyrrias of that city, an immensely distinguished Aitolian elder statesman, three times *strategos* already, the first time nearly a quarter of a century before. He was clearly empowered to negotiate on behalf of Damokritos, as one of the preliminary matters to be undertaken before the special meeting of the Assembly took place. Damokritos himself appears to have been busy with the arrangements for that special meeting, which was to be held at Naupaktos. Pyrrias' task, therefore, was to extract terms from Attalos and Apustius upon which Aitolia would be able to join the war. Pyrrias, in effect, asked the allied commanders what they were offering. This was the wrong tactic, since it was now clear that if Aitolia did join in, it certainly would be on the allied side. Attalos was affronted, perhaps at the virtual auction he was involved in, and he refused to promise even the thousand soldiers he had contributed to the joint cause ten years before. But he was not the important man on the allied side at the meeting, and all could remember how briefly he had actually stayed in the fight in the previous war, as well as noting the possibility that he would yet again be attacked by Philip's brother-in-law, Prusias of Bithynia. It was this which had given him the excuse to pull out last time, and the tactic could well be repeated. So Attalos' refusal to contribute troops was neither important nor unexpected – and a thousand soldiers would not make much difference anyway. He would, after all, continue to supply ships and sailors to the joint fleet. Apustius, on the other hand, had real power at his disposal, and when he made generous promises, Pyrrias accepted them as committing Rome. Apustius could not be specific, of course, since he was only the consul's legate, and only the consul, or even the Senate, could commmit Rome, but Apustius brimmed over the generous promises[98]. Pyrrias reported these discussions and promises to Damokritos.

Damokritos called his special meeting, some time, perhaps a month or so, before the annual *Thermike* was due at the September equinox. The news of the Macedonian defeat at Ottolobos had arrived, and with it the information that Galba and his army were marching about Macedonia, just to the north of Thessaly. Pyrrias' report of Apustius' promises was presented to the meeting. No doubt

[98] Livy 31.46.1-5.

an optimistic review of allied naval activity in the Aegean – which report could only come from allied sources – and of the blockade of the Macedonian coasts and the raids on Macedonian cities was known to the men attending as well. The whole package of information and promises was convincing enough for Damokritos to be able to propose a declaration of war, and for it to be agreed[99]. For the fourth time in forty years, Aitolia and Macedon were at war.

[99] Livy 31.40.9-10.

18. THE FOURTH MACEDONIAN WAR (199-197)

The Aitolian declaration of war was done independently, without an advance agreement with Rome. The discussions with Apustius had been no more than talks, and he had no authority to bind his city or the consul. The Aitolians were therefore fighting a separate war, at least in theory. This created all sorts of difficulties later, but it must have been a deliberate decision. It would have been quite possible to hold out longer so that clear terms of alliance and participation could be negotiated with Rome, and such a process would surely increase the value of the Aitolian contribution to the joint effort. But the Aitolians had gone ahead independently.

Some reasons can be suggested. One is procedural. Damokritos the *strategos* had organised a special Assembly meeting on the subject of declaring war, and a discussion was therefore necessary. In fact, the calling of the special Assembly – apparently a constitutional innovation – implied a decision to declare war on Macedon; the Aitolians had got themselves trapped. The campaign of Sulpicius into highland Macedon might have seemed to be the beginning of the end for Philip, and Aitolia would not wish to avoid being on the winning side[1]; only participants would be likely to acquire a share of the spoils. More probably the Aitolians remembered the difficulties over the previous alliance with Rome, and did not wish to be bound by the same sort of terms again. It seems, indeed, that they assumed that the previous treaty of 211 was still in force[2]. Certain events during the war tend to show this, though it is never stated outright; equally, certain other events suggest the opposite, that Rome at least did not regard the alliance as still in force. After the dispute over the peace terms of 206 and 205, it was very difficult for both sides to decide. In 202 Aitolia had asked for help against Philip in the Aegean; this might have been an approach predicated on the continuing alliance. The Roman response had been a blunt refusal, with a curt reference to Aitolia's separate peace; but this was not a denial of the Aitolians'

[1] This is the clear implication of Livy 31.40.9-10.

[2] There is no sign of a time limit in the section of the treaty which is preserved, and no sign that it was limited to the period of the war.

right to ask[3]. Flaminius later denied the continuance of the treaty, but this may not be the last word, for he was in dispute with the Aitolians over something else at the time, and this was a useful debating point. It was not, however, his only point in the argument; if the treaty really was defunct, that would have been sufficient for his reply, but he went on to make other points. So even this apparent firm statement is not conclusive[4]. It looks as though Flamininus was not actually sure on the issue.

In all probability neither side knew one way or the other, and neither wanted to put the matter to a test. It suited both to leave the issue vague and unresolved. Relations between Rome and Aitolia were never smooth and friendly, under any circumstances or at any time. Aitolia clearly wished to be regarded as a specifically independent state, capable of making its own decisions; and only a brief contemplation of Italy and Sicily would have demonstrated that allies of Rome swiftly sank to the effective status of subjects; in 199 the Aitolians could see the examples of Tarentum, Syracuse, with which they had proxeny relations, and of Capua and all the Latin allies; closer to home the subject status of the Illyrian cities, Apollonia and Epidauros, and of Kerkyra, was equally clear. Aitolia's history had included only occasional alliances, and those which had been made tended to turn out badly; further, like Rome, the league did tend to absorb new members into itself.

None of these suggested reasons is perhaps wholly convincing alone, but if they are taken together, it is possible to suggest that the league deliberately did not seek a new Roman treaty partly because the old one might still be valid, and could be be appealed to when it was opportune, and partly because the status of a Roman ally could be seen to be one of subordination and dependence, a status all Aitolian feelings rebelled against. The Aitolians, with the arrogance which was wholly Greek, and which included, no doubt, a defensiveness as a result of Greek insults directed at them, and which made them disliked so much, assumed that they could fight their own war against Macedon in co-operation with Rome, and that by avoiding an alliance they would be able to insist on their right to be consulted.

The Aitolian decision for war was taken in August of 199. There

[3] Livy 31.29.4; App. *Mac.* 4.2.
[4] Livy 33.13.7-12.

was still time for the *strategos* Damokritos, whose term of office extended to the September equinox, to lead the army in a campaign into Thessaly. The land was effectively undefended, except by scattered royal garrisons and the urban citizen militias, for Philip with his main field army was fully occupied in facing the Roman attack in the west from Illyria. The Aitolian forces were joined by the Athamanian levy – or some of it – under King Amynandros, who had his own purposes[5]. The size of the Aitolian force is nowhere stated, but it was probably the major portion of the league's army, less those in garrison over against the potential enemies in Akarnania, perhaps facing Epeiros, and others facing Achaia across the Corinthian Gulf. Akarnania and Achaia were still allies of Macedon, though until now neither had become active[6].

The Aitolian purpose in marching into Thessaly would seem to have been at least threefold, and its route, in the absence of information as to purposes, must reveal those intentions, unless one is to believe that the army simply wandered erratically. The first place attacked was a town called Kerkinion, which is not securely located, but appears to have been somewhat north of Pherai, and south or west of Lake Boibe. The town, clearly not large, was held by a Macedonian royal garrison, and it had to be besieged. The siege was brief, a few days only, and once the Aitolians took it, the inhabitants were sold into slavery, and their town was burned[7].

This is an interesting area for the Aitolians to be operating in. Between Herakleia and Lamia, which are the likely Aitolian bases, and Kerkinion, there lay the debatable land over which Aitolians and Macedonians had fought several times during the past half-century. Philip had conquered Echinos and Phalara, close to Lamia, in the most recent war, and Phthiotic Thebes in the war before that; the

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[5] Livy 31.4.1.

[6] Achaia, of course, never did join in on Macedon's side, and, indeed, eventually joined the Roman; Akarnania did stay true to its Macedonian alliance, but exactly when fighting broke out in the west is not clear. We have no information until early 197, when L. Flamininus was sent to take care of them; it may be that this was the moment when the alliance was fully activated; the Akarnanians, with Aitolia on their land frontier, and Rome dominating the seas, were in an unenviable position. The uncertainty was quite enough to require Aitolia to keep up its guard in the west.

[7] Livy 31.41.1-4; if the Aitolians believed the Roman treaty was still in effect, they should have turned over the moveable property, or the proceeds from its sale, to Rome; there is no indication that they did; and Rome, denying the continued validity of the treaty, could not ask.

Aitolians had brought Thebes and Pharsalos into their league even earlier; Pharsalos had ceased to be a member some years earlier and was now one of Philip's cities. Further, simultaneously with the Aitolian invasion of Thessaly, L. Apustius and King Attalos were conducting a complex little campaign on both shores of the strait which separates Euboia and the Thessalian mainland. Beginning with the siege of Oreus in northern Euboia (also called Histiaia), held by a Macedonian garrison which had been put on its mettle by earlier royal criticism, the partly-naval force of the allies had also taken Pteleon and Larisa Chremaste on the opposite mainland. The siege of Oreus took some time, and since it began after the conference which Attalos and Apustius had at Herakleia with Pyrrias, before the declaration of war, it was probably still continuing when the Aitolians set off on their own invasion[8]. So the whole south-west corner of Thessaly was a cockpit in August 199.

It would be normal for the Aitolians to campaign with the intention, at least in part, of recruiting new members for their league. Resistance by royal garrisons was to be expected, and this had to be crushed in order for the potential league recruits to be encouraged. Prime targets would be the former league members such as Phthiotic Thebes and Pharsalos, but the original population of Thebes had been sold off by Philip who had then repeopled the city with Macedonians, and a city the size and importance of Pharsalos would have a substantial Macedonian garrison behind well-maintained walls. So the initial Aitolian target would thus seem to have been a smaller place such as Kerkinion where the garrison could be overwhelmed speedily, for the essence of Aitolian strategy in such a campaign was constant movement.

Incidentally, the fact that there was a royal garrison in a small place such as Kerkinion does imply that Philip had to use a substantial part of his army in garrisoning Thessaly. And since the area had not been seriously threatened until the Aitolian raid in 199, those garrisons were intended to hold the province, not defend it. Livy suggests this when he cannot decide whether the people of Kerkinion were under compulsion from the garrison or acting freely an indecision which must have existed in Polybios[9]. The Aitolian action in

[8] Livy 31.46.6-16.
[9] Livy 31.41.2.

destroying the town and selling the people into slavery was scarcely designed to persuade Thessalians to join their league. Presumably the Kerkinians were identified as Macedonian loyalists, and beyond hope. Or it may be Aitolian revenge for the treatment of Phthiotic Thebes many years before. Later events in the campaign do show that the Aitolian aims included the recruitment of allies.

So the attack on Kerkinion was in the nature of a strike at royal Macedonian power in Thessaly, and a warning that it was supporters of that power – garrisons and citizens – who were the Aitolians' targets. Some of the nearby inhabitants at least took the warning: the people living in the area of Lake Boibe fled into 'the mountains' – presumably the hills of Magnesia to the east of the lake[10]. Either these people were staunch supporters of the Macedonian royal power, or, perhaps more likely, they did not wait to find out the Aitolians' precise purpose. Fleeing was safer.

South-east of Kerkinion were the cities of Pherai and Demetrias. The latter in particular was well garrisoned – it was one of the 'fetters' which Philip had fastened on Greece – and the former, as an important centre of Thessalian power, was no doubt also held by its own contingent of Macedonian soldiers. Here were excellent targets, if the Aitolians were intent on striking a major blow at Philip's power. But an attack on either place, both of which were much more substantial cities than Kerkinion, would require a major siege, and this would tie down the Aitolian army indefinitely. Nor would it assist the Roman army in its attempts to break into Macedon, by drawing Macedonian troops down from the north, for Philip could be reasonably confident that the garrisons could hold out for some time, and so he could wait until the Romans in Epeiros retired into winter quarters, and then come south to relieve the siege, and crush the Aitolians. This would defeat the purposes of both Romans and Aitolians.

So the Aitolian force turned away from Demetrias and Pherai and marched northwestwards along the valley containing the lakes Boibe and Nesson, through Pelasgiotis. Without any opposition the army by-passed Larisa, crossed the Peneus River and penetrated further north into Perrhaibia. There they captured and burnt the town of Chyretiai, though such an unimportant town so far from Aitolia seems unlikely to have been held by a royal garrison, and none is

[10] Livy 31.41.5.

actually mentioned. But the effect was immediate: the next town on their route, Malloia, gave in at once: it was made an ally of the league[11].

It may be that collecting allies was one of the purposes of the Aitolians, or perhaps, as Livy supposes – basing himself on Polybios, no doubt – it was mainly a plundering expedition[12]. But the Aitolians had moved a long way to the north for either of these purposes. It would be much easier, one would have thought, to collect allies in the south of Thessaly where some places, such as Pharsalos, had been league members in the past; and if plunder was the object of the campaign, it was hardly necessary to go as far north as Perrhaibia to get it.

It would seem, therefore, that neither of these objects is sufficient to account for the Aitolians' strange route of march into the north. Yet one must assume there was a rational military purpose in the march, and the obvious conjecture is that this was a march co-ordinated with the contemporary Roman campaign in Macedon. The consul Galba had advanced over the mountains from Illyria into Lynkestis earlier in the year, and since then had broken through Philip's defences at the Banitza pass, and into Eordaia. He there marched south, ravaging the land, and, as Livy says, 'proceeded towards Elimia', the next region south. There the Roman army was in the middle valley of the Haliakmon, perhaps in the area of the modern town of Kosane[13].

There Galba's army was no more than forty kilometres as the crow flies from Malloia, with a negotiable pass, the Volustana, providing a passable route for one or the other of the allies. Neither, of course, made any attempt to join the other, and it is highly unlikely that this had been the intention. The two armies' bases were in diametrically different directions, and for either to have crossed the pass would have meant that they would have immediately to retrace their steps. But between them the two allied armies had demonstrated that Philip's defences were very fragile, and that his enemies were able to march almost at will throughout much of his kingdom. They had also

[11] Livy 31.41.3.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Galba in Eordaia: Livy 31.29.1-40.1; for the chronology, Walbank, *Philip V*, 317-319, in which the Roman presence in Elimiotis is put at the same time as the Aitolians in Perrhaibia, though no inference is drawn from this; Walbank clearly thinks they are quite separate campaigns; Kosane: Walbank, *Philip V*, 144.

shown that Philip was more intent on defending the Macedonian heartland than the outlying areas of Thessaly or the highland areas of Macedon, and if this sort of campaign should be repeated, there may well be defections from his cause; indeed next year this seems to have been the case.

Having made their point the allied armies began to withdraw from their extreme positions: the Romans marched northwestwards along the upper Haliakmon valley, paused to capture the town of Keletron in Orestis, and then marched back across the Pindos to winter quarters at Apollonia in Illyria[14]. The Aitolians, with Amynandros and his Athamanes, withdrew southwards. Amynandros had gained nothing, apart from plunder, from the expedition so far, and he 'persuaded' the Aitolian leaders to attempt the capture of Gomphi, the Thessalian town which was closest to his kingdom. They were nothing loath, it seems: the route from Perrhaibia to Gomphi led along the middle Peneus valley, which would be another useful demonstration of Philip's inability to defend his subjects. On the way the joint army camped near the town of Pharkadon, on the Peneus[15]. There had been no opposition to any of the allies' moves since the capture of Chyretiai, and before that none since the capture and destruction of Kerkinion.

Philip's lack of resistance to these damaging marches only increased the damage he suffered. He had camped near Lake Ostrovo after losing control of the Banitza Pass, so as to block the way into the Macedonian heartland. A Dardanian invasion also occurred, but this one was not as serious as earlier invasions, and it was pushed out without difficulty by a Macedonian detachment. Philip did not contest Galba's ravaging of Eordaia and Elimiotis, but one would expect that he was not all that far away when Galba turned to the north; no doubt he had either followed Galba's army or marched parallel with it. When the Romans turned northwards, clearly intent on returning to Illyria, he had the choice of either following their withdrawal, or marching into Thessaly to follow the withdrawal of the Aitolians and the Athamanians. He chose the latter, as being the weaker of the two armies; it had been shown that he could not beat the Roman force with the troops he had with him. But, having made this choice, he

[14] Livy 31.40.1-3.
[15] Livy 31.41.6-9.

had effectively abandoned the people of Orestis to the enemy, but he could no longer simply observe: he had to attack these other invaders. Their defeat would have a useful effect in Thessaly, which was clearly a less staunch part of his dominions than upland Macedon.

Philip is credited here with 'one of his sensational marches'[16], but unusual speed was probably not called for: the Aitolians were not moving especially quickly, for they had to forage and plunder as they went. Philip caught up with the invaders in their camp at Pharkadon. Livy at this point gives a description of men scattered about, unarmed, unprepared, without a guard, and so on. He then contradicts this formulaic picture by reporting that the 'unguarded' Aitolian camp was actually protected by a rampart[17]. Despite the exaggerations and distortions of his account, it seems clear that the Aitolians, who had established a camp separately from that of the Athamanians, were defeated in a straggling fight, and also suffered from Philip's pursuing forces on their retreat[18]. On the other hand, the Aitolians were withdrawing anyway, and the only apparent change in their plans was that now they could not attack Gomphi, as Amynandros had hoped. Casualties are unknown. This was an undoubted Aitolian defeat, but the surrounding detail has a propagandistic look to it; Philip required a victory after his bad summer, and one would expect him to exaggerate it.

Livy says that Amynandros guided the Aitolians home by the mountain paths[19]; they certainly reached home, though their actual route is not known, and the need to take to the hills is not obvious. He even claims that the paths were unknown to Philip's men, rather forgetting that the fight took place in the middle of Thessaly. Philip then marched into southern Thessaly. At some point he retook Larisa Chremaste and Pteleon in the south-east corner, which were in Macedonian hands later, and now is as likely a time as any for him to take them back[20]. He then made a determined attack on the town of Thaumakoi. This was an Aitolian fortress, controlling access to the route south out of Thessaly over Mount Othrys, and situated on the

[16] Walbank, *Philip V*, 146.
[17] Livy 31.41.10-42.6.
[18] Livy 31.42.7-9.
[19] Livy 31.43.8.
[20] Larisa Chremaste was demanded back by the Aitolians at the Nikaia conference next year (Livy 31.13.6); if Larisa fell, Pteleon was not worth holding, and the naval forces had already gone into winter quarters (Livy 31.57.1).

Thessalian side of the hills; so alternatively its position can be described as a *point d'appui* for the Aitolians, a base from which they could raid into southern Thessaly[21]. Philip brought up siege machines for the task, and seems to have spent some time and energy over it. Since he had defeated the Aitolians at Pharkadon with cavalry and light infantry, some considerable time will have elapsed before the attack on Thaumakoi could take place, for he had to gather the siege materials, which were presumably stored in one of the Thessalian cities. The siege must therefore have begun in September, perhaps fairly late in the month[22].

This is relevant to the situation in Aitolia. Their declaration of war came in August, and the rest of that month at least was occupied by their campaign into Thessaly, and by the Roman ravaging of Eordaia. It was not until well into September, therefore, that the riposte by Philip came, for he would need to wait until the Roman army in Eordaia was fully committed to its withdrawal before he could risk a march into Thessaly to the south. The signal may well have been the siege of Keletron, which would immobilise the Roman forces. The Aitolian withdrawal after their defeat at Pharkadon will therefore have occurred in the middle of September, and after that Philip had to recover control of Malloia, Larisa Chremaste, and Pteleon, gather his siege forces and lay siege to Thaumakoi; by the time he had done all this it seems likely that it was, at the least, late in September.

And by that time the Aitolians had held their new election, at the *Thermike* at the September equinox. The new *strategos* was Chalepos of Naupaktos, whose earlier career is wholly unknown, though he remained active in Aitolian affairs for another ten years after his term of office as *strategos*. In fact, his activities as *strategos* are also a mystery, for he is not recorded at all, except in the dating formulae of three inscriptions[23]. His later activities are all diplomatic, and it may be that he was fully occupied in such work. We do not know the names of any of the other Aitolian officials for the year either, but it seems likely that the *hipparchos* was Archedamos of Pholas, who commanded the Aitolian force which relieved the siege of Thaumakoi

[21] Stahlin, *Thessalien*, 155-157.

[22] Walbank, *Philip V*, in his chronological table, p. 341, puts the siege in the autumn; he puts Philip's retirement from the siege 'probably in October, or late in September', on 319; I would think October a virtual certainty, and perhaps even later. The siege seems to have taken some time.

[23] *IG* IX.1.3.615; *SGDI* 2072, 2117.

not long after the election[24]. The *grammateis* cannot even be guessed at.

Philip spent some time and energy on the siege. An approach mound was built, and mantlets deployed, and a battering ram was brought up. The Aitolians and the citizens, reinforced by Archedamos and the extra troops he brought, conducted a vigorous defense, which so delayed Philip's assault that winter arrived before he could succeed, or even use the battering ram. He broke off the siege and went into winter quarters[25].

The winter was used by both sides for diplomacy and for planning for the next year. Philip attempted to re-activate the old alliance with Achaia, and hoped to bring friends to his side by evacuating his holdings in the Peloponnese – always excepting Corinth, of course. This had the incidental effect of bringing a moderate number of soldiers back to reinforce his army, but the main purpose was to persuade the Achaians to honour their alliance. His envoy first asked to Achaians to renew the oath required annually to maintain the Symmachy, but when this did not produce a willingness to join in the war – whether or not the oath was actually taken – he agreed to hand over Philip's Peloponnesian towns. So the Achaian League received Orchomenos, Heraia, and the Triphylian area, and, through Megalopolis, the town of Alipheira[26]. This was a substantial enhancement of Achaian power, not so much from the strength of these places, but more as a removal of impediments. But this sort of bribery never works, since the bribed have simply to hold out for more until they have all that is available. So Achaia was not really tempted to join in, particularly since Philip, by handing over Triphylia to Achaia, ensured that Elis was annoyed, which had an old claim to the area; Elis was a traditional ally of Aitolia and was never likely to be a friend to Macedon, so causing annoyance in that direction did not bother the Macedonians. But, if they needed one it would provide a plausible excuse for the Achaians not to become involved in Philip's war. And what Philip did not hand over was as significant as what he did: the Achaians will certainly have asked for Corinth, though they will never have been

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[24] Livy 32.4.2; if the *strategos* was mainly a diplomat, all the more reason for the *hipparchos* to command the troops; Archidamos (*Prosopography*, 'Archedamos (6)'), was a notable commander.

[25] Livy 32.4.1-7.

[26] Livy 32.5.4-7.

offered it. Philip required that city to maintain a degree of power in the south.

The Aitolians will also have been active diplomatically during the winter, though there is no direct evidence for what they did. One must assume, however, that they were in contact with the consul. P. Sulpicius Galba was succeeded by P. Villius Tappulus after the Romans went into their winter quarters. Villius' winter headquarters were on Kerkyra; it is as certain as anything that he will have met envoys from Aitolia, probably the *strategos* Chalepos personally, and King Amynandros, to co-ordinate the next season's campaign. As it happened, Philip pre-empted any moves they may have intended by seizing the advanced position of the Aous Pass, deep in Epeiros, at the end of the winter[27]. The Romans were compelled to confront the Macedonians there, and any intentions they may have had for a campaign elsewhere, such as in Thessaly, were put to one side.

This, in geographical terms, might seem to have laid Philip's southern flank open to an Aitolian attack. In fact, it made it impossible for the Roman forces in Illyria and Epeiros to provide essential support to Amynandros and to the Aitolians. Later in the year Amynandros needed Roman help to take just one town[28], and the Aitolians had learnt the previous autumn after Philip's sudden counter-attack not to push to far into Thessaly on their own. Further, it appears that Philip had a subsidiary campaign going against the Aitolians at the same time[29]. This, however, was on a small scale, and had the Aitolians wished they could have mounted a new invasion of Thessaly in the spring – as they, in fact, eventually did. Since they had a good incentive to do so, and the ability, it must be assumed that they failed to do so for a good reason, and that must be connected with the stand-off at the Aous Pass.

If Philip was able to defeat the Roman attacks on his forces for the full campaigning season, the Aitolians may have felt that he would be able to negotiate a separate peace. This would leave both Aitolia – which had declared war separately – and Athamania in the lurch. It behoved them both to wait until a decision had been reached at the pass before committing their troops to further fighting. As it happened,

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[27] Livy 32.5.9-10.

[28] Livy 32.14.1

[29] As appears from the situation in Ainis when the Aitolians finally move: Livy 32.13.10 – to be discussed later.

the Romans were not able to break through until late in June, so the Aitolians were granted the time for their harvest as well.

The breakthrough at the pass was the achievement of yet another Roman consul, T. Quinctius Flamininus, who came out in May, earlier than he was expected, bringing reinforcements equivalent to the whole Aitolian army[30], while Villius was still puzzling how to tackle Philip's position. Flamininus was also blocked for over a month ('forty days', says Livy)[31], so much so that Philip was encouraged to suggest negotiations. If they heard any details, the Aitolians were no doubt confirmed in their mistrust of Rome; the negotiations amounted to serious peace talks, and the Romans were quite prepared to suggest terms to Philip without consulting any of their allies. That the terms suggested were unacceptable to Philip, and were probably intended to be unacceptable, was not the point. Both Amynandros and the Aitolians could see that they must look to their own future, without depending on their ally[32]. Since the Aitolians were conducting a separate war, their participation in the Roman-Macedonian peace talks was not required. No doubt the Romans would think back to the Aitolians' separate peace in 206 as well.

So when the impasse at the Aous Pass was broken by a Roman victory, the Aitolians could at last make their own moves. This, in fact, produced a situation which might have been even more dangerous for them, for the Romans did not exploit their victory for several weeks. The battle at the pass took place, by all the best calculations, on June 25[33]; Flamininus did not bring his army over the Zygos Pass into Thessaly until early in August[34]. It was in that period, while Flamininus was organising his new advance, that the Aitolians and Amynandros took up the fight, and by their actions successfully attracted Philip's attention.

Flamininus' preparations included securing his political rear by an

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[30] Livy 32.9.6; for the date, cf. Walbank, *Philip V*, 151 and 319; Plutarch (*Flamininus* 3.1) also emphasised his early arrival.

[31] Livy 32.10.1.

[32] Livy 32.10.1-7; App. *Mac.* 5; Diod. 28.11.

[33] Worked out by J. Kromayer, *Antiken Schlachtfelder in Greichenland: Busteine zu einer antiken Kriegsgeschichte*, II, 108. The battle and the preceding movements are at Livy 32.10.9-12.10; Plut. *Flamininus* 4.2-6; App. *Mac.* 6; Zonaras 9.16.1; *De Viris illustribus* 51; for modern studies: Walbank, *Philip V* 148-193; N. G. L. Hammond, 'The Opening Campaigns and the battle of Aoi Stena in the Second Macedonian War', *Journal of Roman Studies* 56, 1966, 39-56; Hammond, *Hist. Mac* 3.423-426.

[34] Walbank, *Philip V*, 319.

agreement with the Epeirote leaders, establishing control over his own troops – who had mutinied against Villius the previous winter – so that they did not plunder the lands of these new allies; organising a supply line based on a logistics base at Ambrakia instead of Kerkyra, and leading over the mountains through Athamania, an awkward and difficult pass[35]. The use of Ambrakia means that the city had been persuaded to take the Roman side. It had been in Macedonian hands in 205, at the end of the last war. Since then, no doubt, any Macedonian troops had been withdrawn, but they will have left a friendly regime in control of the city. This had clearly now been changed, a procedure which Flamininus was good at. The route from Ambrakia passed also through Epeirote territory; no wonder Flamininus took some time to advance.

Meanwhile the Roman fleet, commanded by the consul's brother Lucius, had sailed round to the Aegean, and two more of the Euboian cities were taken, Eretria by assault, Karystos by negotiation[36]. L. Flamininus had taken over command of the fleet at Same, on Kephallenia, where the previous naval commander, an otherwise unknown 'Livius', had moved the fleet[37]. Same, of course, was the site of the Aitolian colony on Kephallenia, and Kephallenia, if not a full member of the Aitolian League, was a very close ally. Livius had moved from one Roman ally at Kerkyra to another Roman ally at Same as the first stage of the voyage to the Aegean, only to find that a second Quinctius brother had been unusually quick off the mark in taking up his command. This staging at Kephallenia will have been another of the matters agreed on diplomatically during the winter.

Before Amynandros could attack the Macedonian positions on his front, he needed a Roman detachment as support and reinforcement[38]. The Aitolians were strong enough to attack on their own. Livy repeatedly comments that the two allies did not move until Philip had been defeated[39], but it would seem that he could say this only by ignoring events on the Aitolians' front during the previous nine months. For when the Aitolians launched their attack, they had first to recover league territory recently lost in the Spercheios valley. This was the land

[35] Livy 32.14.5-7.
[36] Livy 32.16.8-17.3.
[37] Livy 32.16.2-3.
[38] Livy 32.14.1.
[39] Livy 32.13.10 and 15, and 14.4.

of the Ainianans, who had formed part of the league for eighty years, and later the town of Xyniai had to be recaptured as well.

In Ainis the towns of Spercheios and Makrokome were specifically mentioned as having their lands ravaged by the Aitolian forces[40]. The towns themselves did not have to be taken, so the Aitolian action was thus a matter of clearing out enemies from the countryside, that is, raiders. Ainis' northern border was with Thessaly to the north east, and with the Dolopes, league members, to the north west. A mention later by Livy that a Thessalian (and thus Macedonian) fortress was situated so as to threaten Dolopia[41], gives the clue to what had happened. This fortress, Kyphaira, was on the northern slopes of the Achaian hills, another pass through which was also guarded by Thaumakoi. Having failed to take Thaumakoi the previous autumn, it would seem that Philip had then made use of Kyphaira to raid into Aitolian territory, probably in the spring. The need to clear raiders from the lands of the Ainianes was one of the results; the threat to the Dolopes was another, though they were more difficult to reach, and less rewarding in terms of booty. Yet some small Dolopian towns had been taken, and had to be recovered by the Aitolians in their new campaign. Xyniai, on its lake, was another target, and had been captured. The control of Xyniai would enable Philip's forces to cut the road from Thaumakoi south towards Aitolia, which in turn would accomplish at least part of what Philip had been aiming at in his attack on Thaumakoi in the previous autumn.

From Philip's point of view, this was all an alternative strategy to the capture of Thaumakoi. It threatened the route between Lamia and Thaumakoi, but it also cut the east-west route along the Spercheios valley, which connected Lamia and the west. Should Philip control the Spercheios valley, or gain relatively easy access to it, he had access to a route which led westwards into the Acheloos valley, which had been the scene of several of his earlier exploits and successes, and which would also provide access to the new Roman logistics base at Ambrakia. He was famous for his swift marches; a raid on Ambrakia, where he might consider that he had partizans, could achieve a major disruption of Roman intentions and might delay the attack on Thessaly which was the obvious next move for the

[40] For the campaign as a whole: Livy 32.13.10-15.
[41] Livy 32.13.4.
[42] As is required by the later abandonment: Livy 32.13.13.

Romans after their victory at the Aous Pass. The general concentration on the major conflict between Philip and Flamininus, combined with the lack of an ancient account which gives the story of events from the Aitolian point of view, leaves us with the problem of extracting these alternatives to the Aous campaign from the clues left by Livy in his extraction of detail from Polybios[43].

It is thus clear that the Aitolians had been suffering from attacks by Philip's forces for some time, perhaps since his withdrawal from the siege of Thaumakoi, more likely since the spring, and that their counter-attack in the summer of 198 was aimed first of all at recovering their lost lands. Their failure to counter-attack until after the news arrived of the Roman victory at the Aous Pass was thus deliberate, and was presumably part of the overall strategy of the alliance. The Romans must have welcomed Philip's original move to the Aous Pass, on the assumption that he had stuck his neck out so far that the Romans would be able to cut it off. They would not, therefore, wish anything too serious to happen in Philip's deep rear which might distract him and persuade him to retire undamaged. So neither Amynandros nor the Aitolians made any move while the confrontation at the Aous Pass continued.

Once released, the Aitolians moved with vigour. Control of the Spercheios valley about Spercheios and Makrokome was re-established, and the Aitolian forces moved north over the Achaian mountain range into Thessaly. There they first recovered control of the Dolopian towns of Ktimene and Angeia, which cleared the way into Thessaly, but they ignored Kyphaira for the moment[44]. Further north, Amynandros moved to the attack at the same time, having received a force of Roman soldiers to stiffen his small force. He attacked the city of Gomphi, first capturing a preliminary fort at Phaike. Gomphi, of course, had been Amynandros' target the previous year, and he now returned to the attack[45]. No doubt, his purpose was to remove a major source of Macedonian local power, from which his own kingdom could be, and probably had been, harassed, though he also looked to expand his own local power.

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[43] Walbank, *Philip V*, for example, deals with this in a few lines, 154-155.

[44] Livy 32.13.10; Y. Béquinon, 'La retraite de Philippe V en 198 et l'invasion étolienne en Thessalie', *BCH* 52, 1928, 444-465; Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.426-427 seems to believe the Spercheios valley was Macedonian territory.

[45] Livy 32.14.1.

The attack on Gomphi was probably co-ordinated with the Aitolians' move into Thessaly, for, after clearing their lost lands in Ainis and Dolopia, the Aitolians marched north-west to attack the city of Metropolis. This city was no more than fifteen kilometres from Gomphi, but it was forty kilometres north of Kyphaira, which was the Aitolians' real target. The only reason for the Aitolian attack, when that main target was elsewhere, was to support Amynandros at Gomphi. Metropolis and Gomphi were, for this area, major cities, both of them facing the hills of Athamania, and no doubt they were willing to assist each other when attacked by the hillmen, which was perhaps less unusual in this area of Greece than it had become in the long city-dominated areas further south. The Aitolian force ravaged the Metropolitan fields and drove the people into the city; meanwhile Amynandros' Athamanians and their Roman allies attacked Gomphi vigorously enough to compel the city's surrender after only a few days[46].

The Aitolians also attacked Kallithera, a town ten kilometres from Metropolis, again without seriously attempting its capture. The Kallitherans were prepared, no doubt warned by events at Metropolis and Gomphi, and they came out to fight, but were driven back inside their walls. The Aitolians did not persist, but marched on, heading for home, marching in a straight line from Metropolis towards Xyniai. Having brushed the Kallitherans aside, the villages of Teuma and Kelathara were taken and sacked, and the people of Acharrai capitulated to avoid a similar fate[47]. None of these places was kept by the Aitolians, not even Acharrai, so this was not an expedition aimed at conquering Thessalian territory. The first and main object of the Aitolian campaign was instead to recover Xyniai, whose inhabitants did not wait to be attacked, but fled. They were caught by a sortie of the Aitolians from Thaumakoi and slaughtered, while their abandoned town was taken and sacked[48].

This unusual treatment – Xyniai had been an Aitolian member not many years before[49] – suggests that Xyniai had given in to the Macedonian attack unusually easily, and that its population had been

[46] Livy 32.13.11 and 14.2-3.
[47] Livy 32.13.11-123; there is no good reason to see Livy's 'Celathara' as a doublet for 'Callithera'.
[48] Livy 32.13.14.
[49] *IG* IX.1.187.

singled out by the Aitolians as especially requiring punishment. Alternatively, and perhaps more likely for a frontier town, the town's original inhabitants may have been driven out by their enemies, and the place repopulated by Macedonians and Thessalians, as had happened at Phthiotic Thebes, though the town cannot have been taken by the Macedonians very long before its recovery. This would, however, explain the unusual vehemence of the Aitolian conduct. The contrast, on the one hand, between Xyniai, clearly held by the enemy, and the two Ainianian towns Spercheios and Makrokome, whose lands were being ravaged but which themselves had held out, and, on the other, between Xyniai and the Dolopian towns of Ktimene and Angeia, which had to be retaken but did not suffer the same punishment, does imply that Xyniai was in a class by itself so far as the Aitolians were concerned. Perhaps here we have the only example of an Aitolian member which rebelled.

The Aitolian army then moved westwards past Lake Xyniai to attack and capture the source of all this trouble, the 'fortress' of Kyphaira[50]. Its fate is not recorded, but if it had been a serious threat, no doubt the Aitolians kept hold of it. Possession of the place would usefully complement the defence line formed by Thaumakoi and Ktimene, so long as Xyniai was also held. With these places in Aitolian hands the league's control of the approaches to Ainis through the Achaian hills was ensured, and Melitaia farther to the east extended the line to the Othrys mountains, which in turn continued to the neighbourhood of Larisa Chremaste; but this last was in Philip's hands; this is thus one reason why the Aitolians were so insistent later that it should be returned to them. The Aitolian action was thus apparently motivated by defensive considerations more than expansive. This is in contrast to Amynandros, who may well have been mainly concerned to expand his territory at Thessalian expense, rather than provide stronger defences; though one would think that the hills of Athamania themselves were better defences than Gomphi's walls[51].

These two attacks on Thessalian territory cannot be dated precisely, but it is worth making the attempt to put events into a clear sequence. Livy is specific that the attacks were triggered by the news

[50] Livy 32.13.14.

[51] Livy 32.14.1-3 indicated Amynandros' captures, but there is no sign of his subsequent withdrawal.

of the defeat of Philip at the Aous Pass battle[52]. That battle took place on June 25, according to modern calculations, but the exact date does not matter for the purposes of this discussion. Walbank argued that Amynandros' campaign took three weeks – ten days for his approach march, and ten for the actual campaign – and that he began his march eight to ten days after the battle[53]. But all these figures seem to be too great. If it is assumed that both Amynandros and the Aitolians were waiting for news of the result of the fighting, then both could have begun their marches very soon after the news arrived. And eight to ten days for the transit of the news and the preparation of Amynandros' forces seems to be too long. The news will have moved very quickly from the pass to Athamania. The distance is not more than two hundred kilometres, which could be covered by a rider with changes of mounts in at most two days, perhaps even less. Amynandros had his campaign mapped out in advance – he aimed at the same city, Gomphi, as the year before, and he had scaling ladders ready – and the Roman reinforcements could arrive in five days, if they were not already present. His approach march, therefore, out of Athamania, would not necessarily take more than a day, perhaps two. The fort Phaika fell at once, and Gomphi in 'a few days'[54]; in total it is unlikely that more than ten days elapsed between the Aous battle and the fall of Gomphi.

The news will have taken a little longer to reach the Aitolians, but scarcely more than a day longer than it took to reach Athamania. Their forces were also ready to begin, all the more so since their first task was to clear their own lands of invaders; they will have had their forces actually in the field when the news arrived. So they will have moved north within five or six days of the battle, which is about the same length of time the Roman troops took to join Amynandros. The first part of the campaign – through Ainis, retaking Ktimene and Angeia, and the march as far as Metropolis – clearly coincided with Amynandros' attack on Phaika and Gomphi, and was *intended* to so coincide. There is little point to the attack on Metropolis otherwise. The march back was less hurried, and villages were sacked on the way. The people of Xyniai had time to evacuate the city, and the garrison of Thaumakoi had time to march out to intercept them. Then

[52] Livy 32.14.4.
[53] Walbank, *Philip V*, 319.
[54] Livy 32.14.1-2.

the main Aitolian force was able to sack Xyniai and to capture Kyphaira. This is described as being in a commanding position, yet its capture appears to have taken little or no time. This whole campaign clearly took some time longer than that of Amynandros, which Livy says took only 'a few days'[55], but not much more: perhaps a fortnight, or maybe at the most twenty days, from the time of the Aous battle.

Philip's reaction to his defeat at the pass and to these attacks was, to say the least, strange. He had camped some distance from the battlefield after his defeat, and when the Romans did not pursue, he turned away into Thessaly, marching along the upper Peneus valley as far as Trikka[56]. By this time Amynandros and the Aitolians were already campaigning in the west, and the opportunity clearly existed for him to deal serious blows at both, if he so wished. Neither force was large, it seems and could not have been supported by any other. But the Gomphi campaign took very little time, and the Aitolians were marching back towards their own territory almost as quickly, so it is unlikely that he could have caught either. Philip had taken several days to move from the site of the battle to Thessaly, and by the time he arrived there the chance to prevent these campaigns, or even to interfere with them, had probably gone.

Instead Philip marched through Thessaly, right across the country from west to east, in the process destroying a series of towns and cities. From Trikka he sent out the summons for the levy of the local forces[57], no doubt intending them to reinforce his depleted forces, and perhaps intending to campaign to recover Gomphi and Kyphaira. It may have been the reaction to this demand which led to his devastating march, for he was asking the Thessalian cities to give up their own defenders at a time when Amynandros and the Aitolians seemed to be on the attack, when the Romans' next move must be an invasion, and when he himself was not bothering to defend them. Whatever the cause, Philip marched from Trikka and destroyed a line of towns and cities, Phakion and Peiresia, close neighbours in the central plain, Euhydrion to the south-east along the Enipeus River, and Palaipharsalos and Eretria by the headwaters of that river. He then crossed the Kynoskephalai hills and reached

[55] Livy 32.13.15.
[56] Livy 32.13.2-5.
[57] Livy 32.13.6.

Pherai, but there the word had reached the citizens first, and the walls were manned and the gates shut against him. He attempted briefly to storm the city, but failed, and then marched off north to Macedon[58].

Livy provided no explanation for this strange conduct, though he claims that the inhabitants of the destroyed towns were allowed to leave with what they could carry, before the army was let loose to loot and burn. Modern explanations include Kromayer's suggestion that Philip was replenishing his war-chest[59], and Walbank's idea that Philip was using scorched-earth tactics to deter Flamininus[60]. But Walbank also claims that Pherai's defiance does not mean the city was in revolt[61]. Yet this is virtually the only clear indication in the whole matter: Pherai quite obviously *was* in revolt against its king. And so one must assume that the other places were in revolt also, or at least perpetrating some act of disobediance. The whole affair implies that Philip was facing substantial unrest in Thessaly. The Aitolian promenade the year before, as far as Malloia in the north, was clearly unsettling – and had been effectively unopposed – and Philip's defeat in the current campaign will have suggested that he may not have been able to defend Thessaly any more – an assumption given weight by the invasion of Amynandros and the Aitolians, neither of which were, again, seriously resisted[62].

In addition, the news will have spread that, at the meeting at the Aous Pass between the Romans and Philip, Flamininus had stated terms of peace which included freeing the Greeks, beginning with the Thessalians. Thessaly had been under Macedonian rule since the time of Philip II, a century and a half before, but periodic rebellions had shown that this rule was resented by a substantial fraction, possibly a majority, of those Thessalians whose opinions counted. The Aitolians had been able to persuade several Thessalian cities to join their league in 229-228, and when Philip V reconquered one of

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[58] Livy 32.13.6-9.

[59] Kromayer, *Antiken Schlachtfelder* II 52.

[60] Walbank, *Philip V*, 154.

[61] Ibid, 153, n. 8.

[62] This is Walbank's conclusion, in effect (*Philip V*, 154), though to describe the destruction of five towns as making 'a desert', is somewhat exaggerating the scale of his march; Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 426, interprets the destruction as saving the population from Roman enslavement, – but what about all the other places in Thessaly which were still, one would suppose, so threatened? The idea is absurd.

them, Phthiotic Thebes, he had enslaved the Thessalian population which had been Aitolian League members, and had replaced them with Macedonians. There was little to induce the Thessalians to be loyal to Philip, and only the inability of them to face the Macedonian army, and the lack of a substantial enough ally to help drive the Macedonians out, had kept them under his rule. He had known this, so that places a small as the town of Kerkinion, which the Aitolians had captured the year before, had had to be garrisoned. So the defeat of Philip at the Aous Pass, and the news that the Romans were campaigning for the freedom of the Greeks, could well have been sufficient to spark a revolt, perhaps no more than a refusal to allow the young men to be drafted, which Philip put down in the drastic way he usually employed.

This nasty campaign may have cowed the Thessalians for the moment, but the arrival of the Roman army turned the tables, Flamininus arrived by the same route Philip had used, along the upper Peneus. He took Phaloria by assault, which had been defended by a large Macedonian garrison, but ignored another but smaller force in Aiginion, further upstream. But then he faced no further opposition until he reached the fortress of Atrax, which blocked the route to the north-west, along the lower Peneus. Not far ahead, in the vale of Tempe, Philip was camped with his army. He had put in garrisons where they could hold up the Roman advance, but after Phaloria, Flamininus met none in western or central Thessaly. Indeed Metropolis, which had rebuffed the Aitolians, and Kierion, voluntarily surrendered[63]. It is noticeable that the areas through which Philip had ravaged his way a little earlier provided no resistance, and none is noted at any of the major Thessalian cities, though this may because, as with Aiginion, Flamininus simply ignored them.

After the campaign in the south west corner of Thessaly, which ended with the capture of Kyphaira, we have no information about Aitolian actions. It seems unlikely that they did nothing. Flamininus recruited Epeirotes, and used Athamanians; one must assume that he would welcome Aitolian help as well. Flamininus remained besieging Atrax for a time[64] and then moved south after abandoning the siege,

[63] Livy 32.14.7-15.9.

[64] Livy provides no real hard information on this siege, except to say it was 'longer and more difficult' than expected. Walbank, *Philip V*, 157, says it lasted into September, and rejects as too long Kromayer's estimate of one to two months. The only safe

which certainly presupposes an agreement with the Aitolians, for he moved into Phokis. This necessarily involved a march through Aitolian territory in Malis and at Thermopylai. Yet the very fact that he brought his army into Phokis and set about capturing several towns in a swathe through the centre of the country, argues that his situation was fully independent of all the Greek powers, and was intended to be. The aim of the Phokian campaign was to achieve and maintain access to the western seas, the Corinthian Gulf, and the Ionian Sea, by which the Romans could be supplied from Italy and Illyria. The original intention to supply the army in Thessaly by way of Ambrakia would not suffice for the winter, and perhaps it was only intended as a short-term measure; the capture of Antikyra, and the control of a corridor of land through central Phokis – Ambryssos, Daulia, Phanoteus, Elateia, and Hyampolis were all taken – provided Flamininus with winter quarters and with an assured route for contact by sea with Italy[65]. It also relieved him of dependence of Aitolian goodwill or Ambrakian efficiency. But he was still dependent on Aitolia for access to Philip's kingdom.

Nevertheless there are also signs that the Aitolians, who were Rome's major co-belligerents in the war against Macedon, and whom the Romans had exerted themselves especially to bring into the war, were now being pushed aside. Flamininus' campaign in Phokis had the effect, whether intended or not, of giving him an independent means of communication and supply, under his own control. A hostile, even a neutral, Aitolia, would have been extremely concerned at Roman control of Phokis; an Aitolia fighting the same enemy was less able to complain, but was probably just as concerned. And after the Phokian campaign there was a major Roman effort to bring in the Achaian League as an ally against Philip as well.

The Achaians were, like the Aitolians, divided over the question of joining the war. They had already gained at Philip's expense during

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thing to say is that Flamininus broke off the siege to look for winter quarters, which suggests he did so in September. He had to fight for the winter quarters, in Phokis, and probably he knew that and allowed time for it.

[65] Livy 32.18.3-9 and 24.1-7; Livy gives as the reason for the Phokian campaign that Flamininus controlled no harbour in Akarnania or Aitolia which could accomodate the supply ships (13.3). In this he is factually correct, for Flamininus controlled no harbour at all; that is, he was not prepared to trust the Aitolians with his supplies. It is relevant that 'during the same summer' reinforcements and supplies were sent from Masinissa in Africa, from Sicily, and from Sardinia (Livy 32.27.2).

the previous winter, when he handed over Heraia, Orchomenos, and Triphylia to them, but what they really wanted was Corinth. L. Flamininus, commanding the fleet in the Aegean, having campaigned in Euboia during the summer, brought his ships to harbour at Kenchreai[66]. This was the Aegean harbour of Corinth, and it had presumably heen abandoned by Philip's garrison of the city – there is no suggestion of any fighting. The stated aim was to mount an assault on Corinth[67], presumably when the consul's army was finished in Phokis. But the siege of Elateia delayed him, and anyway it may have been no more than a gesture, designed to impress the Achaians, and to emphasise that if anyone was going to deprive Philip of Corinth, it was the Romans. This preliminary move was then followed by the consul suggesting a conference between him and the Achaians, with other allies participating. But the list of those attending excluded the Aitolians. L. Flamininus attended, with his naval associates, King Attalos, the Rhodians, and the Athenians[68]. But not the Aitolians. This was another consequence of the separate war they were waging.

The subject of the conference was the participation of the Achaians in the war against Macedon, to which the league was still allied, at least formally. Not surprisingly, even the promise of Corinth was not enough to persuade the whole league that it should betray its ally. It took the exiling of the pro-Macedonian leader Kykliadas and major abstentions from the Assembly by the pro-Macedonian Megalopolitans, Argives, and Dymaians (who had suffered a Roman sack in the last war) before the *strategos* Aristainos got the pro-Roman policy accepted[69]. The whole proceeding was highly dubious constitutionally, smacking distinctly of a *coup d'état*. Then the attack on Corinth failed[70] and was followed by the secession of Argos from the league[71].

This might be considered overall a success for the Romans. The Achaians might not be joining in the war with any great enthusiasm, and they were wholly focussed on Corinth to the exclusion of the main war in the north, but their alliance with Macedon had been decisively broken, and their yearning for Corinth was kept warm by

[66] Livy 32.17.3.
[67] Livy 32.19.3.
[68] Livy 43.19.4-5.
[69] Livy 32.19.6-23.2; Aymard, *Premiers Rapports*, 68, 78-79.
[70] Livy 32.23.3-9.
[71] Livy 32.25.1-10.

its continued control by Philip's garrison. The support of the Corinthians for Philip's rule, which became clear during the brief siege, was also a useful element which could be used if necessary. Flamininus had clearly learnt from Philip's experience with Achaia. A bribe only works in such affairs so long as the recipient is kept waiting; once it is delivered, the recipient will look elsewhere.

A further example of the potential conflict between Rome and Aitolia came after the siege of Elateia resulted in the Roman conquest of that city. The Elateians saw their city sacked, but they themselves were not enslaved, and the Macedonian garrison was permitted to march off home without further ado[72]. A neighbour city, Opous, in Epiknemidean Lokris, was in much the same situation, but had a different history. Its acropolis was held by a Macedonian garrison, and this seems to have made the citizens assume that it would be next on Flamininus' list. But Opous, unlike Elateia, had been a member of the Aitolian League at one time, perhaps, more than once. Its Lokrian neighbours, Thronion and Nikaia, were still members of the league. As a result, the citizens of Opous were divided over who they should look to for relief. One group, defined by Livy as the wealthier group, looked to Rome; the other group appealed to Aitolia[73]. The distinction Livy makes is between two groups, one of which was wealthier than the other; that is, both were wealthy. This is thus not an example of the social problems, of debt, and so on. It is a reaction to the events at Elateia, for those of the 'wealthier' group had more to lose in the event of a sack of the city after its capture[74].

This latter group had control of the city government. No doubt a part of the story is the wish of those excluded from local power to gain access, at least, to that power. The citizens as a whole had apparently blockaded the Macedonian garrison in the acropolis. When the Aitolians arrived – but exactly which Aitolians and how many of them there were we do not know – they were kept out of the city; Flamininus, however, was admitted, thus confirming the existing oligarchy's control. But, though threatened with the prospect of an attack by Roman forces, the Macedonian garrison refused Flamini-

[72] Livy 32.24.1-7.

[73] Livy 32.32.1-3.

[74] It must be emphasised that this is not part of any 'general crisis', or 'social crisis'; it is a local matter. Livy does not distinguish between rich and poor; he distinguished a richer group (*opulentior*); the comparison is therefore within the oligarchy, or the citizenry.

nus' terms[75]. The arrival of a herald from Philip gave him a colourable excuse to break off; and the Opountians were left still facing their Macedonian garrison.

From the Aitolian point of view all this was very disturbing. Opous had been a member of their league in the past; they had other Epiknemidean Lokrian members; they had been the first to respond to the Opountian appeal. Yet Flamininus had paid no heed to any of this. They might expect dissent and opposition in a city such as Opous; that was a normal condition of Greek politics. But the Aitolians had joined the war on the Roman side in response to lavish promises. Now they were being excluded from major decisions, such as the alliance with Achaia, and from affairs which directly concerned them, such as the Phokian and Opountian campaigns.

Yet another indication of Roman disdain for Aitolian policies and aspirations followed at once. The herald whose arrival at Opous interrupted Flamininus' attempt to persuade the Macedonians to surrender had come from Philip with the suggestion that another attempt be made at a negotiated peace. For Flamininus this was a useful suggestion, since he was hoping for an appointment as proconsul for the coming year, to continue his command of the war. If he received that extension of authority he could break off the talks; if he was due to be replaced, he could conclude peace on terms, thus blocking his successor and returning in triumph to Rome with a treaty[76].

At least this is the usual consideration which is stated for the talks. But there were other participants in those talks. In particular, it was Philip who had asked for the meeting, and it was also attended by Rome's allies and co-belligerents, and all of these had a strong interest in the outcome. It was clearly in Philip's interest to end the war on any acceptable terms as soon as possible, since he was losing, his strategy had failed, and he could only look forward to another year of fighting, again within his own territory, and to probable defeat. His people were feeling the strain of the war, of decades of his wars. The Thessalians were thoroughly disaffected, as the recent events there had shown, and later in the winter a rebellion broke out in Orestis,

[75] Livy 32.32.3-4.
[76] Livy 32.32.5-8; Walbank, *Philip V*, 159.

another area which had suffered badly, and the premonitory signs of this were probably already present[77].

The other participants came along largely because the principals were meeting. They agreed to meet at Nikaia, just east of the Thermopylai pass, in Aitolian territory[78]. This technically made the Aitolians the hosts, and they were represented by the *strategos* Phaineas, and by others. King Amynandros attended, as did representatives of King Attalos, of the Athenians, of the Rhodians, and of the Achaian League[79]. Philip brought with him an interesting group of advisers: two Macedonians who acted as his secretaries, and perhaps some other Macedonians defined by Livy as 'nobles'; the Boiotian Brachyllas, a man who had long been in Macedonian service, and had served Antigonos Doson in the Peloponnese and the Achaian Kykliadas, the exiled former leader of the pro-Macedonian party in the league, and therefore the political enemy of Aristainos, who attended as one of the Achaian representatives on the allied side[80]. This grouping was clearly an attempt by Philip to emphasise that he was, in fact, not merely the Macedonian king, but also the *hegemon* of the Greek Symmachy. It was a statement to all who attended that the Roman claim to be promoting the freedom of the Greeks was one which Philip could also make, and that he had been acting as their protection – against the Aitolians and against the Romans – for a quarter of a century.

The Aitolian representatives at the meeting were the new *strategos* Phaineas, 'and other politicians', one of whom was Alexandros of Isios. Phaineas, from Arsinoe, had risen by the conventional process, as *grammateus*, then as *hipparchos* (under Skopas in the year he had to resign). He was to have an active political career for ten more years, and on many occasions he appears as an advocate of peace[81]. And so it was at Nikaia as well, or so it seems. The only other Aitolian dele-

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[77] Livy 39.23.6 and 28.2; Walbank, *Philip V*, 163, n. 2.

[78] Livy 32.32.9. The sources for this meeting are Livy 32.32.9-36.10; Pol 18.1-10; Plut. *Flamininus* 5.6; App. *Mac.* 8; Zonaras 9.16.4; Justin 30.3.8; discussion in Walbank, *Philip V*, 159-163; Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.428 (brief); Walbank, *Commentary* 2.548-562; Will, *Histoire Politique*, 2.134-135.

[79] The Athenians are not mentioned by Polybios, who is the source for all the rest of the ancient accounts, but it is inconceivable that they were not represented, since the war began with Philip's attack on them; they sent an envoy to Rome with the rest after the conference, and this is a good sign that they had attended.

[80] Livy 32.32.10-11.

[81] *Prosopography*, 'Phaineas (3)'.

gate who is named is Alexandros, later reputed to be the richest man in Greece, but one who never held elective public office in the league – at least so far as our records go – though he was several times employed as an envoy, as now at Nikaia[82].

The portrayal of these two at the conference, in both Livy and Polybios, suggests a division of opinion between Phaineas and Alexandros, a division which will have mirrored a similar division in Aitolia as a whole. Phaineas' initial speech is reported, only very briefly, when he simply echoed the Roman demands for the freedom of Greece and demanded the restoration of lost Aitolian lands; but Alexandros is said (by Livy) to have interrupted Phaineas, an unlikely event, not reported as such by Polybios[83]. And, by contrast, his speech is fully reported, and is shown to be a personal attack on Philip, one so cutting that Philip was driven to a defence of his actions, and resorted to jokes at the Aitolians' expense, much to the amusement of Flamininus[84]. Indeed Philip and Flamininus had already resumed their jocular relationship at the opening of the meeting, when Philip refused to leave his ship and step ashore for fear, he said, of the Aitolians[85]. This makes some sense when it is recalled that the meeting was held on Aitolian soil, and that it had been arranged between Philip and Flamininus. Again the background is that the Aitolians were independently at war with Philip, not as part of the Roman-led alliance. This may also be part of the explanation for Flamininus' coolness towards the Aitolians, since he was unable to control them as he could his allies.

The division within the Aitolian ranks is plausible, for all Greek states tended to be divided on questions of foreign policy. It is even possible that the account of the conference is broadly correct, and if that is so, there is clear evidence that Flamininus was busy playing off his enemy against his ally. This was one more item for the Aitolians to reckon up in the tally against Rome. The conference had even begun with Philip insulting Phaineas and the Aitolian League, an insult more or less acceded in by Flamininus; from the accounts one would not know that the Aitolians were in fact the hosts of the meeting, which took place on their territory.

Philip replied to a string of Roman, Aitolian, and Achaian accusa-

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[82] *Prosopography*, 'Alexandros (11)'.
[83] Compare Livy 32.33.10 and Pol. 18.3.1.
[84] Pol. 18.3.2-6.8.
[85] Pol. 18.1.5-9; Livy 32.32.12-16.

tions[86] by a speech replete with his own accusations against them, complete with self-justifying distortions of his actions[87]. Neither the Aitolians nor the Achaians got the chance to reply, for after a night's adjournment and a delayed start next day, Philip proposed a private meeting with Flamininus; the Romans' allies did not like this, but were overborne[88]. The result was a serious offer of peace terms by the Macedonian king. He proposed to surrender something to everyone, but not everything everyone wanted. Alexandros of Isios had defined the Aitolian demands as the return of Phthiotic Thebes, Echinos, Larisa (Chremaste) and Pharsalos[89]. Philip's offer was the return of Pharsalos and Larisa, but not Thebes which, of course, he had repopulated with Macedonian settlers[90]. (The offer presupposes also the return of Echinos, unless Philip was proposing to hold the town as an exclave.)

The Aitolians did not like it very much, and the rest of the allies were also unhappy, for none of them was offered what they had demanded[91]. Another meeting was arranged for the next day, and the resonances set up in it make it very probable that it was the Aitolians who arranged things. The one place which Philip specifically refused to return to the Aitolians was Phthiotic Thebes, which he had taken by assault, whose people he had enslaved, and which he had repopulated with Macedonians. Some of the original Thebans survived, escaped, were ransomed, or were freed, and the Aitolians had resettled them at Thronion, a small city a few kilometres to the east of Nikaia. And Thronion was now chosen as the meeting place for the third day of the peace conference[92]. It is unlikely in the extreme that

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[86] Livy 32.33.2-16; Pol. 18.1.12-3.12.
[87] Livy 32.34.1-13; Pol. 18.4.1-6.8.
[88] Livy 32.35.5-7; Pol. 18.8.4-6.
[89] Livy 32.33.16; Pol. 18.3.12.
[90] Livy 32.35.11; Pol. 18.8.9.
[91] The Romans were offered 'the coast of Illyria', captured men and deserters, but Philip said nothing about restoring territories to Ptolemy; the Rhodians were offered the *peraia* (which they already held) but he refused to give up Iasos or Bargylia; Attalos was offered the return of his lost ships and his naval allies, but not the restoration of damaged buildings; the Achaians appear to have been offered both Argos and Corinth, which was what they had demanded, but they were still dissatisfied, and it is thus assumed that Philip was offering the city of Corinth, but not the acropolis, Akrokorinth: Livy 32.33.3-16; Pol. 18.22.6 for the demands, Livy 32.35.9-11; Pol. 18.8.10 for Philip's offers. Walbank, *Philip V*, 161; Aymard, *Premiers Rapports*, 119; G. de Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, Florence, 1923, IV, 1, 70.
[92] Pol. 18.9.3; Livy 32.36.2.

this was an accident. The Aitolians were making a point, and it is one which, if the others did not appreciate it, the Aitolians would ensure that they were fully informed about. The attitude of both principals to this issue was a good test of their professions of devotion to the old ideal of the 'freedom of the Greeks': freedom for the past and present inhabitants of Phthiotic Thebes was one of those extremely difficult matters which could often cause negotiations to founder.

But neither Flamininus nor Philip were particularly susceptible to such treatment[93], though the Greeks, who had suffered at the hands of both Romans and Macedonians over the last generation, no doubt were more affected by the situation. Philip believed he had offered acceptable terms; Flamininus was happy to forward the terms to Rome, since if his command was not extended they could form the basis of his claim to have ended the war, and if it was extended, he could easily arrange for the terms to be rejected, and so be able to continue the war he clearly felt able to win[94]. The terms offered to Rome, in fact, were almost all they wanted; the omission of restitution to Ptolemy was hardly the refusal of an important Roman war aim. The Greeks, who were not privy to the private arrangements of the two men, were unhappy, clearly sensing that they were being sold out. They were torn: on the one hand, they wanted peace, now, to end the burden of foreign armies and their own mobilisation; on the other hand, they could only get what they wanted by further warfare. Flamininus convinced them that the Senate would have to have the last word, and most had bound themselves not to make a separate peace. The Aitolians at least would not wish to be seen to be making a separate peace yet again. And if the Senate rejected the terms, at least it would be Roman soldiers who would be doing the fighting. A truce for two months was arranged, and Philip agreed to evacuate his troops from Phokis and Lokris[95]. This included, of course, Opous, but also those Phokian cities which Flamininus had not attacked earlier. These small garrisons were extremely vulnerable, yet they were unlikely to impose any delay on the Romans; the soldiers were of more use to Philip with his main army in Macedon. If the fighting did

[93] Philip had merely smiled sardonically when Flamininus claimed he had no-one to advise him because he had had them all executed: Pol 18.7.5-6; gallows humour from two men who had had many others killed.

[94] Livy 32.32.5-8.

[95] Pol. 18.10.4; Livy 32.36.8-9.

resume, it would thus be in Thessaly. Philip was not asked to evacuate Chalkis and Corinth, which he had earlier characterised as two of the 'Fetters' of Greece. For the Greeks it will have seemed that the Roman commitment to the 'freedom of the Greeks' was clearly not total, an impression all too plausible[96].

A truce is not a peace, and the contest went on during the two months, mainly between surrogates while the result of the embassies to Rome was awaited. Philip ceded Argos, another vulnerable outpost, to Nabis of Sparta, who then, like the Achaians, promptly made his own terms with Flamininus[97]. The Achaians, doubly annoyed, felt as badly treated as the Aitolians, but until they could acquire Corinth, they could do nothing about it. Flamininus executed a bold *coup* at Thebes early in the spring, thus bringing the whole Boiotian League to the Roman alliance[98]; he also sent his brother Lucius to deal with the Akarnanians, the only ally Philip had left in Greece[99]. Meanwhile Philip suffered a revolt in Orestis[100], and recruited and trained his army, calling in veterans and teenage boys to fill his ranks[101].

The embassies to Rome had gone from all the belligerents, and had accompanied the men Flamininus had sent as his own envoys. The Aitolians sent no less than seven men, while each of the allies of Rome sent only one[102]. The difference is partly due to the fact that Aitolia did not act as an ally of Rome, but as an independent belligerent, and so decided on its own embassy. But the Aitolian delegation was also a curious one, in that two of the men were exiles from their home cities and were living in Aitolia. There is no other instance of exiles being employed by the Aitolians in such a way. All this – the size of the delegation and its odd composition – obviously has some

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[96] As the Greek envoys complained at Rome: Pol. 18.11.4; Livy 32.37.3; whether the Greeks had been duped by Flamininus, as Walbank, *Philip V*, 162, claims, is not clear; they knew what the terms on offer were.

[97] Livy 32.38.1-39.10.

[98] Livy 33.1.1-8.

[99] Livy 32.40.7; it is an indication of the change in the war that the two states in which it originated, Athens and Akaranaia, were so decisively marginalised by 198 that neither is reported to have attended the Lokrian peace conference – though an Athenian was probably there.

[100] Pol. 18.47.6; Livy 33.34.6; for the timing see Walbank, *Philip V*, 163.

[101] Livy 33.3.1-4.

[102] The allies are specifically said to have agreed to send just one envoy each: Livy 32.36.8; the Roman delegates for Flamininus are named at Livy 32.36.10; the allies' envoys are at Pol 18.11.11.

special significance. The exiles are perhaps the easiest to account for[103].

One of the exiles was an Akarnanian, Nikomachos of Thyrreion, who was living in Ambrakia. His presence in the Aitolian delegation and that of Lamios, an official Aitolian delegate who came from Ambrakia, carry two implications. First, the fact that they lived in Ambrakia means that that city was now once more part of the Aitolian League. This rejoining had taken place since the Romans had used the place as a logistics base, and so within the past few months. Ambrakia had been absent from any of the demands made by the Aitolians, and now we can see why: the return of the city had been accomplished by Aitolian traditional persuasion.

The other implication of Nikomachos' and Lamios' presence is that it was a sign that the Akarnanians were divided politically, and that at least one part in the league was friendly towards Aitolia, which may therefore have been both laying claim to it and acting as some sort of protector: the Aitolian attitude to Akarnania had always been ambiguous. Lucius Flamininus was, even as the envoys were in Rome, attempting to bring the Akarnanians into the Roman alliance by persuasion[104]. Nikomachos' presence as an envoy was thus also an indication that a party in the land was pro-Roman. He was thus present in the hope that the Senate would encourage the overthrow of the present pro-Macedonian regime in Akarnania. (To Flamininus the Akarnanians may well have stood to the Aitolians in the same way as the Macedonians in Corinth stood to the Achaians, as part guarantors that the Aitolians would remain in the war, but the Akarnanians saw themselves as the aggrieved party in the whole war, in that it was the execution of two of their citizens by Athens which was the start of the whole crisis. It is fairly clear that everyone else had forgotten this; all the more reason for the Akarnanians to remember it, of course.)

The same sort of thing must be the reason for the presence of the other exile, Theodotos of Pherai in Thessaly, whose exile-home was at Stratos, ironically in the Aitolian part of Akarnania. Pherai had never been an Aitolian member, just as Thyrreion had never been Aitolian. Theodotos' presence in Rome was thus an appeal to Rome

[103] The Aitolian envoys are listed at Pol 18.11.9-10.
[104] Livy 32.40.7.

on behalf of the Thessalian enemies of Philip. Presumably no other means existed of sending such a representative except as a member of an official delegation for, like the Akarnanians, the Thessalians were technically enemies, and theoretically, therefore, represented by Philip's delegates. For the purpose of these Aitolian-sponsored exile delegates was to persuade the Senate not to agree to Philip's promised terms, but to reject them, in favour of something more rigorous; the suggested terms left their homes unchanged, and if they were to return home, they needed change. They, and the delegates of the Roman allies, could all now see that the chance existed of using Roman military manpower to push Philip back into his own ancestral kingdom, if not even further, and thus achieve all their own varied objectives – and for people such as Theodotos of Pherai, that objective was restoration to their homes, and this could only be done if Philip's rule in Thessaly was ended.

So it is likely that these two exiles were included in part because the Aitolians sympathised with their respective causes, but rather more because they would add weight to the argument that the peace terms as worked out at Nikaia and Thronion was simply not sufficient. It was pointed out that these terms would leave Philip still dominant in Greece, a situation which was inherently unstable, and which would thus require renewed Roman intervention later, for in that case neither the 'freedom of the Greeks' nor the Roman requirement for security in Illyria would be achieved. Some in the Senate certainly believed in the ideal of Greek freedom, but rather more would be concerned to ensure that Illyria was no longer to be threatened by Macedonian power. The Senate's precise purposes were perhaps somewhat unclear to the Greeks, but a substantial reduction in Philip's military power could be assumed to be part of it, and even the one essential element. The two obvious ways to achieve both Greek freedom and that reduction in Macedonian power, to the Greeks, were the removal of his rule from Thessaly and the breaking of any remaining Macedonian alliances with Greek states, for both of these had been the means by which Philip had spread his power southwards.

To the Aitolians particularly the removal of Philip from Thessaly would mean the chance to expand their league membership into that area once again, while the cutting of Philip's links with Akarnania would satisfy an old ambition, even if the Akarnanians could not be persuaded to join their league. To the other Greeks the breaking of

Macedonian power in the rest of Greece was tied now to the removal of Macedonian garrisons from Chalkis and Akrokorinth.

The official members of the Aitolian delegation – presuming that the two exiles were present as extra-official members – were a group of five men. Alexandros of Isios, who had been so vehemently anti-Philip at Nikaia, was a member. Another was Damokritos of Kalydon, who had been *strategos* in the year Aitolia joined in the war, and like Alexandros, was a supporter of the war and strongly anti-Macedonian; his manoeuvres during his year as *strategos* looked very much as though he was pressing for a declaration of war. These two men represented the older generation, both having been active politically for two decades already[105]. Two others are only known from their participation in this embassy: Lamios of Ambrakia and Polemarchos of Arsinoe; maybe Lamios was Nikomachos' mentor; Polemarchos, coming from the same town as Phaineas the *strategos*, may well have been Phaineas' man in the delegation[106]. The fifth member was Dikaiarchos of Trichonos, brother of Thoas who had been *strategos* five years earlier, and who was himself destined to be *strategos* in two years' time, a rising and well-connected politician, from a city which was one of the political power-houses of the Aitolian League[107]. He perhaps represented a younger generation than the obvious leaders of the embassy, one which eventually became firmly anti-Roman. One might expect him, like his brother, to be skeptical of the value of the Roman alliance – but then, after the treatment of the Aitolians in the previous months, one would expect such an attitude to be reasonably widespread in Aitolian political circles by this time.

The Achaians sent one man, Xenophon of Aigiai, King Attalos sent one, the Athenians sent one, Kephisodoros; Amynandros was his own delegate. But the Aitolians sent five, plus the two exiles, which emphasised their status as a co-belligerent, independent of the alliance. All these men were agreed that the war should go on until each had received what they wanted from Philip – the Achaians wanted Corinth (and Argos as well now), Attalos wanted to see Philip's power removed from the Straits and the Aegean, the Rhodians (who surely sent an envoy to Rome, but whose name is not preserved) wanted to control their *peraia* on the Karian mainland and more, where Philip had left garrisons after his expedition in the area;

[105] *Prosopography*, 'Alexandros (11)', Damokritos (2)'.
[106] Ibid, 'Lamios (8)', Polemarchos (14)'.
[107] Ibid, 'Dikaiarchos (4)'.

the Athenians wanted peace and, probably, compensation; the Aitolians wanted various parts of Thessaly. For such demands one envoy was clearly enough, but the Aitolians sent five.

Now, it would clearly have been sufficient for the Aitolians to send just one delegate; he would have been equally as insistent on the league's separateness as five (or seven) men. So there must be some further reason, or reasons, for Aitolian conduct. It could be that they imagined that many members would allow them to conduct more effective negotiations; it is, however more likely that the league was politically internally divided to the extent that more than one point of view had to be represented in the embassy. In the meeting at Nikaia a disagreement had emerged between Phaineas the *strategos* and Alexandros of Isios. It is fair to assume that they represented two major strands of opinion, both anti-Macedonian. One factor, represented by Alexandros, was prepared to fight on, and so was strongly pro-Roman, at least for the moment. The other group, the Phaineas-faction, was perhaps less vehement, and felt that the destruction of Philip was not wholly in Aitolia's own interests. Phaineas himself, as *strategos*, could not go to Rome, so the leading man of the embassy was Alexandros; he was balanced by the eminent Damokritos. The later opinion of Damokritos as a strong anti-Roman, and his difficult balancing-act while *strategos* in the run-up to the outbreak of war, tends to put him in Phaineas' group; perhaps the unknown Polemarchos of Arsinoe, from Phaineas' own home, was also in that group. Lamios is unclassifiable, but Ambrakia was clearly staunchly Aitolian, and had suffered from Macedonian conquest and occupation in the fairly recent past; he was probably strongly anti-Macedonian as a result. Dikaiarchos lies between the well-known Alexandros and Damokritos, and the unknown Lamios and Polemarchos, perhaps representing a distinct group; he was later anti-Roman, but it is impossible to classify his political attitudes at this time.

In the event the fears of the Greeks of being abandoned by Rome were groundless. Neither of the new consuls received Macedonia as his province, and Flamininus' command was prorogued; Philip's envoys were faced with a demand that they agree to his giving up control of Corinth, Chalkis, and Demetrias, all three 'Fetters', for which they claimed to have no instructions[108]. This is so unlikely, for

[108] Extension of Flamininus' command: Pol 18.11.1-2; Livy 32.28.3-8; the 'Fetters' issue: Pol 18.11.12-13; Livy 32.37.5.

it was obviously implied in all the negotiations in Lokris, and had been raised by the Achaians at least over Corinth, that is has led to the assumption that Flamininus had duped Philip in their private talks. This is quite likely, just as it is likely that Philip would have duped Flamininus if he had the chance. It is assumed that Flamininus gave Philip private assurances, yet sent his envoys to Rome with instructions to see that the issue of the Fetters was raised there in order to have the war resumed if he gained his prorogation[109]. For the Greeks the outcome was thus quite satisfactory, for it meant that the war would continue, and that Roman soldiers would fight Macedonian soldiers for the freedom of the Greeks, and for the expansion of all the Greek powers who were represented in the Roman alliance.

The two months' truce agreed at Thronion expired sometime in January, by which time it had already become clear that fighting would resume in the spring. Philip's preparations involved increasing and training his army; Flamininus made another attempt on Corinth, which failed[110], and he had seized control of Thebes and Boiotia by his *coup*. He sent his brother to pin down the Akarnanians by discussions[111]. This last was a necessity if the Aitolians were to be able to participate fully in the approaching campaign; using the Roman fleet and its marines to deal with Akarnania was an economical means of releasing Aitolian soldiers for Thessaly. It did not matter if the Akarnanians were conquered or not; they simply had to be pre-occupied. This was successfully accomplished first by negotiations at Kerkyra, at which some progress was made towards a settlement, and thus this would lead to dissension among the leading Akarnanians. This in turn produced a turbulent meeting of the league at Leukas. There were unofficial resolutions, demonstrations, contradictory policies, abstentions, the imprisonment of some leaders by others, and assemblies swayed by momentary rhetorical successes. The net result was that the league, with some member-cities

[109] Walbank, *Philip V*, 162-163.

[110] Livy 32.40.5-7.

[111] Livy 32.40.7; Livy put these events into the winter, and the Boiotian *coup* into the spring (at 33.1.1), but the Akarnanian negotiations are essentially undated. If Lucius had to sail to the siege of Leukas it is more likely to have been a spring matter. From the vague comment at 33.16.1 it does seem as though the whole Akarnanian affair took place in the spring and early summer; Lucius did not win until after the battle at Kynoskephalai, which was fought in June; the whole process looks to be very drawn out; Oost, *Roman Policy*, 50-51.

apparently dissenting, eventually chose to stick with the alliance with Philip. So in the end L. Flamininus had to attack. A siege of Leukas, the momentary leader of the pro-Macedonian section of the league, was begun[112]. This sequence of disturbances in Akarnania must have compelled the Aitolians to stand guard in their frontier cities after all; from Philip's point of view the Akarnanian alliance was thus still useful, and he had helped things along by sending his own men to participate, who swung the decision his way at the decisive moment. There was, therefore, an active war in the area, and necessarily the Aitolians took part in the war in the west.

The proconsul Flamininus seized control of Thebes in March, by which time the truce with Philip had long expired, and Philip had by that time assembled his forces at Dion[113], the last Macedonian town before Thessaly. This was a post which was equally suitable for a defensive campaign if the Romans came rapidly north, or as the base for a move into Thessaly. Had Philip been contemplating an offensive move he would have marched south at once; instead he waited to see what Flamininus would do[114]. Neither army could move before March, but the equinox was the effective signal for the new campaigning season to begin, and this was the date set for the Macedonian army to assemble. Flamininus moved north to attend the Aitolian Assembly, the *Panaitolike*, held this year at Herakleia Trachinia, which would decide the disposition of the Aitolian forces. The decision was taken to send 6,000 foot and 400 horse to join the Roman forces[115]; there were thus some thousands of infantry, and a hundred or so cavalry, still available for the Akarnanian front and for other garrisons. The Aitolians had some arrangements still to make, it seems, and there were other allied forces not yet present, so Flamininus moved slowly forward to Xyniai, marching only thirty or so kilometres in three days. There, on the very borders of their league territory, the Aitolian forces linked up with the Romans, and were joined also by a couple of thousand other Greeks[116]. But most of the Roman allies

[112] Livy 33.16.1-17.14.

[113] Livy 33.3.5.

[114] Walbank, *Philip V*, 167, interprets Philip's assembly at Dion as offensive in intent.

[115] Livy 33.3.6 and 9; Plut. *Flamininus* 7.2 provides what is surely the correct figure; but it is difficult to explain how the Ms of Livy substituted 600 for 6000 in the infantry figure; cf Briscoe, *Comm Livy* 1.251.

[116] Livy 33.3.8-10.

sent nothing – Nabis, the Achaians, the Boiotians, the Phokians. Some Epeirotes had joined the year before, and Nabis is said to have sent 600 Cretans earlier, but he contributed none of his own people. The Achaians were pre-occupied with Corinth. The Aitolians, presumably fully mobilised, formed a quarter of the allied army; but that only emphasised their comparative weakness by comparison with both Rome and Macedon. Aitolia was only a 'great power' in relation to the other Greek states.

Nevertheless the Aitolians were the major participants apart from the Romans and without them Flamininus' anti-Macedonian alliance would have looked especially threadbare; nor would Flamininus' army have been strong enough to face the full levy of Philip's kingdom without further reinforcements[117]. Flamininus marched his army from Xyniai eastwards, hoping to seize control of Phthiotic Thebes, but his intrigues with one of the city's men failed[118], and he could not afford to allow himself to be locked into a siege. He then turned north towards Pherai; he was, in fact, following more or less the same route as the first Aitolian raid of the war, two years before. Philip now came south to meet him, and reached Larisa when the allied army was at Pherai, at which point, apparently, each of the two commanders gained a clear idea of what the other was doing for the first time. Philip marched for Pherai; Flamininus stayed close by. A cavalry skirmish next day pitted the Macedonians against the combined Aitolian and Roman horse, with the Aitolian cavalry gaining distinction and the allies coming off best[119].

Neither commander liked the terrain, and both began to march westwards looking for an advantage, and for a chance of outflanking the other, marching with the range of hills between them. On the fourth day the two armies at last bumped into each other, and the battle of Kynoskephalai developed by a series of accidental encounters. Again the Aitolian cavalry were used along with the combined Roman horse, and though it is not made clear in any of the accounts which survive, their infantry was also fully involved. This follows from the fact that they were the first to reach the Macedonian camp after the battle, when Philip's army was in flight after its defeat. No estimate of casualties among the Aitolians is possible – Livy claims

[117] Plutarch's figures (*Flamininus* 7.3) have both sides equal in numbers at the battle.
[118] Livy 33.5.1-4.
[119] Livy 33.6.1-6; Pol. 18.9.4-20.3.

700 of 'the victors' were killed; some will certainly have been Aitolians, but most, given the numbers of the respective contingents, were obviously Romans[120].

The defeated fled to Macedon; Philip collected those fugitives he could at Gonnos and then pulled back to Tempe. Flamininus was able to advance in an orderly way to Larisa, only to find that Philip's papers, stored there, had been burned. Philip's herald reached him there and requested a truce, which he granted[121]. This annoyed the Aitolians, who obviously looked to make new league members from the Thessalian cities, and could not do so if there was a truce, until after the peace was concluded; they were further annoyed by Flamininus' message to Philip that the king should 'be of good cheer'[122]. These incidents at once re-awakened the former Aitolian suspicion of Flamininus' intentions – if, indeed, they had ever slept. It was in fact a reversion to Flamininus' old attitude; it was apparently his practice to discuss matters with his allies during the campaign[123]; given the situation that meant with Phaineas, the Aitolian commander, in particular, since the other contingents were so small. But this now turned out to have had been a military measure only; once matters were back in the diplomatic mode, Flamininus reverted to the slipperiness which had so bothered the Aitolians the year before.

But the Aitolians were not wholly innocent in this dispute. Polybios is emphatic that Flamininus found that the Aitolians had become arrogant as a result of their part in the victory[124]. Livy and Polybios are unusually favourable in their comments on the Aitolians' conduct in the fighting, so unusual indeed that it must be accepted as correct[125].

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[120] The campaign and battle: Livy 33.6.7-10.10; Pol. 18.20.4-26.12; Plut. *Flamininus* 8; Zonaras 9.16; Justin 30.4; modern discussions include Walbank, *Philip V*, 169-162; G. de Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, Florence 1923, IV.1.82-84; W. K. Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topogaphy*, 3, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, 133-144; also on the topography cf Walbank, *Commentary*, 2, 576-579; Kromayer, *Antiken Schlachtfelder*, II, 95-115; H. Delbruck, *History of the Art of War, 2, Warfare in Antiquity*, trans W. Renfroe, Lincoln, Nebraska, 1990, 397-398; Stahlin, *Thessalien*, 111; Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.432-447.

[121] Livy 33.11.1-3.

[122] Livy 33.11.4; this is Walbank's version of *bono animo esse regem ut iuberat* (*Philip V*, 172); E. Sage, in the Loeb edition, is less exuberant: 'the king should take heart'.

[123] Livy 33.11.5.

[124] Pol. 18.34.1-2.

[125] Pol. 18.22.4-5; Livy 33.7.7 and 13; K. S. Sacks, 'Polybius' other view of Aetolia', *JHS* 95, 1975, 92-106, uses such notices to suggest that Polybios was using a different, more Aitolia-friendly source at this period.

Their boastfulness after Kynoskephalai was the same sort of conduct which had so annoyed the Greeks since the Aitolians' defeat of the Kelts: they seem to have been quite unable to prevent themselves mentioning it on every occasion. Polybios thus lays the blame for Flamininus' withdrawal of goodwill on Aitolian conduct. But there was, of course, a deeper cause, and the constant friction, largely Flamininus' fault, between them in the previous year was part of it, as was the assertiveness of the Aitolians all through, based on their separate declaration of war. Having co-operated enthusiastically with the Romans during the fighting, they were now asserting their independence of action once more. But they discovered that they could not act alone; if Flamininus made a truce with Philip, they perforce had to conform. Their situation was thus thoroughly uncomfortable.

The friction between the Aitolians and Flamininus came into the open – if it was not already obvious – when the allies discussed the terms of peace to be offered to Philip. Flamininus had a set of terms already prepared, it seems. King Amynandros – who had contributed 1,200 troops to the victorious army – was willing to acquiesce in the Roman's policies, emphasising that when the Romans left Greece the Greeks would be on their own. The Aitolians raised objections that the proposed terms were too mild. Alexander of Isios and the *strategos* Phaineas were united in wishing to see Philip removed from power and Macedonian strength decisively reduced. Flamininus would have none of this, pointing to the inevitable consequence of Thracian, Illyrian and Galatian invasions of Macedonia and Greece if Macedonia was destroyed or weakened too much. The disagreement was so strong and so bitter that none of the other allies was able to get a word in. Flaminius cut the discussion short with insults directed at Phaineas[126].

Meanwhile fighting in other areas of saw more defeats for Philip's men and his allies. The Rhodians cleared out most of the Macedonian forces from their *peraia*[127], the Achaians defeated a raid in force from Corinth[128], Lucius Flamininus had at last captured Leukas, and when the news of Kynoskephalai arrived, the rest of Akarnania submitted to him[129].

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[126] Livy 33.12.1-13.
[127] Livy 33.18.1-22.
[128] Livy 33.14.1-15.9.
[129] Livy 33.17.7-15.

So, when Philip and Flamininus met at Tempe the day after the latter's acrimonious meeting with his allies, the positions of both had altered even in the fortnight since the battle. Philip's allies and outposts had faded away, though his men still held Akrokorinth and Chalkis, he had no remaining allies; yet at the same time Flamininus' alliance was less than harmonious. Philip sensibly dealt directly with Flamininus, offering the terms as agreed the year before at Nikaia and Thronion, with disputes to be settled by the Senate[130] – a tactful way of giving the Romans whatever else they wanted.

This was scarcely what the Aitolians contemplated as a peace conference, and Phaineas stated the terms his people required: the Thessalian cities of Pharsalos, Phthiotic Thebes, and Larisa Chremaste, and the Malian town of Echinos. Philip, contemptuously suggested they go ahead and take them, but Flamininus stopped this, claiming that they had fallen to the Romans as spoils of war as a result of the victory at Kynoskephalai[131]. It is clear that Philip had forgotten that the Aitolians were quite good at taking cities, and that in most of those which they had asked for there were Aitolian sympathisers who would be happy to help them. Flamininus had clearly not forgotten, however, and he was also not willing to see the war resumed, for a straight fight between Macedon and Aitolians might lead to a renewal of Philip's strength and self-confidence.

The two allies fell into yet another dispute, no doubt watched sardonically and with quiet satisfaction by Philip. The two disputed over whether the Aitolians should possess Phthiotic Thebes, neither side making much sense in the version of the discussion we have, both retreated into the proclamation of minor points as decisive, and both claimed to gain justification from events far in the past[132]. In the matter of Phthiotic Thebes, this was a city which, like the other three, had been part of the Aitolian League in the past, but had been taken by Philip and populated by Macedonians. There is no doubt Flamininus would know this – he had had dealings with the city earlier – and it was thus natural that it should be the most awkward issue, and both, such was their mutual distrust by now, immediately seized on it.

In the background of all this was a very real issue. If Rome made the peace and then left, the major power outside Macedonia would

[130] Livy 33.13.1-4.
[131] Livy 33.13.5-9.
[132] Livy 33.17.10-13.

be Aitolia, which had fought Macedon four times in the past forty years, only once with any real success. Once Rome was distracted – its forces were also fighting in Cisalpine Gaul in this year, and Spain was proving troublesome – there was no guarantee that Philip could be restrained from exacting revenge. This had been Amynandros' point as well, that Greece needed to be independently strong if the Romans left, and Phaineas had feared that Philip was looking for revenge. So the Aitolians wanted him removed, and Macedon's power for revenge emasculated. Barbarian invasions of Macedon were not something the Greeks were overly concerned about, and the Aitolians had so long harked on their ability to defeat the Galatians that they had possibly come to believe their own propaganda. Their possession for the four cities would give Aitolia control of the southern half of Thessaly, and if Philip was removed from the rest, it was quite possible that the freed Thessalians could be induced to join the Aitolian League – Malloia had been an ally only two years before, and at some point Trikka had made an agreement with the league[133] – especially if Macedon was so weakened that barbarian invasions were a real possibility.

At the same time, leaving Macedon reasonably strong would give Rome a constant excuse to interfere in Greece, as the self-proclaimed protector of the freedom of the Greeks. There is little doubt that this was one of the elements in Flamininus' policy, and something which was fully acceptable at Rome. The Senate could have had peace the year before if it was only peace that was required. But both Flamininus in particular and the Senate generally were clearly aiming at some sort of domination over Greece. The Aitolians, being the most powerful of the Greek states, were thus the major obstacle to this Roman control. Hence the quarrels and the deliberate blocking of Aitolian aspirations.

The net result of Philip's acceptance of the old terms, which could be modified by the Senate, and Flamininus' rejection of the Aitolian claims, was to leave the matter to the Senate, which appointed ten commissioners to implement whatever terms had been agreed. The

[133] Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* III 542; the date of this treaty is widely disagreed; Klaffenbach (*IG* IX.1.136) suggested '238-230'; Schmitt suggests 'nach 206 (?)'; Flacelière, *Aitoliens*, 254, the last third of the third century. Flacelière is the only estimate which is acceptable, though one might extend the possibility to c.190. Schmitt claims that the script fits a date about 206, but such precision is not possible.

terms were vague, probably intentionally, and this circumstance can only have heightened Aitolian apprehensions. They perhaps exaggerated their role in the defeat of Philip in reaction to their denigration by the Romans generally. The apparent friendliness between Philip and Flamininus was ominous, and the general support for the Romans from the other Greek states – none of whom were as exposed to Macedon (or to Rome) as Aitolia was, with the possible exception of Amynandros – left the Aitolians high and dry. Without Greek support their case, whether justified or not, can only have seemed to be petulant carping. It began to seem that the result of the war, which Aitolia had joined at the express entreaties of the Romans, would be to leave Aitolia isolated and friendless in Greece.

PART FIVE

THE ROMAN PROBLEM

19. THE BREAK WITH ROME (197-192)

Between the agreement reached at Tempe and the Roman Senate's adjustments to, and ratification of, that agreement, the Aitolians held another assembly at the *Thermike* in September 197. The new *strategos* elected there was Alexamenos of Kalydon[1], of whom nothing more is known; nor are his colleagues' names known. It fell to him, however, to lead the Aitolians in their reaction to the peace agreement.

Philip had effectively put himself in the Senate's hands by offering terms of peace as suggested earlier and thus permitting the Senate to modify them. The Aitolians' demands for the cession to them of the Thessalian cities they had originally held had been ignored, and Flamininus claimed that they had fallen to Rome as the victims in the war, and so were spoils of war. This, to the justified annoyance of the Aitolians, ignored the participation of the Aitolian army in that war; and Philip's brusque dismissal of the Aitolian claims had been abetted by Flamininus. Further, the argument that the cities had fallen to Rome meant that to get them, the Aitolians must ask the Senate for them. It is not surprising that the Aitolians were angry[2].

They had been urged to send envoys to Rome to put the case for their claims. It is not known who the envoys were, but men from Achaia (the only one named), Elis, Messene, and Aitolia are known to have been in Rome, in addition to the men sent by Philip[3]. They found that opinion was divided at Rome on the terms of peace, and that one consul argued for a continuation of the war[4]. But the Senate decided that the peace terms, which they modified, were acceptable, though the senators deliberately evaded much of the detail; they appointed a commission of ten to attend to that detail. The commission included, by specific order of the Senate, the two previous commanders in the war, P. Sulpicius Galba and P. Villius Tappulus[5].

The Greek envoys had registered some objections, the Eleians to

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[1] Pol. 18.43.11; Paus. 8.50.10.

[2] Pol. 18.45.1-7; Livy 33.31.1-3.

[3] Pol. 18.42.6-7.

[4] M. Claudius Marcellus, who is assumed to be more anxious to gain glory than ensure peace (Pol. 18.42.3-4), but his argument (Livy 33.25.5-6) has merit.

[5] Livy 33.24.7; the full membership of the commission is not known.

the cession of Triphylia to Achaia, the Messenians to the Achaians' holding Asine and Pylos, and the Aitolians had a claim, they said, to Heraia. These items are all bunched together by Polybios at the end of a rather unconvincing description of the ratification process[6]. It seems highly unlikely that this was the only statement and the only claim the Aitolians made; one would expect a good deal more than this on the subject of Pharsalos and the other Thessalian places they were after. This report by Polybios is thus no more than a compressed section of what was said, and refers, of course, only to the places handed over by Philip a year before to the Aitolians. The Aitolian claim to Heraia was probably not too serious, but is a sign that they were able and willing to intervene in other subjects than their own original claims. It may thus be in effect an Aitolian claim to a voice in the peace-making process.

The Aitolian envoys must have registered all their objections to the proposed terms while they were in Rome, and it may have been such statements which encouraged the new consul M. Claudius Marcellus to advocate the war's continuance. No doubt the Achaians also registered their interest in the future of Corinth and Akrokorinth. And it would seem that, despite the vagueness of the terms as stated by the Senate, there were some serious negotiations at Rome. For one of the results of the work of the Roman commissioners, was the delivery of Epiknemidian Lokris and Phokis to Aitolia.

Neither of these areas had been mentioned before in the many discussions which had taken place, and yet they were assigned to Aitolia in the peace because they had been part of Aitolia in the past[7]. This is a reason which could cover half Thessaly and parts of the Peloponnese as well – that is to say, it is really no explanation at all. Indeed it seems likely that Phokis as a whole had never been Aitolian in the past, though it had been an ally of the league at times. So it is probable that this was something arranged in secret, or at least in private, at some time between the meeting at Tempe, when Philip effectively surrendered, and the Senate's announcement of its ratification of the altered terms; the obvious place for such an agreement would be Rome, when the envoys were there.

While waiting for the Senate's decisions the condition of Boiotia

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[6] Pol. 18.42.7; the Aitolian claim to Heraia is a puzzle, and cannot be taken seriously; cf. Walbank, *Commentary*, 2.607-608.

[7] Livy 33.34.8; Pol. 18.47.9.

worsened. This was an area vital for the Romans to control, and important therefore to both Philip and the Aitolians. Flamininus was persuaded to conciliate the Boiotians, who were sore at his cavalier treatment of them in March, by arranging with Philip for the return of Boiotians in the king's service, including Brachyllas, who had spent his political life in Macedonian service. These men were honoured on their return, not surprisingly, and Philip was given the credit[8]. Flamininus proved sensitive on the issue, which encouraged Brachyllas' political opponents to consider a *coup*.

The precondition of success was the murder of Brachyllas, who had been elected one of the Boiotarchs, and had at once assumed a leading role in federal Boiotian affairs. When this was put to Flamininus, he weaseled out, saying he could not take any responsibility for it, but would not stop it, and passed the plotters on to Alexamenos, the Aitolian *strategos*. But Alexamenos proved equal to the challenge, agreed to help, but arranged for the assassins to be three Aitolians and three Italians, the latter being soldiers with the Roman forces in Greece[9]. The Aitolians would be less conspicuous in a Greek city than the Italians, but the origin of the assassins – who escaped anyway – was less important than the immediate assumption among the Boiotians that no such plot could have been formed and carried out without Roman connivance. In this, of course, they were perfectly correct. In the result the Aitolians escaped all blame, but a pogrom of Romans and Italians in Boiotia took place[10].

Flamininus reacted with near-hysteria, purporting to impose a fine of 500 talents and the delivery of the culprits on the Boiotians, claiming that 500 of his soldiers had been murdered. When no-one complied, saying that the murders were private matters, he invaded, laying siege to Koroneia, the federal sanctuary, near which some of the murders had taken place. Intervention by Achaian and Athenian envoys eventually smoothed things over and got the fine reduced to thirty talents[11]. Flamininus' clumsiness and thin-skinned reaction is to be contrasted with the deftness with which Alexamenos took up the challenge he had been handed by the Roman and then turned it

[8] Pol. 18.43.1-4; Livy 33.27.5-8; Brachyllas had been Antigonos Doson's man in Sparta in 222 and was one of Philip's counsellors at Nikaia.
[9] Pol. 18.43.7-12; Livy 33.28.1-3.
[10] Livy 33.29.1-6.
[11] Livy 33.29.7-12.

round. It was Flamininus and the Romans who were blamed; Alexamenos and the Aitolians, actually more culpable, were ignored.

Flamininus' career had so far had seriously unsettling effects on several Greek states. Boiotia was only the latest in a lengthening list of states which had found that Roman intervention rode roughshod over their constitutions. The Achaian League had only been brought to a condition to declare war on its former ally Philip by the exile of one party leader, Kykliadas, a former *strategos* of the league, and by the absence from the Assembly of several delegates – from Dyme, Megalopolis, and Argos. Only then was it possible to drive a declaration of war through the Assembly, and even so the Argives were sufficiently alienated by the whole process to allow the seizure of the city by Macedonian forces from Corinth. Another Macedonian ally, the Akarnanian League, had gone through an equally difficult time, which involved manipulating the league Assembly, the absence of some city-members from the meeting, imprisonment of opposition leaders, sudden reversals of decisions, and eventually the siege and capture of Leukas by the Romans, before finally surrendering. Another league, the Phokian, had suffered invasion and partial conquest by the Romans in the course of the war. Its cities had previously been occupied by Macedonian soldiers, and were then occupied by Romans; it seems unlikely that any sort of functioning league could be considered to be in existence by the time Flamininus had captured several of the Phokian cities.

The constitutional turmoil in these states was the result of Roman pressure, moral, diplomatic, or military. In Achaia it was the election of the *strategos* Aristainos, who was more sympathetic towards Rome than his predecessors Kykliadas and Philopoimen, which opened the way for Roman pressure. This was exerted in part by the presence of the Roman fleet at Kenchreai, and in part by the visit of Roman envoys. In Akarnania the fleet had remained at a distance, but nevertheless had been menacing. In Phokis it was a systematic and pretty brutal conquest by the Roman army which was the instrument. But in all cases the effect was to disorganise the constitutional methods of each league, and so to reduce each league's governmental effectiveness. This, of course, partly accomplished the Roman purpose, and made resistance to both conquest and the imposition of peace terms much less effective.

Boiotia suffered twice. In March of 197, almost at the last moment before he had to march off northwards to face Philip's army, Flamini-

nus had executed a *coup* at Thebes by bringing with him 2,000 soldiers, who occupied the city while he held talks with the city magistrates[12]. Both his political friends and their opponents were deeply upset by this proceeding[13], which fuelled the welcoming reception given to Brachyllas and his friends when they returned from Macedonian service later in the year. It was the brutality and treachery of the Roman methods in March which were the bases for the Boiotian reaction to Brachyllas' murder in the winter of 197; for the Boiotians it was the second example of such treachery in a year. And then a full-scale Roman invasion was necessary to bring Boiotia back under Roman control.

Achaia, Boiotia, Phokis, Akarnania – Aitolia was surrounded by states whose constitutional shambles were examples of the Roman disregard for Greek methods, scruples, and constitutional practices. Roman methods were as bad as those practiced by Philip. Being a Roman ally – as Boiotia was – or an enemy – as Akarnania – or being under enemy occupation and thus a candidate for liberation – as Phokis had been – made no essential difference; all these conditions were equally dangerous. The Aitolians, by contrast, had preserved their constitutional methods and formalities all through the recent crises.

In this they were clearly helped by the adaptability of their system, which was able to create precedents to cope with new conditions. Their constitution clearly permitted of innovation: in the previous war, the post of *strategos autokrator* had been invented as an honour for Attalos, though it scarcely worked as a means of keeping him in the war; in the present war the device of a special assembly meeting was used. This also may have been a fairly recent innnovation, perhaps the origin being the meeting at Naupaktos in 217 which had produced the peace which ended the war against Philip and the Symmachy. It was about this time also that the office of *grammateus* was divided into two, clearly an adapatation to the increased work load imposed by the international crises involving both Macedon and Rome, and the internal problems associated with the debt problem. Otherwise the Aitolians clung to the essentials. It is very noticeable that they continued to hold their regular six-monthly assemblies, and

[12] Livy 33.1.1-8; Plut. *Flamininus* 6; Zon. 9.16; P. Cloché, *Thèbes de Béotie des origines à la conquête romaine*, Paris n.d., 252-253; Roesch, *Études*, 369-370.

[13] Livy 33.1.8 and 12.6.

carried through their regular annual elections without interruption. Keeping the Romans at arm's-length was clearly a matter not merely of independence, but of self-preservation; the campaign into Thessaly in 197 was held up for several days by the constitutional proprieties of the *Panaitolike*. The treatment of the surrounding states can only have made Aitolians all the more insistent on that independence.

Their temper was not improved by the publication of the Senate's decisions on the terms of the peace. After their vigorous participation in the war – as they would have put it – there was not a single mention of them in the announced terms. The Greeks were declared free, which, to Greeks who already considered themselves to be free, was an insult; and Philip was to hand over, by the summer, all the areas of Greece he still held, to the Romans. For the Aitolians this meant that Rome would take over all Thessaly. The one item they will have welcomed wholeheartedly was the limitation on Philip's armed forces: he was to give up virtually all his ships, and to limit his army to 5,000 men. Of his overseas possessions Philip was to surrender every one, but of the cities in the Straits area and in Asia which were named, none were those which had been taken from the Aitolian *strategoi* in his Straits campaign – Lysimacheia, Kalchedon – except Kios, whose disposition was left to correspondence between Flamininus and King Prusias; again no reference was made to Aitolian interests[14]. (The fact that the whole clause was out of date is not really relevant: the Aitolians had an interest, and it was being ignored[15].)

For once, we have information about Aitolian reactions. They are said to be the only Greeks who complained[16], but, since the rest were all under effective Roman control, or even Roman military occupation, and since the Boiotian crises it had been clear what the Romans might do to dissenters, this uniqueness may be taken with a pinch of salt. The Aitolians were the only state in Greece which still had sufficient independence and strength to make a complaint – apart from Philip, whose tactics were now to agree to everything in the hope that the Romans would be lulled into going away. There is no need to believe that all the rest of Greece was happy about the terms.

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[14] Livy 33.30.1-11; Pol. 18.44.1-7.

[15] It was out of date because Antiochos III had taken over the Hellespont cities earlier in the year; the oddly detailed clause concerning the cities of Karia was also out of date, and for the same reason.

[16] Livy 33.31.1; Pol. 18.45.1.

But the Aitolians needed support if their complaints were to have any effect. Their basic quarrel with the terms as presented by the Senate was that they did not give them what they wanted, and that whatever they were to get would come by a decision of the Romans, without a clear recognition of Aitolian contributions to the joint effort, or even, it seems, a separate Aitolian-Macedonian peace agreement. But this sort of complaint would cut no ice with the rest of Greece. Instead, the Aitolians must find some issue in the terms as presented by the commissioners which would appeal to others in Greece. And the way the terms were presented, as a statement of general principles out of which the ten Roman commissioners were to work out detailed solutions, gave the Aitolians their opening.

The vagueness of the wording was pointed out, as was the absence of specific terms. The contradiction between the statement that the Greeks were to be free and that Philip should hand over his Greek possessions to the Romans was emphasised. And meanwhile those in Asia were ignored, and by this the Aitolians meant the cities formerly connected with their own league, Lysimacheia and so on. By contrast, Oreus, Eretria, Chalkis, Demetrias, and Corinth were to be given to the Romans. And, indeed, these objections were the crucial part. If Rome was aiming for control, these Greek cities – three of them were Philip's 'Fetters' – would be the geographical and strategic basis they required. If Rome was genuine about the rhetoric of the 'freedom of the Greeks', these cities would need to be evacuated of both Macedonian and Roman soldiers, in which case, presumably, these cities, and all other cities in Greece, would be free to choose their own alignments, governments, and foreign policies. It followed that some of the cities, such as Demetrias and others in Thessaly, should be free to opt for membership of, or alliance with, the Aitolian league.

Not only did this argument strike home with the Greek cities, it also went to the heart of the argument within the Roman peace commission. Flamininus wanted to evacuate the country completely of all Roman soldiers; some of the commissioners wished to retain control of some areas at least – which must mean the 'Fetters', if anything – and they were not convinced by Flamininus' arguments[18]. He made

[17] Pol. 18.45.2-6; Livy 33.31.7-10.
[18] Pol. 18.45.7-10; Livy 33.31.7-10.

the best of it by getting them to hand over Corinth city to the Achaians, though Roman garrisons continued to occupy the citadel there, Akrokorinth, as well as Chalkis, Demetrias, and other places[19]. He also carried out a successful public relations exercise by having a herald announce at the Isthmia that a string of communities were freed. This announcement, which set off a great demonstration, was very popular, but cooler heads no doubt noted that the list was only a partial one, and that the Fetters remained Roman. And the Aitolians will have taken note of the herald's words, that Rome and Flamininus had overcome Philip – and that there was not a word to acknowledge any other contribution[20].

The Roman peace commissioners by this time had sorted through the various problems, and had reached conclusions on most of them. The Achaians, for example, were confirmed in their possession of Heraia, Triphylia, and Corinth[21]. Thessaly was divided up into independent states: the Magnesians, the Perrhaibians, and the Thessalians, each forming a separate league, and to this last league were assigned most of the Phthiotic Achaians, with the exceptions of Thebes and Pharsalos[22]. Both Livy and Polybios include the Dolopes as being freed in the same list as the Thessalian groups. Since Philip had at some point in the past decades conquered at least some of the Dolopians, this was a prudent move, but, as the sequel involving the Lokrians and the Phokians shows, this did not mean independence; all that the commissioners were doing was listing those states to which Philip was stated no longer to have any claim by right of past conquest, or even present control. In fact, the Dolpians probably had reverted to their former membership of the Aitolian League[23]. Philip also lost Orestis, declared independent as a result of its successful rebellion in 198[24], and two western areas which were given to Pleu-

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[19] Pol. 18.45.12; Livy 33.31.11.

[20] Pol. 18.46.5; Livy 33.32.5; the list of 'freed' communities is indeed remarkably short considering the strength of the demonstration it is said to have provoked: the Corinthians, Phokians, Lokrians, Euboians, Phthiotic Achaians, Magnesians, Thessalians, and Perrhaibians. And 'freed', in the constext, only meant the removal of Philip's control; it did not, as the handing over of Corinth city, but not Akrokorinth, to Achaia showed, mean effective independence. And what exactly was meant by the Lokrians, all of whom were already in the Aitolian League?

[21] Livy 33.34.9; Pol. 18.47.10.

[22] Livy 33.34.6-7; Pol. 18.47.6-7.

[23] Ibid; cf. Walbank, *Commentary* 2.616-617.

[24] Livy 33.34.6; Pol. 18.47.6.

ratos[25]. Strategically these areas would provide a buffer between Philip's remaining kingdom and the Roman territories, and between Macedon and Thessaly. King Amynandros was allowed to keep what he had seized in north-west Thessaly[26]. Philip's kingdom was thus substantially reduced, but it still remained the most powerful single state in the Balkan peninsula.

The Aitolians' gains are only partly clear, and are not fully detailed. In the interviews conducted by the commissioners at Corinth after the ending of the Isthmia, only Lokris and Phokis were assigned to them. Livy notes that a special decree was required for this, but does not explain what this meant[27]; perhaps that is because the Aitolians claimed to be fighting a separate war; perhaps it was a device to avoid accepting Aitolia as an ally. The Aitolians must have felt annoyed at being assigned the Lokrians, when they had been members of the league before the war – it presumably meant the Epiknemidean Lokrians, who had been fought over during the war, and whose political origins may not have been clear, at least to the Romans. The Aitolians are said to have demanded Pharsalos and Leukas as well at this meeting, citing 'the treaty', by which they can only have meant the treaty of 211[28]. No mention was made of two other places – Larisa Chremaste and Echinos – which they had repeatedly claimed, and all that was said of Phthiotic Thebes was that, like Pharsalos, it was separated from Phthiotic Achaia. It may be that 'Pharsalos' stood for all these places in Livy's mind. The commissioners failed to reach a decision, and referred the matter back to the Senate[29].

The Aitolian claim to Leukas is interesting in this connection. The account we have of the conquest of the city attributes it solely to Roman enterprise, by Lucius Flamininus commanding men from the fleet, and while the treaty does contain a clause which would assign the city to the Aitolians even without their participation, for them to claim it with such conviction, they must have participated in the capture in some way. There seems no need to imagine Aitolian troops joining in the siege and the assault, but it was all part of the war as a

[25] Livy 33.34.11; Pol. 18.47.12.
[26] Livy 33.34.11; Pol. 18.47.13.
[27] Livy 33.34.8; Pol. 18.47.9; Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 1.315, calls the decree 'rather puzzling'.
[28] Livy 33.34.7; Pol. 18.47.8.
[29] Ibid.

whole, in which the Aitolians had been, if only defensively, fighting the Akarnanians. So the Aitolians were claiming the place by the terms of the original Roman alliance treaty of 211, whereby the cities captured by joint enterprise were divided between the two: the cities to the Aitolians, the portable booty to the Romans. The Aitolians were thus claiming, because it suited them, that the old alliance was still in force, something which the Romans did not usually deny, but which they always evaded. The fact that the commissioners referred the matter to the Senate shows that they were quite unsure on the issue – and the issue was not the disposal of Leukas, but the validity of the treaty[30].

Since Phthiotic Thebes was excluded from the award of Phthiotic Achaia to Thessaly, it is assumed that it went to Aitolia, though neither Livy nor Polybios actually say so. It would, however, be a sensible move. No-one would want a strong city, inhabited by Macedonians, in the middle of one of the newly independent Thessalian states. But its transfer, alone of the four places demanded by the Aitolians, created difficulties. They had not got Pharsalos, nor, apparently Echinos; Larisa Chremaste is not mentioned. So Thebes was an isolated Aitolian city, inhabited by Macedonians who had displaced the former Aitolian citizens, and surrounded by Thessalian territory, a thoroughly uncomfortable situation.

The commissioners had spent some months on these tasks and others, working apparently at Corinth all the time, and it was September before they got out and about. Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, consul five years before, perhaps accompanied by others of the commissioners, went to see Philip, and then went on to the Aitolian Assembly at the *Thermike* (and so at the September equinox). He found the former enemy easier to deal with than the former ally. Philip meekly accepted all his suggestions[31]. The Aitolians, on the other hand, criticised, though they were also divided in their response. The division of opinion within the Aitolian polity was demonstrated after Lentulus had made a speech in which he recommended acceptance of the settlement just reached. Some of the Aitolians were soft in their replies,

[30] The issue of the treaty's validity is discussed by G. A. Lehmann, *Untersuchungen zu historische Glauburdigkeit zu Polybios*, Münster 1967, appendix 3, 366-371. Most historians simply assume that Aitolia's separate peace in 206 nullified the treaty, but Aitolian insistence and Roman evasiveness rather suggest Roman discomfort with the idea: it was clearly a matter for argument, settled in the end by power.

[31] Livy 33.35.2-7; Pol 18.48.3-5.

calling for a revival of the old partnership of allies (which had probably never actually existed), and asking for the terms of the old treaty to be observed; the others were more belligerent, claiming credit both for permitting the Romans to reach Greece in the first place, and for their part in the defeat of Philip. The language had reflected differing approaches; but these differences were aimed at reaching the same destination. Lentulus limply recommended another embassy to the Senate, and the diplomatic faction was sufficiently dominant to carry this recommendation into action[32].

The meeting, either after this discussion or, more probably, before it, elected a new panel of magistrates. The new *strategos* was Alexandros son of Nikias, of Kalydon, who had been *strategos* once before, in the year following the attempted debt settlement, 204/203[33]. The names of the *hipparchos* and the two *grammateis* are, as so often, unknown. During his term of office, Alexandros sponsored proxenies with two cities, both, in the political context of the time, significant. One was with Dyme, in Achaia, the city sacked by the Romans in their first war with Macedon, and whose representatives had deliberately absented themselves from the Achaian League meeting which voted to join Rome in the war against Philip. He was joined in their sponsorship by Dikaiarchos, one of the envoys to Rome concerning the Nikaian terms[34]. This may be taken to suggest that, whatever Dikaiarchos' opinions a year or so before, they were now decisively anti-Roman. Dyme, of course, had no reason to like the Aitolians, who had raided her territory frequently during the Aitolian war with the Symmachy, and who had been the allies of Rome at the time of the sack; the establishment of proxeny relations between the two would thus seem to suggest a mending of fences; and the participation of the *strategos* in this reconciliation lent it added significance; and his partner Dikaiarchos was to be the next *strategos*, a fact not necessarily obvious at the time of the proxeny agreement, but which those who were alert of Aitolian politics (and *proxenoi* were, they had to be) might well suspect.

The other proxeny-sponsorship by the *strategos* was equally significant, for it concerned Larisa[35]. This, since the city is named without

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[32] Livy 33.35.8-12; Pol. 18.48.5-9.
[33] *Prosopography*: 'Alexandros (12)'.
[34] *IG* IX.1.30a.
[35] *IG* IX.1.31b.

qualification, was the Thessalian city, not that in Achaia Phthiotis which Aitolia claimed. Larisa was one of the main cities of the new Thessalian League – indeed, it was probably the regular meeting place of the league – which was Aitolia's new neighbour to the north, the buffer between it and Macedon. The new league was, no doubt, an unstable entity at first, and it would be a sensible move for the Aitolians to establish relations with it as quickly as possible, and a *proxenos* in this particular city was well placed. This process of establishing new or renewed proxeny relations after a political development was a traditional Aitolian practice, of course, which had been used several times in the past; it may, indeed, have been one of the duties of the *strategos*.

The advice of Lentulus that the Aitolian claims should be discussed with the Senate failed to produce a solution. The envoys sent from the *Thermike* found that the Senate would not, or could not, reach a decision. Instead, since the commissioners had by this time finished their work in Greece, and anyway had been unable to make their own decision on the problem, the matter was referred to back again to Flamininus, who was still in Greece. Livy summarises the dispute as over 'Pharsalos and Leukas and certain other cities', and this last phrase will cover Echinos and Larisa Chremaste, and perhaps also Phthiotic Thebes[36]. The result of this reference back is assumed to be a refusal by Flamininus to hand them to the Aitolians. Certainly they never got Leukas, and a year later Alexandros was complaining of being cheated out of Echinos and Pharsalos[37]. The Senate must have known what the result of their non-decision would be.

The Senate had also passed to Flamininus the question of Nabis of Sparta. To deal with it, he called a meeting at Corinth in spring 195. Delegates were sent from the Roman allies, plus the Aitolians, who were represented by Alexandros[38]. It has been assumed that this was Alexandros of Isios[39] who had appeared at the Nikaia meeting and in the embassy to Rome, but it is perhaps more likely that this was the current *strategos*. He is identified by Livy as *princeps gentis*, which would be an acceptable translation of *strategos*[40]. The meeting was being held

[36] Livy 33.49.8.
[37] Livy 34.23.8.
[38] Livy 34.22.6.
[39] As by Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.86, and by Sage in the index to the Loeb Livy, volume IX.
[40] But *princeps* is a common term in Livy for any spokesman for any Greek state.

close to the Aitolian borders, and would be reachable by the *strategos* without going too far from his domestic duties. The speech he is said to have made provided an alternative to Flamininus' policy for the other Greek representatives present. He aimed to commit Aitolia to a new Greek alliance, and it seems likely that only a man holding the office of *strategos* could do that, and that in order to give such a policy the weight it required to compete with Flamininus' policy, the authority of the head of the Aitolian state was needed.

Flamininus had emphasised the joint nature – Rome and the Greeks – of the war against Philip, and in effect asked that the same combination be used to cut Nabis down to size[41]. After the Athenians, who had called in the Romans' assistance against Philip in the first place, had agreed effusively and had complained of Aitolian criticisms[42], Alexandros replied. According to Livy, he pointed out the Athenian sycophancy, examined and condemned the conduct of the Achaians in deserting Philip and then declaring war on him, and contrasted that with the consistent – so he claimed – support the Romans had received from the Aitolians. The Achaians were aiming to get Argos as a result of this attack on Nabis, he pointed out, having already received Corinth as payment for deserting Philip; meanwhile the Aitolians, despite their treaty with Rome, had been cheated of their share of the spoils. And why were the Romans still occupying the Greek Fetters? Was not this Nabis crisis simply another device to continue the Roman occupation of Greece?

These were all good debating points, but the speech was scarcely designed to gain friends among the Greeks. Nevertheless Alexandros ended, at least according to Livy's composition of the speech, with this alternative to Flamininus' policy: an alliance of *Greek* states, which would deal with Nabis in Argos: either he would be persuaded to leave the city on Greek terms, or 'they would compel him by force of arms to yield to the will of united Greece'[43].

Livy's source for this is undoubtedly Polybios[44], and Polybios was alive the the time of this conference, though young. The account of Achaian policy which Alexandros is said to have given cuts very close to the bone, which rather suggests that the Achaian patriot Polybios

[41] Livy 34.22.7-13.
[42] Livy 34.23.2-4.
[43] Livy 34.23.5-11.
[44] Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.85; 'manifestly of Polybian origin'.

was rendering Alexandros' words more or less accurately. We may assume, therefore, that the suggestion he made, for a Greek alliance which excluded the Romans, was a serious one. It was, in fact, a suggestion that the Symmachy, defunct since the Achaian desertion of the Macedonian alliance, but without much force for a decade and more before that, should be revived, minus Philip of Macedon. And the suggestion was that this revived Symmachy should take it upon itself to police Greece, beginning with that disturber of the social and political peace, Nabis. By implication its aim would be to deter political changes by aggression or by revolution, exactly the aims of all the Greek Symmachies since the time of Philip II. But a further implication was that it would inevitably, if it succeeded in these aims, develop into a pan-Greek government.

It was rather late in the day to propose such a policy. Predictably the Achaians, in the person of their *strategos* Aristainos, rejected it by accusing the Aitolians of wanting Argos for themselves – a preposterous notion – and by completely ignoring the proposed alliance[45]. Nor was such a policy able to succeed while Roman forces still garrisoned half Greece, even though it took them at their word in assuming they meant to leave. It may be pointed out, in parenthesis, that this period was the last chance the Greeks had of forming some sort of unity which would exclude the non-Greek powers – Romans, Macedonians, Seleukids, Ptolemies. But inter-Greek hatreds and rivalries were far too strong; Aristainos' speech in reply was vituperative, describing the Aitolians as 'brigands' – a reply to Alexandros' description of the Achaians as 'deserters' – and he implored the Romans to protect Greece from them. The other Greek delegates echoed the Achaian and Athenian line, so that Flamininus did not have to answer the charges Alexandros had made[46]. He called for a vote, and received unanimous backing. This means that the Aitolians had already left the meeting before the vote, no doubt doing so when it became clear that their alternative had no support[47]. Flamininus sent an envoy to Aitolia to find out what the league's intentions were. We are not told

[45] Livy 34.24.1-4.

[46] Livy 34.24.5-6.

[47] Livy 34.24.7; in fact, one might interpret Alexandros' speech as implying, by his use of rude language towards the Athenians and the Achaians, that he knew full well that the meeting was stacked against him, and he was, as the phrase is, 'getting his retaliation in first'. This does not mean that the suggested policy of a new Symmachy was insincere.

what he feared, or what the answer was that he received, but it is not hard to guess: he will have feared that Aitolia would come out on Nabis' side; the answer was that the Aitolians would do nothing[48]. It was only at that point that Flamininus was able to order the Roman army, in camp at Elateia, to be summoned south[49]. Had the Aitolians proved awkward, the Elateia army may well have had to stay where it was.

Flamininus and his Greek allies were thus free to attack Nabis, an operation which took the whole summer of 195 to complete – one can see why Flamininus was concerned to secure Aitolian neutrality, if not support. It would seem to have been a good opportunity for the Aitolians to have bargained their way into more gains, since Flamininus had been given the task of deciding on their claims, but this seems not to have happened. Certainly the Aitolians never gained Leukas, which was the Roman naval base during the Nabis war[50], and there is no indication that they ever gained Pharsalos. Flamininus had perhaps not made his decision on these claims before the meeting at Corinth, for Alexandros is depicted as demanding it and Echinos, though the language is not clear[51].

The Aitolians may not have gained their full demands, but they had gained territory as a result of the war, defined by Livy as 'Lokris and Phokis'. But exactly what this consisted of is left unclear. Most of Lokris was already in the league, and the only part still outside it was the area around Opous, whose rulers had shown during the war that they did not wish to be part of the league again. There were also other towns in the area – Alope, Kynos, Halai – which were part of Lokris. To the west of these, however, Thronion and Nikaia, close to Thermopylai, were Aitolian, and had not been in dispute, and so were obviously not the subject of the award. Phokis is equally a problem. The Roman army was based at Elateia until mid-194, and that city would thus not be handed over to the Aitolians at least until they left, if then.

In the absence of a definitive statement, the area of Aitolian authority must be extrapolated from the epigraphic record. This consists mainly of instances of decrees, often from now on manumission

[48] Livy 34.24.7.
[49] Livy 34.25.1.
[50] Livy 34.26.11.
[51] Livy 34.23.7.

records, in which a particular city is seen to use the name of the current Aitolian *strategos* as part of its dating formula; also there are cases of men from particular cities performing duties as *hieromnemones* in the Aitolian list. Both of these imply that the city of their origin was part of the league, though in the case of the manumissions it is not quite as clear as that.

The problem is that there is some indication that exiles, such as the men taken to Rome as part of the Aitolian embassy in 198, were still stating their origin as their home cities; Pharsalos, which, judging from the Aitolian complaints, was not in the league by now, is stated as the home-city more than once between 204 and 196[52]. But this is a special case, and there are no other notices dating to the 190s where exiles can be discerned. Many of the inscriptions were put up at Delphi, and one might suspect that they were placed there for honorific reasons, yet using the Aitolian *strategos'* name in the dating formula, usually along with the name of the Delphic *archon*, seems definitive enough. One may take such instances as a clear sign that the originators of the inscription were citizens of the league.

For the period between the end of the Macedonian war and the start of the Roman war (197-192), there is inscriptional evidence that most of both Phokis and Lokris were in the league. From Opous the manumission of the slave Krokos in 191 has also a reference to the Opountian citizen Thersippos[53]. This date is a little awkward, since it is in the period when the Aitolians, along with King Antiochos, controlled most of Greece from the borders of Macedon to the border of Attika, but we have no indication that the league was making new members at the time, so it may be assumed that Opous had become a member of the league at the time of the Roman award, and so in 196 or 195; it was certainly not a member before that, though it had been at times in the third century.

In Phokis there are epigraphic records from Daulis, Ambryssos, Teithronion, and Elateia, manumissions in all cases. From Daulis the slave Aristeia was freed by Sotion son of Simachos, with ten other Daulians named in the inscription as guarantors or witnesses, dated by the *strategos* Damokritos' second term (193/192)[54]. From Teithro-

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[52] *SGDI* 2072, of 198, a manumission; Fl 1 43; Lefèvre 95, an *hieromnemon*, of 204/203.

[53] *SGDI* 1988.

[54] *SGDI* 1969.

nion, Niko and her sons Eupados and Menedemos freed their slave Zopyrion in the second term of Thoas (194/193)[55]; Chairondas of Ambryssos acted as a witness in a manumission in western Lokris during the strategy of Alexamenos (197/196)[56], which is not evidence of his city's political situation, only that he was present in Naupaktos or Plygonos at the time, but four years later, in the term of office of Thoas again (194/193), a man whose name is partly illegible ('A...s...') freed Kydon, and both are from Ambryssos[57]. These examples are good evidence that their respective cities were members of the league.

There is one man from Elateia also mentioned in one of these inscriptions, Philokles, who acted as a witness in the freeing of a slave by a man of Thronion in 191[58]. This by itself is not evidence of his home-city's status, but another inscription, from Stymphalos in Arkadia, honouring that city for habouring exiles from Elateia, provides stronger evidence. The exiles returned after the conquest of Elateia by Glabrio in 191, having been in exile there for several years. They had been allotted land by the Stymphalians, which implies that the exile was thought to be permanent; the inscription claims they were there for 'some years', and 'quite a long time'. It is unclear just who was originally responsible for driving out the exiles, for their city had suffered several changes of control over the previous generation, but it is quite clear that they had remained in exile during most of the 190s. It follows that Elateia was under Aitolian control during that time, and that the removal of that control was what allowed the exiles to go home[59].

The Aitolians therefore took over Epiknemidian Lokris at least as far east as Opous, and in Phokis they acquired Elateia, Daulis, Ambryssos, and Teithronion to add to their control of the city of Delphi. These places are all in inland Phokis, and there is no evidence for Antikyra and the coastal region. The confirmation of Aitolian control of the inland places does imply, however, that the Romans handed over all of Phokis, and we cannot in this case demand evidence in confirmation. The exiguous evidence already presented is

[55] *SGDI* 1983.
[56] *SGDI* 2002.
[57] *SGDI* 2125.
[58] *SGDI* 1984.
[59] M. Mitsos, 'Inscription de Stymphalos', *REG* 59-60, 1946-1947, 150-174.

thin enough. It may be assumed that all Phokis, as all Lokris, became Aitolian.

The league was now at its greatest geographical extent, but the conference at Corinth had revealed its political isolation, though this was not a condition which was either new or unexpected. It was, however, confirmed, even emphasised, by Flamininus' action during the winter and spring of 195/194. Having reduced Nabis' power by stripping him of Argos and the coastal areas of his state, yet left him in control of the inland areas of Sparta, he brought the Roman main army back to Elateia for winter quarters, and then proceeded to visit a series of states, during which he adjusted their regimes and constitutions in order to maintain Roman influence[60]. In the spring he withdrew the garrisons from Akrokorinth (theatrically, during a speech), from Chalkis, Oreus, and Eretria in Euboia, and from Demetrias[61]. Akrokorinth went to Achaia. In Euboia he rather heavy-handedly reminded the representatives of the cities of the Roman services to them[62]; in Thessaly he imposed an oligarchic government upon a region which was considerably disturbed[63]. In both areas he seems to have organised the cities into leagues. It is noticeable that at no time did he visit Aitolia, though it may have been at this time that he visited Delphi, where he dedicated his own shield and some silver bucklers, on which he described himself as bringing to Greeks the gift of freedom, and a gold wreath on which the inscription referred to Flamininus as 'god-like'[64]. None of this could possibly please the Aitolians. Flamininus then, with his army, evacuated Elateia, which was presumably now handed over to Aitolia, and marched through Aitolian Thermopylai and Malis, through Thessaly – some of which Aitolia claimed – and Epeiros to embark at Oricum for Italy[65].

The Romans had thus evacuated Greece, as Flamininus had intended, and as he had promised, and the warnings of the Aitolians were left high and dry. On the other hand, Flamininus had left the Greek states in a condition which almost invited further trouble. In the Peloponnese the Achaian League still confronted Nabis, who was damaged but not left powerless. In Thessaly the instability which

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[60] Livy 34.48.2.
[61] Livy 34.50.8-51.4.
[62] Livy 34.51.1-2.
[63] Livy 34.51.4-6.
[64] Plut. *Flamininus* 12.6-7.
[65] Livy 34.52.1.

Flamininus found could not be eliminated simply by imposing a league and an oligarchy; and Livy's words imply that the area became a by-word for internal instability 'down to the present day' – a phrase he had perhaps taken over from Polybios, his source for this passage[66]. Further north was Philip in Macedon whose meekness over the terms of the peace settlement will surely have fooled no-one. He could be expected to attempt to recover his lost lands at some point; and the restriction of his army to a maximum of 5,000 men was meaningless in a kingdom where every free man was a trained soldier.

But all these states were tied to Rome by treaty, or by terms of peace, or by alliance, and so Rome could exercise a degree of control over their policies. Only Aitolia was independent. True, the league claimed that the old alliance treaty was still in force, but it was clear that Rome did not accept that argument, and anyway that alliance treaty was one between equals, with the terms set out in detail; the later alliances with other Greek states were certainly not between equals, and the ties which joined Rome with Nabis and with Philip were those of the victors and the vanquished. Of all the Greek states, only Aitolia could claim to have real freedom of manoeuvre and decision in its foreign relations. Yet – and this was surely one of the calculations of the Romans – the very fact that all the surrounding Greek and Macedonian states were Roman allies effectively restricted Aitolian actions. Going to war with a Roman ally meant going to war with Rome; making an alliance with a Roman ally would require either Roman permission or the dissolution of the Roman alliance, and this was something the Romans did not permit. The Aitolians were truly isolated, and Flamininus presumably calculated that this isolation also left the league helpless.

The Roman withdrawal was completed by the summer of 194. It took place during the term of office in Aitolia of Dikaiarchos, the *strategos* elected in September 195. He was replaced in September 194 by his brother Thoas, *strategos* for the second time, under whom a new policy was put into effect. It is probable that this was already being considered under Dikaiarchos, for one of its main elements was contact across the Aegean with the Seleukid King Antiochos III, and it is in Dikaiarchos' time that early hints of this appear. During

[66] Livy 34.51.4; cf. Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.127.

Dikaiarchos' strategy the Aitolians had voted honours for two citizens of Magnesia-ad-Maiandros, a city subject to Antiochos. The two men were brothers, one of whom at least had served as *hieromnemon* at Delphi[67]. Contact with Magnesia had been made earlier as well, in 207 or so, when envoys soliciting recognition for the new Leukophryene festival had visited Aitolia[68]. They, or other envoys, had visited most of the states in the eastern Mediterranean, but the renewed contact which is evidenced in Aitolia was not maintained elsewhere. There had also, of course, been the honours voted by the Amphiktyony for Antiochos in 201/200[69]. All this was occasional and tentative, but under Dikaiarchos a more determined policy becomes visible.

In 195/194 to vote honours for a prominent pair of citizens of a city of the Seleukid empire was not an act without political significance. In that year King Antiochos made a second expedition into Thrace, Macedonia's eastern neighbour, an expedition aimed at continuing the process of conquest initiated in 196. Antiochos had seized control of the city of Lysimacheia, Aitolia's former colleague, began to rebuild it, and had met a group of Roman envoys there in the autumn of 196. One of the main points of discussion at that meeting was a Roman proposal that the proclamation of Greek freedom made by the Senate as part of the peace process ending the latest Macedonian war applied also to the Greek states of Asia. One Roman commissioner had visited the Greek cities of Karia, and another had gone to Ainos and Maroneia on the Thracian coast of the Aegean, cities which Antiochos carefully left alone in his Thracian campaigns[70].

This had all been going on in the background while Flamininus was operating in Greece, and Flamininus, though aware of it, had decided that it was not something which concerned him. But Antiochos' success in conquering Thrace, and the Roman evacuation of Greece, brought Antiochos much more into Greek calculations, all the more so as the Aitolians appreciated the scale of their political isolation after the peace. The honouring of men from Magnesia pro-

[67] *IG* IX.1.187 (honours for Magnesians); Fl 1 44 and 45 (*hieromnemones*).

[68] *IG* IX.1.186, a decree of Kalydon in which a list of peoples of the Aitolians is included.

[69] F. Lefèvre, 'Antiochos le Grand et les Étoliens à la fin du IIe siècle av J.-C.', *BCH* 120, 1996, 757-771.

[70] J. D. Grainger, 'Antiochos III in Thrace', *Historia* 45, 1996, 329-343.

vided the Aitolian leaders with contacts, and with information. Men who were important enough in their home cities to be *hieromnemones* were also important enough to have access to the royal court, which was established each spring and autumn at Ephesos, in between campaigns in the summer and wintering in Syria.

At the *Panaitolike* of spring 193, held at Naupaktos, the new policy was proposed by the *strategos* Thoas. It was to establish contact with those powers who could be reckoned to be anti-Roman, which were defined as Nabis of Sparta, Philip of Macedon, and Antiochos III[71]. Thoas is made to complain, in the speech relayed by Livy, of the lack of rewards provided to Aitolia after the victory over Philip, but this was the standard Roman complaint of Aitolian ingratitude, and it was not the real reason for the new policy. The Aitolians were aiming at a coalition of states perceived as enemies of Rome. What Thoas was proposing was a development of the idea put forward by Alexandros at the conference at Corinth. There it had become quite clear that Roman domination of the Greek states was too powerful to be challenged in the name of a Greek Symmachy. Once the Roman army had left Greece, it was equally clear that the Roman domination continued. The Aitolians had suggested at the meeting at Corinth the formation of a coalition of Greek states to cope with Nabis, which coalition would also squeeze out the Romans. By solving Greek problems using Greek methods, the Romans would have been given no reason, or no excuse, to intervene again in the Balkans. That idea had not been taken up even after the departure of the legions, but Roman policy had left other states besides the Aitolians with anti-Roman feelings. There had thus been some radical rethinking going on in Aitolian political circles in the past year. The result was Thoas' policy: abandon the idea of a Symmachy of Greek states, at least for the moment, and recruit into a new alliance those states whic was powerful enough, or independent enough, to defy or challenge Rome.

The suggestion was accepted by the assembly, and envoys were appointed to go to interview the three kings. The *strategos* Thoas' own brother Dikaiarchos, *strategos* in the previous year, was sent to speak to Antiochos. The ex-*strategos* Damokritos, who had presided over the slow Aitolian decision for war with Philip in 200/199, and was to be

[71] Livy 35.12.3-6.

strategos again next year, was sent to see Nabis. Philip was to be visited by Nikandros of Trichonos, the current *hipparchos*[72]. Dikaiarchos and Nikandros may be assumed to have the same views as Thoas: all three were from Trichonos, Thoas and Dikaiarchos were brothers, and Thoas and Nikandros were colleagues as magistrates in the current year. Damokritos emerged a couple of years later as a vigorous anti-Roman, and this seems to have been his position by 193; he became *strategos* at the next election, and this may well have been part of the plan as well. It is clear that the Aitolians were pursuing a consistent policy over several years: Alexandros had proposed the Greek coalition in 195, and, with adjustments, it was a development of this policy which was now being proposed by Thoas, with the participation of the *strategoi* of 195/194 and 193/192, Dikaiarchos and Damokritos. Nikandros, the *hipparchos*, makes his first appearance in the political scene at this point (in our records, that is), but he was to have a long and busy political career ahead of him. He was a member of a notable political family from Trichonos; his grandfather had been a witness in the Akarnanian treaty of 271/270, and his cousins were active as well[73].

The plan failed as badly as the original suggestion for a Greek coalition. The three envoys' tasks were, in fact, mainly to interest the three kings in joining an alliance. No definite plans for action were proposed, but the kings were invited to consider the matter. To each the particular benefits he would reap were suggested. Nikandros is said to have praised Philip's resistance to Rome in the previous wars, as something worthy of his royal ancestors, and pointed out how successful Hannibal – Philip's former ally and now a refugee with Antiochos – had been in destroying Roman armies[74]. Nabis was encouraged by Damokritos to contemplate what he had lost, who had gained by his loss, and to remember that the Roman forces had left Greece; the participation of Antiochos should be Nabis' signal to begin action[75]. In so far as these accounts of private conversations, between Greeks as reported by a Roman historian two centuries later, can be trusted, it seems clear that both Philip and Nabis were only expected to join in once Antiochos had declared himself. But Dikaiarchos rather exagger-

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[72] Livy 35.12.6.
[73] For the careers of these men see the *Prosopography*.
[74] Livy 35.12.10-15.
[75] Livy 35.12.7-9.

ated the willingness of these two to participate when he spoke to Antiochos. He peddled the correct Aitolian line, that the real fighting had been done by the Aitolians, and discussed the Aitolian military strength, and the possible bases there were for Antiochos' forces, both military and naval, in Aitolian territory[76]. But Dikaiarchos was speaking to a man with very much greater responsibilities than his colleagues as targets. Nabis and Philip were much more narrowly focussed than the Seleukid king; Antiochos took his time.

Antiochos' activities during this year were partly determined by the results of an embassy he had sent to Rome. The two powers had been exchanging envoys for several years, and Antiochos' latest embassy had proposed a treaty of alliance between the two great powers. In reply to this, more Roman envoys had been despatched eastwards. The king's envoys were Menippos son of Phainias, and the historian Hegesianax. They had rather surprised the Senate by their suggestion, which was not welcomed[77]. They had returned to Asia in advance of the Romans, who reached Asia themselves in the late spring, after Antiochos had begun his Pisidian campaign and probably at much the same time as Dikaiarchos.

An inscription at Delphi records that Hegesianax was honoured as *proxenos* at Delphi in 193[78]. Menippos is not so recorded, nor is Lysias, who may or may not have been a third member of the embassy[79]. Hegesianax' visit was thus on his return from Rome; Menippos, the senior member, had presumably hurried on to report to Antiochos as soon as possible. Hegesianax was thus in Delphi in the spring, at the same time as Thoas was announcing the new Aitolian policy towards the kings at the *Panaitolike* at Naupaktos. It is, of course, not possible to prove contact between the two men, but it is equally impossible to believe that they ignored each other; a meeting between the distinguished historian who was also an envoy of the Great King and the *strategos* of the Aitolians, who controlled Delphi, which city was enrolling Hegesianax as a *proxenos*, could be taken as certain, even if Thoas was not in the middle of promulgating a new policy which involved contacting that very king with a view to an alliance.

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[76] Livy 35.12.16-18.

[77] Livy 34.57.6; App. *Syr.* 6.

[78] *Syll* (3) 585.

[79] Lysias is included by Appian (*Syr.* 6), but this may be a confusion with an earlier embassy of Hegesianax and Lysias; but it may also be that there really were three envoys, for the Romans sent three men in reply.

Their discussions will inevitably have been political. Hegesianax' experience of Roman obduracy in many ways paralleled that of the Aitolians. The shift in Aitolian policy was surely broached, at least in a tentative form. Hegesianax could not commit his king, of course, but he will have been able to ensure an introduction to the king of any Aitolian envoy who was despatched. In all, it is hardly surprising that it was Thoas' brother who was sent to Antiochos – and Thoas himself went as an envoy later. This was all sensible diplomacy, even down to Dikaiarchos' declaration to Antiochos that both Philip and Nabis were ready and willing to join in, which was not true, though he no doubt expected it to become true if he could deliver Antiochos.

The problem with constructing a diplomatic alliance of this sort is that each of the potential participants had his own agenda, and none of them had any interest in that of the Aitolians. Nabis had been convinced by the argument that the Romans would scarcely bother to intervene over such a minor matter as the fate of the town of Gytheion and of the small towns and villages along the southern and eastern Peloponnesian coast; so, without waiting for the Aitolians or Antiochos, he launched an attack on them[80]. Antiochos was already deeply involved in a campaign in Pisidia when Dikaiarchos arrived to see him. The Roman embassy also arrived and Antiochos was not going to jeopardise the chance of a settlement with Rome at Aitolian bidding. He was fully occupied with the Pisidian campaign, the Roman negotiations, and the death of his eldest son, which occurred in the midst of it all; Dikaiarchos came a long way down Antiochos' list[81]. Philip's reaction to Nikandros' blandishments is not recorded, but it can be assumed to be non-committal: he sat on the fence until well into the war which resulted. The Senate had already reduced the indemnity he had agreed to pay, and had promised to release his hostage-son; such inducements – as well as his recent defeat, and his longstanding hostility to Aitolia – kept him loyal to Rome, at least on the surface[82].

So only Nabis reacted as the Aitolians wished, but he did so in such a way that he was left alone to face, first the Achaians, and then

[80] Livy 35.13.1.

[81] Livy 35.13.5, 14.1 and 15.1-17.2.

[82] Philip's answer to Nikandros is not recorded, and is sometimes assumed to be negative (e.g. Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.448), but it is more likely that he gave no answer at all, which is why it is not recorded: Livy 34.57.1; Diod 28.15; Walbank, *Philip V*, 191.

the Romans as well. Damokritos was wrong in saying that the Romans would not be interested in the fate of a minor town like Gytheion; instead they sent Flamininus, who was able to co-ordinate various armies and fleets, Roman and Greek, against the Spartans. Ironically the numbers of Greek troops involved shows that a Greek coalition to suppress Nabis was now in operation, albeit under Roman sponsorship; Achaians, Akarnanians, and Epeirotes were all mentioned as taking part, and there seem to have been others[83].

By this time the relations between Antiochos III and Rome had reached difficult territory. Antiochos had completed the conquest of Thrace, and had spent 193 reducing Pisidia. This all made some Romans nervous, and the failure of the Roman embassy of that year to produce a clear agreement between Rome and the king made the situation worse. When Nabis, another of the Aitolians' targets, persisted in his war on Gytheion, Flamininus was appointed to sort out the Greek situation, and was given as colleagues three men, two of them of consular rank, including the well-experienced P. Villius Tappulus, who had been one of envoys to Antiochos. The crisis in the Peloponnese had developed relatively slowly over the summer of 193, and the envoys of the Aitolians to the three kings had not hurried in their travels and talks. The appointment of Flamininus and his colleagues came in the autumn or early winter of that year, and they do not seem to have set off for Greece very eagerly either. In February 192 the Achaians, having failed to deter Nabis from the siege of Gytheion, by sending in reinforcements to help hold the city, and perhaps losing patience with the slow Roman response, and perhaps not unwilling to demonstrate their independence, declared war on Sparta.

This at last brought Flamininus and his commission to Greece, and they demonstrated their priorities by urging the Achaians to wait for Roman help before beginning the fighting, and they then concentrated their attention on central Greece. In other words, the threat from the Aitolians was fully perceived by the Romans, who thus knew of the envoys' visits to the kings. For the Romans, therefore, the Aitolians were seen to be the basis of the whole Greek problem. The commissioners visited Athens first, then sailed to Chalkis, one of the Fetters which was now independent, but a member of the new

[83] Livy 35.13.2-3 and 25.2-30.13.

Euboian League; it was still a major fortress, which would be an early target in any new war in the area.

Demetrias, now the chief city of the Magnesians, another of the Fetters, was clearly another place for the Romans to secure. Flamininus first saw the Thessalians, whom he had installed as the government of the new league only two years before, then went on to Demetrias. In a public meeting he failed to deny a rumour that the city was to be handed back to Philip, and, caught out in this, he lost his temper. The leader of the anti-Roman group, Eurylochos, thereupon fled to Aitolia in fear of his life[84].

The Aitolians had had some time, meanwhile, to digest the results of their diplomatic initiatives. Nabis' attacks on Gytheion had been their suggestion, so thay could hardly complain if he took the suggestion seriously enough to act on it. It is doubtful if anyone had entertained much hope of an alliance with Philip; his diplomatic dependence on Rome, and his current weakness, would be fully recognised. On the other hand, it could be assumed that, given the change, he would try for revenge. But Antiochos was in a different league. A king with an enormous kingdom, and a record, recently at least, of victory and conquest, he was also a familiar employer to many Aitolian mercenary soldiers. Some of his senior military commanders were Aitolians, and no doubt considerable numbers of ordinary soldiers will have served in his forces[85]. Dikaiarchos' mission to Asia had not produced any concrete results, but at least Antiochos had not refused his proposals. In the circumstances this could be taken as positive encouragement by optimistic Aitolians – and in any case they had no other options. In the autumn of 193 Dikaiarchos' brother Thoas went across on another mission of persuasion[86].

Thoas was *strategos* until September, when he was replaced by Damokritos, holding the office for the second time[87]. Damokritos had been the envoy to Nabis, and so was fully involved in the new Aitolian policy. The dispatch of Thoas will have been arranged as soon as

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[84] Livy 35.31.3-32.1.

[85] For example, Theodotos Hemiolios in 221-217, Theodotos, 219-213, and Panaitolos 218-209. A large Aitolian force under Skopas had fought against Antiochos III at Panion in 200, and other Aitolians had been in Akhaios' army at Sardis in 213 (cf. M. Holleaux, 'Les Aitoliens auxiliaires d'Achaios (Polybe VII, 16, 7)', *REA*, 18, 1916, 231-247).

[86] Livy 35.32.1.

[87] Named at Livy 35.33.9 (as the '*praetor*').

Dikaiarchos returned – he apparently did not see Antiochos until the late summer, presumably because the king was busy in Pisidia, with the Roman envoys, and with the death of his son – and Thoas could therefore leave soon after his replacement had been elected at the *Thermike*. He did not return to Aitolia until the spring, at about the time Flamininus was making a mess of things in Demetrias.

Antiochos habitually spent the winters in Syria, all the more necessarily in this year after the death of his son, who had been joint-king and had normally administered the kingdom from Antioch when his father went on campaign. Thoas, as a distinguished visitor, will have been accommodated at the court, and will have been able to spend plenty of time with the king, persuading. He returned home in the spring with the king's envoy, Menippos, Hegesianax' former colleague at Rome, a man high in the king's favour, and one who had already been to Rome and Greece on his behalf. This was a serious embassy.

Thoas and Menippos arrived in Aitolia before the *Panaitolike* in March, which they both attended[88]. We do not know where it was held, but the ease with which Athenians reached it, and with which the Romans arrived at it from Demetrias, suggest that it was held somewhere in the east, probably at Herakleia, or maybe Lamia. The Romans, in Thessaly and Demetrias, heard almost at once of the proceedings, and were able to persuade an Athenian embassy to attend. Livy provides an account of the meeting, apparently based on Polybios' account, with his own interjections and elaborations. It is, in essence, more or less believable[89].

Thoas gave an account of his embassy to Antiochos, which was clearly inconclusive. Menippos spoke, without committing his king to anything, but requiring the Aitolians to make clear plans for action before Antiochos would be able to make a decision. The Athenians warned and cautioned against sudden decisions, suggesting that the Romans be heard first. This was a mistake, since Flamininus was not a popular character in Aitolia, and a vote was taken which expressed a popular preference for Antiochos; then another vote was taken by which it was determined to cut off all communications with the Romans. When Flamininus heard of this second vote he resolved to attend the meeting himself, in the circumstances a brave decision.

[88] Livy 35.32.2.

[89] Livy 35.32.3-33.11; 'confidently' based on Polybios: Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.2.

He was heard, despite the earlier decision, courteously and in full[90]. He responded with threats and insults, beginning by examining how often the Aitolians had broken faith with the Roman alliance, and recommending, yet again, that the Aitolians send envoys to speak to the Senate. Then he warned against war. All in all, if Livy reports him correctly[91], it is a tribute to Aitolian restraint that Flamininus was not lynched. It is not surprising that Thoas was able to propose a motion that Antiochos be invited to free the Greeks, by implication from Roman domination, and to have it carried even before Flamininus had left the meeting. Nor is it surprising that, when he asked for a copy of the decree – a pretty insolent request in the circumstances – Damokritos the *strategos* brushed him off by saying there were more important things to do, and that he would deliver it himself, on the banks of the Tiber[92]. Flamininus cut a very sorry figure in all this, and deserved the insults heaped on him.

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[90] Livy uses the term *concilium* both for the Panaitolike meeting and for the audience of Flamininus, but it may be that Flamininus spoke to an Aitolian executive council rather than the full Assembly which was the *Panaitolike*. These Assemblies lasted only a week, and this one had been going on for some time before the vote on Roman contacts was taken. Then Flamininus had to hear about it, by way of the Athenians, and had to travel to the meeting place. There is considerable uncertainty in all this, but it would be more comfortable to see him as arriving several days after the votes at least, rather than only one or two. There is thus a likelihood that the Assembly had dispersed before Flamininus arrived. The fact that the Assembly had displayed hostility to Rome and had voted to cut communications rather suggests also that he was speaking to a smaller, less easily swayed group than a mass meeting.

[91] Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.193-194 detects 'considerable elaboration' by Livy of Polybios' (hypothetical) original text, and sees a good deal of Roman ideas inserted, which might have distorted Flamininus' original remarks as reported (or composed) by Polybios.

[92] Livy 35.33.7-11.

20. THE ROMAN WAR
1. THE SELEUKID ALLIANCE
(192-191)

The Aitolian decision for war on Rome, if not the actual declaration, was clearly taken at the *Panaitolike* of March 192. The decision to invite Antiochos III to Greece, and the rude answer of Damokritos to Flamininus clearly implied that an attack would be made on Rome's political position in Greece. But Flamininus seems not to have taken it seriously, or at least did not react, and Antiochos failed to respond except, it seems, by envoy. But then Menippos had made Antiochos' position clear: the Aitolians would have to show themselves willing to act before any great help came from Asia. The Aitolians had all too clearly shown that they wanted others to bear the main burden. Their reason was obvious enough, that they did not have the manpower to fight Rome alone, but this time they were expected to use their full strength. And meanwhile Antiochos took his army into Thrace for another campaign to reinforce his conquest[1]. This campaign began in the spring of 192, about the time the *Panaitolike* took place, and this move by Antiochos, of course, may be the basic reason why Flamininus did not do anything after the *Panaitolike*. It could be assumed therefore that Antiochos would be occupied in Thrace for the whole campaigning season of 192. This would be a reassurance to Flamininus, who could also see as well as Antiochos that the Aitolians could not hope to challenge Rome alone.

Yet this, in a way, is just what the Aitolians decided to do. They had received no help from Philip, not even any encouragement, but the assurances they got from Antiochos must have been sufficiently convincing to provide that encouragement – perhaps more so in private conversation than Menippos could afford to be in public They set up a committee, called the *apokletoi*, to plan and conduct a preliminary campaign. These were men of experience, meeting in private, not to say secret, but not apparently with executive powers, for it was individual men who conducted the actual operations they set up. It is best to see the *apokletoi* as a staff committee, an advisory and research

[1] J. D. Grainger, 'Antiochos III in Thrace', *Historia* 45, 1996, 329-343.

group, which was to develop plans which would then be implemented by the elected magistrates; for it was the *strategos* and his colleagues who would have operational responsibility, and would therefore also have a veto power on the proposals[2].

Livy suggests that the *apokletoi*'s plans were to promote social revolution in the set of large cities which were the targets: Demetrias, Sparta, and Chalkis[3]. Yet in carrying out the plans there is never any indication of social revolution; only the replacement of one ruling group by another ruling group was intended[4]. The Aitolians' aim, after all, was to remove *Roman* influence in Greece. To do this it was necessary, in the absence of actual Roman soldiers, to displace the oligarchies installed by Flamininus and then replace them with anti-Roman groups, of which every state will have had at least one. The Macedonian kings had identified the key strategic positions, from which most of Greece could be controlled as three – the Fetters. Demetrias and Chalkis were heavily fortified cities, presently independent. The third, Corinth, was in the hands of the Achaians.

The first part of the Aitolian plan was therefore to seize control of Demetrias and Chalkis, which, as cities with new and therefore unstable oligarchic governments, were relatively easy targets. Corinth, however, was different. Under Achaian control it could scarcely be seized, and even to attempt to do so would be self-defeating folly, for this would produce instant Achaian enmity. If a serious effort to remove Roman influence from Greece was to be made, the Achaians had to be brought round to the Aitolian point of view. The problem was that, while the Achaians were at war with Nabis, they were

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[2] The *apokletoi* are mentioned for the first time at this point (Livy 35.34.2), and it is most reasonable to assume that it is a new group. Polybios (20.1) says that a group of thirty was part of the *apokletoi*, and it is therefore presumed that the actual total membership was considerably larger than that. This seems doubtful, for something which Livy (at 33.34.2) calls their 'inner council'. It is better to see the thirty as a maximum. Larsen *GFS*, 200 considers the *apokletoi* as a body selected from a larger council, and implies its continued existence from the origins of the league, but the constitution of the league was a developing organism, and there is no reason to assume this small group was older than the present crisis. It was not very successful, and is not heard of again after Antiochos' arrival late in 192. If it was only a temporary expedient, this would explain the confusion surrounding it in the ancient sources. Cf. also W. Schwan, 'Die Apokleten der Ätoler und die Apokleser der Lokrer', *Wiener Studien* 48, 1930, 141-149.

[3] Livy 35.34.3-4.

[4] The idea of a social revolution, anti-aristocratic, at Sparta while Nabis ruled is laughable.

inevitably placed on the Roman side, and the presence of Flamininus in Greece was a clear sign of that. It was common knowledge, however, that at least one party in Achaia was unhappy about this alignment, and that its programme was complete independence, which was exactly what the Aitolians asked for themselves. The leader of this group was Philopoimen, and he, after a period of self-exile in Crete, had now returned and had been elected *strategos* of the Achaian League for the year 193/192, taking up the office in autumn 193. That is, he was in office at the same time as the *apokletoi* were planning their *coups*, in the spring of 192, and he was busy with his war on Nabis the whole year[5]. Therefore, it followed that, if Achaia, with Corinth, was to be brought to the Aitolian side in the coming war with Rome, Nabis had to be removed, since it was the Spartan war which pinned Achaia to the Roman alignment in its foreign relations. So the third target of the Aitolian plan was Nabis.

This must be explained. There have been several different attempts to explain Nabis' murder: 'presumably the desire to commit Sparta to the war against Achaia'[6], or the Aitolian aim was 'to take Sparta directly under the control of the Aitolian League'[7], as part of 'their scheme of aggrandisement'[8], or in the hope of bringing 'une Laconie liberée' into the Aitolian camp[9]. That is, there are differing explanations with each historian. But in such an investigation it is always best to see who benefits. At no point did the Aitolians in Sparta attempt to seize political power; instead the beneficiaries were Philopoimen and the Achaian League. The organiser of the murder of Nabis, Alexamenos, was no fool nor an incompetent; he had, after all, successfully deflected blame for the death of Brachyllas onto Flamininus, and his accomplishment of the murder of Nabis showed an ability out carry out a plan and to await opportunities patiently until the moment to strike was ripe. Therefore the Aitolian plan was not to seize power in Sparta, nor even to install a new Spartan government. Instead it was to do exactly what happened: to remove Nabis and leave Sparta leaderless. It was obvious what would happen to any contemporary observer: Philopoimen just happened to be

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[5] Errington, *Philopoemen*, 40-108.
[6] Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.196.
[7] Errington, *Philopoimen*, 109.
[8] Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 460.
[9] Will, *Histoire Politique*, 2.170.

ready to intervene, but he would have done so even if he had not been geographically handy. And one result was to drive a wedge between Achaia and Rome, for Flamininus' policy had been to keep Sparta as an independent state as a balance for Achaia in the Peloponnese. This is precisely what Aitolia would want to happen.

The Aitolian plan, therefore, which was produced by the *apokletoi*, was to seize control of Demetrias and Chalkis and make them allies of the league, and to kill Nabis as a means of bringing Achaia into the anti-Roman coalition. How much farther the *apokletoi* went in their planning is not so clear, but it is likely that they could make suggestions as to methods and procedures. The decision to put the plan into effect, however, was for the *strategos* Damokritos, no doubt in consultation with those he trusted, which will have included the *hipparchos*, the *grammateis*, and presumably any past magistrates he trusted (which would surely include some or all of the *apokletoi*). The overall plan was accepted, elaborated into individual plans, and a man was assigned to each part. It is noticeable that, so far as can be seen, the three commanders were not the current magistrates. The Spartan task was assigned to Alexamenos, who had been *strategos* in 197/196, the period during which the peace terms imposed by Rome had become clear, and the man who had organised the killing of Brachyllas. The Chalkis plan was given to Thoas, the best known of the three, *strategos* already twice and the negotiator with Antiochos; the capture of Demetrias was the task of Diokles, about whom nothing more is known, unless he was the same man as others with the same name who were an *hieromnemon* in 217/216 and acted as *archon* at Naupaktos at some time in the first two decades of the second century; it is possible that he was the current *hipparchos*, since he commanded the cavalry in the Demetrias *coup*[10].

Diokles had the assistance of the exiled Eurylochos in seizing control of Demetrias. Eurylochos was the leader of a substantial party of opinion in the city, and he made use of this to organise his return. Diokles, under pretence of escorting him home, brought in the Aitolian cavalry who seized the city gates and other important places while attention was focussed elsewhere, and killed the leaders among Eurylochos' opponents. It was efficiently done, but the essential basis

[10] For the careers of the men, cf. the *Prosopography*; Diokles as *hipparchos* is suggested by Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.196.

for success was the existence of a large body of opinion in the city which could be quickly mobilised in support[11].

This was also the case at Chalkis. The exiled leader in this case was Euthymides, together with a Kian exile called Herodoros, who lived at Chalkis. Euthymides had been Aitolian *proxenos* in 208/207[12]; Kios had been one of the cities which had had an Aitolian *strategos* when Philip took the place. A complicated plot was organised whereby Euthymides would go to Salganeus, the mainland part of Chalkis, a substantial fortress in its own right, while a force of 600 Aitolian infantry in ships, with Herodoros, would wait at Atalante Island, near Opous, fifty kilometres up the Euripos Strait from Chalkis, and Thoas would bring the rest of his force, two hundred cavalry and 1400 infantry, by land across Boiotia. The signal for action was apparently to be the arrival of Thoas' force on the coast opposite Chalkis.

This was a clumsy and over-elaborate scheme, involving large and therefore all-too visible forces. Euthymides never got closer to Chalkis than Thebes, Herodoros and the fleet did not leave Atalante Island, and when Thoas arrived opposite the city he found that the city was alert, and the walls of Salganeus were manned by Chalkidians. The city itself was defended by men from Eretria and Karystos, fellow members of the Euboian League, who had assembled at Eretria for the festival of Artemis Amarynthos. The availability of these men to assist the defence was perhaps merely opportune, but the Aitolian approach had been far too obvious, and the internal subversion far too perfuntory. The Chalkidian leaders, Mikythio and Xenokleides, were able to play on the fear of the Chalkidian citizens and other Euboians of yet another foreign military occupation. After a brief exchange of messages, in which it became clear that surprise was lost and the city was too well defended for his relatively small force to tackle, Thoas gave up and took his troops home[13].

At Sparta Alexamenos pretended to Nabis that he had brought help against the Achaians: a thousand infantry and thirty cavalry. He had no formed plan, but was clearly improvising, and the cavalrymen had been given instructions by the *strategos* Damokritos to do whatever Alexamenos asked. Having got Nabis, attended by only a few men,

[11] Livy 35.34.56-11.
[12] *IG* IX.1.31.
[13] Livy 35.37.4-38.14.

accustomed to drilling the Aitolians, Alexamenos ordered his cavalrymen to kill the Spartan ruler. This was done outside the city, and Alexamenos swiftly followed up by seizing the palace, but then lost control of most of his Aitolian troops. The Spartans were not disarmed, and when they had recovered from the immediate shock they were able to catch the Aitolians scattered about and plundering. Alexamenos was killed in the recapture of the palace, most of his soldiers were killed in a last stand at the Chalkioikos, and the few who escaped out of Lakedaimon were captured as they reached Achaian territory and sold as slaves. The Achaians had taken literally the cover story of them helping Nabis; they were treated as prisoners of war[14].

The Aitolians' behaviour in the aftermath of the assassination is incomprehensible if Alexamenos had been intended to seize control of the state. Certainly he went straight for the palace – where it was later said he was stealing Nabis' treasure[15] – but when he got there he did nothing. His men were not with him but were out causing trouble in the city. If he had wished to seize power he will have known well enough that clear plans had to be made, preferably in concert with a local group – as Diokles had done at Demetrias. A new government had to be organised quickly and a determined show of force was required to browbeat Nabian loyalists. A figurehead was needed to head up the new regime. There were at least two available figureheads: Armenas, Nabis' son, and a boy whom the sources call Lakonikos, who was eventually used by others[16]. But Alexamenos did nothing but sit in the palace. The conclusion must be that this was his intention all along, part of the overall plan. He was thus waiting for something else to happen, which can only be what did happen: a move by the Achaians, whose ambition to unite the whole Peloponnese was well known.

In this connection, it is useful to speculate on the route Alexamenos and his soldiers had taken on their way from Aitolia to Sparta. This is not mentioned in the ancient sources. It is assumed that a route through Achaia was impossible, which actually leaves a route through Messenia or a voyage by sea[17]. Messenia was an old Aitolian

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[14] Livy 35.35.1-36.10.

[15] Livy 35.36.6.

[16] Livy 34.52.7 (Armenas, son of Nabis – but he was a hostage at Rome) and 35.36.8 (Lakonikos – 'a mere boy of royal stock').

[17] Aymard, *Premiers Rapports*, 244, n 61 suggests that they came by sea.

friend, but was an even older enemy of Sparta; sending apparent reinforcements to Nabis through Messenia seems as unlikely as going through Achaia. But if Philopoimen had been contacted already, a route through Achaia could well have been arranged. And Philopoimen was ready suspiciously quickly, and managed to intervene in Sparta very soon after the murder. This is not really contadicted by the fact that the few Aitolians who escaped were captured and sold by the Achaians. Either the Achaians involved were not in the secret, or Philopoimen had no wish for the secret of his plot – if there was one – to get out. And who would listen to a slave, especially, in Achaia, an Aitolian slave?

Despite the disaster of losing the whole force and the leader, Alexamenos had accomplished what he had been sent to do, and Philopoimen of the Achaians completed his work by moving swiftly to execute a pro-Achaian *coup* at Sparta, as a result of which the city, under its new regime, and the Achaian League became allies. To Philopoimen's undoubted satisfaction this happened just as a squadron of Roman ships arrived off Gytheion. He could claim that the war Achaia had waged independently upon Sparta had been concluded successfully, despite Roman objections.

The seizure of Demetrias and the failure of the attempt on Chalkis took only a few days, whereas the Spartan imbroglio took a month or more. So the Roman commissioners reacted to Demetrias and Chalkis without apparently knowing anything about the Aitolian involvement with Nabis. Flamininus and his colleagues had gone to Corinth after the disastrous meeting of the *Panaitolike* in March. He had there insisted that the Achaians lift the blockade they had imposed on Sparta[18], which in turn had permitted Alexamenos and his men to reach the city and gave them the opening for gaining Nabis' confidence. Meanwhile Flamininus attempted to undo the Aitolians' work at Demetrias and Chalkis.

He persuaded King Eumenes, Attalos' successor, who was also at Corinth, to put five hundred of his Pergamene troops into Chalkis[19] – which city therefore ended up with a foreign garrison after all – and also contacted the *strategos* of the Thessalian League, Eunomos, to mobilise the league troops in the hope of recovering control of

[18] Errington, *Philopoemen*, 96-97.
[19] Livy 35.39.12.

Demetrias. But a visit by Villius in a quinquereme demonstrated clearly that the city was completely under Eurylochos' control. Villius did not even land, and Eurylochos made it obvious that he now regarded the city as totally free, and not under Roman influence in any way. Villius, muttering darkly about Demetrian ingratitude – Roman code for a client's refusal of clientship, that is, rebellion – retired, and Eunomos disbanded his troops[20].

It was high summer before the outcome of all this had become clear, and even then there were considerable uncertainties. Demetrias was firmly an Aitolian ally (it does not seem to have become a member of the league) and probably carried with it the land of the Magnetes, the hill-country stretching along the Aegean coast north from the city. At the same time, the Thessalian League, at least under its present leaders, had been shown to be hostile, both to the new regime in Demetrias, and therefore to the Aitolians. Chalkis and all Euboia was also now hostile, and the use of Pergamene troops to garrison the city put Eumenes firmly on this anti-Aitolian side as well. So far, therefore, Aitolian actions had largely clarified much of the situation in Central Greece, at the cost of placing several cities firmly in opposition to them.

It also seemed that the same had been accomplished in the Peloponnese, where the Achaian acquisition of the alliance of Lakedaimon under its new regime had successfully extinguished the Achaian-Spartan war, and had also boosted Achaian self-confidence as against Rome. In the process Flamininus had angered the dominant Achaian, Philopoimen, by interfering in their Spartan war. A rift between Achaia and Rome was exactly what the Aitolians wanted[21].

It was at this point that Thoas, now that this general clarification had taken place, went across the sea to report to Antiochos on the Aitolian actions he had asked for, and to consult on the next move[22]. In fact he had to wait until Antiochos finished his campaign in Thrace, and so it was probably September before he could reach him. In all probability he would need to wait until the election of the new officials at the *Thermike* at the equinox in September 192 before he could go, for he would need authorisation from the new *strategos*, and it would be known that Antiochos was unreachable until his return. The

[20] Livy 35.39.3-8.
[21] Errington, *Philopoimen*, 104-108.
[22] Livy 35.42.4.

new *strategos* was Phaineas, *strategos* once before in 198/197, at the end of the last Macedonian war[23]. The despatch of Thoas is a clear sign that Phaineas was fully committed to the policy of his predecessors. Once again the names of the *hipparchos* and the *grammateis* are not known.

This timing means that the Aitolians had had several months to consider their options. The events in Sparta took place probably in June, but certainly no later than July, by which time the attempts on Demetrias and Chalkis had taken place, while Thoas did not go over to see Antiochos until the autumn. So a summer of discussion and reflection by the Aitolian politicians had not produced any change in their aims or methods. Thoas went to Antiochos to urge him to come through with his implied promise through Menippos at the *Panaitolike* in the spring: the Aitolians had taken sufficient measures during the summer to convince him that they were serious, and that they fully intended to fight Rome. The scenes at Demetrias were sufficient in themselves, and the reproach of Villius to the Demetrians of 'ingratitude' was the standard Roman accusation of treachery. It could be expected that Rome would send troops to Greece as a result.

Rome had in fact already taken such measures. The elections for 191 had been held in September 192 rather than November, and the praetor M. Baebius Tamphilus had been ordered to cross to Illyria with an army of two legions which was already stationed in southern Italy. It is most unlikely that Thoas knew of any of this before he set off to see Antiochos, since Baebius did not land until October, which was probably the first indication for anyone in Greece that the crisis would certainly result in war. No declaration of war had yet been made against anyone, but the intended target was obviously Aitolia[24].

Thoas' argument, backed by Aitolian deeds, was apparently cogent enough, however, and at about the same time that Baebius was crossing the Adriatic, Antiochos brought his own army across the Aegean[25]. His precise reasons for doing so are not known, still less the calculations behind them. The presence of Hannibal in Asia is held by Livy to have been decisive in persuading Antiochos[26], but this is

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[23] Livy 35.44.1.

[24] Livy 35.24.7 and 36.1.7.

[25] Livy 35.43.2-6.

[26] Either, as Thoas is made to argue, so that Antiochos' achievement might outshine that of Hannibal (Livy 35.42.6-14) or by Hannibal's argument made in council (Livy 35.19.1-7).

Roman Hannibalic paranoia; Antiochos was quite capable of making up his own mind. Anyway, as Thoas pointed out, Hannibal in 192 was a failed Carthaginian politician in exile, rather than the victor of Trasimene and Cannae thirty years before.

Antiochos' motives being unclear, the way is open for some speculation. But the motives of the Aitolians are easier to estimate. Their experience in their last two wars had shown them that they could not fight Macedon alone with any hope of success, and since Rome had beaten Macedon, still less could they hope to defeat Rome. The Aitolian policy, therefore, was now to ally with any or all other powers who were capable of providing a boost to Aitolian power in a Roman war; so they had appealed to Philip and to Antiochos, and had plotted to seize strategic points. Achaia was another target, to be approached circumspectly because of the peculiar Achaian political culture (the legacy of Aratos) and the complication of Nabis. Of all these, the most important catch was Antiochos, because of his sheer power, and it is noticeable how much more careful and persistent the Aitolians were in working for Antiochos' participation than for that of any of the others. Philip, who might be thought, after his recent defeat, to be a prime subject for blandishment, was approached only once. But Antiochos issued his challenge to the Aitolians to prove their willingness to challenge Rome, and they had responded; and Antiochos, presumably impressed with their response, had seen the potential[27].

The route he took is carefully noted by Livy – first to Ilion for a sacrifice, then across the north Aegean by way of Imbros and Skiathos, to a landfall at Pteleon, there to be met by Eurylochos and his Magnesian fellow-leaders, apparently by pre-arrangement[28]. They conducted him to Demetrias where he disembarked his forces and set up camp nearby. He had brought 10,000 infantry, 500 cavalry and six elephants. This force has been criticised at least since Livy[29], for being inadequate. This is, of course, a retrospective judgement, based

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[27] Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 460, remarks that 'to characterize Aitolia as an anti-Roman movement is erroneous. Aitolia pursued her own ends'. This is true enough, of course, since all states pursue their own ends, but in the context of the 190s, to pursue its own ends, any Greek state would have to be either pro- or anti-Roman; and since all other Greek states were Roman allies or clients, Aitolia was necessarily anti-Roman.

[28] Livy 35.43.5; Pteleon was actually in Achaia Phthiotis and so was assigned to Aitolia in 197, but here it is clearly part of the Magnetes' league.

[29] Livy 35.42.6; it is, however, the equivalent of a Roman legion and an Italian *ala*, plus elephants.

in the knowledge that Antiochos was defeated, though in the two battles he fought against Roman armies the contest was very close.

All too rarely is Antiochos given the credit for deciding matters for himself. It was obviously a carefully made decision, given that he had much larger forces available in Asia Minor, which he drew on for reinforcements next year. What needs to be discussed is what Antiochos expected to use this army for. The Aitolians had emphasised their willingness to fight, and had perhaps overstated their own military power. Their actual armed strength, in fact, was just about what Antiochos brought with him, so it would seem that Antiochos was deliberately providing an equivalent force. When he set out from Ephesos there was no sign that Rome would intervene. Demetrias had been seized several months before, and still no declaration had come, not even an official protest. So Antiochos was apparently not expecting a war with Rome, but only a joint campaign with Aitolia against other Greek states. For this an army of 20,000 infantry and a thousand cavalry would have been quite adequate. Yet it must have been obvious that Rome would intervene sooner or later, since those states which he would be fighting were opposed to Aitolia just because they were allies of Rome.

The timing of Antiochos' arrival and the size of his forces suggest that it was expected that he and the Aitolians would have the winter in which to work in Greece undisturbed, a calculation which was more or less correct. The arrival of substantial Roman forces at Apollonia in Illyria was presumably unexpected, but those forces were effectively immobilised for the winter by their geographical isolation and by the blocking of the Pindos routes by the winter weather, and, if the Greeks appreciated it, by the rank of their commander, whose remit only allowed him to transport the army to Apollonia. It would only be after the winter that a consular commander would be able to take over. The uncertain attitude of Philip of Macedon was also a factor. In fact, the presence of the Roman army would probably only add urgency to the plans of the allies, and it certainly imposed no restrictions on their actions until the spring.

Antiochos and the Aitolians quickly met to discuss those plans. Antiochos sailed to Phalara, the Aitolians came to Lamia and met him there[30]. The Aitolian 'council' – thought to be a full Assembly

[30] Livy 35.43.7-9.

meeting in special session, but more likely to be the magistrates plus the *apokletoi*[31] – confirmed the decree of the Assembly passed in the spring inviting the king to liberate the Greeks. The king is supposed to have made a speech apologising for his small force[32]. This is nonsense. The force, for one, was not small. Second, no politician embarking on such an enterprise is going to begin with an apology. The force he brought was only seen to be inadequate after his defeat at Thermopylai; it was, to all appearance, a well-calculated force designed to supplement the Aitolians' army, and to conduct a winter campaign, a time when food and fodder supplies were low. It was also expected, of course, that other Greek forces would be forthcoming as the plans for a Greek alliance developed.

The longstanding division of opinion within Aitolia surfaced once more after Antiochos' speech. He left the meeting; Phaineas and Thoas then put forward two contrasting methods for using this sudden increment in strength. Phaineas (the current *strategos*) proposed that the new power be held in reserve, and used to extract concessions from the Romans. Presumably he would, if his proposal had been agreed, contact Flamininus, who seems to have been at Corinth still, in order to renegotiate the terms of the peace settlement of four years before[33]. This presupposed that the Romans would be willing to make concessions to avoid more fighting, that Flamininus and his commissioners had the power to negotiate, and that the new Roman commander (elected as consul a month before) would be willing to hold back his forces (and give up the chances of a triumph and the acquisition of loot). It also presupposed that Antiochos would meekly do the Aitolians' bidding, and sit still in Demetrias while Phaineas negotiated. This is all pretty unlikely, not least because the Roman army was arriving in Greece even as the Aitolian argument was taking place.

Phaineas was opposed by Thoas, the man who had persuaded Antiochos to come to Europe. His argument was that they now, for the first time, had the forces they needed to fight and defeat the

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[31] Livy 35.43.7 and 44.1; Larsen, 'The Assembly of the Aetolian League', *TAPA* 83, 1952, 26, identifies this as a special Assembly, but Livy's word '*concilium*', is quite unspecific, and he uses it for both full Assemblies, such as the *Panaitolike*, and smaller meetings; there is no obvious reason to see this as a full Assembly; the *apokletoi* and the normal executive officers existed just for such occasions.

[32] Livy 35.44.3-6.

[33] Livy 35.45.3-4.

Romans, and that it would be pointless bringing the king and his army to Greece if they did not then use them. This proposal carried the day, and Antiochos was voted the title of *strategos autokrator*, the same honorary post which Attalos had been given, and a committee of thirty men was set up to advise him, who were either the *apokletoi* or a group selected from them[34].

Since Thoas' argument won the day, Phaineas' suggested policy was not implemented. But Thoas' policy was ultimately a failure, but it is worth considering the implications if it had been successful. Suppose Antiochos, in alliance with the Aitolians and other Greeks, had succeeded in defeating the Romans, and in expelling them from Greece. (It was, after all, a close call.) Suppose, further, that Antiochos refrained from going further and invading Italy[35]. The result would be a new occupation of Greece, the revival of the power of Philip, and early arguments between the Aitolians and Antiochos. For the Aitolians were aiming to regain their full independence of action. Antiochos would be able to see that Rome would not be able to refrain from interfering in Greek affairs, and there would be plenty of Greek states wishing to invite Roman intervention. And so a Seleukid occupation of Greek strongholds – Antiochos already controlled Demetrias – would continue to be necessary. This is, of course, the reverse of what happened as a result of the Roman victory, though Rome, having shown its power so decisively, did not feel the need to occupy militarily any part of Greece for the next forty years, and scarcely at all thereafter. But Roman interference in Greece was constant, both diplomatic and at times military.

Phaineas' policy, however, may have yielded dividends for the Aitolians, if Flamininus could have been contacted and persuaded to renegotiate. But the only concessions he could offer would be the occasional Thessalian town – Pharsalos, or another. He would not agree to Demetrias becoming Aitolian in any permanent sense, nor would be agree to a Seleukid occupation of any part of Greece for longer than it took to organise the troops' evacuation. So the subjects for negotiation,

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[34] Livy 35.45.5-9; Pol 20.1.1.

[35] Hannibal is said to have advocated such an invasion in a speech at Livy 36.7.16-20, which is also reported, in different words, in App. *Syr.* 14 and Justin 31.5. There is, however, no indication that Antiochos ever considered such a move, and in his negotiations with Roman envoys before the war all his efforts were directed at defining spheres of influence by which Rome would not interfere in Asia and he would ignore Italy.

on the Roman side, were: the evacuation of Greece by the Seleukid forces, and the restoration of Demetrias to its pro-Roman government. And as the talks went on, the psychological pressure of the Roman forces at Apollonia would become steadily greater as the time approached for the consul to arrive. But Phaineas was, behind his suggestion of talks with the Romans, also advocating the Aitolian policy of a Greek alliance. This must involve, at least, the Achaians, the Boiotians, and the Thessalians, if it was to have any credibility. Optional extras might be Athens and Akarnania, but Epeiros would also be necessary, so as to provide access to the Roman forces at Apollonia. To gather all these states into one alliance looks impossible, unless an access of common sense had afflicted all the Greek leaders at the same time: too many of them had long memories of mutual antagonism, and good contemporary reasons for mutual antipathy. And beyond that, not only would the Romans see as a threat an alliance of Greek states, but so would Philip, and, sooner or later, so would Antiochos. Since the aim of all the Greek states was independence of action for themselves, it further follows that the alliance would scarcely survive its first victory, or indeed, its first defeat.

These speculations would suggest therefore, that the fate of Aitolia was already out of Aitolian hands. By calling in Antiochos, they had made a new Roman military presence in Greece necessary. Whoever won would not permit Aitolia the freedom of action which had been her aim all along. Neither Thoas' nor Phaineas' policy could have produced that result. The Aitolians, and with them the Greeks as a whole, were certain to be crushed by one or other of these great military powers.

The arguments of the Aitolians appear to have been conducted without direct reference to Antiochos, who is explicitly said to have left the meeting before the discussions began[36]. He might be expected to be activist, to take Thoas' part, for he had not crossed the Aegean with an army in order that the Aitolians should then simply negotiate with the Romans. Next day he and the *apokletoi* agreed to make another attempt on Chalkis[37], whose control was clearly necessary if a serious attempt was to be made to control central Greece. This time the manpower used was that of the king, but the talking was once again done by the

[36] Livy 35.45.1.
[37] Livy 35.46.2.

Aitolians: a thousand of the royal infantry, but only a few Aitolians, sailed to Salganeus, then a few of the Aitolians crossed to urge the Chalkidians to give in, but received the same dusty answer as before. The king accompanied his troops but did not take part in the talks. When they failed he withdrew[38]. This had been, in fact, in miniature, just the scenario Phaineas had advocated: talks leading to a removal of Roman influence and the conclusion of an alliance of Greek states. But the Aitolians had gone further, suggesting that the Chalkidians could keep the friendship of the Romans while also accepting that of the king[39]. The Chalkidians refused to fall over at this suggestion, and insisted that they would have to be attacked and forced into an alliance; even so would the Romans – or the Aitolians themselves – have reacted. The Chalkidians were acting in self-defence, no doubt appreciating the Roman attitude rather better than, say, the Demetrians had. To 'desert' the Roman alliance, or the Roman *amicitia*, was an act calling for punishment by Rome, not something to be risked lightly. By insisting on being forced to comply with Aitolian and Seleukid demands, the Chalkidians were protecting themselves; but they were also showing that such force would not be wholly unacceptable. They were, that is, quite prepared to change sides, if compelled.

Antiochos again discussed plans with the Aitolians, and again the basic Aitolian plan for a league of Greek states was to be attempted, by approaches to the Boiotians, the Achaians, and King Amynandros[40]. The Boiotians had in fact been surprisingly quiet in the circumstances. The two approaches by the Aitolians to Chalkis had been made through Boiotian territory, apparently without any complaint, but it was obviously awkward to continue relying on such docility, particularly since the league regime was pro-Roman, being that which had been installed after the murder of Brachyllas, with the approval of Flamininus. Not surprisingly, the reply to the suggestion that they join Antiochos and the Aitolians was equivocating: Antiochos should come in person[41].

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[38] Livy 35.46.3-47.1.

[39] Livy 35.46.5-6; this is condemned as 'specious' by Briscoe *Comm. Livy* 2.209, who points to the presence of the king's troops; but the Chalkidians also had a garrison of Attalid soldiers on their backs. The offer actually suggests that the exclusivity of the Roman *amicitia* was not yet wholly appreciated by anyone in Greece. But it was the Attalid garrison which prevented the Chalkidians from agreeing.

[40] Livy 35.47.2-8.

[41] Livy 35.50.5; Pol 20.1.2.

Amynandros was important because his kingdom could provide access to northern Thessaly, and to Epeiros, or could help defend northern Aitolia. He also ruled Zakynthos, a useful port-of-call, and one close to the Aitolian ally Kephallenia. He was approached through his brother-in-law, Philip of Megalopolis, who had been acting as governor of Zakynthos. Philip had worked up a claim to the Macedonian throne, based on a supposed descent from Alexander the Great[42]. It seems unlikely that Amynandros would have allowed this claim to influence him; he was, after all, already allied with the Aitolians, but he had connections with the Romans as well, and in the past he had been allied to Philip. He tended therefore to join whoever was strong enough to compel him, but did so intelligently. His kingdom was vulnerable to Aitolian pressure, and he appears to have quickly agreed to join the allies.

The Achaians were the most important target. Nabis no longer distracted them although the integration of Sparta into the league was minimal, more an alliance than a union. Philopoimen was no longer *strategos*, but his successor Diophanes had been elected with Philopoimen's support. It was known that Philopoimen had been annoyed by Flamininus' instruction to bring the Achaian attack on Sparta to an end earlier in the year; it was also known that Flamininus had been annoyed even earlier by the Achaian declaration of war on Nabis. But now both Philopoimen and Nabis were out of power. The removal of Nabis by the Aitolians had been intended to remove a potential distraction for the Achaians and so to enable them to become independent of Roman influence and receptive to Aitolian advice. This, it was now seen, had not worked. Instead it had removed the main stumbling block in the way of Achaian and Roman mutual agreement.

The Aitolians and King Antiochos both sent envoys to speak to the Achaians and to urge them to join their pro-Greek alliance. The king's envoy, who is unnamed, is said to have boasted of his master's power, but then only asked for Achaian neutrality[43]. The Aitolian envoy was Archedamos of Pholas, who had been the commander at Thaumakoi in 199, and had commanded the Aitolian horse in the successful skirmish with Philip's cavalry before Kynoskephalai; he

[42] Livy 35.47.4-8 and 36.31.11-12.
[43] Livy 35.48.1-9.

was thus a notably successful military commander, probably having been *hipparchos* of the league, and was to be elected *strategos* at the next *Thermike*, one of the most eminent Aitolians of his day. He echoed the suggestion that the Achaians remain neutral, adding the usual Aitolian comments about the real responsibility for the victory over Philip being due to the Aitolians, and remarking adversely on Flamininus' conduct as general[44].

These approaches were clearly co-ordinated between the two envoys, from their differing points of view and their differing origins. The emphasis on Antiochos' power was a good antidote to the Greek perception of Roman power; the Aitolian comments on Flamininus' conduct – by a widely praised commander, praised, in fact, by Flamininus himself, who was present – was obviously designed to reinforce Achaian annoyance at Flamininus' conduct over Nabis and Sparta. The importance of the meeting is in fact indicated by Flamininus' presence, and he was able to reply instantly to the envoys' speeches. He must have known in advance, however, that the Achaians had no intention of either joining Antiochos and the Aitolians. He could make the standard reply, denigrating the quality and quantity of Antiochos' forces, and remarking sharply on the Aitolian propensity for words rather than actions. He pointed out that by remaining neutral the Achaians would be left out of the reckoning at the distribution of the spoils[45]. Archedemos the Aitolian could also have made some pointed remarks on that subject.

There seems to have been no argument among the Achaians on the issue, and Livy makes the point that there was no debate after the speeches. The meeting appears to have been one of the *ekklesia*, the mass meeting, operating as a body called the *synkletos*, but it was, whatever its exact status, clearly competent to take major decisions[46]. Instead of debating the Assembly agreed to a declaration that the league should have the same friends and the same enemies as the Romans, and then went further and agreed to a declaration of war on both the Aitolians and King Antiochos[47]. No doubt they took a leaf from the Romans' notebook here, copying the same action of the

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[44] Livy 35.48.1-13.
[45] Livy 35.49.1-13.
[46] Larsen, *RG*, 75-105; Errington, *Philopoemen*, 113-114; Aymard, *Premiers Rapports*, 324-328.
[47] Livy 35.50.2.

Athenians at the start of the Macedonian war in 200, and which had then enabled Rome to declare war on Philip. Perhaps Flamininus even suggested it, to give Rome the excuse it may have been seeking to declare war as well. He certainly took the opportunity to ask that Achaian troops be committed at once by sending five hundred men each to Chalkis and to Athens. He added five hundred Romans as well[48].

It would have been helpful if Achaia had joined in on the Aitolian side, and almost as comforting as if they had decided to remain neutral. The fact that both envoys asked for neutrality does suggest that they knew in advance that an Achaian declaration of war on Rome was out of the question. But a declaration of Achaian enmity was not a disaster. Achaian military expertise was not highly regarded, and the allies had an alternative policy available which would largely neutralise Achaian involvement at little cost.

For it seems that these open moves by Aitolia and Antiochos to recruit allies in Achaia, Athamania and Boiotia had been accompanied by less obvious, or less publicised, moves. The Athenians, for one, had been targeted, but in this case the method was one of subversion: the injection of money to support one faction, led by a man called Apollodoros, who had clearly had enough support – even if it was from 'the venal multitude' – to pose a serious threat to the pro-Roman regime led by Leon son of Kicherias. The despatch of the Achaian troops to the city was followed by a visit by Flamininus in person. As a result the ruling group was given adequate support and was able to push Apollodoros into exile[49]. The method of changing a city's foreign policy by subverting the ruling faction was, of course, one used repeatedly by Flamininus in earlier years in Greece; no doubt he recognised the signs when the process was used against him and was able to scotch the plot quickly.

The Achaian declaration of war, however, had other effects elsewhere. There were now only two independent states in the Peloponnese apart from the Achaian League: Elis and Messene. Both of them moved closer to Aitolia now that Achaia was involved. The Eleians

[48] Livy 35.50.3; the Roman troops appear later (50.9) but arrived in Boiotia more or less at the same time as the Achaians; where they came from is not known, but Serranus' fleet had troops on board, and Baebius' force at Apollonia could have sent men to Flamininus as a bodyguard for the commissioners.

[49] Livy 35.50.4.

sent an envoy, Kallistratos, to see Antiochos. They had long been friends with Aitolia, and had more recently protested to the Senate about the transfer of Triphylia to Achaia[50]. Messene was in a similar position, having complained about the allocation of Asine and Pylos to Achaia[51], and having been subject more than once to Achaian military pressure. The Achaian alliance with Sparta, two Messenian enemies, will have frightened the Messenians. The Aitolian *strategos* Phaineas became a *proxenos*-sponsor to Messene at this time[52], a move which was hardly a coincidence given Aitolia's extensive use of such offices for diplomatic purposes, and Messene during the war was considered to favour Antiochos, and was eventually compelled to join the Achaian League[53]. All in all, even these moves were sufficient to pin down the majority of the Achaian forces, and Antiochos reinforced that Achaian uncertainty by sending a thousand soldiers under the command of a Cretan mercenary called Euphanes to bolster the Eleians[54]. Thus diplomacy and some troop movements effectively checkmated the Achaian declaration of war.

Athens, despite the efforts to change things, remained on the Roman side, and Chalkis, and all Euboia, was hostile, while Boiotia remained neutral. But now neutrality was no longer an option for any state in southern or central Greece: all of them had to make a choice. Having been rebuffed from Chalkis when he adopted the Aitolian method of approach, Antiochos had returned to Demetrias. He apparently waited until the results of the meeting of his envoy with the Achaians at Aigion were reported, but then he moved quickly, and in strength, to deal with recalcitrant Chalkis before the Roman and Achaian garrisons reached it. It was clearly the key, since with Chalkis would come Euboia, and this would be extremely persuasive in Boiotia. With both of these on his side, Achaian and Athenian hostility woud be of little moment.

This time Antiochos took matters into his own hands. He used all his army, except for a garrison of a thousand men left at his camp beside Demetrias, and all his fleet. Those of the Aitolian forces which could be mustered at Lamia at short notice came along as well, but

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[50] Pol. 20.3.1 (Kallistratos); 18.42.7 (Triphylia).
[51] Pol. 18.42.7.
[52] *IG* IX.1.31d.
[53] Livy 36.31.4-9.
[54] Livy 35.5.3; Pol. 20.3.7.

this time the enterprise was overwhelmingly Seleukid. He did not reach the city before the Achaians, but Menippos with 3,000 Seleukid troops did intercept the Roman force which was also heading for Chalkis. The Seleukid force was already facing Salganeus when the Romans approached. The Romans turned aside and camped at Delion, where they were surprised by Menippos' troops and destroyed. Then Antiochos brought his fleet down the Euripos, and he gathered nine thousand troops on the mainland opposite the city. He sent in envoys, who were effective enough to persuade the citizens to ignore the pro-Roman advice of their leaders, who had brought in the Achaians, and the Achaian and Attalid garrisons imposed on them. The city gates were opened. The Achaians, the Attalid soldiers who had been there since Thoas' first attempt in the spring, and the few remaining Roman soldiers, tried to hold the mainland fortress at Salganeus, but when Antiochos began a formal assault, they all surrendered[55].

The value of holding Chalkis was shown at once. The other Euboian cities, Karystos, Eretria and Oreus/Histiaia, rapidly signified their subjection – in effect, this was now an alliance with the Euboian League[56]. Kallistratos of Elis reached Antiochos at Chalkis and was sent home with the 1,000 Seleukid soldiers under Euphanes the Cretan. An embassy also arrived from Epeiros, led by Charops. Epeiros' situation was unenviable, with Aitolia and Amynandros in the south, Philip in the east, and a Roman army in the north. Like the Boiotians, the Epeirotes were only going to declare themselves the king's supporters if he would arrive personally, but at least contact had been made[57]. From Chalkis Antiochos took up the Boiotian problem by going personally to Thebes, as the Boiotians had insisted. Not surprisingly, this time the Boiotians welcomed him and agreed to an alliance[58]. They thus had the perfect excuse to give to the Romans if the political situation changed: they had defied Antiochos and had now submitted to his superior force.

The Aitolians had taken little part in the capture of Chalkis, and none in the winning of Boiotia, and their preferred policy had failed in Achaia. It was royal troops which were sent to Elis, and it was to

[55] Livy 35.5.6-51.9.
[56] Livy 35.51.10.
[57] Pol 20.3.1-6; Livy 36.5.3-8; Hammond, *Epirus*, 623; Cabanes, *L'Épire*, 279-281.
[58] Livy 36.1-5; Pol. 20.7.3-5.

Antiochos that both the Eleians and the Epeirotes had appealed. Further, Antiochos seems to have settled on Chalkis as his preferred centre, rather than his original base of Demetrias, thus distancing himself from his Aitolian allies. The change can be located at the point where he decided to make his own attempt on Chalkis, when the results of the joint mission to Achaia were reported. From that point on, Antiochos was the senior partner in the alliance, which was thus no longer one of equals. The policy decided between the king and the *apokletoi*, which had in fact been Aitolian policy, had failed; the royal methods were more direct. He made a practice of consulting the Aitolians again, in a conference at Demetrias[59], but the campaign into Thessaly which followed was conducted by the king, with scarcely a reference to the Aitolians, though he had Aitolians in his forces[60]. It was Antiochos who negotiated with the Thessalian League, who commanded at the conquest of Pherai, who received the surrender of Skotoussa, Kierion, and Metropolis, who ordered the attack on Larisa; and it was Menippos, Antiochos' man, who commanded the Aitolian force of 3,000 foot and 200 cavalry which executed a sweep through Perrhaibia in the north, taking Malloia and Chyretiai (once again)[61]. The Aitolians had been reduced to auxiliaries. It was to Antiochos, so it seems, that envoys from Pharsalos, a former Aitolian League member and one of the cities which the Aitolians were keenest to acquire, surrendered[62]. This would suggest that the Pharsalians were not especially enthused at the idea of rejoining the league.

When Larisa proved obdurate, Antiochos called off the attack and, at last, for it was January by this time, sent his troops to winter quarters. Some garrisons were left in Thessaly, but most of the captured cities were probably left to defend themselves. Antiochos probably did not know of the arrival of a small Roman detachment at Gonnos in the vale of Tempe, but it was the precursor of a much larger force which had gathered at Apollonia in Illyria[63]. Of this he undoubtedly did know, for, if by no other means, the Epeirote envoy Charops will have mentioned it. He may even have heard that Rome had declared war on him, in December, but he will have assumed that from the

[59] Livy 36.6.6.
[60] Livy 36.8.2 and 9 (Aitolian troops to muster at Pherai).
[61] Livy 36.10.5.
[62] Livy 36.9.3-10.9.
[63] Livy's story of the arrival of this force of 2,000 Romans scaring off Antiochos from the attack on Larisa (36.10.10-14) may be taken with a pinch of salt.

start; certainly that would be so by November, when his men had fought Roman soldiers at Delion, before the capitulation of Chalkis.

Antiochos' winter-quarters were of brief duration, though he did cement his interest in Greece by marrying the daughter of an important Chalkidian[64]. Much of his time, contrary to Livy's libels, was spent in preparing for the next stage in the conquest of Greece. Early in March, 'at the beginning of spring', his forces were marched across Aitolia to Stratos, after a period in winter quarters of no more than six weeks. They had to muster from their various winter quarters at Chaironea, and then were marched to the Malian Gulf and, commanded by Menippos and Alexandros the Akarnanian, across to the west by way of the Spercheios Valley and into the valley of the Acheloos. Antiochos himself went by the more populated route, first to Delphi, to sacrifice to his ancestor Apollo, to Naupaktos, Kalydon, Lysimacheia, and so to Stratos where he rejoined the army[65].

The object of this expediton was Akarnania, but Antiochos clearly took the opportunity to show himself and his army to the Aitolians, and to consult with 'the Aitolian chiefs'. But here again Antiochos was in charge of events, perhaps because the long history of enmity between Aitolia and Akarnania prevented either league from even considering an alliance with the other. In fact, coin evidence suggests that the king had been intriguing for influence in Akarnania for some time already[66], and a leading Akarnanian, Mnasilochos, had been arguing for an alliance with Antiochos, and had perusaded the league *strategos* Klytos to support this policy[67].

Akarnania was geographically important. It was the only stretch of coast south of Ambrakia which was friendly to Rome. Epeiros was neutral, and wavering; Elis and Messenia were hostile; Aitolia an open enemy. Of the Ionian Islands, Kephallenia was an ally of the Aitolians, Zakynthos was ruled for Amynandros, Leukas was part of the Akarnanian League. So, if Antiochos could control Akarnania, with Leukas, his allies and friends would control the Ionian Sea coast from Ambrakia to Cape Tainaron. In addition, a major distraction to Aitolian concentration would be removed, and this would then

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[64] Pol. 20.8.1-5 (= Athenaios 10.439e-f); Livy 36.11.1-2; the Roman elaborations of royal dissipation and the fatal weakening of his army may be dismissed.

[65] Livy 36.11.5-7; this seems to be the best interpretation of this passage, though the routes do seem somewhat intricate.

[66] *BMC* Aetolia to Thessaly, p. 195, no 11.

[67] Livy 36.11.8.

enhance the manpower resources of the alliance. Further, pressure could then be exerted on Epeiros to join in. Antiochos already controlled every state between Athens and Macedon, and so at that point the scene of hostilities could be transferred to the northern borders of Epeiros and the Roman area of Illyria; this in turn would be likely to have a substantial effect on Philip of Macedon, who had lost territories in this area only a few years before, and who could be tempted with the offer of their return. But all this depended on the favourable result of this Akarnanian expedition, and the preliminary intrigues.

It did not work. The Akarnanian intrigue provoked suspicions among several groups, and the Akarnanians remembered the siege and capture of Leukas by the Romans in 197 all too vividly. A Roman alliance was, to them, less unpleasant than an alliance with a distant king, who was also allied with the Aitolians. The Akarnanians also knew that the Roman fleet was already at sea, and that it had reached Kephallenia. Antiochos managed to reach and seize the city of Medeon, but the next target, Thyrreion, proved recalcitrant, and its defenders were fortified by a message from C. Octavius, one of the Roman commissioners, who came to Leukas and reported that the new consul had already reached Illyria. When that message reached Antiochos, and with the arrival of the news of Roman advances into Thessaly soon after, he abandoned the Akarnanian expedition and returned, with his army, to Chalkis[68].

The *propraetor* M. Baebius Tamphilus had brought his army across the Adriatic from Brundisium to Apollonia late the previous year, probably in October, perhaps even later[69]. He had been in touch with Flamininus – the Roman soldiers defeated at Delion and Chalkis may have come from Baebius, but contact with Flamininus can be assumed anyway – but he had no authority to go further than Apollonia until the declaration of war by the Senate, which did not come until December[70]. A month later, about the end of December, Antiochos had begun his campaign in Thessaly, and had permitted, or encouraged, Philip of Megalopolis (Amynandros' brother-in-law), who claimed the Macedonian throne) to bury the bones of the Macedonian

[68] Livy 36.11.9-12.11.

[69] Livy 36.1.7; the exact numbers are a matter of dispute, but this notice is unambiguous: Baebius had brought the full army across, two legions and two Latin *alae*, twenty thousand men and more.

[70] Livy 36.3.7-12.

dead at Kynoskephalai[71]. This failed to appeal to the Macedonians, as intended, but it did give King Philip the excuse he needed to abandon his neutrality. He contacted Baebius, and together they agreed that a Roman detachment should march through Macedon to Thessaly[72]. The detachment, just 2,000 soldiers, was commanded by the military tribune Ap. Claudius Pulcher[73], who did not venture to challenge the Seleukid-Aitolian conquest of Thessaly until after the king had withdrawn to his winter quarters. His function, in any case, was probably only to prepare a camp for the main body.

The new consul, M'. Acilius Glabrio, crossed the Adriatic as early as he could, and was in Illyria by the end of January[74]. He could not move his army through the mountains until March, but he could get the fleet moving south to Kephallenia, whence the news of his arrival reached Akarnania in time to deflect Antiochos from his attack there. So, while Antiochos was marching west to campaign in Akarnania, Glabrio was marching his army east to campaign in Thessaly.

An advance force under Baebius, presumably including the detachment which had arrived earlier under Ap. Claudius, was joined by Philip and his army in a preliminary campaign while the consul brought the legions across the mountains by way of Epeiros and the Zygos pass. Baebius was able to clear northern Thessaly, the Peneus valley, though Philip found it impossible to persuade any Thessalians to trust him[75]. When Glabrio arrived with the legions, the campaign moved on southwards, meeting no effective resistance. Apart from the area around Gomphi and Trikka, which was held by Athamanian troops, all the garrisons which were encountered were formed of Antiochos' troops, or were local to the cities taken. They were either recruited by Philip, or disarmed and allowed to go to

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[71] Livy 36.8.3-4.

[72] Livy 36.10.10.

[73] The size of this detachment is a confirmation that Baebius had his full legionary force at Apollonia, for no commander would detach more than a small part of his force, under a junior commander, particularly since he was actually merely waiting for a consul to come to take over. Pulcher laid out a camp larger than his 2,000 men needed (Livy 38.10.11) and this is taken as part of his deception, which is supposed to have frightened Antiochos off Larisa; in fact, it is best seen as a preparatory camp for the full force's arrival next year. In the event the consul brought the main force by a different route.

[74] He left Rome five days before the Nones of May (Livy 36.3.4), which was 27 December 192 (Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.224).

[75] Livy 36.13.2-9.

Demetrias. Philip acquired the Athamanian prisoners, treated them well, and then sent them home. He followed this up by an easy conquest of their homeland; Amynandros escaped with his family to refuge in Ambrakia. It is very noticeable that no Aitolian forces were involved at any point in the Roman conquest. By the end of March or early April all of Thessaly had been retaken by the Romans, and Glabrio moved on south to invade Aitolian territory[76].

It is exactly at this point, at Thaumakoi, on the road through Mount Othrys, where the Romans reached the northern border of Aitolia, that Glabrio's army at last met serious resistance. It was not a problem at first, but to any soldier of imagination, it was ominous. The Romans were, it seems, going to march past the town ignoring it. The place, well fortified, overlooked the road but did not block it, and it could be easily by-passed. But the 'young men' of the city attempted an ambush. Glabrio tried to deter them with words at first, or so Livy says, but he also sent a detachment behind them to take the city while they were out of it. At this the Romans, having blocked the Thaumakian soldiers' escape route, moved in to the slaughter; some of the Aitolians also got away[77]. What was ominous, of course, was the very fact of a small city acting so defiantly. It was a shocking change from what had happened in Thessaly, which had been a walkover. If this conduct was repeated all over Aitolia, the Romans were in for a tough time.

Antiochos and the Aitolians had had some time for preparation after his return from Akarnania; the Roman campaign through Thessaly had taken several weeks. Antiochos had received reinforcements from Asia, sent for before the winter[78], but he had now lost considerable numbers of soldiers in Thessaly, while others were distributed in garrisons from Elis and Akarnania in the west to Demetrias and Chalkis in the east. The result of this wastage was that his own field army was still about the same size as the force he had originally brought with him the year before, about 10,000 men or so[79]; the Greek allies would have to make up the numbers. The Aitolians were the only contributors – the Boiotians and Euboians provided nothing, it seems, not surprisingly – and now they had a major problem.

[76] Livy 36.14.1-11.

[77] Livy 36.14.12-14; Stählin, *Thessalien*, 155-157.

[78] Livy 36.8.1; when they arrived is not recorded, but Antiochos' troop numbers require that several thousand did reach him.

[79] Livy 36.15.3.

The Roman army approaching from Thessaly was the main threat, but it was not the only one. Antiochos' expedition to the west had stirred up the Akarnanians, who could get help from the Roman fleet in the Ionian Sea, which carried a substantial number of soldiers in addition to the sailors, so Aitolian forces had to be left to garrison the cities of the Acheloos valley (Stratos, Agrinion, Oiniadai, and others) and the Akarnanian cities the Aitolians held. In the north Philip's conquest of Athamania now provided another threat, this time to the Dolopes and the upper Spercheios valley, thinly populated lands, but all the easier to penetrate for that reason. Philip's invasions of the Acheloos valley in 218 and in 207 by way of that route immediately came to mind once more. In addition to these threats, the Aitolian coastline along the Corinthian Gulf was exposed to raids by the Roman fleet, and by the Achaians, who had some ships and who controlled most of the southern coast. Then, when Glabrio marched south out of Thessaly, he began at once to lay waste the lands of the Aitolian city of Hypata[80].

When Antiochos sent out his call for troops to face Glabrio's army, therefore, the Aitolians had too many threats to face; they mustered no more than 4,000 soldiers in response[81]. The muster was to take place at Lamia[82], the first Aitolian city (after Thaumakoi) which the Romans would approach on their march, but the total allied force was not sufficiently large to contemplate a fight with the Roman force in the open lands of the lower Spercheios valley, so Antiochos moved back into Thermopylai, where the Roman numbers would prove to be no advantage, and put the Aitolians into the two cities of Hypata and Herakleia, where they menaced the Roman rear. Each city received 2,000 men, in addition, presumably, to their own citizen militia troops. When Glabrio ignored them and marched into Thermopylai, the Hypatan troops moved to Herakleia, close to the rear of the Roman forces. A force of 4,000 troops was a formidable problem, which Glabrio had to cope with, and their presence in his rear would force him to divide his forces. Then Antiochos persuaded the Aitolians to send half of their force to hold the mountain path by which the Romans could outflank his own[83].

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[80] Livy 26.14.15.
[81] Livy 36.16.3.
[82] Livy 36.15.2.
[83] Livy 36.15.1-11.

All this preparation failed in the outcome. The Roman army was large enough to mask Herakleia, to attack Antiochos' main position in the pass, and to send a substantial detachment over the mountain paths to dislodge the Aitolians in their forts there. The defenders of the forts were outnumbered, being 2,000 to the Romans' 4,000. They were divided into three groups, each holding a separate fort; two of the forts were attacked by L. Valerius Flaccus with 2,000 Roman soldiers, and succeeded in holding their own; however, M. Porcius Cato, also with 2,000 Romans, attacked the third fort – defended presumably by about 600 or 700 Aitolians – and captured it. He is said to have caught them off guard, but this is the same story told of Philip in 199 at Pharkadon, and is not to be believed[84]. In the pass below, Antiochos' main force had succeeded in blocking all the Roman attacks, but the flank attack on the Seleukid army from uphill which Cato could now deliver was decisive. The Seleukid army broke and fled[85].

Antiochos and his army swiftly left Europe. Glabrio equally swiftly gained control of Boiotia and Euboia, and at least part of Phokis, and then returned to Herakleia. It would seem that all Boiotia fell after a violent demonstration of Roman anger at Koroneia, and that all Euboia went the way of Chalkis, which was surrendered without fighting. These were two leagues, and it was the leagues which adopted the Roman side[86]. For Phokis the situation was different. This had been part of the Aitolian League since 196 or so, whereas Boiotia and Euboia were in the war as allies of the king. Glabrio reached Elateia in his pursuit of Antiochos' army, which may be presumed to have been captured by the Roman cavalry, which was in the van of the pursuit by then. Livy claims that the Phokian (and the Boiotian) cities surrendered as Romans approached, but this may not be wholly accurate[87]. In Boiotia it took the sack of the sanctuary of Athene Itonia at Koroneia to persuade the league to give in. In Phokis, which was Aitolian territory, the surrenders may well have been piecemeal and may well have produced more resistance. The idea of Phokis as a political unit had received substantial damage over the last thirty years, and the cities appear to have acted much more individually

[84] Livy 36.17.1 and 18.8-19.1.
[85] Livy 36.17.1-19.2.
[86] Livy 36.20.1-4 (Boiotia); 21.1-2 (Chalkis).
[87] Livy 36.19.10.

than did those in Aitolia, or in Boiotia, where leagues had been well- and long-established. It is clear that Elateia fell, but we cannot take Livy's casual word for it that the whole of the area also fell to the Romans at this time.

21. THE ROMAN WAR
2. AITOLIA ALONE
(191-189)

The foreign policy of the Aitolian League which had brought about war with Rome had been predicated on the assumption that Aitolia could not fight Rome by itself. Therefore, an ally or allies had been required. The first attempt had been to recruit Greek allies into a new Symmachy on the argument that the Romans could be squeezed out of Greece if the Greeks could sort out their own problems themselves; the second idea was to recruit the three kings, Nabis, Philip, and Antiochos; this had been pared down to an alliance with Antiochos alone. The idea of a Greek Symmachy had lingered on, though the one essential ingredient in all of these schemes, Achaia, had proved obdurate, for that league had calculated on greater gains from a Roman than from an Aitolian alliance.

And now the alliance with Antiochos had proved to be a failure. The alliance itself continued, as was shortly shown, but the two partners found it increasingly difficult to communicate, until eventually it was impossible. Each was thus on its own, and for the Aitolians this was especially dangerous. The victorious Roman army had thrown the Seleukid army out of Greece. Now the Aitolians were exposed to attack. This situation was exactly what all the diplomatic and military manoeuvrings of the past six years had been designed to avoid.

For many political communities this would have been the moment at which recriminations would have burst out. But the Aitolian League was an unusual case, and this reaction did not, so far as we can see, take place. There were undoubtedly differences of opinion, as that between Thoas and Phaineas which was aired after the meeting with Antiochos in the previous autumn, and these undoubtedly continued. But they have made little or no impact on the sources, and since these sources are generally anti-Aitolian, this is quite suggestive; the implication is that the disagreements did not become too serious[1]. It may be that this was in part the result of the absence in

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[1] J. Deininger, *Der Politische Widerstand gegen Rom in Greichenland, 217-86 v. Chr.*, Berlin 1971, 68-80, puts Thoas and Dorimachos forward as the leaders of the anti-Roman party.

Asia of Thoas, who was perhaps the leader of one faction. If so, it was the belligerent group (heirs perhaps of that of Skopas and Dorimarchos in the Symmachic War), as had been shown at the time of the dispute with Phaineas. But now there was no choice but belligerence, at least until some acceptable peace terms were suggested by the Romans. It turned out that the operative word was 'acceptable'.

Glabrio indeed attempted to open negotiations with the Aitolians in Herakleia when he returned from the pursuit of Antiochos' beaten army after Thermopylai and the Seleukid evacuation of Chalkis and Europe. He pointed out that the king had proved to be unreliable, and stated his terms of peace as the surrender of the city of Herakleia, and 'asking pardon of the Senate'; then the Aitolians could be received into the Roman alliance, as other former enemies had been. The Aitolians knew what that meant, and appear to have refused the terms point-blank[2].

Glabrio met Philip, who had been ill, and had taken no part in the Thermopylai events[3]. Each commander then set his army to besiege an Aitolian city, Philip at Lamia, Glabrio at Herakleia. Since Glabrio now controlled the small towns – Nikaia, Thronion, Skarpheia, perhaps Opous, too – beyond Thermopylai, the strategic aim was presumably to cut the Aitolian League off from the Aegean and so make contact with Antiochos more difficult, as well as securing control of the major route between Thessaly and the lands south of Thermopylai – Boiotia, Athens, and on to Corinth and Achaia, all now Roman allies. The capture of two of the Aitolian League's major member-cities might also persuade the league to consider the Roman peace offer more seriously.

The siege of Herakleia was difficult, and Livy gives a good description of it. It lasted, according to Livy, for twenty-four days, before the city could be stormed[4]. Among those Aitolians who were captured at the end was Damokritos, the *strategos* of the previous year, who had presumably commanded the resistance in the city. He and the chief citizens of Herakleia were kept as prisoners. Herakleia was a relatively small city, and it had held up a two-legion army for a month. Meanwhile Philip had made no progress at all in his attempts, vigorous enough, and including tunnelling, to take Lamia, an even smaller

[2] Livy 36.22.1-4.
[3] Livy 36.25.1.
[4] Livy 36.22.4-24.12.

place than Herakleia. Then, when Herakleia had fallen, Glabrio told him to lift the siege[5].

The reason was the resumption of negotiations between the Aitolians and Glabrio, though Philip later took it more personally. While the siege at Herakleia continued, a meeting of the Aitolian council assembled at Hypata[6]. The purpose was no doubt to consider the overall situation. It was not, as is assumed at times, a full Assembly meeting[7]. Had it been so, Glabrio and Philip could scarcely have continued their sieges without interruption, for a full Assembly was a mass meeting of the Aitolian male population, and such a gathering would have been sufficient by its size and its mere proximity, to force a lifting of the sieges. The meeting was therefore of an executive committee, perhaps the *apokletoi*, more likely the normal *synedrion*. Polybios in fact ascribes the decision at the meeting to Phaineas, the *strategos*, but he would only act in such a matter after discussion[8]. The decision was to send envoys to Antiochos, asking for either his full army to come to Greece, or, if that was not possible – and they must have known that Antiochos could not possibly comply – then he should send money and reinforcements. Several envoys were chosen; only Thoas is named at this point[9]; later another is named as Nikandros, who had been the envoy to Philip in 193.

The siege of Herakleia ended a few days after this decision, and the council sent out more envoys, this time to Glabrio. It was at this point that he ordered Philip to abandon the siege of Lamia, so this may well have been a conciliatory gesture in advance of these peace talks. The Aitolian envoys were a distinguished group: Archedamos and Pantaleon were to be *strategoi* in the future, and Chalepos had been *strategos* in 199/198[10]; so this was a serious attempt at negotiation on both sides. Glabrio refused to discuss terms right away, however, perhaps at last impressed with Aitolian seriousness, but he did agree to a truce of ten days, and sent L. Valerius Flaccus to Hypata with the envoys to negotiate for peace with the full council[11]. The Aitolians had thus gained a respite for Lamia and a brief truce, which, if negotiations were

[5] Livy 36.25.3-8.
[6] Livy 36.26.1.
[7] Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.258: 'a special assembly is involved'.
[8] Pol 20.9.1.
[9] Livy 36.26.1-4.
[10] *Prosopography*, under these names.
[11] Livy 36.27.1-4; Pol 20 9.1-6.

conducted at all seriously, could well be extended. They were thus presumably playing for time, hoping for help from Antiochos.

Glabrio had already stopped the Aitolian envoys from making a lengthy speech when they first came to see him, and the truce of ten days was really only a very brief time. Now at Hypata Flaccus again blocked the attempt of the Aitolian council to go back over the past at length. He did get them to agree to send another delegation to the consul in order to, as they thought, arrange terms; on the other hand, Glabrio thought they were surrendering on Roman terms, that is, *deditio*, a process whereby the Senate, put upon its honour to treat the suppliant well, would hand down terms[12].

This is usually explained as a misunderstanding by the Aitolians as to the exact implications of the process of *deditio*[13]. So it may well be, but there is more to it than merely a misunderstanding, which could be corrected easily. The Aitolians had been quite consistent all through, for the past twenty years, in referring back always to the terms of the treaty of 211. They regarded that treaty as one between two states, each of which was equally independent, and as an agreement which had no time-limit. During the last Macedonian War (199-197) they had consistently insisted on being treated as an equal and independent state, and not as a Roman ally, for they had seen clearly that a Roman ally was in fact a Roman subordinate, if not legally a subject. They had repeatedly rejected invitations to become an ally on Roman terms, the latest occasion just before the siege of Herakleia began, and they had consistently insisted that they were an equal ally by the terms of the treaty of 211.

The Aitolians in meeting Glabrio were therefore thinking in terms of a treaty between two states, one of which had been defeated in a couple of battles, but which was not yet by any means finished. They could look round at other Greek states which had been in a similar situation. To go no further than the last war, Philip had been defeated several times in battle, and his territories in Thessaly had been conquered, but he had still made peace on terms which implied that

[12] Livy 36.27.5-28.2; Pol 20.9.7-10.3.

[13] Much discussed, of course; cf. Walbank, *Commentary*, 3.79-81 for a discussion and bibliography, notably W. Flurl, *Deditio in Fidem, Untersuchungen zu Livius und Polybios*, Munich 1969, whose conclusions are not widely accepted, but whose discussion is wide ranging; A. M. Eckstein, 'Glabrio and the Aetolians: a Note on *Deditio*', *TAPA* 125, 1995, 271-289; an odd sidelight is thrown on this matter by G. F. Franko, '*Fides*, Aetolia and Plautus' *Captivi*', *TAPA* 125, 1995, 155-176.

he was an independent ruler. Those terms, it is true, which Flamininus had arranged at the Tempe meeting, had been altered by the Senate, but not substantially, and Philip had never been in danger of losing his throne. In fact, the Aitolians had tried to get the Romans to depose him, but Flamininus, for one, had shown no wish to go on fighting. Similarly, the Akarnanians had had their city of Leukas captured, and it was clearly possible for the Romans to have gone on to conquer the rest of the league had they wished, but the rest of the league had only given up fighting after Philip was beaten. They had become a Roman ally – a subordinate, that is – but there seems to have been no suggestion of *deditio*, and no sign that the Romans wished to go further. The Akarnanian League, as Antiochos could ruefully attest, still existed, and still fought.

The leader of the delegation which met Glabrio was Phaineas, still *strategos*. To him Glabrio made it clear just what the Romans understood by their surrender, first by demanding the surrender of three specific men, Dikaiarchos of Trichonos, *strategos* three years before (Thoas' brother), King Amynandros and his Athamanian followers, and an otherwise unknown Menestas of Epeiros[14]. Since two of these, being non-Aitolians, were in effect guests of the Aitolians, who had given Amynandros and his followers refuge, and presumably Menestas as well, the demand was an insult. Glabrio, when the envoys protested, made the issue even more brutally clear by putting chains on them. It seems certain that it was only at this point that the Aitolians gained a clear idea of what Glabrio (and Flaccus) meant by the terms they were using. There is, of course, no reason why any Greeks should have understood it more clearly. It was a process the Romans had used in Sicily, in Illyria, and more extensively in Italy and Spain. But in all cases the actual terms imposed were reasonably mild, and in Greece, if the information actually got through in detail, it would be the terms themselves, not the process, which would be noticed. In Roman wars in Greece, such a process had never yet been invoked. There was no reason why the Aitolians should have understood it, and every reason for them to be shocked by their treatment.

[14] Not known otherwise, but he must be more than a 'privateer' (Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.263) or a mercenary (Walbank, *Commentary* 3.81). Polybios says he had recently come to assist the Aitolians, and if the Romans were so concerned about him as to demand his surrender, he will have been important at home in Epeiros; no doubt he was a political leader there who had adopted a too-openly anti-Roman position; Hammond, *Epirus*, 624.

Glabrio's conduct is, of course, quite indefensible. Quite what he expected to result from it is not obvious. It could have been an instant surrender, and if not that, the end could only be a stiffening of Aitolian resistance. Flaccus, who had negotiated the meeting, persuaded Glabrio to relent, but Phaineas then pointed out that any agreement by the Aitolians present[15] had to be ratified by the Assembly of the Aitolian citizens – just as, he might have added, any agreement made by Glabrio had to be ratified by the Senate. The envoys went back to the council at Hypata, which agreed that a special Assembly[16] should be called, and meanwhile spread the news of the terms which were on offer[17].

Glabrio agreed to another truce of ten days for consultations at Hypata, but he must had known that it was not possible to arrange an Assembly in that time. We may therefore accept Polybios on this, that the Assembly did not take place, as opposed to Livy, who says it did[18]. In the middle of the truce Nikandros returned from his embassy to Antiochos[19]. He landed as Phalara (still Aitolian, therefore), and was captured by a patrol of Philip's soldiers, who took him to Philip. He was interviewed by Philip himself in private in his camp at the suspended siege at Lamia.

Livy claims that Philip blamed the Aitolians for bringing the Romans to Greece, and advised Nikandros that they should make peace. We may imagine that rather more was in fact said, besides this distortion of the past, and the gratuitous advice. Nikandros had brought a supply of money with him from Antiochos, which he had left at Lamia before being caught. The siege had been lifted, but the Macedonians clearly controlled, and patrolled, the country round the city, though that control was apparently loose enough for Nikandros

[15] Described as 'he [Phaineas] and the *Apokletoi*'.

[16] This is as good a signal that the council was not a full Assembly as anything; if it really was a 'special assembly' (note 7) it would not have had to agree to a special assembly being called.

[17] Livy 36.28.1-9; Pol 20.102-15.

[18] Livy 36.29.1-2; Pol 20.10.15-16.

[19] It is not clear if Nikandros had gone to Antiochos as part of the embassy which included Thoas (Livy 36.26.1-2), or if he had gone later and independently. Since Thoas and his companions were promised money, and Nikandros came home with money from Antiochos, it is best to assume only one embassy. In that case, the reference in Livy (36.29.4) to his speedy journey ('on the twelfth day') will be to a journey from Antiochos to his landing, and not to the total time from Hypata to Antiochos and back.

to get in and out of the city without much difficulty. This money was provided to help the Aitolians to continue fighting, which was also something which Philip clearly wished, for only while the Aitolians fought on would he be able to go on making territorial gains in Thessaly. Alternatively, if peace arrived as a result of the present negotiations, Philip was angling for good relations with the Aitolians, something which might well be to the Aitolian taste after a defeat in war with the Romans. He also put Nikandros under an obligation, and Polybios points out that he afterwards acted loyally towards Philip and his successor[20]. Generous treatment by Philip could only bring benefits.

Nikandros' message from Antiochos to the Aitolians consisted of more than a gift of money. Antiochos had not, it is true, sent troops, which had been their first request, but it is doubtful if any of the Aitolians had expected him to; but the money he had sent was almost as useful. The timing is such that they may well have planned the whole process. The two ten-day truces, perhaps overlapping by a day or so, had been just enough to get the reply they needed from the king. There were, besides the money, no doubt verbal messages of assurance that Antiochos was still in the war, which was, in any case, the obvious additional message. It was in Antiochos' interests, as it was in Philip's, but for different reasons, that the Aitolians should fight on. Hence the money. But the Aitolians could see this equally clearly. The allies were indulging in a spot of mutual blackmail, each pointing out to the other that they could make a separate peace if they wished. For the moment it was worth it for both to fight on. But the further message was that there were limits to each side's endurance.

Glabrio, informed by Philip of Nikandros' mission, will have drawn the obvious conclusion, that the war was going to continue once the second truce expired, and that a meeting of the Aitolian Assembly would not take place. He occupied the time organising the distribution or sale of booty from Herakleia, and also in making plans for the resumption of the fighting[21]. The Aitolians meanwhile mustered at Naupaktos[22], which will have meant that all surplus soldiers –

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[20] Livy 36.29.3-11; Pol 20.10.16-11.10.

[21] Livy 36.30.1; as Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.267, notes, it is not clear if the people of Herakleia were included in the booty; Glabrio did send a group of forty-three men as prisoners to Italy (Livy 37.3.8).

[22] Livy 36.30.1; this, of course, could have been arranged as the special Assembly promised to Glabrio; if so, it was also a military muster.

surplus to those in the necessary garrisons, that is – will have been summoned there. Glabrio knew this, and so was now faced with a difficult choice: either he could besiege a series of Aitolian fortified cities, probably beginning with Hypata, or maybe Lamia, each of which cities would resist as well and as fiercely and as long as had Herakleia, and each of which would cost time and the lives of some of his soldiers. Meanwhile at Rome a new pair of consuls would be elected, and winter would arrive, when operations would be suspended, so he would be replaced by a successor who would reap the results of his work in the next campaigning season. And meanwhile also an Aitolian army would be able to go campaigning elsewhere, or would threaten the Roman communications, or even relieve the Roman sieges.

Glabrio had shown, as a commander, that he was quite willing to leave enemy posts untaken in his rear, as with Demetrias in Thessaly, as with Thaumakoi in his original intention, as with Herakleia and Hypata before the battle at Thermopylai. He now did the same again, more spectacularly. Since the Aitolian army was at Naupaktos, and since whatever he did he must besiege an Aitolian city, Naupaktos was chosen as the place to attack, which would at best bottle up the Aitolian army, and so prevent it being used to harass his lines of communication and supply. An advanced party under Ap. Claudius Pulcher seized the pass over Mount Oita above Herakleia, and the main body followed, while Glabrio climbed to the top and sacrificed to Herakles at the temple there. (It may be that the sacrifice was a decoy move, aimed at concealing the army's march.) A difficult passage over Mount Korax followed, which Livy describes as a smaller version of Hannibal's Alpine crossing, mules falling into steep gorges and all. Then he marched to Naupaktos and put the city under siege[23].

As so often Livy's bare account scarcely addresses the real problem, even when supplemented by a fragment of Polybios. To get to Naupaktos, Glabrio had not only to climb two mountain ranges, but he had to march through the heartland of the Aitolian League. One of the main Aitolian centres was Kallipolis, which Livy mentions but without informing us whether it was taken; we may therefore assume

[23] Livy 36.30.2-6; Pol 20.11.11-12; the geography is discussed by Walbank, *Commentary* 3.83-85.

it was not, particularly as it never figured in the arguments over the disposal of captured cities after the war. Then one wonders why Glabrio had to climb Mount Korax in the first place, when the obvious route was along the valley of the Daphnos river, which, if it was followed, would bring the Roman army to the coast of the Gulf of Corinth only a few kilometres east of his target, Naupaktos. The comment is made by Livy that the mountain route was undefended; this would suggest that the valley route *was* defended, and that Glabrio was intent on avoiding being stuck in the mountains. The Aitolians had so far concentrated their defences in the fortified centres – as they had done at Herakleia and Lamia and Hypata – and so such places as Kallipolis and Aigition and Poteidania, all in the valley, were also fortified and defended, yet they were ignored by Glabrio's army. Glabrio's march therefore was deliberately difficult, since the easy route to Naupaktos was comprehensively blocked. Once there, of course, he had to be supplied from the sea.

The siege was more a blockade, it seems, than an assault. A camp was established over against the acropolis, but the army was posted around the city. No desperate attacks are recorded, unlike the fighting at Herakleia or even at Lamia[24]. With a large force of Aitolians inside the city the prospects for a successful assault were poor. At the same time, the concentration of the Aitolian armed forces within the city could be expected to exert early pressure on the supplies which had been collected there, as would the Roman army's ravaging of the surrounding lands.

The blockade, however, was only a part of the general Roman strategy. In the Peloponnese Flamininus was exerting his influence to control the Achaians, who were in expansionist mood: they bribed Amynandros' governor of Zakynthos, Hierokles of Akragas, who had replaced Philip of Megalopolis, to hand the island over to them, and they also invaded Messenia. Flamininus made them disgorge Zakynthos, which was taken by Rome, and he stopped the attack on Messene; but then he persuaded the Messenians to join the league 'voluntarily'[25]. At that point only Elis of the Peloponnesian states remained outside the league, but one could scarcely claim that the league was a well-integrated organisation. And in the north Philip,

[24] Livy 36.30.6 remarks on the 'toil and labour' (*operis laborisque*) of the siege, but not the fighting.

[25] Livy 36.31.4-10 (Messene) and 11-12 (Zakynthos).

after carefully clearing his plans with Glabrio, moved against Demetrias. The Seleukid troops in the city surrendered quickly, on the promise of being repatriated, and the Seleukid ships still there were allowed to sail to Asia. The pro-Aitolian regime in the city collapsed; several men went into exile, and Eurylochos committed suicide. A pro-Macedonian and pro-Roman government was then, no doubt, installed[26]. The fears of the Demetrians, that they would be handed back to Philip, expressed the previous year to Flamininus, had now been realised, for by his agreement with the Romans Philip would keep what cities he captured himself. Demetrias was one of the major prizes of the war.

Philip, of course, was pursuing his own course, which aimed at the recovery of the lands he had lost at the peace of 197. He had agreed very easy terms with the Seleukid troops in Demetrias in order to get control of the city quickly. He did not wish to be ordered off, as at Lamia. It seems there may have been fighting in Athamania about this time, which would be attempts by Amynandros' partizans, possibly with Aitolian help, to recover the kingdom for him. Philip reacted, and went further. Another area which he had at one time controlled was Dolopia, south of Athamania, which he now seized. Beyond it again was Aperantia, an ancestral part of Aitolia, into which he penetrated. But this was not land he could claim to be 'recovering' (though Livy uses the word), so he turned back north and 'recovered' the cities of Perrhaibia, on the southern border of Macedon[27].

It is clear that Philip was able to march at will over Thessaly from east to west (Demetrias to Dolopia) and southwest to northeast (Dolopia to Perrhaibia). Just how many of these acquisitions and reacquisitions he would be able to keep was undecided as yet. His campaign had, very obviously, not done any real damage to Aitolia, and it has been supposed that he was deliberately sparing the Aitolians, presumbly with a view to later friendly relations[28]. This is unlikely, and the conquest of Dolopia and Aperantia can scarcely be classified as a process of sparing Aitolians; it is better to see Philip aiming at

[26] Livy 36.33.1-7.

[27] Livy 36.33.7 (Dolopia, Aperantia, Perrhaibia), 39.23.11 and 28.4 (hints of trouble in Athamania); Walbank, *Philip V*, 207; Hammond, *Hist. Mac*, 3.452.

[28] The basis for this theory is the reported conversation between Philip and Nikandros at the former's camp by Lamia (Livy 36.29.3); cf. Walbank, *Philip V*, 206, Hammond *Hist. Mac.* 3.452, n. 4.

gaining what he could for himself. There is no sign in his life or career of any altruism towards enemies, least of all Aitolians. He knew, from experiences earlier in the campaign, at Malloia and at Lamia, that the Romans would decide for themselves just what he would be allowed to have. But this, with the example of the Aitolians' own experience at their hands before him, Philip will have known all along. And the way Zakynthos was taken from the Achaians showed that the Romans' conduct had not changed; generosity was no more a part of their political culture than it was of Philip's.

The blockade of Naupaktos continued for two months while Philip was mopping up in Thessaly and Dolopia and Perrhaibia. At sea the Roman fleet reached the Aegean in August, about the time the siege began at Naupaktos, and had then sailed in stages, with great care, into Asian waters, where it met and defeated Antiochos' fleet in battle at Kissos[29]. So by late September the general situation was very much altered. With his fleet defeated and the surviving ships penned-up under blockade in Ephesos, Antiochos was unable to bring any substantial military help to the Aitolians, even if he had wished to. Philip's career of easy conquest was no doubt very satisfying to him, but it was not what the Romans had gone to war to facilitate. The siege of Naupaktos was getting nowhere, and winter was approaching, when it would be difficult, if not impossible, to provision the Roman army by sea in hostile territory. Flamininus arrived at the Roman camp from Achaia and negotiated a truce by which the siege was lifted and the Roman army marched off to winter quarters in Phokis[30].

This agreement was made while Phaineas was still *strategos*[31], and so it was concluded, and the Romans had withdrawn from the siege, before the election of his successor at Thermos at the September equinox – unless the election was delayed because of the Roman invasion, but there is no reason to assume this. The election, in either case, will have followed at once. The new *strategos* was Archedamos of

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[29] Livy 36.42.6-45.4.

[30] Livy 36.34.1-35.6; Plut. *Flamininus* 25.6-9; the tale of Aitolians begging Flamininus to save them, Phaineas and his colleagues grovelling at Flamininus' feet, and the dim-wittedness of Glabrio, may all be ignored; it was surely not in Polybios, but from some pro-Flamininian sycophancy. The general political and military situation made a Roman withdrawal necessary before the winter, and the Aitolians could see that just as clearly as could Flamininus and Glabrio.

[31] Livy 36.35.3.

Pholas, a well-experienced commander, who had commanded at Thaumakoi in 199 and at Kynoskephalai in 197. He had also been the envoy to the Achaians in 192, and one of the envoys to Glabrio at Herakleia. He was a man, therefore, fully aware of the political and military situation, and trusted by the Aitolians with both military and diplomatic missions.

The truce was essentially for the winter season, though an actual period is not recorded. The Roman withdrawal to Phokis was in effect an Aitolian defensive victory. Both sides manoeuvred to gain advantages during the period of the truce, no doubt on the well-founded assumption that the embassy which the Aitolians were to send to Rome would fail to bring back acceptable peace terms. In the Peloponnese the Eleians were at last persuaded, cajoled, compelled to become part of the Achaian League[32], but they did so on their own terms. This removed the last of Aitolia's independent allies, apart from Antiochos. The Peloponnese was thus, more or less, and very precariously, united for the first time, yet the whole process was so tentative that most of Achaia's energies would be absorbed in holding on; no further adventures were going to be possible.

Glabrio's winter quarters were in Phokis, the army stationed at Elateia once again. It was at this point that he began a series of measures which continued the process of the reduction of Aitolian power begun at Herakleia and in Thessaly and the north. The capture of Elateia by the army after Thermopylai, and its retention under Roman control, stimulated the Elateian exiles at Stymphalos in Arkadia to approach Glabrio with a request that they be allowed to return. They were supported in this by Diophanes, who was Achaian *strategos* until September, and who was accompanied by an otherwise unknown man called Athanakles (perhaps a Stymphalian). This therefore seems to have occurred after Diophanes ceased to be *strategos*. Glabrio agreed to their return[33], and this would imply that Elateia would not be returned to Aitolian control at the end of the war, if Rome won.

Delphi was also in Phokis, and one of the unmentioned achievements of Glabrio, perhaps on his retirement from Naupaktos, was to seize control of the temple and the city. So, for the first time in almost a century, these were removed from Aitolian control. Furthermore

[32] Livy 36.35.7; Paus. 8.30.5 (quoting from the inscription on Diophanes' statue pedestal); Errington, *Philopoemen*, 131; Aymard, *Premiers Rapports*, 356-358.

[33] M. Mitsos, 'Inscription de Stymphalos', *REG*, 59-60, 1946-1947, 150-173.

this was not merely a temporary wartime occupation. During the winter Glabrio acted at Delphi as a ruler, handing down decisions on the ownership of land and the boundaries of the city-state. It is clear that his intention was that Aitolia would not recover control.

This was, in retrospect at least, regarded as the liberation of Delphi, and for it Glabrio was awarded an equestrian statue, whose base was decorated with a permanent record of his acts in the city[34]. Over the previous century considerable sections of Delphian land, and buildings in the city, had been acquired by Aitolians. It was, of course, normally illegal for a non-citizen to acquire ownership of property in a sovereign city-state, and so some Delphian measure must have been passed, no doubt at Aitolian instigation and insistence, to permit outsiders to make purchases. This would put these men into positions of influence, at the least, from which they could exercise some control, distant or close, over the city's affairs. No doubt this had been one of the purposes, from the Aitolian point of view. In recent years an Aitolian *epimeletes* had also been appointed over the city, which would suggest some restiveness on the part of the Delphians at the Aitolian domination[35]. It also suggests that when Glabrio liberated the city, he did so to the satisfaction of most of the Delphians. Clearly it was necessary to root out the locally domiciled Aitolians in order to make the liberation effective.

The people dispossessed, and the location of their lost lands, are listed on Glabrio's monument, as a permanent record, presumably to prevent vexatious claims later. The great majority of the men named were in fact Lokrians, and almost half of those Lokrians were from Amphissa, the closest city to Delphi. At the same time others who had acquired something had come from more distant places: Herakleia, Kallipolis, Agrinion, Matropolis, Arsinoe, Naupaktos, and others. Lokrians may have predominated, but all Aitolia participated. The hurt and deprivation was accordingly well distributed, but it also fell heaviest on the nearby communities.

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[34] P. Roussel, 'Delphes et l'Amphictionie apres la guerre d'Aitolie', *BCH* 61, 1932, 1-36, and J.-P. Michaud, 'Nouvelle Inscription de la Base de M'. Acilius', *BCH Supplement* IV, 1977, 125-136; cf. also Daux, *Delphes*, 213-233.

[35] Five of these *epimeletai* are known, all from the period c.205 to 199 (Flacelière, *Aitoliens*, 333-335); this concentration of evidence strongly suggests a late development; the honorific decree for one of them, Satyros of Agrinion, shows that much of his duty was judicial; P. Roussel, 'Les epimeletes Étoliens de Delphes', *BCH* 50, 1926, 124-134.

The lands and buildings confiscated by Glabrio were handed over to 'the god and the city'. This was part of the process of re-establishing the formal autonomy of the city, which was also provided with an array of privileges guaranteed by Rome. Glabrio defined the boundaries of the newly organised city, including within those boundaries the port at Itea, much of the Krisan plain, and the road which lead from the coast north towards Doris and the Kephisos valley and the Malian Gulf[36]. This was obviously intended to render Delphi independent of any overbearing neighbour, though the war had to be won first. The Delphians sent off envoys to the Senate to secure official confirmation of all this[37].

While Glabrio was thus busy dismantling the eastern political buttresses of their league, the Aitolian envoys went to Rome, and in the Senate made their speech asking for the Roman peace terms. Livy provides a version in which the envoys confess guilt, plead like suppliants, and generally act as though they would agree to accept whatever terms the Senate decided[38]. This cannot be accepted. It is what Livy and the Roman tradition felt *ought* to have happened, not necessarily what did happen. Whatever it was the envoys really said the Senate was not satisfied, and the terms presented were such as the senators must have known would not be accepted: either submit to whatever the Senate required, or pay a fee of a thousand talents and conclude an alliance with Rome[39]. The envoys asked for a clarification of the *deditio* which was the first alternative, but did not get it[40]; the second alternative would both impoverish them (it was a tenth of what Carthage had to pay, which was spread over fifty years, from a much wealthier city, and double what Philip had in the end had to pay) and the alliance would render the league completely dependent on the Senate, no matter how generous the Senate's eventual terms of the peace. The envoys' request for clarification amounted to a refusal of either of the Senate's alternative sets of terms, and they were ordered to leave Italy within fifteen days[41].

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[36] *Syll* (3), 609, 611, 612, 826; cf. G. J. Szemler, E. W. Kase, M. P. Angelos, 'The Donation of M.' Acilius Glabrio, cos 191, a re-interpretation', *Ancient History Bulletin*, 3 3/4, 1989, 68-77.

[37] *Syll* (3), 612.

[38] Livy 37.1.1-3; Pol. 21.2.4 is undetailed.

[39] Livy 37.1.5; Pol. 21.2.4-6.

[40] Livy 37.1.6.

[41] Ibid.

These envoys had left for Rome soon after the September elections at the *Thermike*. They met the Senate soon after the Roman elections, which took place in mid-November, and so they will have left Italy – if their fifteen days is to be taken literally – early in December, and will have reached home by the end of that month at the latest. This gave the Aitolian commanders time to consider how to cope with the next attacks from the Romans and the Macedonians. The winter quarters of the Roman army at Elateia and the obvious Roman control of Delphi made the direction of the next Roman attack reasonably clear. So in February, before the Romans would have stirred out of their hibernation, the passage they had used the previous year through Mount Korax was fortified[42]. This, together with the pre-existing fortifications in the cities in the valleys, blocked all the routes Glabrio might use to bring his army west to mount a new siege of Naupaktos. The extent of the danger which the Aitolians faced was emphasised by a naval raid by the Achaians along the Corinthian Gulf coast[43]; on the other hand, the Achaians were not going to invade Aitolia on their own, and such raids as they could mount could be endured as passing annoyances.

What preparations were made by the Aitolians to face any possible attack by Philip, whose line of approach through Athamania was again available, is not known, though, like the Achaians, he would be unlikely to invade alone, and the full strength of the Aitolian forces would obviously be required to face the Roman attack. In the event Philip was unable to attack because a new consular army arrived at Apollonia in mid-March, and he was kept busy helping out with guides and supplies and hospitality as it marched through Epeiros and Thessaly. The fortification of Korax, however, was wholly successful[44], and when he broke up his winter camp Glabrio was unable to resume his old campaign. Livy claims he thereupon tried to surprise the Aitolians by attacking Lamia, but if the blocking of Korax had worked, an attack on the Spercheios valley was one of Glabrio's obvious alternative options. Lamia, perhaps already weakened by Philip's attacks the previous year, and perhaps now not defended very vigorously, given its isolated situation, held out only a couple of days[45]. If Glabrio had

[42] Livy 37.4.7.
[43] Livy 37.4.6.
[44] Livy 37.5.4.
[45] Livy 37.4.8-5.3.

wanted to use the attack to entice the Aitolians forward to attempt the city's relief, the speedy collapse of resistance foiled him. But perhaps the main aim of the attack on Lamia was to open the route from the north, which continuing Aitolian control of the cities of the Spercheios valley threatened[46].

Glabrio now again turned south. Unable to attack Naupaktos he was forced to begin the long-drawn-out process of fighting his way into Aitolia city-by-city. He marched back through Phokis and began an attack on Amphissa, the next city on the route from Delphi westwards into heartland Aitolia. This march, according to the events noted by Livy, will have taken some time: Glabrio had to march from Lamia to Amphissa, make camp, and bring up battering rams, and the siege itself went on long enough for several gaps to be made in the city wall, and several sorties by the defenders to be mounted[47]. Even then there was no suggestion that the Roman army was ready to mount an assault. If the capture of Lamia took place directly after breaking from winter quarters, the siege at Amphissa went on until June at least before it was interrupted by the new army's arrival.

The arrival of this new Roman army, commanded by the consul L. Cornelius Scipio, provided the interruption to the siege which the Aitolians will have hoped for. Having reached the area of Lamia[48], Scipio found that Glabrio was still a long way off, locked into a siege which, even if it could be successfully concluded, would only lead on to yet another siege; and meanwhile, the Aitolians held the nearby city of Hypata, and every other city of Aitolia. If Amphissa was difficult to take, so also was Hypata[49]. The prospect existed that two Roman armies would be spending the rest of the year slowly grinding their ways into the heart of Aitolia, and then would need to be withdrawn into winter quarters, so that the process would need to be repeated next year – just as Glabrio's had already done. Neither Roman commander would gain any glory that way, and meanwhile the real enemy from the Roman point of view, Antiochos III, waited in Asia, unaffected.

Scipio made an attempt to bluff Hypata into a quick surrender, but

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[46] When Scipio's army arrived, the first move it made was to threaten Hypata, which implies that the city was a threat, even to an army of 13,000 men.

[47] Livy 37.5.4-6.1.

[48] Livy 37.6.2.

[49] See the description of the site in Y. Béquignon, *La Vallée du Spercheios*, Paris 1937, 308-312.

it did not work[50]. He marched his army onwards, but sent his brother Scipio Africanus riding on ahead to see Glabrio. The Scipionic assumption seems to have been that the main enemy was Antiochos, so, if he could be dealt with, then the Aitolians would automatically give up the fight. But the full strength of both Roman armies was required to attack Antiochos. Therefore, the Aitolian war was deemed an unnecessary obstacle in the way of the real war. The consul halted his army at a sufficient distance from Amphissa that Glabrio's proconsular authority was not extinguished[51], and let Africanus get on with the process of organising an end to the fighting at Amphissa, so that he could take over an army which was not locked into an active campaign and send Glabrio home. Meanwhile the Amphissans, noting the arrival of another Roman army, abandoned their lower city and retired to the acropolis[52]. There was no sign of giving up here.

Whether by coincidence or by pre-arrangement, a group of Athenian envoys led by Echedemos now met Africanus and were employed as go-betweens. The Aitolian magistrates were at Hypata, and they were happy enough to speak of a truce or of peace. The longer the Romans talked the better; and if the Romans went off to fight Antiochos, even better still. At the least they would leave Aitolia alone for a time; at best they would be defeated. The Athenians returned to the consul's camp with Aitolian envoys. The conference was between the Aitolians and Africanus. They made speeches at each other, with no discernible result. This time the Aitolians were apparently permitted to finish what they wanted to say, though they did not persuade any of the Romans; not altogether surprisingly. But the terms of peace which Africanus could offer were only those already offered by the Senate in the winter at Rome: surrender at the Senate's discretion, or a 'fine' of a thousand talents and an alliance[53].

The Aitolians went back to Hypata, but the terms were still impossible to accept. Echedemos had gone with them, and he suggested a truce to enable envoys to go, once again, to the Senate. This time the truce was to be for six months, which would thus last into the next

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[50] Livy 37.6.2.

[51] Livy 37.6.4.

[52] Livy 37.6.3; but the archaeology has revealed a powerful third century rampart enclosing both the city and the citadel (*Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites*, sv. Amphissa), which wouid seem to imply that Livy was embroidering the truth somewhat - or the acropolis wall has not yet been found.

[53] Livy 37.6.4-7.4; Pol. 21.4.1-5.6; App. *Syr* 23; Zon 9.

winter, and would therefore effectively be for far longer. The Aitolians must have known that this meant that the Roman army would thus be deflected onto their ally, but, Micawber-like, Echedemos remarked that something might turn up in the meantime. The Aitolians, clearly interpreting this in their own favour, and hoping, indeed assuming, that what turned up could well be the destruction of the Roman forces in Asia, accepted the suggestion. Africanus, without difficulty, persuaded his brother; or rather, the consul accepted the results of his brother's mediation[54].

Glabrio at once handed over his army to the consul, took his loot, and left. The double Roman army marched off, making its slow way through Thessaly and Macedon to Asia[55]. The Aitolians, relieved, no doubt, sent off their envoys to Rome, led by Damoteles. No-one was in any hurry. It took the Scipios six months to get to Asia, and the Aitolian envoys were not interviewed in the Senate until after the elections in Rome in November[56]. One reason for the delay at Rome was the wish to have Glabrio present for the senatorial debate, and he clearly took some time for his journey, having substantial booty to transport[57]. But the Aitolians were probably in no hurry either. At home they knew that preparations for the resumption of the fighting were going ahead, but that the truce would not expire until November at the earliest, and in practice not until later, after the winter.

The Aitolian envoys found rumours of Roman disasters rife in Rome. One rumour was that the Aitolians at home had contacted Macedon, the Dardanians, and Thrace in order to collect mercenaries. This is retailed by Livy on the basis of an item in the unreliable Valerius Antias[58]. He adds another story from the same source, that the Aitolian envoys were asked by the Senate about a story which was circulating that the Roman army in Asia had been destroyed[59]. Livy clearly disbelieved this second story, but the first, of Aitolian recruitment, is obviously plausible. Livy names two men as being sent to take the report to the *propraetor* A. Cornelius Mammula in Aitolia. One name is that of A. Terentius Varro, who certainly was connected with the envoys later; a second is 'M. Claudius Lepidus', whose name sug-

[54] Livy 37.7.4-6; Pol. 21.5.7-12.
[55] Livy 37.7.7; Pol. 21.5.13.
[56] Livy 37.47.6-7 (elections); 49.1 (envoys seen by the Senate).
[57] Listed at Livy 37.46.3-6.
[58] Livy 37.48.1-5.
[59] Livy 37.48.6-7.

gests an adoption which is very unlikely, and who could well be an invention[60]. But A. Cornelius Mammula really was the commander of a Roman army which had been stationed in southern Italy during the year, with orders to cross to Greece if needed[61], in much the same terms as the propraetor M. Baebius Tamphilus had operated the year before. It is not certain whether Mammula had done so, but he and his army were certainly earmarked for any further operations in Greece if and when they should begin again. If he had crossed the Adriatic he will have gone no further than Illyria; either way the army was available. If the Senate believed the stories of Aitolian recruiting in the Balkans, Mammula would certainly be the man to be warned – unless, already in Illyria, he was the source of the information.

The Senate delayed until the truce was almost expired before seeing the envoys, presumably hoping for decisive news from Asia. In the absence of such news it was quickly clear that neither side had modified its position in the slightest. The Aitolians had the temerity to stand up for themselves, behaving as an independent people, treated badly and ungratefully by their erstwhile colleagues and allies; the senators offered only the old alternatives of *deditio* or subordinate alliance. Since the Aitolians had only lost two cities, and Delphi, but not the war, they were scarcely going to accept the old terms. Glabrio proposed that they should be dismissed, ordered to be out of Italy within fifteen days, and that no further Aitolians should be permitted to come to Italy without the permission of the commander on the spot. A. Terentius Varro was detailed to escort them on their journey; presumably this was because the truce had now expired, and the envoys could be treated as active enemies[62].

The Aitolians may well have been recruiting mercenaries. Despite the war they could certainly afford to do so, and not just because of the contribution from Antiochos brought by Nikandros. Glabrio had been granted a triumph for his successes, and in the procession there were carried well over two hundred talents in silver in the form of bullion, Attic tetradrachms, *cistophoroi*, vessels, and furniture, plus forty-four golden crowns[63]; his great generosity in elections later leads

[60] Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.367.
[61] Livy 37.2.7.
[62] Livy 37.49.1-8.
[63] Livy 37.46.3-6; the fact that *cistophoroi* may or may not have been produced yet does not alter the overall value of the loot.

to the assumption that he had personally acquired a lot more; his soldiers also benefited[64]. This loot was partly taken from Antiochos at Thermopylai, and in the pursuit afterwards, and partly from Thessaly and Boiotia, but most of Glabrio's fighting had been done in Aitolia, and it was from there, from the two sacked cities of Herakleia and Lamia, and from the Aitolian countryside he had marched and ravaged through, that the great majority of this loot came. Yet only part of the league territory had been affected; there was clearly plenty more wealth in Aitolia, in addition to whatever Antiochos had sent across with Nikandros and any which had arrived since. The Aitolian protestations that they could not afford the Roman indemnity are not therefore to be taken too seriously. But it is clear that the league was fully capable of fighting on for a long time, particularly if the strategy of defending every city to the end was followed; the prime need would be manpower, for the Aitolian armed forces had never been very large in numbers, and it would be better to use the country's wealth in hiring soldiers to fight for its freedom than to have to give it up to the Romans as an indemnity without a fight.

Glabrio had also displayed in his triumphal procession the retained prisoners from Herakleia. He had sent these men to Rome the year before, forty-three 'chiefs' escorted by no less than 'two cohorts' of soldiers. They were held in the Lautumiae prison, and by the time of the triumph there were only thirty-six left. One hopes the other seven had escaped, but the fear must be that most had died. The main prize had been Damokritos, the former *strategos*, whose brother had also been caught. But Damokritos escaped before he could be humiliated in the triumph, and had somewhow acquired a sword. His guards chased him along the banks of the Tiber, and when he was cornered, he committed suicide[65]. He had certainly achieved his ambition to deal with Rome on the banks of its river, and he had cheated Glabrio of one of the main elements of his triumph. This would probably not be a surprise to the Romans; the Aitolians' stubborn defence of their independence was both individual and collective.

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[64] He was prosecuted in 189 for failing to hand over some part of the loot; the procedure was politically motivated, and was dropped when he pulled out of the contest of the censorship; the imputation of graft remained, of course: Livy 37.57.10-58.1.

[65] Livy 37.3.8 (escorted from Greece to Rome); 46.4-5; 'cohorts', of course, are later Roman military units; Livy was adapting his source, which will have been a thousand soldiers.

A further sign of this came in September, with the new elections at Thermos. These were conducted, of course, in the shadow of the likely renewal of the war. The truce had no more than a couple of months at the most to run, having been concluded in May or June. The march of the Roman army to Asia had still not brought it to the Hellespont, and it was surely known that yet another Roman army – that of A. Cornelius Mammula – had been allotted to Greece if necessary (and it may have already reached Illyria). The prospects of acceptable peace terms emanating from the Senate were surely thought of as remote, particularly as it would have been clear by September that the Senate was deliberately delaying discussion with the Aitolian envoys, presumably in the hope of good news from Asia.

So the Aitolian elections were another opportunity for the Aitolians to signal their wish for peace, or their determination to fight on until acceptable terms were forthcoming. The new *strategos* was Nikandros of Trichonos, *hipparchos* four years earlier, envoy to Philip and to Antiochos, the bringer of the treasure from Antiochos the year before[66], a man active in high policy affairs all through the crisis with Rome and clearly identified as a committed supporter of the war against Rome. There was, therefore, no indication of a lessening of Aitolian determination to fight on in this choice. Nikandros had been in office for at least three months or more when the news of the failure of the embassy to Rome reached him (late in December). The imminence of winter, and the lack of decision in Asia – which meant that the Roman army there was not free to return to Europe – and the general absence of any significant enemy forces nearby, all precluded any immediate Roman action when the truce expired. But these considerations did not prevent actions by the Aitolians on its expiry.

King Amynandros had taken refuge with his family in Ambrakia when his kingdom had been conquered by Philip's army, and he was regarded as sufficiently dangerous to be named personally by Glabrio as one to be surrendered by Aitolia in the discussions at Herakleia. He had other Athamanians with him, apart from his family, according to Glabrio's demands, and these could be the nucleus of his recovery force[67]. Philip's forces in occupation of Athamania had

[66] *Prosopography*, 'Nikandros (6)'.
[67] Livy 36.14.9 and 28.3.

made themselves thoroughly disliked[68], and Amynandros began organising his return. He contacted Nikandros, for he would need more troops than he commanded personally to remove the Macedonians, and he would also need a substantial force to defend the kingdom against the inevitable counter-attack. He organised a resistance movement inside the kingdom, and a well co-ordinated simultaneous rising in four places in Athamania in January or February effectively freed most of the land, except for the border fortress of Athenion, which was held by some of the Macedonians[69].

This fortress gave Philip a foothold for his reconquest, but it also gave a clear indication of the route he would have to use. He brought up 6,000 men, which was three times the combined Athamanian and Aitolian forces available, but then he divided this force and marched into the enemy's hills. The advance guard of a thousand men, commanded by Xenon, went ahead to camp at a place called Aithopia, close to the main Athamanian centre of Argitheia. Another two thousand Macedonians were put into the Athenion fortress. Philip, with the rest, then marched to join Xenon. His column was ambushed by the Athamanians posted in the hills on either side of the line of march, and by the Aitolians who attacked the rear of the column and then also blocked a vital crossing. Philip's main force then dissolved in panic, and fled back to his base at Gomphi. Then the Athamanians and Aitolians turned on Xenon's force, which first retreated and then was defeated. Philip, in effect confessing defeat, agreed to a truce to bury the dead[70].

Who commanded the Aitolians in this expedition is not known, though one might expect it to have been the *strategos* Nikandros, but it was a very well executed little campaign, effectively employing two small forces to defeat a much larger one. The liberation of Athamania also now interposed a barrier between Philip and the other areas he had conquered in the last campaign. Nikandros, therefore, followed up by mobilising the whole Aitolian army and moved to recover the lost northern lands, Amphilochia, Aperantia, and Dolopia[71]. Exactly how much of these areas had been taken by

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[68] Livy 38.1.2.

[69] Livy 38.1.3-11; Walbank, *Philip V*, 213-214; S. I. Oost, 'Amynander, Athamania, and Rome', *Classical Philology* 52, 1957, 1-15.

[70] Livy 38.2.1-14.

[71] Livy 38.3.3-5; Pol. 21.25.3-6.

Philip is not known, though probably only the inland hilly areas were affected: he does not seem to have held Amphilochian Argos, for example, and Amynandros had been able to travel from Ambrakia into Athamania through this area without difficulty. Probably only the upper valleys of the Inachos and Acheloos rivers had to be retaken, and with Athamania lost in their rear the Macedonian troops were probably not capable of much of a fight. Dolopia was the only area to provide any resistance. The people were often reckoned to be part of Thessaly, yet for much of the previous century they had been in the Aitolian League, so there was probably a division of opinion there, and perhaps a Macedonian garrison. But the land was thinly populated, and the approach of the whole Aitolian army was eminently persuasive. The whole province soon returned to the Aitolian fold.

Amynandros, as soon as he was in control of his kingdom again, immediately sent envoys to both the Senate at Rome and the consul Scipio at Ephesos, explaining what he had done – but no doubt failing to mention the participation of the Aitolians – and asking for peace. His explanation seems to have laid some stress on the evil conduct of Philip's men during their occupation[72]. The reply of neither Roman authority is recorded, but Amynandros was able later in the year to act as an intermediary between the new consul and his city of refuge, Ambrakia, so it would seem that he was received into the Roman alliance. He was not important enough to provoke serious Roman anger and reprisals, and no-one on the Roman side was bothered that Philip had been beaten.

The new consul, elected in November 190, who had won the province of Aitolia in the lot, was M. Fulvius Nobilior. He was assigned the army which the propraetor Mammula had been commanding for the last year. It may have been in Italy still, or it may be that Nobilior brought it across the Adriatic himself; either way it was not available for the next campaign until Nobilior himself reached Illyria. He was given an extra twelve thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry to reinforce Mammula's two legions: a force of perhaps 35,000 men; further, he was also given command of a fleet of new ships, thirty quinqueremes and twenty triremes. The reason for this was that the island of Kephallenia, an Aitolian ally which

[72] Livy 38.3.1-2; Pol. 21.25.1-2.

included the Aitolian colony of Same, had been added to his command[73].

The island had recently been the base for a Spartan, Hybristas, who had commanded a naval force which had been so successful in attacking Roman shipping that the sea route from Italy to the Aegean had been cut. Ships had already been sent from the allied fleets in the Aegean to deal with his men and the Kephallenians, apparently without success[74]. It would seem that the problem still existed in the new year. The four ships detached from the Aegean were now to be replaced by fifty ships from Italy, and a consular army. The sensitivity of the whole area for the Romans had been shown earlier when Flamininus had insisted that the Achaians hand over Zakynthos to Roman control. It would seem that it was now intended that the whole line of islands, from Kerkyra to Zakynthos, was to become Roman.

Nobilior mustered his full army at Apollonia, and there he consulted a group of Epeirotes. Livy and Polybios both make it seem as though he was persuaded by the Epeirotes to attack Ambrakia[75]; but Nobilior was an experienced soldier, who had already commanded successfully in Spain as praetor, and he would not be easy to persuade in such a matter against his own inclination. Further, the nature of his province, which included Kephallenia, and of his command, which included a fleet, tended to draw him towards the west. The experience of Glabrio, who had got back to Rome well before the elections and had surely been consulted, had been that the approach into Aitolia from the east was very difficult, yet Philip – whose envoys were also in Rome at the time of the elections – had twice been able to penetrate all the way to Thermos from the direction of the Ambrakian Gulf. An attack from that direction was also logistically easier, since the supplies for his army came from Sicily, Sardinia, Africa and Italy[76].

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[73] Livy 37.50.4-5 and 8. Nobilior's arrival at Apollonia is at 38.3.9. 'with his army'. This may be just the reinforcements he had been authorised to recruit, or it may be Mammula's army as well; Mammula had been authorised to take his two legions to Aitolia 'if the consul [i.e. Glabrio] wished'. It is not likely that Glabrio did so wish, but Mammula may have gone to Apollonia at any time before Nobilior arrived.

[74] Livy 37.13.11-12; Hybristas and the Kephallenians were, of course, regarded as pirates by their enemies.

[75] Livy 38.3.9-11; Pol. 21.26.1-5.

[76] Livy 37.50.10, e.g.

However, as the Epeirotes pointed out, the city of Ambrakia, an Aitolian League member for most of the past forty years, lay in the way, and had to be taken if the Romans were to penetrate into the Aitolian heartland. Philip might have been able to *raid* as far as Thermos, but such an achievement was not sufficient to end the war with a clear victory; it had been other factors which had brought the Aitolians to make peace. And the Senate had shown quite clearly that this peace would need to be one in which Aitolia submitted to Roman authority. This required the conquest of Aitolian land piece by piece until the Aitolians gave in.

The Aitolians could see this as well as the Romans. After their winter reconquests, they put together another embassy to Rome. News of the comprehensive defeat of Antiochos' main army at Magnesia had arrived soon after Nikandros' triumph in the north[77], and the news of the arrival of Nobilior at Apollonia was another spur to diplomacy. Damoteles and the other envoys to Rome had also returned with the news of the Senate's obduracy in the way of terms, or of its determination to receive no more Aitolian envoys without the agreement of the Roman commander in Aitolia. They were either going to ignore this prohibition, or go to Nobilior first. If they could persuade Nobilior to agree to another truce before he began operations, all the better.

This group of envoys was a notable set of men. The two leaders were the old partnership of Alexander of Isios and Phaineas of Heraklea, who had been harnessed together in diplomacy as far back as the meeting with Philip and Flamininus at Nikaia nine years before. They had three fellow envoys. One of these was of equal rank with Phaineas, Chalepos of Naupaktos, *strategos* in 199/198, and one of those who had lost land in Delphi as a result of Glabrio's actions the previous winter; despite his rank he is listed by Polybios in such a way as to make it clear he was of less importance in the embassy than Alexander and Phaineas. The other two are mere names to us: Alypos of Ambrakia – whose city was immediately under threat – and a man called Lykopos, whose home-city is not known[78].

The envoys sailed, perhaps for Italy, perhaps for Illyria, but their ship was captured by a man called Syburtes of Petra. He is not known

[77] Livy 38.3.6; Pol. 21.25.8.
[78] Livy 38.3.7-8 (very vague); Pol 21.25.10-11.

otherwise, and his home cannot be located, but he may be assumed to have been acting at least semi-officially for the Epeirotes. He intercepted the envoys' ship off Kephallenia, a location which does not allow us to decide on the envoys' eventual destination, then took them to Charadros, from which they were taken to Bouchetion, both in Epeiros. They were kept *incommunicado* for a time, then a ransom was demanded of them, of five talents each. None of them was unable to pay, merely very reluctant, and Alexandros positively refused. Polybios' story concentrates on the behaviour of Alexandros, but there is no hint of censure against the Epeirotes. In theory envoys' persons were sacred, but this seems not to have been a consideration; it would seem that the Eperiotes' conduct was thought to be quite normal.

The story got out, as it must if a ransom was demanded, and the Epeirotes reduced their demand to three talents each. All but Alexandros agreed, gave surety for the payment, and were then released. Alexandros eventually offered one talent, but did not have to pay even that much, for Nobilior meanwhile wrote to the Epeirotes requiring that they release their captives. It would seem, however, that the four who had given surety still had to pay. By this time, of course, the embassy as a whole had been foiled, and Nobilior and his army were on the march – and this may well have been the object of the Epeirotes all along. The Aitolians had sent off Damoteles as a replacement envoy when they heard of the capture of the others, but he turned back when he discovered, when he was off Leukas, that Nobilior was marching south through Epeiros with his army[79]. This in fact seems to suggest that the main object of the embassies was to delay his march, and that the main purpose of the kidnapping was to prevent the envoys seeing Nobilior.

It is difficult to decide whether the Epeirote intervention made any difference to the outcome. Clearly the five envoys must have been sent off with an offer which the Aitolians thought would have been acceptable to Rome, either to the consul or to the Senate. On the whole it seems more likely that they were to see the consul first. They knew that the Senate had forbidden contact with more Aitolian envoys, and their immediate aim must have been to forestall Nobilior's attack, which they could not do if they became stuck in an Italian jail, just as their sojourn in an Epeirote jail performed the same

[79] Pol 21.26.7-19.

function. The six months' truce concluded with Scipio the year before had been very useful to the Aitolians; perhaps Nobilior could be persuaded to accept a new truce, or an extension of the old one, before he even began. It was certainly worth trying.

Nobilior set siege to Ambrakia, and around this siege a series of subsidiary campaigns were waged for the next several months. He had ensured the alliance of the Epeirotes whilst at Apollonia, all the more easily because their contacts with Antiochos at the beginning of the war made them eager to please the Romans. But the intention to attack Aitolia from the western side made the active participation of the Epeirotes necessary, and Nobilior insisted, it seems, on the Epeirote forces being mobilised and taking part. Earlier participation by Epeirotes on the Roman side had been more passive, not to say absent.

Nobilior could also count on the participation of the Akarnanians, and on that of the Macedonians. King Philip did not take part himself, presumably because he was concerned with the activities of the Roman army in Asia, but also to give his son Perseus the opportunity of command. The Achaians, still digesting Sparta, Messene, and Elis, of which none were enthusiastic members of the league, also joined in, but without great enthusiasm. From the north Nobilior persuaded Pleuratos, one of the Romans' allies who had gained substantial territory from Philip after the last war, to join in with some ships. This may have been less for the strength Pleuratos could provide than to reassure Philip that Pleuratos had been removed from the Macedonian borders. The Roman alliance was, in fact, considerably fissured: the mutual antipathy among its members was almost as great as their hostility towards the Aitolians. In that situation, which was obvious to the Aitolians, it made sense for them to stand on the stubborn defensive; in this way the gaps between the Roman allies could be made visible, and could perhaps be exploited.

The Roman army marched through Epeiros to besiege the city of Ambrakia. Nobilior set up a formal, careful siege. The city, enclosed on three sides by rivers, with an acropolis rising eighty metres above the river plains, was fortified by a strong wall, and towers in the Hellenistic style[80]. Nobilior established a line of camps connected by a

[80] There is a plan in Hammond, *Epirus*, 141; J. Linderski, 'Cato Maior in Aetolia', in R. W. Wallace and E. M. Harris (eds), *Transitions to Empire, Essays in Greco-Roman History 360-146 BC in honor of E. Badian*, Norman, Oklahoma, 1996, 376-408, suggests that Ambrakia had already changed sides twice in this war.

continuous, though not very high, rampart. There seems to have been no sudden assault with the intention of taking the city on the run: either Nobilior had determined on the siege from the start, and did not like to change his mind, or the inhabitants had good warning and were thus prepared. Both of these look to be likely – Nobilior behaved throughout in a stubborn way, without displaying much imagination; the Aitolians had already mustered their army at Stratos when the siege was being set, and so had had plenty of warning[81].

Of course, when the Romans marched south though Epeiros, and had consulted Epeirote advisers, the Aitolians could see that it was odds-on that Ambrakia would be attacked. It had been Pyrrhos' capital, and part of the city was still called the Pyrrheion, either his palace or a part of the city he had had built. In the face of such an advance, an Aitolian muster at Stratos was the best preparation. Philip had bypassed Ambrakia on one of his campaigns and had crossed into Akarnania to raid into Aitolia from there; Stratos was a good defensive point, providing a fortified base from which attacks from the north and from the west could be blocked. The city also made a useful base from which counter-attacks could be mounted, and raids made on the besiegers. Even as the Romans were organising their camps, and digging their rampart, a reinforcement of a thousand Aitolians, commanded by Eupolemos of Hypata, was able to get into the city.

The Aitolian commander, the *strategos* Nikandros, had made tentative plans to attack the Epeirote forces, who were camped across the river from the Romans and so separated from the main force, at the same time as Eupolemos' entry, but in the event did not do so, apparently fearing that the Romans had got to hear of his plans[82]. It was obviously more important to boost the defence, both in numbers and in morale, than to beat up a fairly unimportant detachment, and the arrival of Eupolemos' men would certainly put both the Romans and the Epeirotes on the alert. It was also above all necessary that the main Aitolian army be preserved intact; it must not be risked in an attack on the Romans, and a raid against the besiegers would be too dangerous.

Nikandros instead – and it may well have been his intention all along – raided the Akarnanians, apparently taking his time over it[83].

[81] Livy 38.4.1-6.
[82] Livy 38.4.7-10.
[83] Livy 38.4.10 and 5.6.

To do this made a certain sense, for if the Akarnanians could be kept down he would then be able to concentrate on events to the north. Assaults on the Ambrakian city wall were now being made on a regular basis[84], but at the same time a Macedonian force, commanded by Perseus, now joined in, by moving into Dolopia and Amphilochia again, retaking those areas, or some of them, which had been recovered by Nikandros during the winter. How far Perseus had advanced is not clear, but his attack was another distraction for the Aitolians[85].

The situation in the city required that another reinforcement be pushed in. Another plan, rather elaborate, was developed to combine the entry of this reinforcement with an attack from within the city on part of the Roman forces, and with an assault by the main Aitolian force elsewhere. But the appearance of Perseus' forces made it more urgent to face him than mount an attack on the Roman besiegers. Once again the old Aitolian strategy of ignoring the main enemy force, and picking off or driving away the lesser enemies, was put into practice. The reinforcement, however, did get into the city, under an otherwise unknown commander called Nikodamos[86].

The impossibility of mounting a major assault on the Romans from outside the city in the face of the attacks on other parts of the league territory had become clear, and the chances of throwing in more reinforcements were now much less: the first group had only to cross a rampart to get in, but Nikodamos' men had to fight their way in and cross a wall as well. This meant that of reinforcement was no longer possible, an aggressive defence of the city had now become too costly; manpower had to be conserved, and the garrison had to be content to repel attacks only[87].

Nikandros drove off Perseus' force – which was besieging another city, possibly Amphilochian Argos – and the Macedonians withdrew all the way to Macedon[88]. This suggests, as does the employment of Perseus as commander rather than Philip, that the Macedonian forces were not at full strength. But as soon as Perseus had withdrawn, Pleuratos of Illyria and the Achaians began raiding the Aitolian coast from the sea along the Gulf of Corinth. Nikandros detached

[84] Livy 38.5.1-5; Pol. 21.27.1-6.
[85] Livy 38.5.10.
[86] Livy 38.4.6-9; Pol. 21.27.7-9.
[87] Livy 38.6.8-9.
[88] Livy 38.7.1.

a land force of a thousand men to march against the raiders wherever they landed. This may or may not have been successful, but we hear no more of Pleuratos' raids[89].

Nikandros was doing reasonably well in the face of enemies on all sides, any one of whom (except the Akarnanians) outnumbered the whole Aitolian army. His strategy was to keep the siege going, which would immobilise the Roman army, which was the main threat, while vigorously attacking any other enemy who came within reach. The Akarnanians, the Macedonians, the Illyrians, and the Achaians, had all attacked and had clearly had a bad time of it so far, and were all driven off or otherwise punished. The immobility of the Roman army, is, in fact, astonishing. An army of 35,000 men was being blocked by the siege of one moderately-sized city. For the engagement of the citizen defence force of Ambrakia, with 1,500 Aitolian reinforcements (plus, presumably, the original Aitolian garrison of some hundreds) the Romans were being prevented from mounting a serious invasion of the Aitolian heartland. Nikandros' employment of relatively small detachments while conserving his main force, is reminiscent of the Aitolian methods in the first war with Philip (the Symmachic War), and was even more effective, at least for the moment.

But Rome was not Macedon. Rome had enormous quantities of manpower, and the siege of Ambrakia was only one of several campaigns being conducted simultaneously – in Spain, in Cisalpina, in Asia – and if the siege dragged on too long Nobilior would be replaced by a new consul and another army could be added to his: that in Asia, already victorious against the Great King of the east, twice, would need to march home through Macedon and would be available, if the war continued long enough. The Aitolians could see all this clearly enough. So, once Nobilior was blocked, and his army pinned down, and his allies had suffered defeat at Aitolian hands, and while the Aitolian army was still intact, the moment had come for diplomacy to be tried once again.

Nikandros called a council meeting, which agreed to sue for terms. Phaineas and Damoteles were chosen as envoys to go to Nobilior to get the best terms they could. It did not work. The consul's terms were that the league must first disarm its troops, and surrender their weapons, pay the same thousand talents as originally demanded in

[89] Livy 38.7.2-3.

the old terms, and accept an alliance with Rome. The only advance on the previous terms was the absence of a demand for *deditio*, but the addition of the demand for disarmament amounted to the same thing: once disarmed the Aitolians would be helpless. As could have been predicted, these terms were instantly rejected by the Aitolians when they were publicised[90].

The envoys went off to try again, thus fortified with a strong and popularly-based rejection, and were captured by Akarnanians on the way[91]. 'The life of an Aetolian on the foreign service in 189 seems to have been quite adventurous', as Oost comments[92]. They were imprisoned at Thyrreion, but, of course, this was just the sort of act by his allies which Nobilior must have hoped to avoid. This, and the capture of the original envoys by the Epeirotes, is an indication that those allies had their own aims in this war, and that, as before, they were happy for the Romans to do the fighting, on the assumption that as allies they would gain from their victory. The Aitolians could have put them right on that score.

By now also, others had sensed that a settlement might well be possible. Amynandros came down from his kingdom to attempt to intercede with the consul over the siege. He had presumably been accepted back into the Roman alliance after his recovery of his kingdom[93], and, since his exile had been spent at Ambrakia, he was in a useful position to act as mediator. The Aitolian envoys were released by the Akarnanians at Nobilior's insistence; since he did insist, and since he then received them once more as envoys, he must now be thinking of easier terms for the peace. The Akarnanians' actions, like the Epeirotes before them but more seriously, had helped the Aitolians more than their own side. And Nobilior's latest attempt to attack the besieged city, by tunnelling under the walls, had been detected by the defenders and had failed ignominiously[94].

The Aitolian envoys contacted the consul's half-brother, C. Valerius Laevinus, the son of the consul with whom they had made the old treaty of 211, whose mother had remarried after Nobilior's

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[90] Livy 38.8.1-9.2.

[91] Livy 38.9.3.

[92] Oost, *Roman Policy*, 66.

[93] Or, since he had to obtain a safe-conduct from Nobilior, it may be the Romans had not yet decided; cf. Sage's note 1, p. 8 in the Loeb Livy, vol XI.

[94] Livy 38.9.4 and 6-7; Pol. 21.29.1-3 (Amynandros); Livy 38.9.5; Pol 21.29.4-5 (release of envoys); Livy 38.7.4-13; Pol 21.28.1-17 (siege).

father's death. Laevinus was young – he only reached the praetorship ten years later – but was presumably present as an aide to the consul[95]. In addition, delegates from Athens and from Rhodes had now arrived in the Roman camp, hoping to act as intermediaries[96]. There was thus a considerable pressure on the consul to reduce his terms; some of his allies (Amynandros, Athens, Rhodes), were clearly becoming anxious at the long siege; other allies (Macedon, Achaia, even Pleuratos) who had taken part on the Roman side, had done so without much enthusiasm and had, at least morally, suffered defeats; only the allies situated closest to Aitolia (Akarnania, Epeiros) were at all keen that the war continue, perhaps because they were more likely to gain territorially, and they had suffered also. And the consul's brother was also acting as a peacemaker.

The Aitolians had thus reached the stage where they were prepared to consider terms less satisfying than total independence; as Livy puts it: 'fair terms if possible, if not, endurable', where 'fair' means Aitolian demands[97]. And the consul was at last at the same time under serious pressure, diplomatically from his allies, militarily because the season was drawing on and the siege showed no signs of being successfully concluded before the winter, to reduce his terms to something the Aitolians might accept. Amynandros proved to be the active agent in producing an agreement acceptable to both sides. He was able, with the agreement of the consul, to get into Ambrakia to begin serious talks about the city's surrender. It would be clear to the Ambrakiots that the Romans would not go away until the city was taken, even if it was not accomplished under Nobilior's command. They held out for honourable terms: the Aitolians (meaning the non-Ambrakiot soldiers in the city, for the Ambrakiots were themselves legally Aitolians), were to be allowed to leave the city unmolested and armed, so they would be able to rejoin the Aitolian main army and fight on; private arrangements were made with the consul to prevent the city being sacked and looted. On these terms, which also meant that potentially the city became detached from the Aitolian League into independence as an ally of Rome – not as part of Epeiros – the city surrendered[98].

[95] Livy 38.9.8; Pol. 21.29.10-12.

[96] Livy 38.9.3; Pol. 21.29.9; Linderski, 'Cato Maior in Aetolia', suggests that Cato was another intermediary.

[97] Livy 38.8.3.

[98] Livy 38.9.6-7 and 9; Pol 21.29.14-15 and 30.9.

This negotiation was conducted in parallel with the talks between the league and the consul over a general peace. The consul finally agreed to reduce the indemnity payment to five hundred talents, delivered over six years in installments of fifty talents a year, with an immediate down payment of two hundred. The usual provision that the Roman prisoners and deserters in Aitolian hands should be handed over was included – no doubt the deserters were now given the opportunity to get away. But the main item was the territorial terms: any 'city' which had been taken by Rome or had become a Roman ally since the consul L. Cornelius Scipio reached Greece in 190 was to be abandoned by the Aitolians[99]. This date makes little sense, for it would leave the Aitolians able to claim cities in Thessaly and Phokis, including, of course, Delphi. If 'L. Cornelius' was really in the original agreement, it was quickly changed. Kephallenia, which was listed separately in the provinces for which Nobilior was responsible, was specifically excluded from the peace.

Damoteles and Phaineas took these terms back to Aitolia. It was now about the September equinox, and there was some delay in Aitolia in the process of ratification. The Assembly will have taken some time, and the discussions were prolonged by some disagreements over just which places were involved in the clause of the terms requiring cities to be excluded from the league: there will have been men at the Assembly whose cities were affected, and some places had changed hands several times in the past years, and perhaps the date was not clear[100]. Further, the usual annual elections would need to be conducted. Nobilior, having accepted gold worth 150 talents from Ambrakia, and having collected all the worthwhile art objects from the city – statues, paintings, and so on – as his price for not allowing a sack[101], became sufficiently concerned at the delay at Thermos to begin a march towards the Assembly. He got as far as Amphilochian Argos when he was met

[99] Livy 38.9.10 names the consul as T. Quinctius; Pol. 21.304 as L. Cornelius. The difference in dates is thus 198 or 190. Neither have much relevance; Flamininus arrived while Aitolia was a Roman ally; Scipio halfway through the present war. In the final treaty this date was changed to the consulship of L. Quinctius and Cn. Domitius, that is, 192, which was the start of the war. It seems most likely that this date was intended from the start. The mistake could, however, have been in the original treaty.

[100] Livy 38.9.11; Pol. 21.30.8.

[101] Livy 38.9.11; Pol. 21.30.9-10.

by Damoteles with the news that the Assembly had finally ratified the treaty[102].

Aitolian hesitation was also due to the knowledge that it was the habit of the Senate, when ratifying its consuls' treaties, to impose further conditions and terms. Nobilior's treaty was thus the maximum terms Rome would offer, and it could be expected that the Senate's version would be somewhat more stringent. The absence of the disarmament clause which had been originally proposed by Nobilior was therefore crucial, in that the Aitolians would be able to resume the fight if the Senate proved to be obdurate. But the ratification meeting had also been the occasion for the election of the next *strategos*, and the choice of Eupolemos of Hypata was also a signal that Aitolian will to resist further erosion of the league's power was still strong, for Eupolemos had been the main Aitolian commander in Ambrakia[103]. He will have come directly from Ambrakia to the *Thermike*, released from command in the city as part of the surrender terms.

The ex-*strategoi* Nikandros and Phaineas were appointed to go to Rome as envoys to argue for ratification there. They were accompanied by the Athenian and Rhodian intermediaries, and by C. Valerius Laevinus[104], all of whom were personally involved in securing the terms, and all of whom, from their varying points of view, could attest the terms – and the determination of the Aitolians to resist too great an erosion of those terms. The Aitolians, predictably, met early hostility from the Senate, in part because Philip's envoy had got there first and had been complaining that he should get Athamania and Dolopia, but also because the Senate would make peace only if further terms were imposed on the Aitolians; the need for keeping their military capability intact was thus demonstrated. Neither Nikandros nor Phaineas could make any headway with the Senate, but the Athenian delegates did manage to persuade the senators that reasonable terms be accepted[105]. And, sure enough, in the process the Senate both elaborated on the terms Nobilior had agreed, and added new ones.

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[102] Livy 38.10.13-14; Pol. 21.30.11-13; Nobilior's display in his triumph was immensely rich – over 1100 talents of silver, plus gold and the statues land so on (Livy 39.5.14-17). Some of this came from Kephallenia, and 150 talents from Ambrakia, but the rest – several hundred talents – came from the comparatively small area of Aitolia he had conquered. It seems an enormous quantity.

[103] *Prosopography*, 'Eupolemos (5)'.

[104] Livy 38.10.2; Pol 21.30.15-31.2; only Polybios names the Aitolian envoys.

[105] Livy 38.10.3-11.1; Pol. 21.31.3-32.1.

The basic terms concerning the monetary indemnity and the Roman prisoners and deserters were much the same, but the Aitolians were now also to provide forty adult male hostages, for the term of the indemnity. The surrender-of-cities clause was fairly seriously modified. It was first of all clarified by stating the date as the consulship of L. Quinctius Flamininus and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, that is, 192, the start of the war, which made sense. It thus clearly included those cities which had been captured by the Romans after 192, and the question of Thessaly was thus disposed of; the conquests of Delphi and in Phokis were definitely included, as were Herakleia, Elateia, Lamia, and Ambrakia. Kephallenia was still excluded from the terms. Added were two totally new clauses (besides that concerning the hostages): that Aitolia was to become a subordinate ally of Rome, pinned down with a detailed exposition of the terms of the alliance in such a way that Rome could control the league's foreign policy completely. And, finally, the sting in the tail, the city of Oiniadai was to be given to the Akarnanians[106].

Nobilior and his army had remained in Greece during this ratification process at Rome. It cannot have been intended in this way, but the addition of Kephallenia to his province had permitted him to do this, without being overtly overbearing. Yet he was on hand, close to Aitolia, and could even be thought to be threatening, if the modified senatorial terms provoked any active resentment among the Aitolians. He had crossed to Kephallenia and there had persuaded all but one of the island's towns to submit and provide hostages. The exception was Same, the Aitolian colony. One must wonder at this. The siege of that small city took Nobilior four months to complete. This was an unconscionable time for such an army – 35,000 men, with Achaian help – to capture such a small place[107]. It may be that Nobilior delayed so as to ensure that the Aitolians settled down under the treaty while he was still nearby; it may be that the Aitolians provoked the Samians to resist so as to pin the Roman army down in an awkward place just in case they felt they had to restart the war on the mainland. Nobilior certainly went off to Rome for

[106] Livy 38.11.2-9; Pol. 21.32.2-15; these two are essentially the same, given the differing languages; for discrepances cf. Walbank, *Commentary* 3.131-136; Linderski, 'Cato Maior in Aetolia', ignores these changes, but the Aitolians' knowledge that the Senate did make these changes, routinely, is fundamental to their attitude.

[107] Siege of Same: Livy 38.38.5-11; Pol. 21.32b; the chronology is discussed by Walbank, *Commentary*, 3.136-137.

the elections during the siege, which does not argue any great urgency to complete it. It would seem likely that the usual game of brinkmanship between Rome and Aitolia was to be played out to the end. In the event it is clear that the Aitolians, perhaps grumbling, and certainly unhappily, did accept the modifications imposed by the Senate, and in January the Sameans were finally conquered.

22. THE ROMAN CLIENT (189-167)

The Roman defeat of the Aitolian League, while not crushing, was definitive. The league was shorn of considerable areas of land, lost its control of the city of Delphi, and was removed from control of the Amphiktyony. It had fought an intelligent defensive war against overwhelming numbers of enemies and their outnumbering armies, in a sort of enlarged version of the war against the Greek Symmachy, and had fought long and hard enough to avoid the humiliation of submitting to a *deditio*. The central terms as spelled out by the consul were, however, only cosmetically an improvement on the original terms being demanded by Rome, and they were made more onerous by the Senate in the final version.

The territorial losses were seriously weakening to the league. In the west Ambrakia was made an independent city under Roman protection, a situation which was a repetition of what had happened after Philip V's conquest, but Roman power ensured that it was impossible for the city to be re-recruited into the league once more. Oiniadai was removed, presumably at Akarnanian urging. These two cities were detached from the league by specific terms in the treaty. The loss of Oiniadai implies that sections of southern Akarnania which had become Aitolian in 211, particularly Astakos, were also lost. However, the lands lost briefly to Philip in 191 and then recovered by Nikandros' winter campaign, Amphilochia and Aperantia, seem to have remained Aitolian; they had not been wholly lost anyway, in all probability[1]. Elsewhere the Aitolian losses were determined partly by the vague clause in the treaty which removed places taken by Rome after 192, and partly by arbitrary and unilateral actions by the Senate. These were mainly in the east.

The line of fortified cities along Mount Othrys – Xyniai, Thaumakoi, Melitaia[2] – and the towns along the north coast of the Malian Gulf which had been fought over for forty years – Larisa Chremaste,

[1] Livy 38.10.3.
[2] Livy 39.26.2 (Xyniai); *IG* IX.2.218 (Thaumakoi); *Syll* (3) 647 (Melitaia).

Echinos, Phalara[3] – and the city of Lamia[4], were all lost, partly to Thessaly, though the coastal areas went to Philip, who also kept the city of Demetrias and Achaia Phthiotis. Philip was particularly riled at not getting Lamia[5], which he had besieged but then had been forbidden to capture. However, he had been able to keep hold of Perrhaibia in the north[6], and various parts of inland Thessaly. The status of Dolopia, taken by Perseus in 190, recovered by Nikandros in the winter campaign of 190/189, and invaded again by Perseus while the Ambrakia siege was on, is not clear. Later, in the 170s, there was a Macedonian governor in the area[7], so at least some of it was under Philip's authority; it may be also that part was Aitolian.

Phokis, so recently and so briefly united to Aitolia, was made an independent league once more, and Delphi had become an independent city. The status of Delphi as originally proposed by Glabrio in the winter of 191/190, was emphatically confirmed by Roman magistrates at the end of the war. The praetor Sp. Postumius Albinus in 189 wrote officially to both the city and to the Amphiktyony to confirm the autonomy, inviolability, and immunity of the city[8]; a little later the consul C. Livius Salinator confirmed Glabrio's expulsion of the Aitolian 'settlers' and the confiscation of their lands. The letter notes that the city's envoys to Rome had all been killed, apparently by other Delphians: it is clear that detaching Delphi from the Aitolian League was not universally popular in the city[9].

Surprisingly, Herakleia Trachinia appears to have been returned to the Aitolians, and with it Oitia. Further, Epiknemidean Lokris was probably Aitolian as well, and that would include control of Thermopylai. Exactly how much of Lokris was involved is unclear, but it seems likely that Opous, never wholeheartedly a member of the league, would become independent once again. As in 280 and 191, the key place was Herakleia, for without control of that city, no control of Thermopylai was possible, and without it for the Aitolians

[3] Livy 39.23.12 (the Magnetes plus Demetrias); 39.25.9 (Phthiotic Thebes).

[4] *IG* IX.2.64 (Lamia).

[5] Livy 39.23.8-9 and 28.3 (Philip's complaints, the first a paraphrase, the second a speech).

[6] Livy 39.24.11; pol 22.6.3.

[7] Livy 41.22.4 and 42.13.8; App. *Mac.* 16.6.

[8] *Syll* (3) 612; Sherk 15.

[9] *Syll* (3) 611; Sherk 16; cf. M. Holleaux, 'Le Consul M. Fulvius et le siège de Same, étude de Chronologie', *BCH* 54, 1930, 1-41 (= *Études* V, 249-294); Daux, *Delphes*, 259-266; Flacelière, *Aitoliens*, 360.

there was no possibility of extending into eastern Lokris; that is, if, as was the case, the Aitolians held such Lokrian towns as Thronion and Skarpheia, this presupposed control also of Herakleia.

Herakleia, of course, had been taken by the Romans in the most decisive victory over the Aitolians in the whole war. In other sieges, they had failed, as at Naupaktos, at Amphissa, or had succeeded so easily, as at Lamia, that it looks as though the defence was deliberately minimal, or their victory had been eventually secured by negotiation, as in the end at Ambrakia. Still other cities had not even been attempted, as Hypata. Only Lamia, isolated and already damaged, had been captured as clearly and decisively as Herakleia. Once taken, Herakleia had been looted by the Roman army, and the fighting had caused considerable damage to the fortifications, and perhaps to the buildings in the city as well. It is not known if the population was sold into slavery, but the Romans would have been within their rights to do so[10]. Even if they were not, casualties among the inhabitants had surely been considerable after the fighting which lasted over three weeks, and it would seem that the leading men were taken as prisoners to Italy and kept there until Glabrio's triumph, if not longer[11].

This all means that the city was substantially weakened, if not actually left desolate, both in its fabric and its population, by the conquest. Yet it was in a geographical position whose strategic importance was not lessened by the Roman victories. It was surrounded by reasonably powerful states: Macedon on the north coast of the Malian gulf as far as Echinos, the Thessalian League as far south as Lamia and the mouth of the Spercheios river, the Aitolians in the middle Spercheios valley and in Eastern Lokris, the Phokians south of Kallidromos. A badly weakened city in a strategic position was all too tempting a target. If left independent it would be all too easily seized by one neighbour, and such an act would provoke war. And if handed over to a neighbour unpopular with the inhabitants, this would be almost as destabilising.

When the Senate had considered Nobilior's draft treaty, one of the alterations made was to the date after which the Roman conquests

[10] Looting: Livy 36.30.1; uncertainty on the fate of the population: Briscoe, *Comm. Livy*, 2.267.

[11] Only Damokritos and his brother are mentioned individually (Livy 36.34.12), but the group is described as 'noble' at Glabrio's triumph (37.46.4).

from Aitolia became permanently lost to the league. The change was expressed in Roman terms from 'the crossing of L. Cornelius [Scipio]' to 'during or subsequent to the consulships of L. Quinctius [Flamininus] and Cn. Domitius [Ahenobarbus]', which substituted post-November 190 by spring 192[12]. The effect of the alteration was to backdate the Senate's ability to dispose of conquests to the beginning of the war, which had been declared in December 192, soon after the first fighting between Seleukids and Aitolians and the Roman and Achaian and Attalid troops at and near Chalkis. The change affected those cities captured by Glabrio, which were, precisely, the Phokian cities taken after the fight at Thermopylai, and Herakleia and Lamia. It might also be considered to have included Delphi and Ambrakia.

This permitted the Senate to dispose of all conquests, of which Herakleia was perhaps the most important. (Delphi was made independent, effectively under Roman protection by the actions of Glabrio and the confirming Roman magistrates; Ambrakia was accorded the same status by the terms of its surrender.) It may be assumed that the decision in favour of handing Herakleia back to Aitolia was made soon after it was clear that the Aitolians would accept the Senate's modifications to the treaty: indeed, it may well have been the Herakleian carrot, combined with the Fulvian stick beating Same, which persuaded Aitolia to submit. It was certainly done by 184, for in that year Melantas of Herakleia manumitted one of his slaves and had the deed recorded at Delphi, dating it by the names of the Aitolian *strategos* and the Delphian *archon*[13]. Herakleia, that is, was a member of the Aitolian League at that date.

The precise point at which this return occurred, I have suggested, was back in 188, for it seems to be more logical to have dealt with the issue right away than to have it hanging on, subject to dispute. It has also been suggested that it took place at the conference at Tempe in 185, where Philip was arraigned by Thessalian accusers before yet another group of Roman commissioners[14]. This looks plausible, in that the discussion at Tempe focussed on the disposition of former

[12] See ch. 21, n. 99.

[13] *SGDI* 1959.

[14] Daux, *Delphes*, 671-674, for the definitive discussion; W. Vollgraf, 'Notes sur la fin et les conséquences de la guerre étolienne: 2. A quelle époque Heraklee est-elle sortie de la ligue étolienne?', *Revue de Philologie*, 27, 1903, 240-244, argues that the city was given to Philip and transferred to Aitolia in 185.

Aitolian cities. But Herakleia was not, by any stretch of geography, part of Thessaly, nor had it been taken by Philip – one of the main criteria in determining the destination of Thessalian conquests – nor was Herakleia mentioned at any point in the argument, though Lamia was. To import Herakleia into the discussions at Tempe distorts the whole event; it may be thus considered certain that it was not at Tempe that the city was assigned to Aitolia. If that is accepted, it follows that the city had not been given to Philip beforehand either. Since it was Aitolian in 184, and had not changed its situation in 185, it was Aitolian then as well. It is easier, more convincing, and altogether tidier, to put its assignment to Aitolia back to 188.

The geographical and strategic effect of this, and of the continued possession of Amphilochia and Aperantia, was that Aitolia still stretched right across the Greek peninsula from the Aegean Sea, in the Malian Gulf, to the Ionian, in the Gulf of Ambrakia. The Akarnanians were still hemmed in by Aitolian lands, and the Aitolians still controlled the land route along the Acheloos from Epeiros to the Gulf of Corinth. They also controlled the Malian Gulf end of the 'Great Isthmus Route', and the basin of Doris as well as Amphissa, both parts of that route. They also still controlled the Thermopylai pass, not only at the Herakleia end, but at Skarpheia as well, as is shown by another manumission[15].

Despite these compensations, the territorial losses of the league were nevertheless important. Lamia, Ambrakia, and Oiniadai were all important cities, and while none of them was large by the standards of, say, Corinth or Athens, they had been some of the largest in the league. The loss of their populations was a serious reduction in the manpower of the league, and the loss of their economic resources sharply reduced the communal wealth and the league tax-base. The need to pay off the indemnity of five hundred talents was also impoverishing, and the loss of those cities made that task all the more onerous.

Not surprisingly after such a defeat, it was some time before the league found its political feet. Perhaps one sign of the difficulties is the election of Archedamos of Pholas as *strategos* for the year 188/187, in succession to Eupolemos[16]. Archedamos had been *strategos* only three

[15] *SGDI* 1756.
[16] *SGDI* 2132.

years before, in 191/190, and there is no other example of a man holding this office twice in such a short time. This is possibly a sign of the electorate inclining to a known quantity in a time of shock and upheaval. There is no indication of any activity on Archedamos' part to justify such a supposition, but it is worth considering the succession of *strategoi* over the next period in Aitolian history from this point of view.

Between Archedamos' election in September 188 and the outbreak of the next Macedonian war in 171, seventeen *strategoi* took office, one of these, the last, is unknown[17]. Of the remaining sixteen, only four were taking up the office for the first time; the other twelve had all been *strategos* at least once already. This is a most unusual proportion. To put this in perspective, in the previous seventeen-year period (205-189), the proportions were eleven newcomers and six repeaters, and in the seventeen years before that (222-206) it was ten and nine. In the two previous seventeen-year periods (239-223 and 256-240) there were substantial numbers of years when the name of the *strategos* is unknown, but these would in all likelihood be men who held the office only once (for they would most probably be known in another year if they had repeated). So, combining the unknowns with those known to have held the office for the first time, the numbers are four known and seven unknown first-timers, and six repeaters – eleven and six – in the period 239/238 to 223/222, and five known and four unknown as against eight repeaters – nine and eight – in the period 256/255 to 240/239.

That is, in no single seventeen-year period between 256/255 and 172/171 did the iterating *strategoi* outnumber the first-timers, except in that between 188/187 and 172/171. In two of the periods there were almost twice as many taking up the office for the first time than those repeating, in two others the numbers were almost equal, but even there the new *strategoi* outnumbered the repeaters. These earlier periods were stressful, with wars and crises coming thick and fast, yet there was no obvious hesitation in electing first-timers. The period after 188/187, by contrast, was the longest period of peace which the Aitolians had experienced since the 250s. Yet in that time they repeatedly elected the same men to their chief office: Archedamos

[17] The list is firmly established both in sequence and in absolute date; most of the relevant inscriptions are also dated by the name of the Delphian *archon*.

three times, Pantaleon three times, Nikandros and Thoas twice each. There are also some striking sequences: Archedamos-Nikandros-Eupolemos-Archedamos in the years 191-188, Nikandros-Proxenos-Archedamos-Thoas-Pantaleon in 184-180, Nikandros-Eupolemos-Archedamos-Pantaleon-Thoas in 177-173. Of these men only Proxenos (of whom more later) did not repeat his office.

Without specific evidence on the subject it is not possible to be certain, but this concentration of names, the repetitive holding of office, and the repetitive sequences, all suggest that we are seeing here an oligarchy exercising its tight control over the top offices. One of those who was a first-timer, Pantaleon (elected for the first time in 186), was part of the oligarchy already, or was quickly co-opted; others, Proxenos of Trichonos in 183/182, Lochagos of Kallipolis, and Lykiskos of Stratos in 179/178 and 178/177, either did not fit, or died without reaching the office again in this period. Lykiskos, in fact, proved to be the downfall of the system, and so his appearance, and that of Proxenos, in the group suggest that the oligarchs' control was not total. Thoas, *strategos* already in 203/202 and 194/193, was exiled by the Romans for a time after 189, but resumed a place in the oligarchy on his return, and once again gained office in 181/180 and 173/172. His first term of office came after the failure of the attempt by Skopas to tackle the debt problem, and this may well be the clue to the oligarchy's grip on power, for the problem of indebtedness arose once again in the 180s and 170s, more seriously than before.

Inscriptions from the early period after the Roman treaty, however, suggest that the leaders of the league were also reacting in the usual Aitolian way to a change in the political situation by re-establishing relations with other states. Even during Eupolemos' strategy, in the year of the peace treaty, proxeny relations were developed with Athens by two men, Boutheras of Arsinoe, who had been an *hieromnemon* fifteen years earlier, and Damokles of Hypata, Eupolemos' own city[18]. The date and the target-city were significant, for Athens was one of the cities which was acting as intermediaries in the peace process, which were going on at Ambrakia and in Rome in that very year.

If this development may be most plausibly linked to the negotiations, three years later there was a more traditional exercise in proxeny-

[18] *IG* IX.1.4b.

making. This was in the third strategy of Alexandros son of Nikias of Kalydon, a man whose involvement in Aitolian affairs went back twenty years, to his opposition to Skopas' debt cancellation programme, and he may thus be categorised without difficulty as a conservative as well as an oligarch. During his third term of office an important series of proxenies were established with a series of cities[19]. Alexandros himself sponsored relations with one city whose name has disappeared, and the two *grammateis*, both called Agathon, sponsored *proxenoi* with Corinth and Rhodes, two highly important commercial cities. Other cities with which relations were established or renewed at this time included Thebes and Thisbe in Boiotia, Patrai and Sikyon in Achaia, Histiaia in Euboia, Epeiros, Alexandria (presumably that in Egypt) and (probably) Pergamon; four other cities were originally named on the same inscription, but their names have gone. The sponsors came from some of the most important cities of the league: Trichonos, Hypata, Kalydon, Stratos, Naupaktos, Erythrai, and others. This has all the appearance of a concerted attempt to rebuild old links which had been broken during the recent war. There were even attempts to establish new connections, with major cities in Greece and the Aegean. This dual intention can only have been to facilitate the commercial process, and to smooth the diplomatic paths after the disruptions of the Roman war. The presence in the list of all the major Hellenistic powers except Macedon and the Seleukid kingdom is very obvious. The Ptolemaic and Attalid kingdoms, Achaia (with three representative cities in Patrai, Sikyon and Corinth), Rhodes, the Boiotian League, and Epeiros: there were few worthwhile states left unconnected after this list. And next year, in Nikandros' second strategy, proxeny-relations were established with Neapolis for the first time, a product presumably of a renewed concern for Italian events[20].

The establishment of proxeny-relations with Pergamon in 185/184 was followed in 182 by a swift response to a request from King Eumenes II for the recognition of a reorganised festival in that city, the *Nikephoria*, which celebrated Eumenes' triumph over Antiochos III[21]. Since Antiochos had been Aitolia's ally at the time of the triumph in question (and Eumenes the league's enemy), this recognition implies a new ordering in the league foreign relations. It is further

[19] *IG* IX.1.32.
[20] *IG* IX.1.33; always assuming it was the Italian Neapolis, of course.
[21] *IG* IX.1.179 (= Rigsby, *Asylia* 178).

reflected by the dedication of an equestrian statue of Eumenes by the Aitolians collectively at Delphi about the same time[22]. This, together with the earlier establishment of proxeny relations with the city of Pergamon, may be characterised therefore as the development of a Pergamene-Aitolian *entente*. Eumenes was a consistent enemy of Philip of Macedon, and had been one of his accusers at the Tempe meeting in 185. In the same year the Achaian League rebuffed an invitation by Eumenes to renew their alliance[23]. No doubt the Aitolians watched their moment, having laid out their diplomatic lines with the *proxenoi* of 185. By that time Philip was clearly still hostile to Rome, and was assisting the Bithynian king in his conflict with Eumenes. By 182 the diplomatic alignments in Greece and the Aegean were reasonably clear: Macedon-Bithynia-Achaia against Pergamon; Aitolia chose to link with the latter against its old enemies; but Pergamon was also an ostentatious friend of Rome, which Macedon would never be, while Achaia was still pretending to an independence it could not sustain. To align with Pergamon was to gain the help of a friendly voice with the all-powerful world power.

A theory has been promoted that in the period after the peace treaty of 189 Aitolia developed more friendly relations with Macedon[24]. This is traced back to the meeting of Philip V with Nikandros outside Lamia, and is then supposed to have developed after the peace because of the antipathy of both towards Thessaly. This in turn is thought to have become manifest in the reorganised Amphiktyonic League. It is best to begin at the Amphiktyonic end.

The removal of Aitolian domination from Delphi by Glabrio in 191/190 had also necessarily meant a reorganisation of the Amphiktyonic League. Aitolian control of Delphi had after all been the instrument for the further control of that league, and thus to greater influence in central Greece, and Glabrio's measures were designed in part to reduce that Aitolian influence. The reorganisation therefore required that the old Amphiktyonic membership list be revised. This took some time and involved references to Rome, which was effectively the sanctuary's and the league's political protector. It was not until 184 that the matter was fully sorted out, on the initiative, it

[22] *IG* IX.1.183.

[23] Pol. 22.7.3 and 7.8-8.13; Diod 29.17; Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, 123-124.

[24] Walbank, *Philip V*, 220 for a clear statement, repeated by Hammond *Hist. Mac.* 3.493-494, less certainly.

seems, of a Thessalian from Larisa, Nikostratos son of Anaxippos[25]. This disturbed period has been seen as one in which a contest took place between, on the one hand, the Thessalians, who now, being an independent league, had their own men attending once more as *hieromnemones*, and, on the other, the Aitolians and Philip of Macedon. The evidence for this three-sided contest is remarkably thin, though not actually negligible, and, of course, given the histories of the participants, it is not unlikely.

From the Aitolian point of view, however, the main consideration was that their league's complete control of the Amphiktyony had been removed, but at the same time it was not entirely displaced. It is not until 178 that a list of the *hieromnemones* survives, but one may assume that this list does reflect the final membership as settled in the mid-180s[26]. It shows that the Aitolians could count on six *hieromnemones* – two representing the Ainianians, two the Lokrians, and one each from Herakleia and the Metropolitan Dorians. That these seats are regarded as Aitolian first of all, rather than as representing their nominal members, is demonstrated by the men who attended in that year. The two Ainianian *hieromnemones* came from Kallipolis and Kalydon (in Aitolia proper), the Herakleian came from Sosthenes (in Ainis), the two Lokrian representatives were from Pholas and from Trichonos (both in Aitolia), and the Dorian from an unknown place called Apeirikos. Thus not one man of the Aitolian communities came from the particular community he was titularly representing; the Aitolians were quite deliberately operating as a coherent group.

The other representatives on the council in 178 could be divided into those controlled by Macedon, which was by then ruled by Philip's son Perseus since Philip's death the year before, and the rest. The king had two representatives in his own name, a resumption of the practice which had originated under Philip II after the Sacred War. Perseus could also count on the two representatives from the Phthiotic Achaians, two Magnetes, and perhaps one from the

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[25] *Syll* (3) 613.

[26] The list is in *Syll* (3) 636; cf. Daux, *Delphes*, 303-315 and 651-652; it is assumed by Walbank, *Philip V*, 255, though not stated, that the Macedonian membership did not begin until Perseus, but this reflects the absence of any lists from the end of Philip's reign. It seems unlikely that the membership entitlement could have been revised between 184 and 178, still less between 179 and 178. Whether Philip sent representatives to Amphiktyony meetings is another matter, of course.

Dolopes[27]. This is six or seven in total, much the same as the number which the Aitolians could muster. Together these two would form a bare majority of the twenty-three total. The rest were a varied group: two from Delphi city, two Thessalians, two Boiotians, and one each from Euboia, Athens, Malis, and the Perrhaibians. The Thessalians, in fact, controlled the Malian and the Perrhaibian votes, giving them four. But it looks very much as though the distribution of the membership, while it was said to have been restored to that originally intended[28], had in fact been carefully balanced between the three main north Greek powers, Macedon, Thessaly, and Aitolia, with the balance spread among several others. Thus it was probably carefully organised – it had of course been agreed to, and so probably in part devised, by Rome – so as to perpetuate any disagreements and so reduce whatever political authority it may have had; clearly a Roman contrivance.

The evidence in all this for any *rapprochement* between Aitolia and Philip is thin to non-existent, though one can see that the membership of the council might suggest it. In fact, the inclusion of roughly equal representation for Macedon and Aitolia, with a smaller group of Thessalians, on the initiative of Nikostratos the Thessalian, who is credited with achieving the 'restoration', could be seen as a conciliatory gesture to all the major parties involved. And it is very probable that one of the main concerns of Nikostratos was to set up an administration for the temple, one of the main functions of the Council, after all. This would not exclude, of course, the machiavellian interpretation of Roman intentions; the conciliation which was seen by a Greek might seem a recipe for trouble to a Roman. Other evidence, however, including the Aitolian resumption of friendship with Eumenes almost at the same time, argues against an Aitolo-Macedonian *entente*. There was certainly a continuing conflict between Philip and the Thessalians until the Tempe meeting in 185, but that meeting resulted in the Roman decision decisively in favour of the Thessalians, and the only

[27] That is, if Dolopia was fully under Perseus' control; it may have been divided with the Aitolians. It may be relevant that the Dolopian *hieromnemon*, Syagros son of Datyadon, was probably the grandson of Syagros who had been Aitolian *strategos* in 226/225 (*Prosopography*, 'Syagros (2)'). This may indicate that he was an Aitolian nominee; more probably he was the current representative of the most prominent Dolopian family and claimed the position by right of birth; I include him in the *Prosopography*, but with misgivings.

[28] *Syll* (3) 613.

reference to the Aitolians at that meeting was in Philip's desperate attempt to indict the Thessalians over Xyniai[29], which he claimed was an Aitolian town, implying it was illegally held by the Thessalians. This may have been so, and the Thessalians may have simply got Xyniai along with other places such as Lamia, but we have no evidence that the Aitolians were complaining about it. The evidence for a political conflict between Aitolia and Thessaly, which is supposed to be the basis for the Aitolo-Macedonian *rapprochement*, does not exist.

Macedonian policy changed, at least in its outward effects, when Philip was replaced as king by Perseus in 179. The overall intention of both kings was the same, to increase Macedonian strength, but the methods Perseus used were somewhat different, so that Macedonian influence in Greece revived. By this time, Aitolian internal affairs had become peculiarly difficult with the revival of the old problem of debt. This had apparently ceased to be a critical problem after the defeat of the proposal for debt-cancellation which Skopas had proposed in 205. Partly this is, in all probability, a fault of the sources, but the wars and diplomatic proceedings of the 190s will also have diverted minds away from the problem. Yet the absence of any reference at all to what had apparently been a serious issue in 205 does suggest that the issue may not have been quite so serious after all. Those who were the creditors may well have been persuaded by the very threat of cancellation to moderate their demands, and the failure of the attempt to do so will have discouraged those campaigning for it.

However, the revelation of the wealth of the five envoys who were kidnapped by the Epeirotes in 189 emphasises the gulf which existed between those in debt and those who were wealthy. All five were held to ransom for five talents each; there was no suggestion that they could not pay; their only reaction, at first, was defiance. In the end, four of them paid three talents each, and Alexandros of Isios refused, though he offered one talent, and escaped paying anything. He is described as the wealthiest man in Greece, possessing a fortune of two hundred talents, and the point of Polybios' version of the story is to contrast his wealth and his 'meanness'. There seems no doubt, therefore, that Aitolian society saw a very wide gap at that time between the wealthy oligarchy, who monopolised the offices of gov-

[29] Livy 39.26.2.

ernment and exercised power, and those in debt, who were, presumably, numerous.

In that same year, 189, with the ending of the war, Aitolia was faced with a bill for the payment of the indemnity to Rome. This amounted to five hundred talents, two hundred of which was to be paid at once, followed by fifty talents each year for the next six[30]. For comparison Antiochos the previous year had to pay three thousand at once and a thousand a year for twelve years: there is no suggestion that there was any difficulty in paying this sum, though Seleukos IV did fall behind with the payments. Carthage from 201 paid two hundred talents a year for fifty years; within a short time the city, even deprived of its empire, was able to ask if it could pay off the whole amount in one lump sum. Philip of Macedon's original indemnity bill was a thousand talents, which was quickly reduced to five hundred. None of these indemnities was nearly as heavy in proportion to the size, population, and power of the states involved as was that imposed on the Aitolians.

How the money was collected is not known, though this scarcely matters. Given the normal methods of financing states in Greece, some of the money would come from taxation, and some from private individuals as liturgies – the ransoms demanded of the five envoys would have covered a half of an annual payment. But liturgies only in the most immediate terms came out of an individual's strong box; ultimately they were paid out of their rents and profits, which meant the money came from his tenants' earnings and from higher prices charged to customers; taxation and liturgies, in effect, came from the same sources. Yet many men in Aitolia had been burdened by debt even fifteen years before, and since then two wars had been fought – expensive affairs, always – and substantial areas of the league territory had been ravaged and looted by enemy armies. One doubts, for example, that Herakleia would have been able to contribute much to league coffers for some time after 191. And several

[30] This has provoked several discussions about the value of the money, based on the specification by Rome that there was an apparent equivalence of gold and 'ten pieces of silver', cf. Livy 38.11.9; Pol 21.32.8; cf. Walbank, *Commentary*, 3.133-134; L. A. Losada, 'The Aitolian Indemnity of 189 and the Agrinion Hoard', *Phoenix* 19, 1965, 129-133, and G. Le Rider, 'Les Clauses Financieres des Traités de 189 et de 188', *BCH* 116, 1992, 267-277. These are all very well, but the ability of the Aitolians to pay is scarcely considered, nor the effect of the indemnity on the Aitolian polity and society.

areas had been removed from the league and could no longer contribute at all. Two of these, Ambrakia and Oiniadai, were ports, trading centres, and substantial cities, just the sort of place where the rich lived and which produced tax revenues and customs duties. The loss of control over Delphi and its lucrative temple had also happened, and this was perhaps the greatest blow, not only directly, but also to those Aitolians deprived of the lands in and about Delphi which they had acquired.

The payment of the indemnity, therefore, can only have exacerbated the debt-problem. But this may not be the only issue which disrupted Aitolian internal affairs in these years. Under the year 174 Livy described an event at Hypata in which exiles from the city were murdered as they returned under an agreement[31]. This was clearly one stage in a longer sequence of events. The exiles had been out of the city long enough to conduct negotiations for their return, and before that there will have been a period of dissension in the city before they were driven into exile. No timescale is mentioned by Livy, but it seems unlikely that this took less than several years. The 'leader of the city' was Eupolemos, the *strategos* of 188/187, who held the office for the second time in 176/175 as part of the oligarchic sequence noted earlier, but the problem at Hypata would seem to be local to that city, for Eupolemos is identified as a man of Hypata, not as a *strategos*, or as a league official.

On the other hand, his opponents, those whom he had murdered despite the guarantees given them, are identified as men of 'Proxenos' party'. Proxenos had been *strategos* in 183/182. He was from Trichonos, but, unusually in this period, he did not reach the office a second time. Since he was not from Hypata this might contradict the impression that the quarrel at that city was local. If men in Hypata were of his party, it implies that there were other groups identified as Proxenos' men elsewhere. Perhaps the events at Hypata were merely the worst of those which were part of the general problem, which is called by Livy 'the rage of the Aitolians'.

Livy's account does not link this 'rage' with the problem of debt, and in fact exile is hardly the appropriate response to debt agitation, unless the matter was not simply one between debtors and creditors, but rather one which divided the oligarchy as a whole. This it clearly

[31] Livy 41.25.3-4.

was, and the solution of the debt problem was obviously one cause of division, in the 170s as at the time of Skopas' attempted solution thirty years before. There may, however, have been other reasons for such a division besides debt. By 174 the conflict had obviously been going on for some time, and even before the massacre at Hypata it had developed into violence – for the exiles had clearly been driven out by at least threats, if not actual physical attacks. Both sides – though there may have been more than two – sent envoys to Rome appealing for intervention, and at the same time opened local negotiations[32]. It was these local efforts at a solution which produced the agreement which was then so bloodily broken at Hypata. Only after all this did a group of Romans arrive.

Although no mention is made in Livy's account of debt in connection with these events it is certain that this problem existed at this time, and it no doubt made the conflict within the league worse. It was, of course, a problem which was seen at the same time in Boiotia and Thessaly, and so it can scarcely be blamed exclusively on the Aitolian oligarchy. So wider causes were at work, of which the prime one was, no doubt, the Roman policy of installing and supporting their own supporters in power locally. If even the Aitolians could not resolve their mutual differences without both sides appealing to Rome it is unlikely anyone else could.

Into this complexity also entered Perseus of Macedonia. He had dealt with part of the problem of debt in Macedon by cancelling those due to the king, and recalling those Macedonians who had fled to escape their creditors, and the king. This roused expectations elsewhere, naturally[33]. He advertised the measures at the central Greek sanctuaries at Delphi and Athene Itonia, and at Delos. This may well have been a gesture towards Greek opinion, though it seem somewhat early in his reign for the development of a major new approach; his reason was probably, in fact, the usual one, to provide information to those affected. Indeed, it was not for four or five more years that he moved towards the states to his south, and then the move was in a sense forced on thim. In 174 Perseus' governor posted in Dolopia was killed by the locals[34]. Macedonian control of the area was thereby made uncertain, and in fact it may only ever have been partial,

[32] Livy 42.25.2.
[33] Pol 25.3.1-4.
[34] Livy 42.41.14.

with the Aitolians holding the rest. Communications between Dolopia and Macedon were presumably very difficult, since it seems that they had no mutual boundary after Philip lost control of the Thessalian areas. Further, in 185 Philip had been instructed by the Romans at the Tempe conference to remain within the ancestral boundaries of his kingdom[35], whatever that meant, and it could be argued that Dolopia was not within those boundaries. Nevertheless a Macedonian governor was in office there until his murder in 174 or perhaps the year before. Perseus seized the opportunity of this incident to make a strong political point to the rest of Greece.

He campaigned in Dolopia, crushing the rebellion, not a difficult task, given the small population, and which will not have required a large army[36]. Then he came south, through Oitia, to visit Delphi. His reason is said to have been his wish to consult the oracle, but he brought his army – or some of it, at least – with him. He then returned by way of Doris and Oitia – both Aitolian territories, and Thessaly[37]. He must therefore have made advance arrangements with the Aitolians for this march, and with the Phokians and the Delphians as well. He was accused later (by his enemy King Eumenes in a speech to the Senate, which was already anti-Perseus) of encouraging 'the worse cause' in the civil conflict in Thessaly, and of operating to 'crush the better' sort – meaning he was accused of encouraging uprisings of the poor against the ruling oligarchs[38]. The origin and destination of this accusation renders it extremely suspect, and it is best disregarded, though it may confirm the existence of some sort of civil conflict in the area. He is said also to have sent out exhortations to 'the states through which he was planning to march' – that is Aitolia, Phokis and Thessaly – urging the establishment of friendly relations[39]. This, given that he was negotiating to travel through these lands, was hardly revolutionary, being exactly what he should say to gain their permission. It was, however, exactly what his enemies

[35] Livy 39.26.13; this was intended to remove Philip from Thessaly above all, and it is likely that the Dolopes were ignored by everyone; the only other power which would be interested was Aitolia, which was not represented at the meeting.

[36] Livy 41.22.4; 23.13; 24.8 (describing them as 'the weakest of mortals'); 42.13.8; 40.8 (they were 'utterly ravaged'); all these are statements by Perseus' enemies. The only comment by Perseus himself is at Livy 42.41.13-14, where emphasis is laid on the murder of the governor as justification.

[37] Livy 41.22.4-6; Daux, *Delphes*, 315-317.

[38] Livy 42.13.8, specifically referring to Thessaly and Doris.

[39] Livy 42.22.7-8.

could seize on as implying that Perseus was intent on developing an anti-Roman conspiracy. His difficulties are illustrated by the similar accusation that he had prevented the Dolopians from appealing to Rome over their dispute with him and his governor[40], though this is only an accusation by his enemies, and the Romans do not seem to have taken it up; it is, therefore, not necessarily to be believed. But his appeals for his father's enemies to forget their past quarrels were thus likely to fall on deaf ears – or perhaps on ears more attuned to detecting ammunition to be used against him than taking the appeal at its face value.

At some point at least one group of Aitolians had appealed to Perseus for assistance, either for help in suppressing their internal enemies, or in suppressing the internal conflict, and at some point he did send some Macedonian troops to Aitolia[41]. Neither of these moves had any effect, so far as can be seen, other than to rouse Roman suspicions, eventually, and in fact they are only known through later references to them at the time of the senatorial discussions as to whether to go to war with Perseus. It seems clear that at the time no-one objected to whatever Perseus did. The evidence is also very slim as to exactly what was involved. The only reference is in Appian, where Perseus' help to the Aitolians is briefly listed along with the help he had given the Byzantines and the Boiotians without a date or a purpose. It may well be a distorted reference to the march to Delphi. It is, in any case, a very narrow base upon which to develop any theory.

The arrival, therefore, just about this time, of a commission of five Romans was both opportune and not unexpected. Appeals to Rome to help sort out the situation in central Greece had come from some of the Dolopians and from two groups of Aitolians[42]. The Roman group was an interesting set of men, clearly carefully chosen. One of the two senior men wwas C. Valerius Laevinus, who had been consul in 176, but, more significantly for this mission, he was also the son of the negotiator of the treaty of 211, and the man who had helped to negotiate the peace treaty of 189 with his half-brother M. Fulvius Nobilior; he certainly had a hereditary interest in Aitolian affairs,

[40] Livy 42.22.4; 23.13.

[41] Livy 42.12.7 (seeking aid); App. *Mac.* 11.1 (sending aid to the Aitolians) – always assuming this is not the same event as his visit to Delphi, of course.

[42] Dolopians: Livy 41.25.2.

though whether this put the Aitolians in the position of being his clients is not definite[43]. The other senior man was Ap. Claudius Pulcher, who as a military tribune in 191 had brought the advance force of Baebius' army through Macedon to camp in the vale of Tempe, and later had fought at Thermopylai, and had commanded Glabrio's advance guard in the march to besiege Naupaktos. He had then risen very swiftly at Rome, being praetor in 187 and consul in 185; since then his two brothers had also been consuls. These two men were clearly chosen because of their family and personal connections with Aitolia, and for their familiarity with the area.

The other three Romans were of lower status. The most senior was M. Popilius Laenas, praetor in 176, and destined to be elected consul the year after this visit to Greece. He had already distinguished himself as one of the new generation of Romans by persuading the Senate to excuse him from going to his praetorial province, and was to clash still more seriously with the Senate during and after his consulship because of his independent ways. He could well have been a forceful, if unsympathetic, member of the commission. The other two had not yet reached praetorian rank, but soon did so: C. Memmius in 172, and L. Cornelius Dives the year after[44]. This was a formidable body of men, who might have achieved something had they had any serious backing; as it was, their remit was limited and they could only try to persuade.

The Roman envoys, who arrived at Delphi during 174, had as little effect on the events in Aitolia as had Perseus. They discovered that, since they had been sent out, the Aitolian groups had negotiated a settlement of some sort among themselves, which had broken down as a result of the massacre of Proxenos' party at Hypata, and that the internal conflict had broken out again[45]. They met the Aitolian party leaders at Delphi, where Proxenos, leader of the party whose members were slaughtered at Hypata, is said to have made a notable impression[46]. Since he was out of power, and his opponents (assuming that Eupolemos was a representative of his opponents, and that the *strategos*-sequence from 177 to 173 was the result of the oligarchic group closing ranks) controlled the government, and since it was

[43] E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, Oxford 1958, 158.
[44] Livy 21.25.5; Broughton, *MRR*, 1.4o5.
[45] Livy 41.25.2-4.
[46] Livy 41.25.6.

Proxenos' followers who seem to have been suffering, as at Hypata, he could well inject a portion of passion into his eloquence. It does not seem that he persuaded anyone, despite Livy's claim that his case was the better, as was his eloquence. A few days afterwards he was murdered by his wife, which may be part of the politics, or it may be a domestic matter[47]. Such a murder would be interpreted politically, however, whatever its origins, and no doubt it prevented any possible solution to the problem at the Delphi meeting. His wife, Orthoboule, went into exile.

The elimination of a party leader in a state subject to civil war rarely solves the problem which caused the war. The Roman commissioners returned to Rome to report back to the Senate that they had found it impossible to 'check the madness' of the people[48]. They were followed to Rome, or accompanied, by envoys from Aitolia who explained, no doubt in greater detail, what the difficulty was. These men are described as 'ambassadors' (*legati*) which will mean that they were appointed officially by the Aitolian League, and will thus have been representatives of the ruling group[49]. They arrived in Rome after the elections there, and after the allotment of the provinces for the next year, so they will probably have been chosen at the *Thermike* of September 174, at which Pantaleon of Pleuron was elected *strategos* for the third time[50], the fourth in the current sequence of repeated office holders.

The Aitolian problem began to mesh with others in the area. Thessalian envoys arrived at Rome about the same time as the Aitolians. There was a debt problem in Thessaly also, but these ambassadors came to report what they thought was happening in Macedon. The Senate was already bothered by Perseus' activities, whose visit to Delphi during the previous summer was seen as somewhat provocative. It was known that he had lent armed assistance of some sort to several states, including Aitolia, and it was reported – whether true or not – that he was angling for alliances in Greece[52]. He was also

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[47] Ibid.

[48] Livy 41.27.4 and 42.2.1; the second seems to be a repetition of the first.

[49] Livy 42.4.5; the separation of this notice from the report of the Roman commissioners (note 48) is probably only a day or so. Livy fills the narrative separating them with his usual collection of omens, prodigies and legislative measures.

[50] *SGDI* 1856.

[51] Livy 42.4.5.

[52] Livy 42.5.1-2.

accused of favouring those out of power over those in, which is scarcely surprising given that those in power were Roman clients or supporters.

The Thessalians also reported that fighting had broken out in their land, over the question of debt, as well as in Aitolia, and that there was trouble also in Perrhaibia[53]. This brought the disturbances close to Macedon, and the Senate clearly appreciated the difficulties. Ap. Claudius Pulcher was despatched once again, this time with enhanced authority as a senatorial commissioner, and perhaps with clearer instructions, to sort out the problem in Thessaly; to Aitolia was sent another consular, M. Claudius Marcellus, consul in 183, who also, from the work he actually did, went with greater authority than the previous year's comissioners[54].

Pulcher knocked heads together in Thessaly, and imposed a settlement of the debt problem by distinguishing debts charging 'illegal' rates of interest from the rest, and then providing ten years as the standard period in which the acceptable debts should be repaid. This was clearly done by negotiation with the parties involved, but Pulcher had first to ensure that everyone paid attention to him. It is very doubtful if the debt question was fully solved, for there was no guarantee that the debtors would be able to go paying for ten years. From Rome's point of view, it did not matter whether the debt problem was actually solved or not. What counted was the end of the civil conflict, and thus the end of the opportunity for Perseus to intervene[55].

Marcellus adopted a different approach with the Aitolians, probably because the debt question had already been dealt with locally before he arrived. Diodoros puts the Thessalian 'debt-cancellation' after that in Aitolia[56]. This is presumably a reference to what Pulcher had done, and so the 'cancellation of debts' had thus taken place in Aitolia before the two Romans arrived. Or it may be even earlier, though the Senate, in appointing Marcellus, clearly thought measures to deal with debt in Aitolia needed to be taken. Either way Marcellus is not described as attending to the debt problem, except that he did not change the burden on either side, which suggests that a solution

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[53] Livy 42.5.7.

[54] Livy 42.5.8 and 10.

[55] Livy 42.5.9-10; Diod 29.33 makes the connection explicit, though it is probably Roman justification.

[56] Diod 29.33.

of sorts had been reached before he arrived. His main concern was to attend to the problem of the disorder in the country. Again this was the main Roman concern, for it had already permitted Perseus to intervene, though ineffectively. As Pulcher had done in Thessaly, Marcellus in Delphi (neutral ground?) brought the disputants to a compromise, enforced by hostages taken from each side and deposited at Corinth, in the custody of the Achaians[57].

In both Thessaly and Aitolia the civil conflict was not actually settled by the solution of the debt problem, which implies that it may well have had other, perhaps parallel, causes. But the conflict died down, perhaps because the debt-cancellation, whatever this meant, and whatever its extent, had clearly been carried out by the ruling group, who had thus showed willing. The debtors, being by definition the poor, would be unable to maintain an agitation for long. The action of the Aitolians in taking measures before Marcellus could reach them, is revealing. After the failure of the five commissioners to produce a solution which the Aitolians could accept, it will have become obvious that another effort would be made from Rome, and this time, rather than the tactics of persuasion being used, a solution would be imposed. Pulcher had that authority in Thessaly, and it is reasonable to suppose that Marcellus, appointed at the same time, had the same authority. Therefore, between the five commissioners leaving for Rome and the arrival of Marcellus, talks had gone on in Aitolia on the issue. One spur to this move was obviously the prospect of Roman authority being imposed, and this may well have been something the Aitolians had wished to avoid. The compromise which Marcellus found in operation when he arrived will have involved both sides surrendering something. All we hear of is 'debt-cancellation', but that is only what the rich had to give up; the other side of the argument must have involved an agreement by the debtors to pay something; maybe Pulcher's agreement in Thessaly, cancelling some debts and scheduling the payment of others, was the pattern.

The conflict within Aitolia is rarely specified. Except for the massacre of Proxenos' party at Hypata, no details are recorded, and all references are in such terms as 'civil war', 'contending with ruthless violence'[58], which are notably vague, and could apply to any events from the occasional riot up to armies marching about and fighting.

[57] Livy 42.5.10-12.
[58] Livy 42.5.7 and 11.

The use of the term 'civil war' does leave the impression of armies and battles, but doubts remain. Considerable scepticism may well be in order in assessing Livy's terms.

The approach of a new war between Rome and Macedon provided all the states in Greece with yet another opportunity to play off one great power against the other. It is perhaps in this connection that King Eumenes visited Delphi in 172. The public reason was, as it had been for Perseus' visit two years before, to sacrifice to Apollo, a simple religious pilgrimage. But kings do not make simple visits, and he was escorted by Pantaleon of Pleuron, who had been Aitolian *strategos* the year before. The contacts between Aitolia and Perseus might have bothered Eumenes, and the attitude of Rome to Perseus clearly concerned the Aitolians, and was something Eumenes knew about. Political conversations are certain.

As it happened, Eumenes' visit was also the occasion for an assassination attempt. This was organised by Euandros of Crete, described as a commander of auxiliaries. His plot failed narrowly, and Pantaleon was praised for standing by the unconscious king when the king's own people fled. Perseus was blamed, and it was said that Euandros had Macedonian accomplices. The involvement of a rich woman of Delphi called Praxo who later was taken to Italy complicated matters. The involvement of Perseus could not be proved, since the assassins escaped, but seems likely enough. The attempted killing, because it failed, could not but encourage Perseus' enemies in Greece and Asia to persist in their enmity[59].

The exact date of these events is not known, but it may have been at much the same time as the visit to Greece by another group of Roman commissioners. They toured the country in the summer of 172 with the object of gathering allies, since Rome now assumed that a new Macedonian war was about to begin. Central Greece was the area visited by Q. Marcius Philippus, consul in 186, and so an even more senior senator than Marcellus, the last senatorial tourist. He was an unscrupulous patriot. He was accompanied by A. Atilius Serranus, who had been twice praetor, the last time just the year before (173) and as long ago as 192, when he had commanded the Roman fleet in the war against Nabis; he was to be consul in 170. The other three members of this commission were not even of praetorian rank,

[59] Livy 42.15.3-16.5; Diod. 29.34; App. *Mac* 11.4; Pol. 22.18.8.

though Ser. Cornelius Lentulus was to be praetor in 169, and P. Cornelius Lentulus became consul in 162; L. Decimius seems never to have reached the praetorship. The group was thus very obviously under Philippus' authority, and their differing experience and authority was reflected in their varied assignments. Decimius, the junior, went to Illyria, the area least likely to be difficult, but one which had to be prepared for the arrival of a Roman army, and alerted to be on the defensive in case Perseus attacked first. The two Lentuli went to Kephallenia first, and then to the Peloponnese, where the Achaian League had to kept in line. The two senior men, Philippus and Serranus, headed for the area which would be in the front line when the war began, central Greece. The delicacy of Greek sentiment was fully appreciated, and the recent disturbances – civil and murderous – were reminders to the envoys, unusually, of the volatility of opinion in Greece. The five Roman envoys had a thousand soldiers with them as escorts and guards, and Philippus and Serranus had their share of these men[60].

The envoys' approach to each state varied with the local situation. In Epeiros they were able to gain a vote of approval from the league Assembly, and they recruited a force of Epeirote soldiers to reinforce the Oresteians, who were clearly badly exposed to Macedonian attack[61]. In Thessaly they also gained the support of the ruling oligarchy. But these two states, like Orestis, were neighbours of Macedon, and felt themselves immediately threatened, and obviously hoped to be protected by the presence of a Roman army. Further away the willingness to line up on the Roman side was much less. The Boiotian League was judged unreliable and under Roman pressure it was broken up. Aitolia was different again.

The two senior Romans reached Aitolia early in their journey, after gaining rapid support in Epeiros. It was a time of crisis in the league: the *strategos* who had been elected at the *Thermike* of September 172 had died, after no more than a month in office. His name is not known, but the fact that he had died suggests that he may well have been old. The five previous *strategoi* had all been in and out of the office of *strategos* for at least twenty years, and the last of them, Thoas in 173/172, for more than thirty. These men were the core of

[60] Livy 42.37.1-4; Broughton, *MRR*, 1.413.
[61] Livy 42.38.1.

the oligarchy, and it would not be at all surprising if they had seen to the election of another oligarch, nor if the whole group was close to dying off. What is certain is that there is a clear break in continuity at the suffect election which took place in October 172. To take only the more obvious change: for the next twelve years, 172/171 to 160/159, no *strategos* was re-elected; all held the office once – though some did gain re-election after 160/159.

That was also the year when the man who was elected as suffect *strategos* in October 172, Lykiskos of Stratos, died. He was given the dubious honour of an obituary notice by Polybios, short sections of which, defining him as a 'bad man', survive[62]. Polybios all-but states that it was Lykiskos who dominated Aitolian affairs until he died, presumably from the time of his election in 172/171. Certainly at the time of his election the Roman envoys who were present were pleased[63], and he is classified as a pro-Roman politician along with Charops of Epeiros and Kallikrates of Achaia. But this is too simple a classification. Lykiskos had been elected as *strategos* for the first time in 178/177, the last year before the long string of iterating oligarchic *strategoi* from Nikandros to Thoas (177/176 to 173/172). It would be unlikely that he would be classified as pro-Roman as early as that first term, and of course he will have been politically active for several years before that. Since he lived until 160/159, he would seem to have been one of the younger generation of politicians, who had served in lower positions in the wars of the 190s and rose through the major offices in the 180s. Proxenos, who was *strategos* in 183/182, and Lochagos of Kallipolis, *strategos* in 179/178, are other examples. Proxenos, of course, was killed in 174, and Lochagos held no other offices[64]. So Lykiskos was, by 172, the most prominent man of his generation, after half a decade of political domination by the older group.

Lykiskos' election clearly reassured the Roman envoys. No hint is given in Livy that Philippus influenced the election, but it is scarcely believable that such a man was not noticed and his opinions solicited. The emphasis by Livy, deriving surely from his source, that Lykiskos was safely pro-Roman, must be a way of contrasting him with the other

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[62] Pol. 32.4.1-3.

[63] Livy 42.38.2.

[64] It may well be Lochagos' house which has been discovered and excavated at Kallipolis: *SEG* XXX, 512.

Aitolian leaders. The conduct of the preceding *strategoi*, the oligarchs, had hardly been noticeably friendly towards Rome. It was during their rule that Perseus had gained permission to march through Aitolian territory to visit Delphi; it was in their time that Perseus had lent Macedonian soldiers for some unspecified internal security purpose in Aitolia; it was under their rule that the debt-problem, and other problems, had provoked more than one Roman senatorial commission to visit Greece, and the last one, of M. Claudius Marcellus, had arrived only to find that the Aitolians had produced their own compromise solution; this might be construed as insulting by some hyper-sensitive anti-Hellenic Romans. There was, in short, no reason for Roman senators to believe that any of the preceding Aitolian *strategoi* were in any way sympathetic towards Rome. One of them indeed, Nikandros of Trichonos, was well-known as a friend of Philip and had continued his devotion to Macedon into Perseus' reign[65]. But they saw in Lykiskos a pro-Roman, which is to say a man who had identified himself, publicly and recently, as such. The presence of Philippus and Serranus was perhaps the opportunity Lykiskos had been waiting for to displace the oligarchs and gain power for himself and his own group.

But the election of Lykiskos was not a full guarantee that Aitolia would participate in the coming war on the Roman side. In fact, when the war came, next year, Perseus had a small contingent of a few hundred Aitolians in his forces, brigaded with a similar number of Boiotians, all under the command of an Achaian[66]. These Aitolians were presumably exiles, and there is no indication that they had been sent to Perseus as an official contingent. On the other hand, the Roman army, when it finally gathered, did include the full Aitolian cavalry force of five hundred men[67]. This clearly was the official Aitolian contribution, but not a particularly enthusiastic one: the Achaians sent three times as many men, and even the city of Apollonia sent four hundred[68]. Even worse, the Aitolian horsemen were blamed for the defeat of the Roman force at Kallikinos near Larisa in summer 171. The consul M. Licinius Crassus chose the commanders of the Aitolians as scapegoats, arrested all five of them and sent them off to Rome as prisoners[69].

[65] Pol. 20.11.9-10.
[66] Livy 42.51.9.
[67] Livy 42.55.9: 'the total force of cavalry of the whole league'.
[68] Livy 42.55.9.
[69] Livy 42.60.8-10.

Polybios names four of them as Hippolochos, Nikandros and Lochagos, and another seems to have been Eupolemos[70]. Hippolochos is otherwise unknown, though with a name like that one suspects wealth in the family. The other three, however, were all former *strategoi*: Nikandros three times, Lochagos once, and Eupolemos twice, and all three may be identified as members of the same political group, which I have been calling the oligarchy. The fact that they turn up here as *cavalry* commanders – and therefore rich – is support for this classification. They were later denounced by Lykiskos as anti-Roman[71], but from him this only means they were anti-Lykiskos. Yet Lykiskos must have participated in their appointment as commanders of the Aitolian cavalry with the Romans, perhaps with the hope that they might not return, though arrest and deportation to Rome is hardly likely to have been his expectation.

The conduct of the Roman army over the next few months made it very difficult for Greek statesmen to take Rome's part – or indeed to believe that the blame for the defeat at Kallikinos had been correctly assigned. Perseus, by suing for peace after the Kallikinos battle, had shown that Rome's aim was the destruction of Macedon, for Crassus, in consultation with his senior officers, had demanded Perseus' surrender[72]. He would, of course, scarcely expect a Roman consul to make peace after a single defeat, so the offer of peace was not made in expectation of it being accepted, but in order to publicise Rome's aims in the war. And, in fact, the elimination of Macedonian power, by whatever means it was accomplished, would remove the one bargaining element the Greek states had in the field of international relations, for they would then be subject, almost directly, to Rome. In addition, the behaviour of the Roman army was such as to suggest that Rome's control over Greece – the obvious corollary to Macedon's destruction – would be a most unpleasant condition. The Roman army sacked most of the cities which fell to it – Haliartos, Koroneia, Malloia, Pteleon[73] – and enforced heavy demands for sup-

[70] Pol 27.15.14; Eupolemos is named as a deportee to Rome at 28.4.7.

[71] Pol 28.4.6.

[72] Pol 27.8.1-15; Livy 42.62.3-15.

[73] Haliartos: Livy 42.63.10-11; Koroneia: Livy 43 Per and 43.4.11; Zon. 9.22; Malloia: Livy 42.67.7; Pteleon: Livy 42.67.9. The city of Keremia in Illyria was sacked under particularly barbarous circumstances, where the Roman commander had promised clemency then loosed his army when frustrated in another siege (Livy 43.1.3).

plies on others[74]. Sufficiently vehement protests were made to make the Senate produce decrees which were designed to protect the Greeks from the requisitions, but it was rather late for amends[75]. Indeed a plot by some Epeirotes produced dissension within their league, so that the league itself broke up, and the Molossi took the Macedonian side[76]. This was the first Greek state to ally with Perseus, and its geographical situation opened the way for Macedonian action in central Greece.

The consul for 170 who was allotted the war, A. Hostilius Mancinus, sent envoys round Greece to publicise these senatorial decrees – in effect an apology by the Senate. It was a less than congenial task, and instantly exposed them to the internal rivalries and disputes in each Greek state they visited. They reached Aitolia in time for the *Thermike* in September 170. The arguments their visit provoked may well have been the more vehement because it was the time of these annual elections. The *strategos* who presided was Proandros, whose term was expiring, and who is identified by Polybios as an opponent of Rome, although in his speech he is said to have pointed to the services he had performed for Rome. But it was presumably his actual anti-Romanism which made the Roman envoys, C. Popilius Laenas and Cn. Octavius, demand the surrender of hostages. This can only mean that the Romans had seen that the situation in Aitolia was so delicately balanced that the league might follow the Molossians into alliance with Macedon. The *strategos* Proandros replied with the speech in which he emphasised his services to Rome. The tactic was presumably designed to deflect the demand for hostages. If Proandros really was anti-Roman, this means that his election in September 171 had produced a vote against Lykiskos and his party.

Lykiskos next spoke. He was fully identified as a supporter of Rome, and he congratulated the envoys on the arrest of the cavalry commanders, two of whom he defined as ringleaders in the anti-Roman group, but he also pointed out that their supporters were still present. Then he went on to agree to the hostage demand, suggesting that the children of his political opponents would be the ideal choices.

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[74] The treatment of Athens (Livy 43.6.3) and of Chalkis (7.7-9) were detailed to the Senate; other places with a less staunch history of loyalty to Rome, no doubt suffered as badly.

[75] Livy 43.17.2; the preliminary attempt by the Senate to restrain its officers is at 43.8.7-8.

[76] Pol. 27.16; Diod. 30.5a; Hammond, *Epirus*, 628.

One of those he accused of being anti-Roman, Pantaleon of Pleuron, protested at this blatant Rome-boot-licking, but then aimed his venom also at Thoas, who had apparently now come round to express his support for Rome, after his anti-Roman stance twenty years before in the Aitolians' war against Rome. The personal nature of the relationships between these men is pointed up when Pantaleon explained that he had been instrumental in securing Thoas' return to Aitolia from his exile in Italy, yet Thoas was now showing himself to be so ungrateful that he was opposed to Pantaleon's anti-Roman policy. This provoked the Assembly to shout Thoas down, and to stone him off the tribunal. Popilius is said to have reproved the meeting for this, and then left[77].

The Assembly was seen to be generally anti-Roman, but the leaders were clearly divided. Lykiskos vehemently, and Thoas less so, were in favour of supporting Rome; Proandros and Pantaleon were not, but they were hampered in expressing their views by the knowledge that the other leaders of their faction were exiled to Rome. The Roman envoys apparently did not actually press their demand for hostages, presumably because they could see that they would be refused by the Assembly. They could also see that opinion was divided, and may have thought that a lighter touch, and the improved discipline of the Roman army which the consul Mancinus had brought about, would calm the situation.

The Aitolian Assembly continued in session after the Roman envoys left (for Akarnania, and more disputes). Since Proandros appears to have presided at the meeting with the Romans, the election followed their visit. The choice of the next *strategos* was Agelaos of Naupaktos[78], whose political leanings are not known, though he is probably the grandson of the Agelaos who had drawn attention to the great war in Italy at the peace conference at Naupaktos fifty years before. We know, unusually, the name of the *hipparchos*, Dinarchos, who appears as a pro-Macedonian later in the year[79], but quickly changed his mind when events prevented a Macedonian *coup* at Stratos. In this opportunism he may well be typical of Aitolians as a whole.

The Roman campaign in Thessaly and two attempts to invade

[77] Pol. 28.4.1-13; Livy 43.17.5-6.
[78] *SGDI* 1789 and 1828?
[79] Livy 43.22.4.

Macedon ended in failure in 170, and the difficulties and dissensions among the Aitolians now encouraged Perseus to attempt a long-range raid. In March 169, before the Romans in Thessaly had stirred from their winter quarters, he took part of his army on a long march through Molossia (now his ally) to attempt the capture of the city of Stratos. This target is said to have been suggested by Epeirotes, but Perseus clearly seized on the idea[80]. The city is said to have been the strongest in Aitolia, no doubt because it was the main guardian of the league against attack from Akarnania, or from Epeiros. The capture of such a city would be a heavy blow to Aitolia. But it was also a good political target. It was the home city of the pro-Roman Lykiskos, for instance, and its loss would thus be a damaging blow to the pro-Roman party. It must be assumed that this was one of the main objects of the raid, to provide sustenance to the pro-Macedonian group in Aitolia and, if nothing more, at least increase the disorder in the league and so provide a further distraction for the Romans. The preferred result, of course, would be a declaration by the Aitolians of support for Macedon, and war between Aitolia and Rome.

The city had been prepared for capture. Perseus was in contact with Archedamos, three times *strategos* of the league, and a senior politician of the oligarchic party. He had sufficient influence in Stratos to be able to claim that he could hand the city over to Perseus. His report to Perseus, when they met north of Stratos[81], was over-optimistic, and Perseus found that the city was not surrendered to him as soon as he arrived as he had hoped. Archedamos' absence to meet and brief Perseus had apparently caused his influence to wane, and second thoughts had prevailed among those whom he thought he had convinced – a clear sign, yet again, of the fluidity and fragility of Aitolian opinion. The Stratians did let in a garrison of Roman soldiers from Ambrakia, commanded by C. Popilius, who had been one of the envoys to Aitolia the previous year, and who had been contacted by the anti-Archedamian group in the city[82]. This effectively ended all possibility of the raid succeeding, for Perseus' swift march had been made without any siege equipment. When the league *hipparchos*, Dinarchos, with a small force of six hundred infantry and a hundred cavalry, also arrived, apparently with the

[80] Livy 43.21.5.
[81] Livy 43.21.9.
[82] Livy 43.22.1-4.

intention of joining the pro-Macedonian Aitolians and Perseus, he saw how things were and promptly changed his mind. Popilius seized full control of the city, holding the keys to the gates, and manning the walls with his men. He put the suspect Aitolians, including Dinarchos and his men, into the acropolis as the garrison there, so that they were out of the way, and could not let the Macedonians into the city[83].

Perseus quickly recognised the failure of the raid. He tried to bluff the city into surrender, but failed. He was urged to remain by Archedamos, but when the issue was thrashed out in a council of his commanders, the idea of a blockade (not a siege) was quickly seen to be impossible, partly because of a lack of supplies, and partly because the Aitolian winter-quarters were not far off, and so posed a threat, and the blockaders would soon suffer more than the people of the city they were blockading. But the main reason was the need for the king to get back to Macedonia before the new campaigning season opened there. Perseus marched off northwards, to defend his kingdom against the coming Roman assault from Thessaly, but left Archedamos and his supporters in Aperantia, presumably as a nucleus for a hoped-for pro-Macedonian rising in Aitolia[84].

Whether any rising of this sort happened or not is not known, for there is no source for Aitolian events for the next year; we do not even known the names of the *strategoi* for the next two years – that is, the names of both are known, but not the years in which they held office. It is odd, however, that one of the *strategoi*, Hagelochos son of Trichas, was from Stratos[85], and in the other year, one of the *grammateis*, Alexandros son of Polemaios, came from that city also[86]. It must be assumed that Popilius had made certain that the city was safe for Rome, and thus it may also be assumed that any politicians from the city were also pro-Roman. Hagelochos' son Trichas, in fact, was twice *strategos* later, when pro-Romanism was *de rigueur*. The occupation of one of the main cities of the league by a Roman garrison was surely a major pressure on the Aitolian electoral process – Thermos was only thirty kilometres from Stratos.

It seems likely that the opportunist decision of Dinarchos the

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[83] Livy 43.22.5-7.
[84] Livy 43.22.8-11.
[85] *IG* IX.1.69 (undated).
[86] *IG* IX.1.71c (undated).

hipparchos was one which was copied, or acquiesced in, by most other Aitolians. The assumption was thus that the Romans were going to win the war with Perseus, and that overt opposition was now out of the question. The next time we hear of Archedamos, for instance, is after the defeat of Perseus by L. Aemilius Paullus at Pydna in June 168, when he was one of those who accompanied the king in his flight[87]. So he had not been able to maintain his position in Aperantia for very long.

Paullus defeated Perseus, captured him, and occupied the whole kingdom. The usual commissioners did not arrive until the next year (167), and in the meantime Paullus toured Greece, ostensibly as a tourist, but such a man, holding such an office, after such a war, could not just be a tourist. The main object was to ensure friendly governments in the Greek states, in the same way that Flamininus' tour at the time of the Roman withdrawal in 194 had ensured the installation of pro-Roman oligarchies. In Aitolia this was accomplished with quite unusual brutality. A detachment of Roman soldiers, commanded by A. Baebius (otherwise unknown) which was already stationed in Aitolia – perhaps the garrison of Stratos? – was used to surround a meeting of the Aitolian 'senate', as Livy calls it. Aitolian soldiers under the command of Lykiskos and a man called Teisippos then massacred 550 of the men at the meeting[88]. It is clear that this was an internal *coup* assisted by the Romans, but carried out by the Aitolians, though some of the Roman soldiers also helped in the killing. It was accompanied, and followed, by proscriptions whereby other Aitolians were driven into exile. The property of those killed and of those exiled was then confiscated, no doubt to the eventual benefit of the murderers.

This took place while Paullus was touring Greece, for he is said to have heard of it first when he returned from a tour of the Peloponnese to Demetrias, where he was met by a number of exiled Aitolians dressed in mourning, who complained of their treatment. It is impos-

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[87] Livy 44.43.6; Perseus was accompanied by Archedamos, and by Neon the Boiotian, another political exile, and by Euandros of Crete, the mercenary and failed assassin.

[88] Livy 45.28.6-7. Exactly what this 'senate' was is not clear. It may be a council, and this notice has been used to claim that the 'federal council' was very large. But Livy does not say this, and his word 'senate' may be only a guess. It was clearly a meeting of a large number of Aitolians. It is not clear if everyone at the meeting was killed, or if the elimination process also involved selection.

sible to believe that such an act took place without Paullus knowing about it in advance. He very carefully sent the complainants on to Amphipolis, where, a considerable time later, he censured Baebius, but not Lykiskos or Teisippos – and Baebius was censured for letting Roman soldiers take part, not for the deed itself[89]. The *coup*, that is, had been intended to be a purely Aitolian affair, even though its ultimate beneficiaries were clearly the Romans. The killings were excused, the sentences of exile confirmed, and the exiles were not permitted to return. The troubles of Aitolia were thus intended to be brought to an end.

[89] Livy 45.31.1-2.

23. ROMAN SUBJECT
THE END OF THE LEAGUE (FROM 167)

The result for Greece of the defeat of Perseus and the destruction of the Macedonian army was the assertion of greater Roman control. Direct rule was still eschewed, though the Ionian Islands were, like the Illyrian coastal cities, under closer supervision than the mainland. The destruction of the Macedonian kingship was accompanied by the division of the kingdom into four republics, and the Achaian League was intimidated by a thousand hostages being taken away to Italy. For Aitolia, the massacre of the men of the anti-Roman faction, and the exile of more, made the taking of hostages unnecessary. The ruling group was now composed exclusively of the pro-Roman element.

It was this group which now had to accept the new terms of Roman suzerainty. With Macedon quartered and disarmed, and the Achaians controlled though their hostages, Aitolia was the major remaining state of the Greek mainland. It was, to be sure, an ally of Rome, but that status had existed before the war, and yet it had not sufficed to ensure Aitolian compliance during the war, partly because the Romans seem not to have applied the terms of the alliance – indeed there is no evidence that Rome ever remembered the particular and detailed pains they had gone to over that alliance. Aitolia had been treated, during the period between the last wars (189-171) in much the same negligent way as the rest of the Greek states[1]. But without the Macedonian state frowning down at it, and so providing a balance of sorts, the Aitolian League could not, from the Roman point of view, be left with any real power. Aitolia's foreign policy in the 190s had eventually become an aspiration towards a sort of pan-Hellenic alliance, a Symmachy with the Macedonian element removed, and to other Greeks this may well have become a more attractive idea now that the Macedonian alternative to Roman domination had been removed.

So Aitolia, the Roman ally which had fought for Rome in the war, was stripped of more territory. This much is certain, but the details are not. The only area known to have been detached for certain in

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[1] A point made, in relation to Aitolia, by Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 31-32.

167 is Amphilochia[2]. This removed the connection of Aitolia with the Ionian Sea at the Ambrakian Gulf; it may have been the people of that area which had given support to Archedamos and his friends at the time of Perseus' raid as far as Stratos, though this is recorded as Aperantia, next door. If so, this separation may in fact have been a way of punishing the Amphilochians, and a move towards helping Lykiskos consolidate his power. But it had the additional effect of removing Aitolia from contact with the sea in that area.

In the east it is known that the city of Herakleia was separated from the league by the time the Achaian War began in 147/146, and that this had taken place some time before. It had become a member of the Achaian League, then had rebelled, and was in process of being coerced back in 146[3]. This in-and-out process clearly took some years. And the city will scarcely have moved directly from the Aitolian to the Achaian League, so it must be assumed that its separation from the Aitolians took place some considerable time before 146, and 167 is one possible, perhaps even the most probable, date.

The reason is even less clear than the timing. It seems likely that the city had been deliberately returned to the league by Rome in 188, as argued in the last chapter. It would be most reasonable, therefore, to suppose that it was Rome which had required the separation. With Macedon destroyed and Achaia pinned down, the potential strength of Aitolia meant that the fortress of Herakleia, and the control of Thermopylai which went with it, were best separated off. There is also, however, the possibility that it was the Herakleians who had taken the initiative in seeking to be independent, and that the Romans had agreed. This possibility, for which there is no more evidence than there is for the idea that Rome determined the change, may be thought more acceptable when some other items of evidence are considered.

It is not possible to decide such a matter without more concrete evidence, but the search for this does lead to a further realisation. The evidence used for such matters in earlier chapters, the use of the name of the Aitolian *strategoi* to date manumission records preserved epigraphically at Delphi, becomes ambiguous in the period after 167. Whereas before that date the dating formula comprised a reference

[2] Diod. 31.8.6.
[3] Paus. 7.14.1.

to the current Aitolian *strategos* and the current Delphian *archon*, after 167 this changes: the Delphian *archon* is still there, but there are very few references to the *strategoi*. Instead, many of the inscriptions are dated by the *archon* of the city whose citizens are involved, and others by an official called the *agonothetes* of the Lokrians. At first sight this appears to be a purely cosmetic change, but further consideration suggests that it is rather more significant.

The dating formulae reflect more than just the desire to put a date on a legal document. The choice of date also reflects the political loyalties of the person who had the inscription carved, who was, in manumission cases, the former owner. The dating by Delphian *archons* is due to the placing of the inscription at the holy site of the temple there, and if the epigraphist-manumitter was a citizen of Delphi, that was all that was necessary. But if it was a non-citizen who chose to record the manumission at Delphi he or she provided two dates: by the Delphian *archon* and by the chief magistrate of the state of which he or she was a citizen. Before 167 for Aitolians this meant dating by the Aitolian *strategos*; after 167 the dating formulae at Delphi are much more local. The *archon* of Delphi is named as before, but the second element is now usually the *archon* of the home city. So we find dating by the *archon* of Amphissa on several manumissions, whereas Amphissans earlier named the Aitolian *strategos*.

This method of dating seems at first sight to be special to Lokrians, but that is simply because the Lokrians seem to have been particularly prone to use Delphi as their point of manumission. They were, after all, no more than twenty kilometres away. But there are also three instances of dating by the *archon* of Kallipolis, in 166, 151/149, and 139[4], whereas that city earlier had dated by the league magistrate. And farther away from Delphi manumissions at such places as Naupaktos, Kalydon, and Bouttos also show the same pattern of dating by a local official, *archon* or *grammateus*[5].

This may, of course, simply be a shift in fashion, but the dating is suggestive when considered in relation to two other notices. In 164 C. Sulpicius Gallus, Roman consul in 166, was sent to Greece and Asia with a vague mission which included the investigation of a conflict over the border between Argos and Sparta, but which also referred to

[4] *SGDI* 1747, 2279, 2137.

[5] See the collection, not always closely dated, to be sure, in *IG* IX.1.2.

Greece generally. While he was in Greece he was approached by 'the Aitolians of Pleuron' who wanted his permission 'to leave the Achaian League'[6]. This is usually taken at its face value, and the theory has been put forward that Pleuron became Achaian in 168, though how and why is not explained[7]. It seems better to assume that the manuscript of Pausanias is in error, and that it should be the Aitolian League which Pleuron wished to leave.

This notice may be put alongside the change in dating methods, and perhaps helps with the problem of the separation of Herakleia from the league. Together these items suggest that the Aitolian League was no longer the binding force it had been, and that some local areas were now asserting their local authority. A second notice comes from approximately the same time as the visit of Gallus, in 165, and it lists, as separate *koinoi*, the Aitolians, Dorians, Ainianians, Oitians, and East Lokrians. It is an inscription which records the grants of citizenship to a single man by the cities and leagues he listed[8]. There had always been local citizenships of the Dorians, the Oitians, and so on, yet before 167 it was very unlikely that they would have been listed separately in this way, for the grant by the Aitolians would have included all the others. It looks very much as though these others were being more assertive, at least.

This is a new development in the league, for in the past it had shown a remarkable ability to claim and retain the loyalties of a most disparate set of peoples and cities. It bears repeating that, so far as can be seen, no polity, once included, showed any wish to leave, with the possible exception of Opous, whose exposed position rendered it particularly vulnerable, and which was shown, at the time of Flamininus' visit, to be deeply divided over its orientation[9]. And yet there were included in the league neighbours who might be expected to have ancient quarrels to revive – as in the Peloponnese, Sparta and Messene, and Argos and Sparta, repeatedly did – and peoples who had been hereditarily at enmity with the Aitolians, such as Naupak-

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[6] Paus. 7.11.1.

[7] Aymard, *Premiers Rapports* 37.9 n. 3. The citizens of Pleuron had moved the site of their city away from the coast to a more secure inland site in the 230s. Since then several Achaian raids had taken place along that coast; there seems little which would have attracted Pleuron to join the Achaians voluntarily; equally there is no sign that the Achaians had any claim to the city.

[8] *Syll* (3) 653 (= *FdD* III.1.218).

[9] Livy 32.32.1-5.

tos, or the Akarnanian cities. Yet none of these showed any reluctance to remain in the league. Only Opous left, and it moved in and out of the league so often that it can scarcely have developed any feelings of loyalty. But it would seem from the new emphasis on local dating in the inscriptions, and the action of Pleuron and perhaps that of Herakleia, that the general attitude had changed. The automatic loyalty to the league had weakened.

The regime presided over by Lykiskos may be in part responsible. He had successfully removed the main opponents of his policy by the massacre at the council meeting of 167, and this was followed by others fleeing the country into exile, and by still more being taken off to Italy by the Romans. Other massacres took place, one at Arsinoe being mentioned by Polybios[10]. This may be the same event as that at Livy's 'senate' meeting, but it is more likely to be different one. The plural suggests a series of atrocities such as those earlier at Hypata. Lykiskos lived on until his assassination in 160/159, but Aitolia does not seem to have been any less disturbed as a result of his violent actions. The description of the disorder by Polybios in which the Arsinoe massacres are mentioned, might be descriptions of any condition of *stasis*[11]. He provides no reasons, no chronology, no names, and no context, but later he does ascribe the situation to the influence of Lykiskos. In his obituary notice of Lykiskos Polybios made the point that it was only after Lykiskos' death that calm descended in Aitolia[12]. That is, it was Polybios' opinion as a contemporary that it was Lykiskos' influence which was the disturbing element.

Lykiskos is not recorded as having held any public office after his suffect strategy in 172/171, except for an embassy of congratulation to Paullus at Amphipolis in 167. But from that suffect strategy until his death in 160/159 the list of annual *strategoi* is made up of men who held the office only once. There are twelve of them in succession, whereas, as pointed out before, the previous period had included twelve who were repeating the office, and only three reaching it for the first time. Again, the contrast is as noticeable with the next thirteen holders after Lykiskos' death, whose names and dates seem generally secure. Between 159/158 and 147/146, six are repeating holders and seven first-timers, which is close to the normal pattern of

[10] Pol. 30.11.5.
[11] Pol. 30.11.1-6.
[12] Pol. 32.4.1-3.

the third century. And the first repeater occurs in the very year following the murder of Lykiskos.

It may be assumed that repeated terms of office conferred prestige, in the same way that iterated consulships did at Rome, and in part for the same reason: that repetition was clearly not permitted for several years. Only one *strategos*, Archedamos of Pholas, repeated the office in less than six or seven years, when he held the office in 188/187 only three years after holding it for the first time. During the 160s, Lykiskos, having cleared out the old guard who had held the office repeatedly, by murder, or by driving them into exile, or through the deportation of the cavalry commanders to Rome, may well have been the only politician still active in Aitolia to have been *strategos* more than once.

I suggest, therefore, that Lykiskos was the power behind the orator's tribunal in Aitolia throughout the 160s, and that it was he who manipulated the *strategos*-list so as to ensure that the holders were his men, and that he ensured that no-one else could reach the same level of prestige by holding the office a second time. At least one of the *strategoi* is known to have collaborated with Lykiskos in organising the massacre of 167. This is Teisippos (as spelled on inscriptions), or Tisippos (in Polybios), who was *strategos* in 163/162, a surprisingly long wait for a man who clearly had been a major figure several years earlier[13]. Apart from his participation in the massacres, he had also accompanied Lykiskos on the embassy to congratulate Paullus[14], a signal mark of favour, presumably, and an indication of local power. So the delay in reaching the office of *strategos* may have been Lykiskos keeping a rival down. Or it may be that the massacre-perpetrators were so unpopular afterwards that they were unelectable for a time. It is very noticeable that Lykiskos did not take the office again, though he clearly could have done.

The fact that Aitolian politics remained turbulent throughout Lykiskos' period of domination, despite his apparent control, may be adduced as an explanation for the loosening of the bonds of the various communities which made up the league, which seems also to be evidenced in the occasional notices in the historians and in the datings in the epigraphic records. That is, it is conceivable that Lykiskos' policies, especially his massacres, evoked not only opposition from the

[13] Livy 45.28.7; Pol. 30.13.5; *IG* IX.1.101, 102 and 103.
[14] Pol. 30.13.5.

individuals who were his victims, but also disgust, and that such communities as the Dorians and the Ainianes could effectively withdraw from participation in league affairs. It is noticeable, for example, that none of the office holders of the period after the war until Lykiskos' death came from these smaller communities. The home cities of the *strategoi* were Stratos, Phytaion, Arsinoe, Agrinion, Kalydon, Trichonos (two), and Oachos. Of these the location of Oachos is not known, but all the rest are concentrated in a relatively small area south and west of the lake country, the traditional Aitolian heartland. Stratos, of course, was Lykiskos' home-city, and Teisippos came from Trichonos, which account for three of the *strategoi.*

These *strategoi* thus merit some further investigation. The first after the end of the war, Panaitolos of Phytaion, is unusual in that he seems to be a former mercenary commander in the army of Ptolemy IV, who switched sides to the Seleukid Antiochos III as long ago as 217[15]. If so, he was an old man when he became *strategos* of the league, but as a non-political semi-outsider, old and respected, he might well be a useful figurehead in the aftermath of the dire events of the past few years. His successor, Straton, was a member of a distinguished family from Arsinoe, whose grandfather had been *strategos* almost fifty years before[16]. Hybistas of Agrinion was very likely the grandson of an *hieromnemon* of that name in 226[17]. Nothing is known of Antochos of Oachos[18], nor of Teisippos of Trichonos[19]. Phylax son of Pantaleon of Kalydon eventually held the office of *strategos* five times, but of his ancestry nothing but the name of his father is known[20]. The *strategos* of 161/160, however, Trichas, was the son of Hagelochos of Stratos, who had been *strategos* in 169/168 or 168/167[21]. The final one in this group was Damotimos of Trichonos,

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[15] *SGDI* 1729, 1783, 1854. Of course, it is not possible to *prove* the identity of the *strategos* and the mercenary, but a family connection to another, later, *strategos*, and to other men active in the mid-second century, can be traced (cf. *Prosopography*, 'Families', under 'Phyta'). Panaitolos can thus be seen as a successful commander who came home rich, was widely respected, and founded an actively political family.

[16] Stratos' strategy date is calculated from the fact that he had a second term in 159/158 (*FdD* III.3.54) and 166/165 is the only possible date for his first. His grandfather is attested at *IG* IX.1.28, 59B and 96a.

[17] *SGDI* 1818; *Prosopography*, 'Families', under 'Agrinion'.

[18] *IG* IX.1.99.

[19] *IG* IX.1.101, 102, 103.

[20] *IG* IX.1.105, 106.

[21] Trichas: *IG* IX.1.100; his father: *IG* IX.1.69.

who had been *proxenos*-sponsor for Epeiros twenty-five years before[22]. He was thus a man active in affairs long before the civil conflict. It was during his strategy that Lykiskos was murdered.

While it is the case that these are all first-time *strategoi*, it is also a fact that they are a mixture of established families who may well be considered to have been part of the ruling oligarchy of pre-167 times, and 'new men'. They were all, no doubt, wealthy, since this was one of the prime requirements for all politicians in the ancient world. If it is accepted that they all formed part of Lykiskos' party, and had done so back in the 170s, it becomes clear that the issue in the period of civil conflict was not merely an insurrection against the rich by the debtors, but it reflected a division within the ruling oligarchy. This division was, no doubt, exacerbated by the debt issue, but the basic division was over something else. Since Lykiskos won the contest only with the help of Rome, and since the only issue of policy which he is said to be identified with is the issue of support for Rome, it is reasonable to presume that the division was over policy towards Rome. The debate at the Assembly in 170 in front of Popilius thus becomes the illustrative event. Some men were pro-Roman, some anti-, but other divisions were personal. And some men, such as Thoas, had changed their minds. But the debate shows that there was still a lively and open political life in the league, even if the presence of Roman senators – such as Philippus in 172 – was inhibiting. One may assume that this liveliness changed with the massacres, and that one of the symptoms seems to be a lessening of loyalty towards the league.

This suggested decline in the cohesion of the league may be due in part to the overbearing presence of Lykiskos, but it may have even more to do with the general domination of Greece by the Romans. The league – all Greek leagues – were essentially instruments of foreign policy. For the Aitolians the prime danger came from Macedon, and repeatedly their league had fought Macedon to preserve its liberty of action. Macedon had now been replaced by Rome as the major threat, but in the process Rome had also destroyed Macedon, and despite three wars the Senate had still shown no interest in physical possession or direct rule in Greece. The ouside pressure which had formed and preserved the league had thus been relaxed, and to that extent the league had lost some of its purpose. As a result the non-

[22] *AM* 27; *proxenos* sponsor: *IG* IX.1.32.

Aitolian areas became detached, and men in Doris, Ainis, and Lokris, all began to emphasise the autonomy of their lands rather than their membership of the league.

The league did not disappear, but in the next crisis, the rebellion of Andriskos in Macedonia and the Achaian War in Greece (149-146) the Aitolians took no part. In the first of these, the reconstitution of Macedon into a single kingdom was scarcely something any Aitolian would welcome; at the same time it was also an event which Rome would deal with without much trouble. The kingdom of Andriskos was scarcely the threat to its neighbours which had been posed by the kingdom of Philip V or Perseus. The second crisis, the Achaian War, was separate from the Macedonian problem both in space and in time. It might be seen by later historians as the 'end of Greek liberty'[23], or the last chance for Greek independence, but to contemporary Greeks it may have had more the aspect of an attempt at conquest by the Achaian League. The Herakleians, besieged by the Achaians after attempting to leave the league (with Roman encouragement) would not feel that the Achaians were fighting for liberty. If the Aitolians had been unable to beat Rome, and if the Macedonians could not do so in three, now four, wars, no Greek would expect Achaia alone to succeed in that endeavour. And for the Aitolians there was the added insult that their former member, the city of Herakleia, having joined the Achaian League and then seceded from it, had become the focal point of the fighting. From the Aitolian point of view their league's neutrality was intelligent statesmanship – for had not Achaia repeatedly fought against Aitolia in alliance with both Macedon and Rome in the past? And the result of the war was the dismemberment and effective extinction of the Achaian League, the destruction of the cities of Thebes and Chalkis, which had joined Achaia, and of Corinth, where a Roman magistrate had been insulted and mocked, while the Aitolian League continued in existence in peace.

The Roman settlement did not affect Aitolia. One source claims that all the Greek leagues were dissolved, but then claims that they were soon re-established[24]. In fact, even those leagues who fought

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[23] Cary, *Greek World*, 203, gives this as his title to the chapter on the war; A. Fuks, 'The Achaian War in its Social Aspect', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 90, 1970, 78-89, looks at the social dimension, and points to evidence for widespread support for Achaia in Greece.

[24] Paus. 7.16.10.

against Rome – as opposed to individual cities, and with the exception of the Achaians – do not seem to have been affected; Pausanias probably got it wrong. Rome's enemies, of course, were punished with fines[25] and losses of territory, but the leagues themselves continued. Nor do they seem to have been subjected to direct Roman authority. Thoroughly defeated, liable to intervention from Rome at crisis moments, and with many of the great cities in ruins, there was no need of a Roman governor. The leagues continued, but only as local governments. To Rome this was its gift of freedom to Greeks[26].

Of course, the old excitement of independence and involvement in great affairs had gone. After 146, if not before, the league was concentrated into the old central areas, and the rural hills, and included only a few small cities. Stratos became the most important urban centre, and Kalydon, Trichonos and Arsinoe produced the main politicians. The league continued to exist, but the only proof of this is in the inscriptions in which names of occasional *strategoi* are recorded. These are personal records, not the records of actions by the league. Indeed after 146 only eight more *strategoi* can be named, and one of those only incompletely. Four of these are in the 140s, and one man accounts for three instances. After 129/128 only two are known, one honoured by a statue from the Lokrians of Opous, another, the very last, in a fragmentary proxeny-inscription, and both of these are undated[27].

A continuous sequence of *strategoi* is only known as far as 147/146, the year of the war. It shows that the old pattern of a mixture of iterated *strategoi* and first-timers had been re-established after Lykiskos' death. It also shows that his death had no influence on the choice of *strategoi*, for four of the six repeaters were men whose first term was during Lykiskos' period of domination. So we may assume that he had successfully established his party in full control of the diminishing league. The circle of officials remains small, however, with a quite noticeable repetition of home-cities, in which a *strategos* is repeatedly succeeded by another from the same city: Straton in 159/158 by Ladikos in 158/157, both from Arsinoe, then Kritolaos and Teisip-

[25] Ibid; the Boiotians had to pay theirs to Herakleia and Euboia, the Achaians to Sparta.

[26] There is a general assumption that the Roman governor of Macedonia exercised supervision over Greece, but actual evidence for this is non-existent. Cf. Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 523-527 for a dismissive discussion and modern references.

[27] See the list in Klaffenbach's introduction to *IG* IX.1.

pos from Trichonos, then Phylax and Alexandros from Kalydon. The sequence breaks at 152/151 because the home city of Kleu[damos] the *strategos* of that year is not known, but it resumes in 150/149 and 149/148 with Arkison and Phylax, both of whom were from Kalydon. One might suppose that Kleu[damos] actually came from Arsinoe, the home city of his successor, Ladikos. Another pattern is that from 157/156 to 148/147 a first-timer is always succeeded by a repeater. This has all the appearance of an organised programme of succession, determined by a small group of men – the oligarchy, that is, was fully functional.

This is also suggested by the excavation of a sling bolt at Numantia in Spain. It is inscribed 'Of the Aitolians', and suggests that a contingent from Aitolia served at the famous siege there in the 130s. This has been connected to the command there by P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, by way of the theory of Roman clientship[28]. Scipio Aemilianus was the natural son of the victor of Pydna, M. Aemilius Paullus, who had, if distantly, supervised the purge of anti-Roman anti-Lykistan elements in Aitolia in 167. He was also the adopted son of P. Cornelius Scipio, the son of Africanus, who had negotiated the truce of 190 which relieved the siege of Amphissa. These connections may well suggest the operation of the client network, though these Aitolian connections are hardly direct or convincing. They may equally, and perhaps more plausibly, suggest the operation of Roman overlordship[29]. It certainly, whatever theory is applied, demonstrates that the Aitolians were by this time thoroughly integrated into the system of Roman control.

The last known *strategos*, Nikias son of Ladames of Kalydon, was a member of a prominent local family whose line can be traced for almost two centuries[30]. The last member on record, Ladames son of Nikias, put up a statue to Sulla the dictator at Kalydon, and so was active c.84 BC[31]. But no office is attached to his name. Indeed, how sincere the gesture of the statue was must be questionable. Aitolia is

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[28] J. Gonzalez, 'P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus et Aetoli', *Athenaeum* 74, 1996, 143-156.

[29] There is another instance, whereby Achaians are recorded as fighting the Gauls in northern Italy, which may be dated 192 or 122 BC (*ISE* I, 60); R. M. Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire, the development of the Roman Imperium in the East from 148-62 BC*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1995, argues for 162 or 96.

[30] *IG* IX.1.36; *Prosopography*, 'Aitolian Families', under 'Kalydon'.

[31] *IG* IX.1.139.

recorded with Thessaly as supporting Sulla in the Greek campaign against Athens and the forces of Mithridates of Pontos[32], but such support was scarcely voluntary, and the campaign was the first of a long line of Roman campaigns in Greece in which the Greek population was involved, willy-nilly. From Chaeroneia in 84 to Aktion in 30 Greece was the scene of all the decisive campaigns and battles of the Roman civil wars, and the Greeks suffered from exactions of taxes, supplies, forced labour, or just by being plundered. Plutarch's city, Chaironeia, had been the scene of two battles in the 80s, with another nearby at Orchomenos, and the trophies set up by Sulla after his victories were still visible to Pausanias after Plutarch's time[33]. Plutarch himself descibed how his great-grandfather had had to carry grain to the coast at Antikyra for Antony's army[34]. The Greeks did not even have the consolation of being protected by these enormous and greedy armies from barbarian attack. Delphi was captured and sacked by a band of raiding Thracians, probably in 83[35]. For Aitolians this must have been the final humilation.

Of the Aitolians there is only one notice after the time of Sulla, where light-armed contingents from the Dolopes, the Akarnanians, and the Aitolians fought in Caesar's army at Pharsalos[36]. The Aitolians at least seem to have had the knack of choosing the winning side – Sulla, Caesar – in these wars, though the real reason for their choice was no doubt that the Roman general who controlled their land was the effective recruiter. By the 50s Cicero was commenting on the ruined state of cities around the Saronic Gulf[37]. No-one commented on the state of Aitolia; it can be presumed to be as badly off as all the rest of Greece[38].

The continued appearance, even intermittent as it was, of league *strategoi* down to the end of the second century[39] implies the continued existence of the full machinery of the league: regular elections of *stra-*

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[32] App. *Mithridatic War*, 30.

[33] Paus. 9.40.7; Plutarch mentions the trophies in his *Sulla*, 19.10.

[34] Plut. *Antony* 69.5-8?

[35] App. *Civil Wars* 2.70.

[36] Cicero, *Ad Familiares* 4.5.4.

[37] A full survey of the literary evidence for the ruin of Greece is in S. E. Alcock, *Graecia Capta*, Cambridge, 1993, 24-32.

[38] The statue of Lykopos son of Polemarchos, noted as a *strategos*, is roughly dated to the end of the second century: *IG* IX.1.72; Nikias son of Ladamas of Kalydon is about the same date: *IG* IX.1.36.

[39] The last full list of these officials is dated 141/140: *IG* IX.1.34d.

tegoi, *hipparchoi*, and the *grammateis*[40], regular meetings of the *Thermike* and *Panaitolike* assemblies, and all the rest of the normal state paraphernalia in Greece, including, presumably, the despatch of the contingent – volunteers, surely – to serve in Spain. However, even these tenuous hints disappear after c.100 BC. The origins of the last *strategoi* – Kalydon, Trichonos, Arsinoe, are much the same as those of the period before 146[41], but by about the end of the century, the last known proxeny-agreement is one between the league and Stratos, and this implies that by then even Stratos had detached itself from the league.

It is not therefore possible to prove the existence of the league after c.100 BC. It may have lingered on, but if it did, it had no influence on events. Archaeologists have detected squatter occupation in the ruins of the public buildings at Thermos in the first century BC – so public business, apart from that in the temple, was no longer being transacted there[42]. The league certainly did not survive the Roman civil wars, however successful the people were in choosing sides, for at the end of them, the winner Octavian planted two new Roman colonies in western Greece, at Nikopolis near Ambrakia and Patrai in the northern Peloponnese. The process involved attributing the Aitolian lands to one or other of these colonies, and even physically transporting the populations. Most of the former cities of southern Aitolia became part of the territory of Patrai; for any Aitolians with a sense of the past, this was perhaps the ultimate humiliation, for Patrai was one of the former Achaian cities. But even that was not the worst. The other colony, Nikopolis, was founded close to Aktion, the federal sanctuary of the Akarnanian League, and took in all Akarnania, and so the parts of Aitolia attributed to Nikopolis were joined to Akarnania as well[43]. The statues of the gods went with the people, so Artemis Laphria went to Patrai, though the temple remained near Kalydon[44].

By the first century AD, all mention of the league had vanished. Strabo describes Stratos as an Akarnanian city, Kalydon and Pleuron

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[40] This is, of course, in part the accident of the preservation and discovery of inscriptions. More work at Thermos might widen our knowledge.

[41] Paus. 5.23.3 and 7.18.6.

[42] R. Stillwell (ed.), *Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites*, Princeton N.J., 1976, sv. Thermos.

[43] Strabo 10.2.21; A. D. Rizakis, 'Les Colonies Romaines des côtes occidentales grècques, populations et territoires', *Dialogues d'Histoire Anciennes* 22,1996, 255-354.

[44] Paus. 7.18.6-7.

as reduced, presumably to small towns or villages. The Aitolians, he says, were never conquered because of the ruggedness of their mountains, by which he clearly means that the Aitolians were now confined to those mountains[45]. Half a century later, Pliny the Elder made a complete hash of the summary listing of the geography of Aitolia in his Natural History[46]. Neither of these knew much about the interior of the country; Strabo knew of the federal sanctury at Thermos, but Pliny did not mention it. Pliny lists as Aitolian an eclectic set of tribes, including Perrhaibians, which list he clearly got from somewhere else. They were again separate peoples, without a league.

An explanation for this state of ignorance is partly provided by the archaeology of Aitolia. An extensive survey to locate sites into broad periods shows a drastic reduction in numbers and density between the Hellenistic and the Roman periods, so much so that large areas which were occupied in the former period are shown as blank on the latter[47]. The survey probably understates the extent of rural settlement, but even so it fits with information derived from other surveys, and with ancient comments that the land was less heavily populated than in the Hellenistic period. For this the blame must go to the Roman wars, to the drastic re-settlement of people as a result of the new Roman colonies, but above all to the decline of the urban centres. Without cities in which to market their produce, the rural areas inevitably declined in wealth, and so in the material remains to be found by archaeological surveyors. But the league itself, even before then, had faded away. Other areas, in the Peloponnese, in Lokris, in Phokis, retained their league organisations into the imperial period. But not Aitolia[48].

The name survived, and was used in the fifth century by Prokopios[49], and it has been revived for an area of the local administration of modern Greece. But there is virtually no indication in the ancient world of further activity in the league areas. In the early first century AD, Strabo commented on the quality of the horses produced in Aitolia[50], which suggests that the rich pastureland was owned by rich

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[45] Strabo 10.3.2.

[46] Pliny, *Natural History* 4.2.6.

[47] S. Bommelje *et al.*, *Aetolian Studies Project*, Utrecht 1985; also S. Alcock, *Graecia Capta*, 138.

[48] Listed in S. Alcock, *Graecia Capta*, table 8, p. 153.

[49] Prokopios, *Wars*, 5.24.30.

[50] Strabo 8.388; *CIL* VI.33937.

men who could afford to breed racehorses, and did not need to grow arable crops on any large scale. Pausanias noted horses and cattle breeding in the area a century and more later[51]. Of people there is no sign.

[51] Paus 8.24.11; J. A. O. Larsen 'Roman Greece', in T. Frank (ed.), *Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, vol IV, Baltimore 1938, 473.

PART SIX

CONCLUSION

24. THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE LEAGUE

The active history of the League of the Aitolians lasted less than two centuries, from its inception in the 330s to its reduction in the 140s. Judging by its spokesmen's boasts, and by its coinage, its proudest achievement in that time was the deliverance of the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi from the threat of a sack by the Keltic invaders in 278. It may be that it is possible, however, to suggest other achievements for which the league should also be remembered, and that can lead to a suggestion for its ultimate failure.

The first, perhaps surprisingly, is peace. After the repulse of the Kelts the league entered on an extended period in which no wars of any consequence are recorded until the 240s. Even when this period of peace ended, the Achaian War was only brief and involved only minor actions, except for the Chaironeia battle to defeat the Boiotians' threatened invasion; and the War of Demetrios which followed was, at least from the Aitolian point of view, an almost unfought conflict until its last year. So, from 278 till 220 the league's people enjoyed a remarkably long period in which conflicts were few and brief. It was this which was the basis for the prosperity which is evident in the later third and early second centuries.

The second achievement, which may perhaps be best placed at the root of all others, is the construction of a stable yet adaptable constitution. The league system was not devised once for all, but was worked out over a long period, a period of which we know little. It involved the discarding of some old cherished Greek methods: conquest and colonisation, the massacre and enslavement of enemies, were all tried, at Naupaktos, at Oiniadai, and had failed. Greek states had experienced this sequence of early success and final failure before, of course, all too often. But it was Aitolia which worked out, and applied, the correct replacement for that discredited method: persuasion and participation instead of force and domination. The men who devised this method of expanding their original small league are unknown and unsung, but the achievement is nonetheless remarkable. It worked, to be sure, largely because it was applied to the small and vulnerable states which surrounded the unified league territory, and to states without great and glorious histories which would have impeded their appreciation of Aitolian ideas, but this does not detract from its originality and success.

The geographical spread of the league, which resulted from the adaptibility of this constitution and from Aitolian persuasiveness, did not produce a state which was especially powerful. No doubt one of the reasons for Aitolians resorting to persuasion was that they were not powerful enough to exert force. The league's armed forces were never large in number, and its commanders could rarely afford to risk a full-scale pitched battle. Its army had to be safeguarded for the final emergencies, for a battle defeat would produce crippling casualties, which might result in the destruction of the whole league. When the Aitolians did fight a full scale battle, it was with the strong likelihood of victory, as at Chaironeia in 245, or in defence of their territory in the face of a determined invasion, as in 278 against the Kelts, or in 209 against Philip V. Yet it was clear to all potential enemies that an invasion of Aitolia would be combatted with a determination and would ensure that it would be costly to the invaders. The Macedonians discovered this in 321, and the lesson was not lost on Philip V or the Romans a century and more later, by which time the league was fully fortified. In the Macedonian Wars Aitolia was subjected to raids, in which only undefended Thermos was seriously damaged; in the Roman War several cities endured sieges, which was the purpose of the fortifications. Only M'. Acilius Glabrio ventured to invade the league's heartland, and he became trapped in an unwinnable siege, and was relieved to withdraw.

Yet this was a state which only rarely put a force as large as a single Roman legion in the field. It should, given the size of armies of the time, have been crushed easily. That it was not was due first of all to its diplomatic slipperiness in avoiding binding commitments, and to its policy of fighting wars as far from its own territory as possible. The Second Macedonian War (220-217) is the masterpiece of this policy: alone and facing the enmity of Macedon and the Macedonian Symmachy of almost all other Greek states, Aitolian diplomacy collected useful allies, and deterred others from joining in the attack, and Aitolian forces then compelled their enemies to fight in the Peloponnese, in Akarnania, Thessaly, Kephallenia, and in Epeiros – anywhere except Aitolia – and as a result the homeland suffered only a single raid, on Thermos. Similarly in the Roman War, facing an even more powerful and numerous enemy, the use of Aitolian forces in small packets successfully defended the heartland of the league, even when its peripheral cities and regions – Herakleia, Lamia, Ambrakia, the Dolopes – were conquered. The Roman war, after Antiochos'

defeat at Thermopylai, was unwinnable, but the league fended off determined attacks for two years before making peace on terms. It was an achievement comparable to that of Philip V in 199-197, or of Perseus in 171-167, but with a much smaller manpower. In the history of the league there were large areas of its territory which never saw an enemy army for over a century.

These are substantial achievements, but they are not matched by anything comparable in the cultural field. Aitolians are absent from the lists of artists and playwrights and poets, and even from that of sportsmen. They certainly appreciated these achievements. A poetess from Smyrna was honoured at Lamia, and the Aitolians gave refuge to the Messenian poet Alkaios; and a state which reorganised the *Soteria* celebrations at Delphi and held a festival at Thermos surely appreciated the contests there. It is tempting to call up the old standby, and blame the absence of Aitolians from the lists on the gaps in the source materials, but this is not reasonable in this case. It seems that the Aitolian peace did not result in a flowering of culture, and neither did its wars stimulate native creativity.

In political affairs, Aitolia was creative enough, but here the achievement was limited. In retrospect it may be seen that the major failure of the league was in restricting its ambitions to its immediate neighbourhood. The expansion of the league in the 280s and 270s, and the methods it was using, could have formed the basis for an even wider union, one which could have encompassed the whole of Greece. The obstacles facing such an enterprise were immense, starting with the inherited animosities of Akarnanians, Achaians, and Macedonians. The unwillingness of the Aitolians to use force, though not total, was probably a handicap also. But the Aitolians do not seem to have seen the possibilities inherent in their situation and their achievements. With Antigonos Gonatas deliberately avoiding any quarrel after 276, the way was open for a much wider expansion by the league. In the expedition to the Peloponnese in 240/239 it was remarkably easy for the Aitolians to collect alliances with half the peninsula – Elis, Triphylia, Messenia, cities in Arkadia – and a determined attack on Achaia would have eliminated that league, which was quite friendless at the time. This would certainly have brought on a Macedonian war, since Macedon could not permit a powerful Greek state to exist, but Aitolia could well have stood up as the champion of the Greeks against Macedon and collected support from Athens, Boiotia, Sparta; posing as the liberator from Macedon served

Rome well, it could have done the same for Aitolia. Hostility from Macedon could have been the glue which fastened an Aitolian union of Greece together.

This did not happen, indeed it does not seem to have occurred to the Aitolians of the time, though later, in the crisis over Nabis, a version of it was suggested at the conference at Corinth. By then it was, in all probability, too late. A united Greece could certainly have beaten Macedon, but not Rome. And once Rome was involved in Greece it was not possible to escape its clutches.

The ancient animosities and determined particularism of the Greek states were, perhaps, even greater obstacles than powerful enemies. Indeed, they were probably too strong for any of the Greek states to succeed in forming a political union of them all. And the snobbish disdain for the Aitolian hillmen was a further social obstacle to Aitolian growth. Yet, if 'freedom' for the Greeks from Roman (or Macedonian) rule was desirable, then a political union was essential. In the third century BC, the last period when this was possible, only the Aitolian League had the political imagination to produce a polity through which this wider union could be achieved. Its only competitor, the Achaian League, was too wedded to the terrorist methods of Aratos to be persuasive.

Yet the Aitolians did not try to achieve a wider union, so far as we can see, perhaps hampered by the tradition of persuasion which it adopted to avoid forcing new members. This put the league into the same political condition as Athens, Sparta, Achaia and the rest of the failed unifiers: a local state whose potential was not wholly realised. It deserves credit, though, for its originality, its diplomatic intelligence, its suppleness, and its military sense. To have created an island of peace which lasted two generations in the violent land of Greece in the violent third century (two Punic Wars, five Syrian Wars, Keltic invasions of Italy, Greece, Asia Minor, Macedonian invasions of Greece) was as remarkable an achievement as Alexander's conquest of Asia, and conduced more to the sum of human happiness than all of Hannibal's victories.

APPENDIX

MAGISTRATES OF THE AITOLIAN LEAGUE

This is just a bare list, based on those of Gawlikowski and Klaffenbach. Amendments since Klaffenbach's list have been incorporated. Full references will be given in *Aitolian Prosopographical Studies*. Numbers in parentheses refer to entries in that book; others to the sequence of offices held.

Year of Office	*Strategos*	*Hipparchos*	*Grammateus*
322/321	Alexandros (1)		
–			
288/286	Charixenos (1)-1		Lakrates
–			
281/280	Charixenos (1)-2		X of Molykreos
279/278	Eurydamos (1)		
278/277			
277/276	Polykritos (1)-1		
276/275			
275/274			
274/273			
273/272	Dorkinas	Antochos (1)	Polycharmos (1)
272/271	Skopas (1)		Pantarkos
271/270	Polykritos (1)-2	Philon (3)	Alexandros (4)
	Neoptolemos (1)		
270/269	Charixenos (1)-3		
269/268)			
)	O[...]		Oikiadas (1)
268/267)			
)	Oikiadas (1)		Al[...]
267/266)			
)	[...]o[...]		Pa[...]
266/265)			
)			
265/264)			
264/263	Arkison (1)-1		
263/262	Polykritos (1)-4	[...]il[...]	Skamandros
262/261	Trichas (1)	Lykos (1)	Phaineas (2)
261/260	Alexandros (4)-1	Charixenos (2)	Kritolaos (1)
260/259			
259/258	Lykopos (1)-1		
258/257			
257/256	Physkos (2)		
256/255	Arkison (1)-2		
255/254	Charixenos (2)-1		
254/253	Polykritos (1)-4		X of Bouttos
253/252	Alexandros (4)-2		
252/251	Lykopos I (1)-2		
251/250			
250/249			
249/248			
248/247	Charixenos (2)-2		

Year of Office	*Strategos*	*Hipparchos*	*Grammateus*
247/246	Polykritos (1)-5?		
246/245	Neoptolemos (1)-1	[...]u[...]	[...]ios
245/244	Alexandros (4)-3		Lamios (1)
244/243	Lykopos (1)-3	Ariston (5)	[Pha]lausios
243/242			
242/241	Pantaleon (1)-1		
241/240	Charixenos (2)-3		
240/239	Timaios (1)	Kleupatros	
239/238	Neoptolemos (1)-2	Nikostratos (6)	Damoxenos (1)
238/237	Aiakidas	Lagetas	Hagemachos (1)
237/236	Lykopos (1)-4		
236/235			
235/234	Pantaleon (1)-2		
234/233	Charixenos (2)-4		
233/232			
232/231			
231/230	Agelaos (2)-1		
230/229			
229/228			
228/227	Pantaleon (1)-3		
227/226			
226/225	Syagros		
225/224			
224/223	Agelaos (2)-2	Polemarchos (11)	Skopas (3)
223/222	Pyrrias (3)-1	Theodoros (3)	Archippos (1)
222/221	Pantaleon (1)-4		
221/220	Ariston (5)		
220/219	Skopas (3)-1		
219/218	Dorimachos (3)-1		
218/217	Agetas -1		
217/216	Agelaos (2)-3		
216/215			
215/214	Pyrrias (3)-2	Alexon ?	
214/213	Pantaleon (1)-5	Agelaos (4)	[...]lonos
213/212	Straton (1)	Ladikos (4)	Taurion (1)
212/211	Skopas (3)-2		
211/210	Dorimachos (3)-2		
210/209	Pyrrias (3)-3	Agathon (5)	Damoteles (1)
209/208	Philleas (2)	Damokritos (2)	Lykos (2)
208/207	Ma[...]s	X of Physkeis	
207/206	Menestratos	Alexandros (12)	Phaineas (3)
206/205	Agelaos (2)-3	Pantaleon (3)	Molossos
205/204	Skopas (3)-3	Phaineas (3)	Thoas (1)
	Lattamos (Suffect)		
204/203	Alexandros (12)-1		
203/202	Thoas (1)-1	[...]kleontos ?	
202/201	Dorimachos (3)-3	Alexamenos (7)	Sphakias
201/200	Agetas -2		
200/199	Damokritos (2)-1		
199/198	Chalepos		Menarchos (1)
198/197	Phaineas (3)-1	Archedamos (6)	
197/196	Alexamenos (6)		

Year of Office	*Strategos*	*Hipparchos*	*Grammateus*
196/195	Alexandros (12)-2	Nikarchos ?	
195/194	Dikaiarchos (4)-1		
194/193	Thoas (1)-2	Nikandros (6)	X of Hypata Mikkylionos
193/192	Damokritos (2)-2		
192/191	Phaineas (3)-2		
191/190	Archedamos (6)-1		
190/189	Nikandros (6)-1		
189/188	Eupolemos (5)-1		
188/187	Archedamos (6)-2		
187/186	Dikaiarchos (4)-2		
186/185	Pantaleon (5)-1		
185/184	Alexandros (12)-3	Alexamenos (10)	Agathon (7)
184/183	Nikandros (6)-2		
183/182	Proxenos (5)		
182/181	Archedamos (6)-3		
181/180	Thoas (1)-3	Lykos (13)	
180/179	Pantaleon (5)-2		
179/178	Lochagos (4)		
178/177	Lykiskos (9)-1		
177/176	Nikandros (6)-3		
176/175	Eupolemos (5)-2		
175/174	Archedamos (6)-4		
174/173	Pantaleon (5)-3		
173/172	Thoas (1)-4		
172/171	X Lykiskos (9)-2 (Suffect)		
171/170	Proandros (2)		
170/169	Agelaos (8)	Dinarchos	
169/168)	Hagelochos (4)		
)			
168/167)	Polemarchos (18)	Phrikon (3)	Stomios Alexandros (20)
167/166	Panaitolos (1)		
166/165	Straton (6)-1	Ladikos (4)	
165/164	Hybistas (2)	Kritolaos (3)	Archedamos (10)
164/163	A[ntochos] (3)		
163/162	T(e)isippos -1		
162/161	Phylax (7)-1		
161/160	Trichas (4)-1		
160/159	Damotimos (6)		
159/158	Straton (6)-2		
158/157	Ladikos (4)-1		
157/156	Kritolaos (3)		
156/155	Tisippos -2		
155/154	Phylax (7)-2		
154/153	Alexandros (22)		
153/152	Trichas (4)-2		
152/151	Kleu[damos] (4)		
151/150	Ladikos (4)-2		
150/149	Arkison (3)		

Year of Office	*Strategos*	*Hipparchos*	*Grammateus*
149/148	Phylax (2)-3		
148/147	Lyson (3)		
147/146	Dorimachos (5)-1		
146/145			
145/144			
144/143	[...]as of Arsinoe		
143/142	Satyros (9)-1	Philoxenos (8)	
142/141	Phylax (2)-4	Menelaos	Alexandros (24)
141/140	Nikiadas (9)	X of Trichonos	Polemaios (5) Polykrinos
140/139	Dorimachos II (5)-2		
139/138			
138/137			
137/136	Antiochos (6)		
136/135	Satyros (9)-2		
135/134	Phylax (2)-5		
–			
129/128	Satyros (9)-3		
–			
end C2	Lykopos (6)		
–			
end C2	Nikias (19)		

The following are recorded in office, but undated:

Strategoi	*Hipparchoi*	*Grammateis*
Ari[...] (end C3)	Archedamos (2) ?219	Aratos
Lamios (16), c.150	Drakon (3) 210/200	Damokles (1) c.250
Nikias (21), (n.d.)	Lamios (7) (late C3)	Polemarchos (1), 230/200
Philodamos (2) (C2)	Timolochos (1), c.250	

The following *Grammateis* are recorded on undated seals from a house in Kallipolis; they may be officials of the city or of the league:

Charixenos (9), Damophilos, Eunikos (6), L[...]niak, Lochagos (5), Lyson (4), Nikiadas (10), Seleukchos, Telephon (3), Xenophon (2).

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABBREVIATIONS

AJAH – *American Journal of Ancient History.*
Allen, *Attalid Kingdom* – R. E. Allen, *The Attalid Kingdom, a Constitutional History*, Oxford, 1983.
AM – *Athenische Mitteilungen.*
App. *Mac* – Appian, *Macedonian Wars.*
App. *Syr* – Appian, *Syrian Wars.*
Aymard, *Premiers Rapports* – A. Aymard, *Les Premiers Rapports de Rome et de la confédération achaienne*, Bordeaux, 1938.
BCH – *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellenique.*
Benecke – Benecke, *Die Seepolitik der Aitoler*, Hamburg 1934.
BMC – British Museum Catalogue of Greek Coins.
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